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Journal articles on the topic 'Established democracies'

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1

Azari, Julia R., and Jennifer K. Smith. "Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 (2012): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711004890.

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Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).
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2

Reilly, Benjamin. "Centripetalism and Electoral Moderation in Established Democracies." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 201–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2018.1457827.

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3

Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies." Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 7 (2005): 1271–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004.

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4

Franklin, Mark N., Patrick Lyons, and Michael Marsh. "Generational Basis of Turnout Decline in Established Democracies." Acta Politica 39, no. 2 (2004): 115–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500060.

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5

Chakravarti, Sonali. "Transitional justice in established democracies: A political theory." Contemporary Political Theory 15, no. 4 (2016): 509–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2015.59.

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6

Steiner, Nils D. "Economic globalization and voter turnout in established democracies." Electoral Studies 29, no. 3 (2010): 444–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.04.007.

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7

Dick, Archie L. "Established democracies, Internet censorship and the social media test." Information Development 28, no. 4 (2012): 259–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0266666912461600.

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Social media can test how firmly entrenched Internet freedom is in established democracies through a comparison with countries with an authoritarian track record. The method is to evaluate the use of social media in recent protests in a sample of established democracies and authoritarian regimes, and to compare differences and similarities in government responses.
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8

Gundelach, Birte. "Political consumerism: A comparative analysis of established and developing democracies." International Political Science Review 41, no. 2 (2019): 159–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512118819211.

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Research on political consumerism has focused predominantly on highly developed democracies. This focus has led to theoretical explanations closely connected to the social and political transformations of advanced industrialized democracies. In times of globalization and individualization, political consumerism is assumed to originate in political distrust stemming from perceived governance gaps. Recently, political consumerism has become a more frequent form of political participation in the Global South and a research topic attracting increased attention. The inclusion of the Global South requires a re-evaluation of political distrust as a general stimulus for political consumerism because of its conceptual links to socio-economic contexts in the Global North. This article provides such a re-evaluation and thereby advances the comparative analysis of political distrust as an important impetus of political consumerism in established as well as developing democracies.
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9

Grewal, Sharanbir, and Erik Voeten. "Are New Democracies Better Human Rights Compliers?" International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 497–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000435.

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AbstractRecent scholarship finds that new democracies are more likely than established democracies to make binding commitments to international human rights institutions. Are new democracies also better at following through on these commitments? Stated differently, does their greater willingness to join international institutions reflect a genuine commitment to human rights reform or is it just “cheap talk?” We analyze this question using a new data set of more than 1,000 leading European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases. Since new democracies face judgments that are more difficult to implement than established democracies, we employ a genetic matching algorithm to balance the data set. After controlling for bureaucratic and judicial capacity, we find that new democracies do implement similar ECtHR judgments initially more quickly than established democracies, but this effect reverses the longer a judgment remains pending. Although new democracies have incentives to implement judgments quickly, they sometimes lack checks and balances that help ensure implementation should an executive resist.
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O'Brien, Diana Z. "“Righting” Conventional Wisdom: Women and Right Parties in Established Democracies." Politics & Gender 14, no. 01 (2018): 27–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x17000514.

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Parties are the key actors shaping women's representation in advanced parliamentary democracies. Based on traditional patterns of feminist organizing, conventional wisdom suggests that parties of the left are the strongest advocates for women. Despite the prevalence of this claim, a burgeoning body of work indicates that parties on the right can—and often do—seek to represent women. To address these competing narratives, this article offers the first large-N, party-level study of women's descriptive and substantive representation over place and time. The results suggest that party ideology continues to affect women's representation: right parties lag behind their left counterparts with respect to women's presence in elected office, and right and left parties address women differently on their platforms. At the same time, there is significant heterogeneity among right parties. Christian democrats, for example, are more likely than conservatives to adopt voluntary gender quotas and make policy claims on behalf of women. The traditional left-right distinction is thus too coarse to fully explain party behavior in these states.
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11

Leblang, David, and Steve Chan. "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?" Political Research Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2003): 385–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591290305600401.

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12

Lambourne, Wendy. "Book Review: Transitional Justice in Established Democracies: A Political Theory." Political Science 68, no. 1 (2016): 99–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032318716654335.

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13

Leblang, David, and Steve Chan. "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?" Political Research Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2003): 385. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3219800.

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14

Döring, Holger. "Mapping established democracies: Integrated data on parties, elections and cabinets." Electoral Studies 44 (December 2016): 535–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.07.002.

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15

Galoob, Stephen. "Stephen Winter, Transitional Justice in Established Democracies: A Political Theory." Journal of Value Inquiry 50, no. 1 (2014): 249–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9446-9.

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16

Rashkova, Ekaterina R., and Yen-Pin Su. "Political finance regimes and party system size: evidence from new and established European democracies." European Political Science Review 12, no. 1 (2019): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773919000316.

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AbstractStudies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.
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17

Best, Robin E. "How Party System Fragmentation has Altered Political Opposition in Established Democracies." Government and Opposition 48, no. 3 (2013): 314–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.16.

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This article examines the consequences of increased party system fragmentation for oppositions, their respective governments and representation more generally, focusing on 18 established democracies. Two of the findings presented here suggest that there is reason to be concerned about the future of parliamentary representation in established democracies. Firstly, an increasing proportion of votes now go to parties that do not receive a proportionate share of legislative representation, implying that a growing degree of organized opposition is extra-parliamentary. Secondly, the findings show that parliamentary oppositions have generally become more fragmented than their respective governments. This suggests that the composition of governments may not be keeping up with current trends in electoral preferences and, in some cases, that governmental majorities have become smaller and more tenuous. Thus, the overall picture is one of a growing and increasingly fragmented opposition, against a smaller and relatively cohesive government.
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18

Cwalina, Wojciech, Andrzej Falkowski, and Lynda Lee Kaid. "Advertising and the Image of Politicians in Evolving and Established Democracies." Journal of Political Marketing 4, no. 2-3 (2005): 19–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j199v04n02_02.

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19

Minkoff, Debra. "The Payoffs of Organizational Membership for Political Activism in Established Democracies." American Journal of Sociology 122, no. 2 (2016): 425–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/687743.

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20

Dion, Stéphane. "Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec." British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 2 (1996): 269–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400000466.

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Secession, defined as ‘formal withdrawal from a central authority by a member unit’, has been particularly rare in democracies. In fact, there has never been a single case of secession in democracies if we consider only the well-established ones, that is, those with at least ten consecutive years of universal suffrage. The cases most often mentioned happened only a few years after the introduction or significant expansion of universal suffrage: Norway and Sweden in 1905, Iceland and Denmark in 1918, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1922. What is more, one would hesitate before calling the first two cases real secessions, since the ties between the political entities involved were very loose at the outset. Secessionists never managed to split a well-established democracy through a referendum or an electoral victory. We must conclude that it is very hard for them to achieve and maintain the magic number of 50 per cent support. My aim is to explain why this is the case.
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21

Khaitan, Tarunabh. "Executive aggrandizement in established democracies: A crisis of liberal democratic constitutionalism." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 1 (2019): 342–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz018.

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22

Steenekamp, Cindy, and Reinet Loubser. "Active Citizenship: A Comparative Study of Selected Young and Established Democracies." Politikon 43, no. 1 (2016): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2016.1155141.

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23

Ibenskas, Raimondas. "Understanding Pre-electoral Coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2015): 743–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000544.

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While pre-electoral coalitions have important effects on the functioning of democracy, their formation has only been systematically examined in the context of established democracies. This study examines the patterns and factors of electoral alliance formation in eleven democracies in Central and Eastern Europe by focusing on joint candidate lists. It finds that electoral coalitions are more frequent in newer democracies than in established democracies. The formation of alliances is systematically related to their potential costs and benefits. On the one hand, coalitions can provide small parties with legislative representation and larger parties with important government coalition partners. On the other hand, parties face costs related to their electoral compatibility and the sharing of election candidacies and office positions.
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24

KOSTELKA, FILIP. "Does Democratic Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout? Global Evidence Since 1939." American Political Science Review 111, no. 4 (2017): 653–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055417000259.

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This article challenges the conventional wisdom that democratic consolidation depresses voter turnout. Studying democratic legislative elections held worldwide between 1939 and 2015, it explains why voting rates in new democracies decrease when they do, how much they decrease, and how this phenomenon relates to the voter decline observed in established democracies. The article identifies three main sources of decline. The first and most important is the democratization context. When democratizations are opposition-driven or occur in electorally mobilized dictatorships, voter turnout is strongly boosted in the founding democratic elections. As time passes and the mobilizing democratization context loses salience, voting rates return to normal, which translates into turnout declines. The second source is the democratic consolidation context, which seems to depress voter turnout only in post-Communist democracies. Finally, new democracies mirror established democracies in that their voting rates have been declining since the 1970s, irrespective of the two previous mechanisms.
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25

Chu, Yun-han, and Min-hua Huang. "Partisanship and Citizen Politics in East Asia." Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (2007): 295–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800008754.

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This article assesses the relative importance of partisanship in explaining level of citizens' political engagement within a multivariate framework. In particular, we examine if the relative worth of partisan attachment in explaining civic engagement differs systematically between East Asian emerging democracies and established democracies. We find that partisanship in East Asia exerts just as much influence on citizens' engagement in politics as in established democracies. The global trend in which interest associations and social movements are becoming vigorous competitors to parties for the opportunity to represent and mobilize citizens in democratic process has also spread to East Asia.
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26

Catterberg, G. "The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18, no. 1 (2006): 31–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh081.

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27

Vaccari, Cristian, and Augusto Valeriani. "Digital Political Talk and Political Participation: Comparing Established and Third Wave Democracies." SAGE Open 8, no. 2 (2018): 215824401878498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244018784986.

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28

Rozanova, Julia. "Public Television in the Context of Established and Emerging Democracies: Quo Vadis?" International Communication Gazette 69, no. 2 (2007): 129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048507074926.

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29

Katsimi, Margarita, and Vassilis Sarantides. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?" Public Choice 151, no. 1-2 (2010): 325–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8.

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30

Rebe, Ryan J. "Re-examinging the Wall of Separation: A Cross-National Study of Religious Pluralism and Democracy." Politics and Religion 5, no. 3 (2012): 655–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175504831200034x.

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AbstractMutual autonomy between religious and state institutions is often seen as a key ingredient for democratization. Yet, there are a large number of democracies with an established religion. If a separation of church and state is desirable for the maintenance of a stable democracy, then why do so many democracies continue to support religious institutions and practices? As the evidence from this study reveals, the difference between democracies and non-democracies does not depend on a wall of separation between church and state, but instead, on the protection of religious freedom for minority groups and the promotion of secular legislation.
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Kuehn, David, Aurel Croissant, Jil Kamerling, Hans Lueders, and André Strecker. "Conditions of civilian control in new democracies: an empirical analysis of 28 ‘third wave’ democracies." European Political Science Review 9, no. 3 (2016): 425–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773916000011.

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Institutionalizing civilian control over the military is a crucial challenge for newly democratized nations. This paper aims to answer the question under which conditions civilian control can be established after the transition to democracy, and under which conditions civilian control fails. To answer this question, we draw on original data on civil–military relations in 28 new democracies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and run a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. We find that no single explanatory factor can be considered necessary for the success or failure of civilian control in new democracies, but identify a number of sufficient variable combinations to explain the development of civil–military relations after the transition to democracy.
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Fieldhouse, Edward. "Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945." Representation 41, no. 4 (2005): 304–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344890508523327.

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33

Henry, N. "From Reconciliation to Transitional Justice: The Contours of Redress Politics in Established Democracies." International Journal of Transitional Justice 9, no. 2 (2015): 199–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijv001.

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34

Rosyidin, Mohamad. "Konfl ik Internasional Abad ke-21? Benturan Antarnegara Demokrasi dan Masa Depan Politik Dunia". Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 18, № 3 (2016): 223. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jsp.13137.

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‘The clash of civilizations’ of Samuel Huntington and ‘the end of history’ of Francis Fukuyama are two grandtheories that have been widely accepted as the most dominant narratives in post- Cold War internationalrelations. Unfortunately, there have been litt le theoretical developments in today’s world to predict thefuture of international confl ict. The theory assumed that the future international confl ict will not occurbetween democracies and non-democracies as Democratic Peace Theory proposed, but between establisheddemocracies and emerging democracies. The established democracies reluctant to share their power with theemerging democracies on how to manage global order. This reluctancy will lead to political frictions andconfl icts among them. In spite of its theoretical breakthrough, this theory suff ers of logical inconsistencysince it does not distinguish between emerging democracies and emerging powers. Instead of confl ictamong democracies, this article argues that international confl icts in the 21st century will be dominatedby asimetrical confl ict between nation-states and radical movements, confl icts due to information openess,and confl ict over natural resources.
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35

Levy, Sara A., Patricia G. Avery, and Annette M. M. Simmons. "Constructions of national narratives in established and emerging democracies based on student survey responses." Citizenship Teaching & Learning 7, no. 1 (2011): 5–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/ctl.7.1.5_1.

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36

Allen, Nicholas, Sarah Birch, and Katja Sarmiento-Mirwaldt. "Honesty above all else? Expectations and perceptions of political conduct in three established democracies." Comparative European Politics 16, no. 3 (2016): 511–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41295-016-0084-4.

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37

Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. "Strategic voting in established and new democracies: Ticket splitting in mixed-member electoral systems." Electoral Studies 28, no. 1 (2009): 51–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2008.06.011.

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38

Bühlmann, Marc. "The Beauty and the Beast?" International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development 4, no. 1 (2013): 44–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jsesd.2013010103.

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There are two competing hypotheses concerning the connection between democracy and globalization. The critics hold globalization responsible for an ongoing crisis of democracy. The enthusiasts highlight the positive contributions of financial openness and international political cooperation on the development of democracy. In this contribution the author investigates the interrelation between globalization and the quality of established democracies. He introduces the Democracy Barometer, a new instrument that measures the quality of democracy in 30 established democratic regimes between 1995 and 2005 and that explicitly does not measure sustainable government because it aims at serving as dependent as well as independent variable to explain different economic, societal and natural environment, i.e. sustainable development. Based on this instrument, the author first shows that one cannot speak of an ongoing crisis of (established) democracies. Second, he also conducts several multilevel analyses to model the different developments of the quality of democracy in the different countries. The author then shows that economy, i.e. economic globalization indeed has a positive impact on the quality of democracy. However, this impact is stronger in stable, i.e. older than in younger established democracies. Further investigations show that a high quality of democracy also goes hand in hand with societal and environmental performance.
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39

Ribeiro, Pedro Floriano, and Luis Locatelli. "Time after time: party organizational strength in new and old democracies." Opinião Pública 25, no. 1 (2019): 199–233. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1807-01912019251199.

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The ‘time factor’ has not been systematically considered in cross-national studies on party organizations. Relying on the largest dataset to date on party organizations, namely the Political Party Database Project (PPDB), the article tests the impact of time as a two-level variable (duration of democracy and age of parties) on parties’ organizational strength in new and established democracies. We add original data from three Latin American countries to the nineteen countries covered by the first PPDB database (132 parties overall). The results suggest that parties in established democracies have less members and more money than those of newer democracies. Among the latter, the greater capacity for mass mobilization produces stronger parties—as in Latin America—compared to the Eastern European countries. The findings challenge the traditional view of the exceptional weakness of Latin American parties and point to the importance of time as a multilevel variable: besides the national context, the “ancestral” party origin in previous regimes have a large impact on organizational strength.
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Jackson, Joshua L., Shelby L. Hall, and Daniel W. Hill. "Democracy and police violence." Research & Politics 5, no. 1 (2018): 205316801875912. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053168018759126.

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Are police agencies less likely to use torture in democracies than in non-democracies? Much empirical research has shown that democracies are less likely to engage in torture in general, but most of this research does not distinguish among victim types or state agencies. Using the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data, we focus on police agencies and evaluate whether they are less likely to use torture against (separately) political dissidents, criminals, and marginalized communities. Using logistic regressions with random effects, we find that the well-established and relatively high level of democracies’ respect for the rights of dissidents extends to police agencies as well. However, we find weaker statistical evidence that police agencies in democracies are less likely to use torture against criminals, and no evidence that they are less likely to torture marginalized communities. Our results suggest that one of the most robust empirical facts in the literature must be qualified. The protection from violence offered by democratic institutions does not seem to generalize beyond violence directly related to political competition and dissent.
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41

Albanesi, Enrico, and Jonathan Teasdale. "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Law Reform in Recently Established Constitutional Democracies and in the Commonwealth Sphere." European Journal of Law Reform 22, no. 2 (2020): 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5553/ejlr/138723702020022002001.

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42

Koch, Michael T., and Sarah A. Fulton. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." Journal of Politics 73, no. 1 (2011): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000824.

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43

van der Brug, Wouter, Mark Franklin, and Gábor Tóka. "One electorate or many? Differences in party preference formation between new and established European democracies." Electoral Studies 27, no. 4 (2008): 589–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.12.010.

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44

Hyde, Susan D. "Democracy’s backsliding in the international environment." Science 369, no. 6508 (2020): 1192–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2434.

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If the end of the 20th century was defined by the relatively widespread acceptance of democracy, the second decade of the 21st century is marked by concerns about backsliding in new and established democracies alike and by a notable decline in foreign support for democracy around the world. As democracy’s global tailwinds shift to headwinds, scholars have an opportunity to better understand how experience with even superficial forms of democratic institutions across a diverse set of contexts influences citizen behavior when formal democratic institutions erode or disappear. This shift also provides the opportunity to examine whether citizen movements alone—absent external support—are sufficient to check newly emboldened autocrats.
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Dunn, Kris. "Authoritarianism and Intolerance Under Autocratic and Democratic Regimes." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 2, no. 1 (2014): 220–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.260.

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Based on findings indicating that authoritarians express greater intolerance in situations where diversity is more apparent, Stenner (2005) proposes that democracies may sabotage their stability by allowing the unbridled expression of societal pluralism. She therefore suggests that pluralism in democracies be suppressed in order to pacify authoritarians and the threat their unbridled intolerance may pose to the stability of these countries. Based on data from the World and European Values Surveys, I examined 75,478 individuals across 75 countries to determine if authoritarians are indeed more intolerant in more democratic societies; a key assumption upon which Stenner’s suggestion rests. While authoritarianism was more strongly and negatively related to tolerance in more democratic countries, authoritarians in more democratic countries were more tolerant than were authoritarians in more autocratic countries. I argue that Stenner’s concern may be valid if we strictly consider rapid pluralization within a single generation within consolidating democracies, but for established democracies, her concern appears unwarranted.
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Martínez i Seguí, Joan Alfred. "El europeísmo y sus retos democráticos en el marco adverso del neoliberalismo global: cultivo del ethos humanista de Europa y renovación del contrato sociopolítico | Europeanism and its democratic challenges in the adverse global neoliberalism: cultivation of the humanist ethos of Europe and renewal of the socio-political contract." Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 40 (June 27, 2019): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/cefd.40.13932.

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Resumen: ¿Cuáles son los valores que han de sustentar el incierto futuro de la Europa del siglo XXI inmersa en un mundo multipolar en gestación? Metodológicamente desde una hermenéutica fenomenológica crítica con vocación normativa, el artículo intenta dar respuesta a tal pregunta mediante dos objetivos concretos. Primero, a partir del acervo común de los humanismos democráticos asentado tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial por el europeísmo político, establecer los valores y principios que, a modo de ética pública, deberían regir la imperiosa renovación del contrato sociopolítico de las democracias europeas. Y segundo, diagnosticar algunos de los impedimentos a este deseable desarrollo de las democracias europeas provenientes tanto del pensamiento hegemónico neoliberal como de las variadas reacciones populistas e iliberales surgidas en su contra.
 
 Abstract: What are the values that will sustain the uncertain future of Europe immersed in a multipolar world in gestation? Methodologically from a critical phenomenological hermeneutics with a normative vocation, this text tries to answer this question by means of two concrete objectives. First, based on the democratic humanisms established after the Second World War by political Europeanism, to establish the values and principles that, as a public ethics, should govern the imperious renewal of the sociopolitical contract of European democracies. And second, to diagnose some of the impediments to this desirable development of the European democracies coming from both the neoliberal hegemonic thought and the varied populist and illiberal reactions that have arisen against it.
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47

Davies, Mathew. "Regional organisations and enduring defective democratic members." Review of International Studies 44, no. 1 (2017): 174–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210517000365.

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AbstractInstead of asking whether regional organisations can promote democracy, a well-established conclusion, this article asks what type of democracy regional organisations can promote. Where their commitments to democracy are weak, regional organisations can promote the transition away from authoritarianism but cannot drive that process to completion with the creation of embedded liberal democracies. Under such circumstances regional organisations serve as regimes of bounded toleration, and can provide regional linkages that sustain defective democracies. Through examining the relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Myanmar, three supporting roles are identified; regional legitimacy, defence from external pressure, and future-oriented accommodation. The presence of these linkages between defective democracies and regional organisations provides a caveat to the positive assessments of regional organisations as socialisers of democracy.
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48

Rapeli, Lauri, and Inga Saikkonen. "How Will the COVID-19 Pandemic Affect Democracy?" Democratic Theory 7, no. 2 (2020): 25–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2020.070204.

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In this commentary, we discuss some possible effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in both established and newer democracies. We expect that the pandemic will not have grave long-term effects on established democracies. We assess the future of democracy after COVID-19 in terms of immediate effects on current democratic leaders, and speculate on the long-term effects on support for democratic institutions and principles. We also discuss possible implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global trends in democratic backsliding. We predict that, in the short term, the repercussions of the pandemic can aggravate the situation in countries that are already experiencing democratic erosion. However, the long term economic effects of the pandemic may be more detrimental to non-democratic governance.
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49

Trinkunas, Harold A. "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 3 (2000): 77–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166439.

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Democratic transitions create an opportunity for elected officials to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and create institutions that permanently shift power away from the military. This article develops a theoretical argument about how civilian control- is established. Venezuela institutionalized weak civilian control in the wake of its 1958 democratic transition, allowing the regime to survive the 1992 coup attempts. Argentina moved close to strong civilian control by 1995, although such control is exercised through questionable institutional channels.
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50

Kinsella, David. "Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War." Canadian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (2006): 724–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423906399970.

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Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005, pp. x, 300.Research by political scientists has established, fairly conclusively, that democratically governed states rarely go to war against each other. There is also evidence to suggest that democracies tend not to become embroiled in militarized disputes short of war. The policy implications of this body of scholarly research seem clear: one path to a more peaceful world is by encouraging, pressuring, even forcing autocratic governments to embrace democracy. Not so fast, say Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder in Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, for a glaring exception to the “democratic peace” is their finding that societies undergoing democratic transitions may in fact be rather warlike.
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