Academic literature on the topic 'Eternity clauses'
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Journal articles on the topic "Eternity clauses"
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Preuss, Ulrich K. "The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience." Israel Law Review 44, no. 3 (2011): 429–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018124.
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This paper explores the conceptual possibility and implications of the concept of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. In the first section, the author argues that unconstitutional constitutional norms are conceptually impossible within the conventional hierarchical model of norms. In the second section, the author discusses the normative particularity of the amending power and concludes that an unlimited power may endanger the constitution. In sections III and IV, the author explains why so-called “eternity clauses,” in order to fend off such a danger, have been designed to place certain immutable elements of the constitution beyond the limits of the amending power. The paradigmatic case is the German Basic Law and a recent decision by the Federal Constitutional Court that discusses the implications of the “eternity clause” with reference to the distinction between constituent power and the constituted amending power. The author develops an alternative understanding of that distinction and its consequences for the amending power. The possible adverse effects of “eternity clauses” on the normality of the constitution are briefly considered in the final section.
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Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva, Adilson De Lima Tavares, Anderson Luíz Rezende Mól, and Raimundo Marciano de Freitas Neto. "Proteção Anti-takeover e Gerenciamento de Resultados: O Efeito das Poison Pills com Cláusulas Pétreas." Contabilidade Gestão e Governança 23, no. 3 (December 21, 2020): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4.
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Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.
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Weintal, Sharon. "The Challenge of Reconciling Constitutional Eternity Clauses with Popular Sovereignty: Toward Three-Track Democracy in Israel as a Universal Holistic Constitutional System and Theory." Israel Law Review 44, no. 3 (2011): 449–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018136.
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Since the concept of democracy made its premiere, popular sovereignty has always been one of its fundamental characteristics. Nevertheless, many democracies have adopted eternity clauses (non-amendable constitutional provisions) as well as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine (the judicial power to strike down amendments to the constitution on substantive grounds), seemingly betraying the established democratic tradition. Including eternity clauses in a constitution certainly poses a challenge to any democracy, namely that of resolving the tension between their freezing effect on the legal system and the democratic notion of popular sovereignty. The intuitive question is why bother? Why address this challenge in the first place rather than uprooting eternity clauses from the constitutional system altogether, thereby resolving the inner tension they generate? One answer is that eternity clauses are presumably here to stay. More to the point, however, is that their presence in a legal system is desirable, since their absence would leave a modern democracy vulnerable to irresponsible normative acts by an incompetent body of representatives. Although Israel's Basic Laws do not include formal eternity clauses, its legal system tends to limit the scope of amending power where the Zionist project is concerned, thereby freezing the imperfect founding formula of the Jewish state. As a result, Israel as a Jewish democratic state faces the same challenge of resolving the tension between the freezing effect and popular sovereignty. This article argues that this challenge can be successfully met as soon as eternity clauses are integrated within a three-track democracy—a holistic constitutional system and theory. As a constitutional system, it distinguishes between three decision-making tracks and identifies the basic norm of the legal system with a nation's collective will or dynamic founding narrative. As a constitutional theory, it justifies constitutionalism and judicial review mainly for the purpose of regulating a nation's evolution. Eternity clauses play a pivotal role in three-track democracies by blocking the first decision-making two tracks in order to force revolutionary movements to engage in the consensual third track. This protects society from a unilaterally-imposed revolution—an act liable to be detrimental to the delicate evolutionary process.
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Hein, Michael. "Do constitutional entrenchment clauses matter? Constitutional review of constitutional amendments in Europe." International Journal of Constitutional Law 18, no. 1 (January 2020): 78–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaa002.
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Abstract Do constitutional entrenchment clauses matter? And if yes, how? This article examines these questions by analyzing a comprehensive collection of 154 decisions issued by European constitutional and supreme courts from 1945 up to 2016, on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. The article shows that entrenchment clauses do matter: in the vast majority of decisions studied, the claimants and/or the courts referred to a constitutional entrenchment clause. About one-fourth of these cases resulted in the invalidation of a constitutional amendment, most of which were based on an “eternity clause,” that is, the most extreme type of entrenchment clauses. However, the article also demonstrates that most of these invalidations can be assessed as instances of democracy-adverse judicial activism. The article concludes, therefore, that entrenchment clauses cannot be considered an unambiguous instrument for the protection of democratic constitutionalism.
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Szakály, Zsuzsa. "Human Rights, Civil Rights and Eternity Clauses." Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 2, no. 1 (December 2014): 259–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5553/hyiel/266627012014002001017.
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SUTEU, SILVIA. "Eternity clauses in post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitution-making: Promise and limits." Global Constitutionalism 6, no. 1 (March 2017): 63–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381716000265.
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Abstract:The literature on entrenchment as a means to achieve constitutional endurance has grown in recent years, as has the scholarship on unamendable provisions as a mechanism intended to safeguard the constitutional project. However, little attention has been paid to the promise and limits of eternity clauses in transitional settings. Their appeal in this context is great. In an effort to safeguard hard-fought agreements, drafters often declare unamendable what they consider the fundamentals to the political deal: the number of presidential term limits, the commitment to human rights and to democracy, the form of the state (whether republican or monarchical), the territorial integrity of the state, the territorial division of power, secularism or the official religion. This article explores the distinctive role and problems posed by eternity clauses in transitional constitution-building, as guarantees of the pre-constitutional political settlement in such fragile periods. The article also compares unamendability to other techniques of constitution-making in uncertain times, such as sunset clauses, deferring hard choices and other forms of constitutional incrementalism.
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Weill, Rivka. "On the Nexus of Eternity Clauses, Proportional Representation, and Banned Political Parties." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 16, no. 2 (June 2017): 237–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2016.0418.
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Klein, Claude. "Introduction." Israel Law Review 44, no. 3 (2011): 318–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018070.
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The question discussed in the articles published in this issue of the Israel Law Review is not really new. In 1978, published an article in this review dealing with the issue. At that time, it looked much more like an academic question with very few potential practical consequences. The reason for this is clear. It was like the discussions that took place in European countries a century ago regarding judicial review (of legislation). Even those who favored it were not able to consider any form of implementation. In the absence of an established principle of judicial review, the problem looked purely theoretical. Later, after World War II, judicial review of legislation became very fashionable and conquered almost all modern occidental democracies. The question arising now is whether we can expect a similar development as regards the validity and efficacy of eternity clauses. On the one hand, there is a growing number of eternity clauses; on the other hand, we have witnessed an extraordinary development in the field of judicial review, which is the result of the general growth of judicial activism in all countries. In other words, two parallel trends are coming increasingly close to one another and will certainly give rise to a new chapter in constitutional theory and practice.In April 2010, the International Association of Constitutional Law (I ACL) held one of its two annual round tables in Jerusalem. Entitled “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments,” it was devoted to the issue of constitutional review. In this issue of the Israel Law Review, we present some of the papers presented at the round table by experts from various countries.
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Lolja, Saimir A. "The Preservation of Albanian Tongue (Shqip) Since the Beginning." Advances in Language and Literary Studies 10, no. 6 (December 31, 2019): 152. http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.alls.v.10n.6p.152.
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In the beginning, humans had a tongue (gjuhën, Shqip). Then, they could or couldn’t let go of the tongue (len…gjuhën, Shqip). Albanian natural tongue (Shqip) implies the use of the tongue in the mouth for articulating (shqiptoj, Shqip) words. The eternity of Shqip (Speech) is in its words that are wordy clauses, phrases, parts of or short sentences. The Speech (Shqip) and other lan…guages (len…gjuhët, Shqip) carry these kinds of wordy clauses to prove the permanency of Shqip.The Speech (Shqip) had local and schooled forms in distant antiquity. Therefore, various types of writing appear now. Since the schooled style was in general use and carried later in the papers and books of lan…guages (len…gjuhëve, Shqip), it has been preserved unchanged. Its pieces, no matter how small are, every time get easily read and quickly understood using contemporary Shqip.The Speech (Shqip) was the first stratum in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It was the Speech (Shqip) of Nephilims (Nëfillimëve). The Shqip of today can be used to read and understand both words in other idioms and ancient writings.
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Landau, David. "Presidential Term Limits in Latin America: A Critical Analysis of the Migration of the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine." Law & Ethics of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (November 27, 2018): 225–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2018-0013.
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Abstract Across a number of countries including Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, incumbent presidents in Latin America have recently sought to amend their constitutions to eliminate or weaken presidential term limits. In some cases, these efforts to extend terms have been part of broader projects to consolidate power, weaken other state institutions, and tilt the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents. From a legal perspective, these cases are interesting because they highlight the limits of tools limiting constitutional change, such as eternity clauses and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, to constrain potentially anti-democratic or anti-liberal forms of constitutional change. Although constitutional texts in most of these cases gave courts ample ammunition to reject attempts to eliminate term limits or at least to force those changes down more demanding paths, courts did not stand in the way of most of these efforts and in some cases even used the doctrines to eliminate rather than protect term limits. The case studies highlight the extent to which the “superficial” spread of doctrines controlling constitutional change may fail to block, and indeed may promote, forms of constitutional change that threaten liberal democratic constitutionalism. It also suggests possibilities for deepening the effectiveness of transnational dialogue on these issues.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Eternity clauses"
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Flórez, Ruiz José Fernando. "Voter sans élire : le caractère antidémocratique de la réélection présidentielle en Amérique Latine, 1994-2016." Thesis, Paris 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA020062/document.
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Au cours des 22 dernières années, lorsque les présidents latino-américains au pouvoir ont aspiré à se faire réélire, ils y sont toujours arrivés à moins que leur pays ne connaisse une débâcle économique. Entre 1994 et 2016, dans les 18 démocraties qui composent l’ensemble appelé « Amérique latine », il y a eu 21 tentatives de réélection présidentielle immédiate dont 20 furent couronnées de succès. La seule exception à cette tendance électorale s’est présentée en République Dominicaine en 2004, lorsque le président HIPÓLITO MEJÍA a perdu la réélection car son pays était plongé dans une profonde crise économique. L’interprétation de ces données indique que l’autorisation de la réélection présidentielle consécutive a annulé dans la région la compétitivité électorale, qui est une des conditions fondamentales pour que la démocratie puisse exister. La principale cause de ce phénomène antidémocratique est l’abus du pouvoir présidentiel à des fins électorales, qui fait du chef d’État qui aspire à être réélu un candidat invincible à cause des ressources exorbitantes dont il dispose pour manipuler le résultat des élections. On peut en outre constater une corrélation entre autorisation de la réélection présidentielle immédiate et détérioration progressive de la qualité de la démocratie au cours des deuxièmes et troisièmes mandats du même président, selon le « Electoral Democracy Index ». En définitive, la réélection présidentielle immédiate en Amérique Latine constitue un poison pour la démocratie qu’il convient de proscrire de manière renforcée dans les textes constitutionnels, par le biais de clauses immuables qui puissent garantir l’alternance dans l’exercice du pouvoir présidentielIn the last 22 years, whenever Latin American presidents in office sought reelection they always achieved it save in cases of national economic collapse. Between 1994 and 2016, in the 18 democracies that make up the cluster denominated “Latin America”, 21 immediate presidential reelections were attempted out of which 20 resulted in success. The only exception to this electoral pattern took place in Dominican Republic, when in 2004 president HIPÓLITO MEJÍA lost his reelection amidst a profound economic crisis. The interpretation of this data indicates that the exercise of consecutive presidential reelections in the region has ruined electoral competitiveness, which is one of the basic preconditions for the existence of democracy. The chief cause of this antidemocratic phenomenon is the abuse of presidential power for electoral gain, which turns the head of State seeking reelection into an invincible candidate because of the exorbitant amount of resources that he has at his disposal to manipulate electoral results. There is also a correlation between the exercise of immediate presidential reelections and the progressive deterioration of democratic quality during the second and third terms of reelected presidents, as noted by the “Electoral Democracy Index”. In sum, the practice of consecutive presidential reelection in Latin America is a poison for democracy that is advisable to proscribe in a reinforced manner in constitutional texts, by means of eternity clauses that guarantee alternation in the exercise of presidential power
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Kubitová, Alžběta. "Neomezitelná podstata lidských práv jako atribut demokratického právního státu?" Master's thesis, 2019. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-398823.
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A democratic rule of law state combines two legal principles: the principle of democracy and the principle of rule of law. The democratic principle requires rule of the people and therefore implicitly the protection of political rights (in particular the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association) that allow an individual to actively participate in the political community. The formal conception of rule of law, which is defined by the exercise of state power based on law, requires in particular the right of access to a court and the right of due process, which guarantee genuine enforceability of the law. The material conception of rule of law requires a much wider range of rights: according to Czech jurisprudence essentially all that are included in the Charter. This does not mean that any interference with the abovementioned rights means that a state is no longer a democratic rule of law state; if it did, there would not be a single democratic rule of law state in the world. However, any interference with fundamental rights must be carried out according to statute, must be proportionate to a legitimate aim and not interfere with the unbreachable core of human rights. The unbreachable core of a fundamental rights is a limit for the proportionality test; it is the core of...
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Preuss, Ondřej. "Je změna podstatných náležitostí demokratického právního státu nepřípustná?" Doctoral thesis, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-338040.
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Thesis "Does the change of the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State is really impermissible or unimaginable?" aims to answer the question if it is not really acceptable to change or modify the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State or their understanding. The main outcome of the work should be practical reflection of these issues. Paper is divided into seven parts. The first part defines the democratic, law-abiding (rule of law) State, Second part deals with the threats to the democratic, law-abiding (rule of law) State - these are the people (populous), elite and international community. Next part deals with the opposite - the system of protection. Fourth part presents comparison of approaches to the question of constitutional amendments and its limitations on examples of several states. Parts five and six are based on the approach of the Czech Constitutional Court to the change or modification of the substantive provisions of the democratic, law- abiding State and their understanding, from both, national and international perspective. The last section is based on past previous sections and tries to answer a title question in a practical and abstract ways; therefore this part is the highlight of the work.
Books on the topic "Eternity clauses"
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Suteu, Silvia. Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.001.0001.
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This book makes a critical contribution to the growing literature on constitutional unamendability, as well as to the broader scholarship in the field of comparative constitutional change. It represents a unique analysis of unamendability in democratic constitutionalism that engages critically and systematically with its perils, offering a much-needed corrective to existing understandings of this phenomenon. This book takes seriously the democratic challenge that eternity clauses pose and argues that this goes beyond the old tension between constitutionalism and democracy. It adopts a contextual approach that allows for more nuanced understandings of constitutional amendment rules and substantive limits on amendments. It also looks beyond the usual suspects typically discussed in this literature and brings to the fore a variety of case studies from non-traditional jurisdictions. Together, these insights illuminate the prospects of unamendability fulfilling its main intended aim, that of protecting constitutional democracy.
Book chapters on the topic "Eternity clauses"
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Suteu, Silvia. "Relinquishing Eternity." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 234–63. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0008.
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This chapter investigates the possibility of repealing eternity clauses and renouncing doctrines of implicit unamendability. It looks at two case studies from Turkey and India, where backtracking from an eternity clause and basic structure doctrine were debated and ultimately rejected. It also explores the possibility of placing judicial doctrines of unamendability on formal constitutional footing and discusses the impact of this move on constitutional adjudication. This chapter examines the distinctions upon which unamendability repeal rests, such as between constitutional amendment and constitutional revision, between formal and informal amendments, and between amendment and revolution. It shows how pushing back against unamendability is very difficult through formal constitutional change and unlikely through judicial interpretation.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity Faces ‘the People’." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 204–33. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0007.
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This chapter looks at a trend that seemingly contradicts the global rise of eternity clauses: popular participation in constitution-making processes. It discusses whether the deeper democratic embeddedness of constitutions as pursued through participatory processes can help address democratic anxiety about eternity clauses. It maps several processes of constitution-making that can be characterized as participatory, with a view to determining whether unamendability was incorporated into the final constitutional drafts, how it was debated, and why alternative design choices have been adopted. This chapter seeks to test empirically those theoretical arguments about eternity clauses that view them as repositories of constituent intent. It also explores eternity clauses as the high point of the battle between rigidity and openness in constitutional design.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity and Expressive Values." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 89–124. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0004.
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This chapter scrutinizes the literature on constitutional identity, within which eternity clauses are viewed as repositories of the constitution's core values. It analyses unamendability as the site of constitutional expression and eternity clauses as capable of defending against attacks on the integrity and identity of the entire constitution. It also highlights serious problems with importing the sociological concept of identity into constitutional theory's arsenal. This chapter shows that the concept relies on particular understandings of both liberal constitutionalism and pluralism, as well as on a presumed pacified and coherent constitutional ethos. The concept obscures the deep and continuous contestation of the core constitutional commitments rendered unamendable. The chapter also discusses the rise of constitutional identity review as a form of resistance to supranational integration in Europe.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity and Democratic Precommitment." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 17–50. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0002.
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This chapter examines eternity clauses as mechanisms of constitutional precommitment and as tools for defending democracy in the face of anti-democratic forces. It looks at two broad categories of eternity clauses: provisions protecting state fundamentals and provisions defending democratic pluralism. It also analyses understandings of unamendability as either merely descriptive or as preservative of a core of liberal constitutionalism by assessing the operation of eternity clauses in practice. This chapter discusses unamendable provisions as dealing in imponderables and enshrining values that need judicial specification. It shows how precommitment and militant promise are entirely dependent on other elements of the constitutional architecture, in particular constitutional review. The chapter explains how this results in court self-empowerment and unduly limiting the scope of permitted constitutional change in the name of democracy.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity in a Global Context." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 169–203. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0006.
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This chapter analyses eternity clauses in a transnational context, as part of the story of the internationalized nature of constitution-making processes and the growing diffusion of global values in democratic constitutionalism. It explains this diffusion along two axes: the internationalization of constitutional authorship and the rise of international and regional organizations as constitutional norm entrepreneurs. The chapter also describes the adjudication of unamendability as transnationally embedded, which takes the form of national courts that rely on international law or a transnational referent when developing unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines. It also explores the possibility of international courts developing supranational forms of unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines. This chapter raises awareness about the impact of the transnational on the content and authorship of eternity clauses, but also cautions against assuming positive transnational engagement in the adjudication of unamendability. The chapter highlights the mounting backlash against universalistic values and international law as anchors to ground and orient unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity in Post-Conflict Constitutions." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 51–86. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0003.
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This chapter analyses eternity clauses as drafting mechanisms that facilitate and safeguard post-conflict constitution-making. It discloses the constitutional bargaining dynamics specific to conflict-affected settings and reveals the largely ignored function of unamendability. It also highlights three distinctive roles played by post-conflict unamendability: signalling compliance with international norms, ensuring electoral turnover, and insulating political and military elites. This chapter shows how contested and sometimes incoherent the unamendable values in post-conflict constitutions can be, reflecting the messiness of constitution-making processes in certain contexts. It outlines the risks associated with expecting too much from eternity clauses in fraught state-building settings that are habitually characterized by institutional weakness and shifting political commitments.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Eternity as Judicially Created Doctrine." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 125–66. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0005.
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This chapter focuses on implicit unamendability and looks at the spread of unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines. It discusses the understanding of unamendability as a necessary implication of liberal constitutions in general, whether supplementing or absent any formal eternity clause in the constitutional text. It examines arguments about why courts should recognize an unamendable constitutional core even where the constitution itself is silent on this matter. This chapter also investigates where to locate the elements of the constitutional core and how to restrain unamendability doctrines in order to prevent judicial overreach. It explains how judicially created unamendability is prone to both over- and under-reach in concrete adjudication. It reviews the birth of the basic structure doctrine in India and traces its global influence, as well as demands to develop unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines in response to democratic backsliding.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Introduction." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 1–14. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0001.
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This chapter reviews the growing literature on constitutional unamendability and provides a unique analysis of unamendability in democratic constitutionalism. It looks at the democratic challenge of eternity clauses that goes beyond the old tension between constitutionalism and democracy. It also assesses unamendability in constitution-making and constitutional interpretation. This chapter reveals how eternity clauses are a far more ambivalent constitutional mechanism than hitherto understood, which has greater and more insidious potential for abuse. It offers a novel look at unamendability in democratic constitutions by placing the rise of eternity clauses in the context of other significant trends in recent constitutional practice, such as the rise of participatory constitutional change and the transnational embeddedness of constitution-making and constitutional adjudication.
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Suteu, Silvia. "Conclusion." In Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism, 264–68. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0009.
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This chapter revisits the most troubling aspect of unamendability: its deep tension with democratic constitutionalism. It reasserts the necessity to take seriously the darker reality of constitutional unamendability. This reality includes the often fraught and deeply contested origin of eternity clauses, as well as their use as a vehicle for judicial self-empowerment to block democratically legitimate constitutional change and their irrelevance when democratic backsliding actually occurs. The chapter is less an attempt to argue for or against the embrace of unamendability in a given context and more a warning about the very real dangers of constitutional eternity in practice.
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"Some semantic aspects of gerundive clauses in European Portuguese." In From now to eternity, 85–103. Brill | Rodopi, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789042032682_006.
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