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Freelin, Jeffrey M. "Toward a naturalized virtue ethic /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p3036826.
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Robinson, Daniel Blake. "Nietzsche's Ethic: Virtues for All and None?" Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1429128387.
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Cagney, Michael Francis. "The Problem of "Big Food" and the Response of an Integrated Catholic Ecological Ethic." Thesis, Boston College, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107212.
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Thesis advisor: Stephen J. PopeThis dissertation argues that industrial food production, characterized under the term “big food,” is an environmental and social problem that requires a response from Christian theology and ethics. However, previous scholarship addressing “big food” did not confront the intransigent nature of this problem. As a result of this state of the problem, the dissertation poses the question: what is an adequate response to the intransigent problem of “big food?” In response this dissertation argues that a proper response involves an integrated Catholic ecological ethic. An integrated ecological ethic combines the methods of virtue ethics and social ethics to propose virtues within a contextually aware framework. The resources of the Catholic tradition can be utilized to develop an integrated ethic that balances the concerns of ecojustice and environmental justice. The solution proposed involves the development of ecological reformulations of the virtues of charity, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. The above virtues are not proposed within a theoretical vacuum, but rather within an awareness of various unjust structures in the United States that support “big food” and habituate the ecological vices of pride, fearlessness, and gluttony. The dissertation makes constructive proposals for structural change to develop structures of “big food” that can promote ecological virtue as opposed to ecological vice. In addition, the dissertation makes several recommendations for personal reforms in relation to food habits so as to move toward ecological virtues
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Theology
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Harper, Reuben. "The analogy of love : the virtue ethic of St Maximus the confessor." Thesis, University of Winchester, 2015. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.698193.
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This study primarly aspires to locate and retrieve the ethical dimensions of Maximus the Confessor’s great theological synthesis, offering his suppositions as foundational paradigms towards the formation of an alternative Christian moral approach. As recent advances in Maximian scholarship have indicated, the Confessor’s rich synthesis is fertile ground for the discovery and the means to understanding theological and philosophical currents within Late Antiquity and the Early Mediaeval Period. However, his significance is by no means limited to the work of historical exposition. Indeed, Maximus has become an indispensable reference point for contemporary theologians and philosophers East and West, providing seemingly limitless material for many nascent debates and dialogues. This study endeavours to follow in the wake of these emerging discussions, seeking to examine and to affirm Maximus’s inherently ontological approach to virtue, human behaviour, and morals. Elements of both Aristotelian and Stoic versions of naturalism function as points departure for the Confessor, as he endorses the diachronic maturation of nature through the habituation of virtue, on the one hand, and the presence of an immanent divinely-constituted natural law, on the other. These naturalistic elements, however, are subordinate to and function in accordance with his larger Christocentric vision, which considers the imitation of the Incarnate Logos to be both the ontological and ethical focal point for authentic human existence. Concern for a relationship with the divine and temporal other emerges as the primary moral criterion of truth. As such, the ethical dimensions of Maximus’s theology are best described as having a relational character, and constitute a perspective that sees virtue as being wholly defined in terms of love. In an effort to provide a modern context to this discussion, the study also notes and juxtaposes prominent features of deontological morality to Maximus’s own approach, focusing especially on those elements that have contributed to the formation of a contemporary moral psychology. A critical part of this study is a brief examination of the suppositions of the theory of Immanuel Kant, the thought of whom is perhaps the most refined exemplar of a deontological approach to morals.
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Sandlin, Mac S. "Help Us to Be Good: A Pneumatological Virtue Ethic for Churches of Christ." University of Dayton / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=dayton1627659252721087.
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Neri, David B. D. "A Content Analysis of Ethical Statements within Journalistic Codes of Conduct." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1596735747305321.
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SOUZA, Júnio Cézar da Rocha. "O homem depravado e a possibilidade do bem na filosofia política de Jean-Jacques Rousseau." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2012. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tde/785.
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Previous issue date: 2012-08-29This work has a purpose to discuss about Rousseau´s thoughts about the possibility of doing the right thing in the society. The philosopher from Geneva, to work on this possibility, plead mainly about the people´s primitive condition and his degeneration with the society´s advent. We will study some Jean-Jacques Rousseau´s works to discuss the way from the wild man, passing through his corruption until a political redemption proposal by the establishment of the Republic. The Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men describes the first characteristics of this primitive man and of the pacific and harmonious way of living together; then, it discusses the emergence of the property, the main cause of the inequality and clear manifestation of the bad repercussions on the society´s establishment. We will discuss this misrepresentation grown of society, but he possible recovery of the man from this moment of corruption celebration, to a civil estate ordained by laws and by the terms of a convention that claims for the common good of every citizen. The man, wild at first, passes to his civil condition, and Rousseau proposes the transformation of this man into a citizen, inside the Republic order. In the Republic, the citizen will have conditions to have a good behave in their pair; he will obey the laws, which comes from their own wishes- the wish to practice the good. The Republic citizen´s wish to practice the good is settled in the common good. The wish for the good can only be longed by the obedience to the conscience and by the self-love overcoming. The work discusses another great Rousseau´s text, The Social Contract, and others of the above mentioned, as Émile or On Education, Julie or The New Heloise, The Moral Letters, Letter to Christophe de Beaumont, these will have great concepts of virtue, good, general wish, etc. The perverse man and the possibility of good will be equally analyzed through he establishment of speakers who also will discuss about this possibility. The man will be thought according to Rousseau´s philosophy, that understands man with a tendency to a morality, what makes him a practitioner of good. However the problem that introduces is the Rousseau´s defense of a good nature of man, but it suffers a corruption in the historical development but is reascended in the Republic. This binary man, paradoxical, is good, but the misunderstandings of the conscience revival as it was thought by the philosopher form Geneva, what will sediment the hope in the pact proposed in the work The Social Contract that refers to its feasibility. There´s hope in politic because there´s hope in people themselves.
O presente trabalho procura trazer uma discussão sobre o pensamento de Rousseau acerca da possibilidade do agir bem na sociedade. O filósofo genebrino, para tratar de tal possibilidade, arrazoa prioritariamente sobre a condição primitiva do homem e a degeneração desta com o advento da sociedade. Lançar-nos-emos sobre algumas obras de Jean-Jacques Rousseau para discutirmos o trânsito que vai do homem selvagem, passando por sua corrupção até uma proposta redentivo-política por meio do estabelecimento da república. O Discurso sobre a origem e a fundamentação da desigualdade entre os homens descreve as características primeiras desse homem primitivo e de sua vivência harmônica e pacífica; logo, igualmente, trata do surgimento da propriedade, causa primária da desigualdade e manifestação clara das funestas sequelas do estabelecimento da sociedade. Discutiremos no presente esforço, essa deturpação dimanada da sociedade, mas a possível superação do homem desse momento de celebração da corrupção, para um estado civilmente ordenado por leis e pelas cláusulas de uma convenção que visa o bem comum de todos os cidadãos. O homem, primeiramente selvagem, passa para sua condição civil, e Rousseau propõe a transformação desse homem em cidadão, dentro do ordenamento da república. É na república que o cidadão terá condições de agir bem entre seus pares, obedecendo às leis, as quais fluem de sua própria vontade. A vontade do exercício do bem por parte dos cidadãos da república está firmado no bem comum. Bem que só pode ser ansiado pela obediência à consciência e pela superação do amor-próprio. O trabalho discute outro texto magno de Rousseau, o Contrato Social, bem como outros textos do autor supra, como Emílio, A Nova Heloísa, As Cartas Morais, Carta a Christophe de Beaumont, que nos remeterão a conceitos importantes como virtude, bem, vontade geral, etc.. O homem depravado e a possibilidade do bem serão analisados igualmente por meio do estabelecimento de interlocutores que fomentarão a discussão em torno de tal possibilidade. O homem será pensado à luz da filosofia rousseauniana, que o compreende como tendo uma tendência à moralidade, o que o faz um potencial praticante do bem. Contudo, a problemática que se instaura é a defesa de Rousseau de uma natureza benfazeja no homem, contudo que se corrompe no desenvolvimento histórico, mas é reapropriada na república. Esse homem binário, paradoxal, que é bom, mas que se degenera, poderá obedecer e praticar o bem por azo do ressurgimento da consciência como pensada pelo filósofo de Genebra, o que sedimentará a esperança no pacto proposto no Contrato Social, no que se refere à sua exequibilidade. Há esperança na política porque há esperança no próprio homem.
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Cortés, Andreu Laura. "La recuperación contemporánea del concepto de “virtud”. Posibilidades y límites de la “virtue ethics”." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/383522.
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El objetivo de esta tesis es determinar tanto los límites como las posibilidades de la virtue ethics. Desde sus inicios hasta el momento actual, la virtue ethics ha evolucionado rápidamente desde revindicar una mayor atención a las virtudes en la ética contemporánea hasta convertirse en una de las tres teorías éticas normativas principales —juntamente con la deontología y el utilitarismo-. Es el momento de analizar este gran desarrollo con el objetivo de averiguar cuáles son los mayores problemas a los que se enfrenta la teoría y cuáles son sus posibilidades más prometedoras.
El primer capítulo se destina a presentar las diferentes ideas y tesis contenidas en la virtue ethics. Después de encontrar una definición adecuada de la virtue ethics, se presenta un marco general de la teoría ética normativa. Este marco está compuesto por las principales cuestiones a las que toda teoría ética normativa debe enfrentarse y es apto para clasificar todas las ideas y tesis de cualquier teoría ética. Finalmente, las principales tesis de la virtue ethics concernientes a cada cuestión identificada previamente se anuncian y se clasifican en el interior del marco.
El segundo capítulo analiza las objeciones y los límites de la virtue ethics. Se argumenta que la teoría puede hacer frente a algunas de las principales objeciones que se le han planteado, como la objeción del egoísmo y la del elitismo. Sin embargo, si la virtue ethics no quiere verse limitada por un concepto insubstancial de 'virtud', debe ocuparse de algunos aspectos fundamentales de la teoría antigua de la virtud que, en la actualidad, pueden constituir problemas filosóficos.
El objetivo del capítulo tercero es explorar las posibilidades más prometedoras de la virtue ethics. Se defiende que estas posibilidades pueden encontrarse, precisamente, en el ámbito donde la teoría ha recibido las más duras críticas: el área de la normatividad. La virtue ethics no solo puede hacer frente a la objeción action-guiding, sino que puede hacer mucho más: puede desarrollar una propuesta normativa innovadora. A lo largo de varias secciones se presentan y analizan algunas ideas fundamentales de la virtue ethics. Todas estas ideas conducen a una nueva perspectiva sobre la normatividad que se centra en la formación global del carácter virtuoso. Este proyecto se denomina "el proyecto normativo como proyecto educativo". Se argumenta que la virtue ethics debería abandonar el propósito de presentar un procedimiento general diseñado para individuar la acción correcta en cada caso. En cambio, debería dirigir todos sus futuros esfuerzos normativos a desarrollar el nuevo proyecto normativo presentado aquí, desplegando así sus posibilidades más importantes. Para tal fin, debería adoptar una perspectiva multidisciplinar, contando especialmente con los resultados de la psicología empírica. Después de analizar el debate reciente entre la virtue ethics y la psicología social, se argumenta que el nuevo proyecto normativo se beneficiará de los hallazgos empíricos de la psicología.
En el capítulo cuarto se reexaminan las varias tesis clasificadas en el primer capítulo, con el objetivo de seleccionar las mejores sobre la base de los resultados obtenidos en los capítulos centrales del trabajo. Para cada una de las cuestiones principales que toda teoría ética debe afrontar, se selecciona la respuesta más apropiada de la virtue ethics. El resultado es la versión máximamente adecuada de la virtue ethics.The aim of this PhD thesis is to find the limits and the possibilities of virtue ethics. From its beginning until now, virtue ethics has developed evolved into one of the three main normative ethical theories —together with deontology and utilitarianism. It's time to take a look back to this great development in order to see what are the worst problems the theory has to face and what are its most promising possibilities. The first chapter is devoted to present the various ideas and thesis contained within the vast landscape represented by virtue ethics. After finding an adequate definition of virtue ethics, a general framework of a normative ethical theory will be presented. Finally, the main thesis of virtue ethics concerning each question previously identified will be classified within the framework. The second chapter deals with the objections and limits of virtue ethics. It is argued that the theory can face the objection of egoism and the objection of elitism. However, if virtue ethics does not want to find itself limited by an insubstantial concept of 'virtue', it should address fundamental aspects of the ancient theory of virtue which can now be problematic. The purpose of the third chapter is to explore the most promising possibilities of virtue ethics. The main contention is that these possibilities can be found precisely where the theory has received the hardest criticisms: normativity. Virtue ethics can face the action-guiding objection, but it can also develop a genuinely innovative normative approach. Along several sections some fundamental ideas of virtue ethics are presented and explored. All these ideas add to a new perspective on normativity which focuses on the formation of a global virtuous character. After reviewing the recent debate between virtue ethics and social psychology, it is argued that the new normative project will benefit from the empirical findings of psychology. In the fourth chapter the various theses classified in the first chapter are re-examined, in order to select the best ones on the basis of the results yielded by the central chapters of this work. The result is the most promising version of virtue ethics so far.
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Kakalis, Nicolaos. "Plato's ethics & virtue ethics." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/24749.
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Brown, Steven G. "Realistic Virtue Ethics." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1339517161.
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Moberly, Jennifer Lynne. "The virtue of Bonhoeffer's ethics : a study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ethics in relation to virtue ethics." Thesis, Durham University, 2009. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/89/.
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Jennifer Moberly, 'The Virtue of Bonhoeffer's Ethics: A Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics in Relation to Virtue Ethics' (PhD, 2009) This study first explores the prima facie reasons for rejecting the possibility of seeing a close relationship between Bonhoeffer's Ethics and virtue ethics. However, a closer reading of his texts, and the examination of formulations of virtue ethics by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, lead to the conclusin that those grounds are insufficient for dismissing the possibility of such a relationship. Instead there is compelling evidence for the presence of virtue-ethical aspects in his treatment of justification and sanctification, his implicit anthropology and holistic conecption of human life, and especially in the theme of 'conformation' and the notion of 'simplicity'. Given the fact that there are some ways in which Bonhoeffer's Ethics appears to be positively related to virtue ethics, the study then examines how these aspects are related to elements of Barthian divine command ethics which are also present in Bonhoeffer's conception. The suggested conclusion is that the two forms of ethical thought were used throughout the writing periods in a dialectical integration within an overall vision of the agent participating (by grace) in the reality that Christ has reconciled all reality to God. Finally, the thesis considers how this understanding of Bonhoeffer's Ethics may be of use within contemporary debates, and advocates seeing it as a distinctive example of how virtue ethics may be articulated without compromising the role of grace.
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Weatherup, Michael Norman. "Neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2017. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.728826.
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In this dissertation I argue that a neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethic is a viable position in moral philosophy, preferable to deontology, consequentialism and neo-Aristotelianism. I do this by arguing that, as Schopenhauer’s main criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy apply to contemporary deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethics is preferable to both. I defend the Schopenhauerian claim that compassion is the basis of morality by appealing to its intuitive plausibility and by arguing for a neo-Schopenhauerian version of the Aristotelian idea that the virtues are constitutive of the good life. I further support the claim that compassion is the basis of morality by illustrating how compassion can account for a range of our core moral concepts and intuitions. 1 also defend neo-Schopenhauerianism against, a number of criticisms of virtue ethics in general and neo-Schopenhauerianism in particular. I conclude by arguing that as the Aristotelian virtues of courage, temperance, prudence, etc., could be possessed by someone who is malicious and/or extremely selfish, and so do not capture our intuitions about what makes a person morally good, neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics is preferable to Aristotelianism.
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Jotterand, Fabrice 1967. "Does virtue ethics contribute to medical ethics? : an examination of Stanley Hauerwas' ethics of virtue and its relevance to medical ethics." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=33292.
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The aim of this thesis is to examine the concept of virtue ethics in Stanley Hauerwas's understanding of virtue and delineate how that contributes to his ethical reasoning and his comprehension of medical ethics. The first chapter focuses on the shift that occurred in moral theory under the stance of the Enlightenment that eroded the traditional idea of morality as the formation of the self, allowing space for new concepts that dismissed the importance of the agent in the ethical task of seeking the good. In the second chapter, the three main ideas (character, vision, and narrative) that make up Hauerwas' ethical theory are examined with a particular attention to the importance of agency in moral life. The third chapter describes how Hauerwas' medical ethics, informed by his moral theory based on character, vision, and narrative, is relevant to medical ethics. Hauerwas argues that because medicine is a form of human activity with internal goods and standards of excellence intrinsic to its practice, it requires taking into account the notion of agency in the healing relationship. Finally, in the last chapter the specific religious discourse of Hauerwas' ethics is discussed in relation to secular medical ethics. In other words, this thesis raises the question of whether the reduction of medical ethics to a set of principles, as it is mostly the case today, represents a suitable picture of the reality of moral life in medicine.
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Moula, Payam. "Virtue Ethics and right action." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-54309.
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This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.
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Svatos, Michele Lynn. "The structure of virtue ethics." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186878.
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Virtue ethics is the view that virtue, happiness, flourishing, and human nature go together to constitute the core of ethics. However, this definition is far from precise. It raises questions about the foundation of virtue ethics, the logical relations between its main concepts (its "structure"), and its place in the standard taxonomy of moral theories as teleological or deontological. This work provides the analysis of the foundation, structure, and taxonomical classification of virtue ethics lacking in the contemporary literature. Such an analysis is necessary for successfully defending or attacking a modern version of virtue ethics. I argue that there are two main distinct forms which virtue ethics might take. Both are teleological, and neither is consequentialist: an analysis of virtue ethics reveals that the standard taxonomy of moral theories must be revised to allow for different sorts of non-consequentialism within a broader class of teleological theories. The foundation of the first form of virtue ethics is happiness, thus resembling standard consequentialist theories. However, it differs from such theories in three ways: first, virtue is constitutive of rather than instrumental to happiness. Second, happiness is given objective rather than subjective content. Third, it rejects reductionism, hierarchy, and completeness. The alternative also rejects reductionism, hierarchy, and completeness. However, its foundation is human nature, which need not be identified with happiness. Such a theory is unavoidably naturalistic, and its need for an account of human nature raises many problems. Virtue ethics may take either of these broadly teleological yet unique forms. The first is more similar to other teleological theories, and is most viable. Its unique structure provides many advantages as well as some unique challenges. Only careful attention to structural and foundational details in the further development of virtue ethics will determine whether its benefits outweigh its faults.
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Nussbaum, Martha C. "Virtue Ethics: The Misleading Category." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113259.
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Virtue ethics is frequently considered to be a single category of ethical theory, and a rival to Kantianismand Utilitarianism. I argue that this approach is a mistake, because both Kantians and Utilitarians can, and do, have an interest in the virtues and the forrnation of character. But even if we focus on the group of ethical theorists who are most commonly called virtue theorists because they reject the guidance of both Kantianism and Utilitarianism, and derive inspiration from ancient Greek ethics, there is little unity to this group. Although there is a thin common ground that links all the group's members - a focus on the formation of character, on the nature of the passions, and on choice over the whole course of life - there are also crucial differences among them.La ética de la virtud es frecuentemente considerada una categoría singular de la teoría ética, y una rival del kantismo y del utilitarismo. Considero que es un error, puesto que tanto kantianos como utilitaristas pueden tener, y tienen, un interés en las virtudes y en la formación del carácter. Mas, aun si focalizamos el grupo de teóricos de la ética, comúnmente llamados teóricos de la virtud, porque rechazan la dirección tanto del kantismo como del utilitarismo y se inspiran en la ética griega antigua, hay poca unidad en este grupo. Aun cuando hay un delgado territorio común que vincula a todos los miembros del grupo -una preocupación por la formación del carácter, la naturaleza de las pasiones y por la elección sobre el transcurso entero de la vida- también hay diferencias cruciales entre ellos.
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Kaplan, Christopher Francis. "Environmental Virtue Ethics and the Virtue of Ecological Sensitivity." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/579285.
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What traits and virtues must a person possess to be considered environmentally virtuous? And further, must we recognize new human excellences specific to environmental contexts, or can the traditional virtues be 'extended' to apply to environmental interactions and relationships? Current disagreement in the environmental virtue ethics literature over how to identify and ratify environmental virtue represents a significant issue in the literature because its answer impinges upon other areas of an environmental virtue ethic's framework, including the acquisition and sufficiency of virtue, environmental practical wisdom, and the normative resources available to an environmental virtue ethic. Ronald Sandler, a proponent of non-extensionist environmental virtue ethics, has suggested the recognition of a novel human virtue called "ecological sensitivity".¹ However, Sandler left open at the time exactly what character dispositions and traits constitute that virtue, and how it ought to be fully understood. The thesis presented here attempts to identify the dispositions, attitudes, and traits that constitute ecological sensitivity (or eco-sensitivity).
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Rouintree, Kevin Paul. "Virtues, pluralism, and human nature : prospects for an integration of virtue ethics and modern moral theory /." Digital version accessible at:, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Waidler, Katharyn. "The justification of virtue." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2000. http://www.tren.com.
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Kim, Jeong Woo. "The relevance of Calvin's ethics to basic issues in contemporary virtue ethics." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 1992. http://www.tren.com.
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Willows, Adam Matthew. "A defence of theological virtue ethics." Thesis, Durham University, 2015. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10957/.
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In this thesis, I show that the commitments of a theological tradition are a conceptual resource which allows new and more robust responses to criticisms of virtue ethics. Until now, theological virtue ethics has not provided a distinctive response to these criticisms and has had to rely on arguments made by secular virtue ethicists. These arguments do not always address theological concerns and do not take advantage of the unique assets of theological ethics. This thesis resolves this problem by providing a chapter-by-chapter confrontation of criticisms of virtue ethics and offering a specifically theological response to each one. In so doing, it identifies the key theological commitments that enable these responses and constitute a particular strength of theological virtue ethics. I consider criticisms that attack the internal coherence or completeness of virtue ethics as well as those which associate virtue ethics with other problematic philosophical positions. In the former group, I address the claims that virtue ethics is not a complete moral theory, that it cannot explain right action, and that it relies on a flawed concept of character. In the latter, I deal with the arguments that virtue ethics must subscribe to moral particularism, moral relativism or egoism. The final part of the thesis returns to the previous chapters to draw out the concepts that are central to these responses. Theological work on the virtues has made important contributions to ethics but has so far been vulnerable to criticism. This thesis addresses this gap and highlights the advantages that theological commitments have to offer virtue ethics.
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Austin, Nicholas Owen. "Thomas Aquinas on the Four Causes of Temperance." Thesis, Boston College, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3742.
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Thesis advisor: James F. KeenanThis dissertation aims to give a theoretical account of the cardinal virtue of temperance that portrays it as an attractive (albeit demanding) virtue, and provides the justification and method for applying it to multiple spheres of life today. To this end, it offers a critical interpretation and retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas' account of the four causes of temperantia in the Summa Theologiae. I claim that, for Thomas, the four causes of a moral virtue are its mode (formal cause), matter and subject (material cause), proper end (final cause) and agent (efficient cause). Less technically, they can be expressed in terms of five guiding questions to be used in understanding any given virtue: What is the practical wisdom actualized by that virtue? What is the sphere of life with which the virtue is concerned? What aspect of the human heart and mind does the virtue modify? What is the virtue for? What causes the virtue to exist and increase? To answer to these five questions is to give an account of a moral virtue. This dissertation develops and applies this causal method for analyzing a moral virtue, both as a means of interpreting Thomas' account of temperance, and as a tool for constructing a theory of temperance for today. Temperance, I claim, can be defined as the modulation of attraction for the sake of right relationship. It is developed through both discipline and grace. Temperance does not repress desire, but forms and channels its positively, placing it at the service of right relationship to oneself, others, the earth and God. It does limit and restrain desire, but always for the sake of deeper and more meaningful goods. Temperance therefore modulates harmoniously between the restraint and the redirection of desire, the fast and the feast. Temperance is often misunderstood as proposing a purely negative ideal of repression and constraint. The dissertation claims that, on the contrary, temperance is a positive and attractive virtue, and one that is urgently needed in consumer society
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Theology
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Bachour, Omar. "Kantian Ethics and the Formula of Humanity: Towards Virtues and Ends." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/30336.
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The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.
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Horner, David Alan. "The seeds of virtue : law and virtue ethical conceptions in Aquinas's ethics." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:91aff45b-df61-4435-937d-b8331ec20b86.
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There is a prima facie incompatibility between a law conception of ethics, in which law concepts (e.g. ought, rule, action) are basic, and a virtue conception of ethics, in which virtue concepts (e.g. character trait, ideal, agent) are basic. However, both conceptions contain elements that are needed for an adequate ethical account. Aquinas's conception of ethics is of interest, because it combines virtue and law components within a broadly Aristotelian account. I argue that Aquinas's virtue-and-law ethical conception is not ad hoc, but emerges from, expresses, and is grounded normatively, rationally, and motivationally in his general conception of practical thought. My first objective in the thesis is to explicate and defend an interpretation of Aquinas's understanding of practical thought as the rational determination of general good into particular action. I argue, first, that this interpretation expresses Aquinas's conception of the nature of practical thought, as reflected in Aquinas's central practical concepts of order, nature, good, and reason. Second, I argue that this interpretation is expressed in Aquinas's conception of the structure of practical thought, as reflected in general, specific, and particular conceptual levels of practical thinking, reasons, and forms of reasoning. My second objective in the thesis is to show that Aquinas's virtue-and-law account presupposes and develops this conception of practical thought, and briefly to indicate how insights from Aquinas's account elucidate relationships between virtue and law ethical conceptions.
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Gribov, Shulamit. "Minimalistic virtue ethics, theory for moral education." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape3/PQDD_0010/NQ61646.pdf.
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Byrd, Brandon Thomas. "Virtue ethics and Moore's criticisms of naturalism." unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07312007-162233/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.
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Quillin, Tyler R. "An Egoistic Aristotelian?: Virtue Ethics v. Egoism." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/144922.
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LeBar, Mark. "Virtue ethics and the interests of others." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288980.
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In recent decades "virtue ethics" has become an accepted theoretical structure for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists--the ancient Greeks, who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our treatment of others. First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least some others (e.g. family, friends, loved ones) ought to give us non-instrumental reason for acting--that is, reason independent of consideration of our own welfare. Second, we think others are entitled to what we might call respect, just in virtue of their being persons. Eudaimonist accounts (the objection runs) either cannot account for these intuitions at all, or they give the wrong sort of account. My dissertation assesses the resources of eudaimonism to meet these lines of criticism. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 survey the views of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, to discover insights that are important for a successful response. In Chapters 5 and 6, I offer my own account, based on what I call empathic identification. This is the habit or disposition of seeing things, in effect, through the eyes of others. Empathic identification is a process through which the interpersonal transmission of reasons for actions between persons becomes possible. I argue first that our interest in our own eudaimonia justifies us in identifying empathically with others as a general habit or disposition. Second, I argue that empathic identification explains our intuitions about the respect others are due. So empathic identification generates the right sort of explanation of our intuitions about the constraints others and their interests impose upon us after all, and renders eudaimonist virtue ethics a viable form of ethical theory.
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Dinh, Hoa Trung. "Theological medical ethics: A virtue based approach." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104403.
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Thesis advisor: LISA S. CAHILLThe Nuremberg trials ushered in a new era in which the four principles approach has become progressively the norm in Euro-American biomedical ethics, while the concepts of virtue and character become marginalized. In recent decades, the AIDS pandemic has highlighted the social aspects of health and illness, and the individualistic nature of the four principles approach proves inadequate in addressing the social causes of illness and poor health. At the global level, the promotion of the four principles approach as the universal norm can lead to the displacement of local values and customs, and the alienation of people from their cultural heritage. In this dissertation, I argue that although principles are indispensable, the virtue-based approach is more adequate in addressing these needs. The dissertation demonstrates that a virtue-based medical ethics informed by the gospel vision of healing would support models of health care that take seriously the social determinants of illness, and advocate action on behalf of the poor and the marginalized. At the global level, virtue-based medical ethics also allows the coexistence of the universal values and the local norms, and encourages cross-cultural dialogue. This dissertation develops a virtue-based medical ethics grounded in the Aristotelian teleological structure, and integrating insights obtained from the historical critical study of the healing narratives in Luke-Acts. It also provides a correlative study of the love command in Luke and the virtue of humaneness in the medical ethics of eighteenth century Vietnamese physician Hai Thuong Lan Ong. The concluding chapter brings these elements together in a discussion of the work of the Vietnamese Catholic AIDS care network
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Theology
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Runwen, Zhu. "Environmental Virtue Ethics : Wildlife Tourism in Sweden." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för organisation och entreprenörskap (OE), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-76288.
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With the permission of Swedish Allemansrätten, the Right of Public Access, allows people to interact with the natural environment... . Environmental ethics, discuss about the relationship between man and nature, and is hence clearly connected to the questions of wildlife tourism. Great part of the previous literature has focused on the environmental ethics in tourism from the perspective of utilitarianism or deontology, with special concern in animal rights, animal ethics and animal welfare. However, questions like ‘what kind of people will do good to the environment?’, ‘What are the characteristics of these people?’ are among those that still need to be discussed in the field of wildlife tourism research. According to the theory of environmental virtue ethics, man's attitude towards nature originates from the internal quality and character of human beings. Whether it is the western scholars Thomas Hill and Geoffrey Frasz, or the ancient Chinese School of Confucianism and Taoism, they all put forward their own opinions on the characters required by the virtue ethics of the environment. In this thesis, documentary writing and network media records of wildlife tourists in Sweden are used as empirical materials to demonstrate the behavioral and psychological manifestations of the three characters of environmental virtues ethics. These three characters reflect the harmonious interaction between man and nature, and contribute in the theoretical discussions of of ethics in Tourism Studies.
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Kent, Leanne E. "Tragic Dilemmas, Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1225468182.
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Cooper, Angel Marie. "Prolegomena to a Sartrean Existential Virtue Ethics." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1333819043.
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O'Connor, John Daniel. "Groundwork for a theoretically ambitious and distinctively virtue ethical theory : constitutivist virtue ethics." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25708.
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In this thesis I address two related and rarely asked questions: (i) Is a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious possible? (ii) If such a theory is possible, and such a theory is also a credible theory in its own right, then what might such a theory look like? By ‘distinctively virtue ethical,’ I mean a theory in which the virtues and other aretaic concepts are foundational, and which does not collapse into forms of other ethical approaches, such as consequentialism and deontology. By ‘theoretically ambitious,’ I mean a systematic theory that seeks to fulfil all the principal aims of theories of practical reason: to explain, justify, prescribe and to guide action. In this thesis I argue that a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious is possible. I do this by working out what such a theory might look like. In developing the theory, I also make a case that the theory is credible and attractive in its own right. In Chapter 1 I look at what makes an ethical theory distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue for a eudaimonic conception of virtue ethics, and determine a number of constraints on such a theory if it is to be distinctively virtue ethical. In Chapter 2 I look at what a more precisely characterised distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious might look like. I argue in favour of using some ideas derived from Plato. A serious problem remains: the virtue ethical theory I develop in Chapter 2 is unable to give adequate action-guidance, a requirement for the theory to be theoretically ambitious. In Chapter 3 I introduce the central strategy of the thesis: to combine the virtue ethical theory arrived at in Chapter 2 with a form of ethical constitutivism in order to arrive at a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious, not least one able to give adequate action-guidance. Chapter 3 is concerned primarily with developing a form of ethical constitutivism suitable for combining with virtue ethics. The chapter is also concerned with examining objections to ethical constitutivism and diagnosing what is required to overcome these objections. In Chapter 4 I combine the virtue ethical theory favoured in Chapter 2 with the form of ethical constitutivism developed in Chapter 3 to form a combined theory. I call this theory: ‘constitutivist virtue ethics.’ I present what the theory involves, and I argue that although the theory incorporates elements from ethical constitutivism, it merits being considered distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue that constitutivist virtue ethics overcomes the objections that, as shown in Chapter 3, ethical constitutivism on its own is unable to overcome. Constitutivist virtue ethics therefore holds out the attractive prospect of a theory incorporating both the advantages of virtue ethics and some of the best of what ethical constitutivism has to offer. In Chapter 5 I address the biggest challenge to constitutivist virtue ethics being regarded as a theoretically ambitious theory: to be able to provide adequate action-guidance. To this end, I present an action-guidance procedure of eight action-guidance principles derived from constitutivist virtue ethics. I then argue that the action-guidance procedure can provide adequate action-guidance, even when faced with a difficult test case. I also examine two objections to the action-guidance procedure, and I argue that these can be overcome. I finish the thesis by considering some topics from the literature relevant to constitutivist virtue ethics, and which might be the basis for further work.
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Svensson, Frans. "Some basic issues in Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics /." Uppsala : Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-7113.
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Jordan, Neil Kevin. "Virtue, salvation and value : Schopenhauer's ethics of patience." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.500813.
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Mpekansambo, Lawrence M. "The limits of virtue theory in business ethics." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/80336.
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Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The overall aim of this study is to establish the implications, effectiveness and limitations of making Aristotelian virtue theory a meta-theory of business. The study intends to test what the business world would be like with the virtue framework as its meta-theory, i.e. if virtue theory provided the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of business enterprises, thus making virtue the philosophy of business. Since virtue is concerned with moral character rather than moral principles – it is community-based rather than individualistic – the application of the virtue framework to business implies that we will have to deal with the reality that individualistic capitalism is corrosive to virtue. The virtue framework is only compatible with collective forms of capitalism, not individualistic forms. Thus, in order to nurture virtues, it is necessary to build an economic system, a type of capitalism that is compatible with the virtue framework. Such a project is morally plausible because it is congruent with human nature, which is rational and social.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die algehele doel van hierdie studie is om die implikasies, effektiwiteit en beperkings van die toepassing van die Aristoteliaanse teorie van deug as metateorie vir besigheid vas te stel. Die studie beoog om te toets hoe die besigheidswêreld sou lyk met deugdeteorie as metateorie, dit wil sê as deugdeteorie die fundamentele beginsels wat die formasie en bedryf van besigheidsondernemings onderlê voorsien en dus deug die filosofie van bedryf maak. Deugde is bemoei met morele karakter eerder as morele beginsels omdat dit gemeenskapsgegrond eerder as individualisties is. Die toepassing van ʼn deugde-raamwerk op die sakewêreld impliseer dus dat ons moet afreken met die realiteit dat individualistiese kapitalisme korrosief is vir deugde. Die deugde-raamwerk is slegs verenigbaar met kollektiewe vorme van kapitalisme, eerder as individualistiese vorme. Om die deugde te koester is dit dus nodig om ’n ekonomiese sisteem te bou in die vorm van ’n kapitalistiese stelsel wat verenigbaar is met die raamwerk. Só ʼn projek is moreel aanneemlik omdat dit ooreenstem met die menslike natuur, wat rasioneel en sosiaal is.
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Tan, Gregory. "Ecological Virtue Ethics: Towards Conversion and Environmental Action." Thesis, Boston College, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107480.
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Thesis advisor: James T. BretzkeThesis advisor: Andrea Vicini
This thesis argues that, in order to address adequately the ecological crisis, humanity needs to change drastically soon from ecologically harmful to ecologically friendly attitudes and practices. In our Christian understanding, this change requires a conversion from ecological vices to ecological virtues. To do so, humanity needs to move away from its overtly anthropocentric concerns to a more genuine respect for creation. Drawing from Church tradition, this thesis establishes that creation has rights, endowed by the Creator, that need to be protected, if ecological integrity is to be preserved. This thesis suggests what these rights should be and the means that would allow their protection. I then argue that, for the necessary changes in human behaviour to take places, ecological conversion needs to begin with individual conversion before social transformation is possible. This thesis, therefore, proposes the ecological virtues needed for individual conversion, and then ecological social action and advocacy. Thus, this thesis charts a course forward from principles, to motivations, and finally, to action
Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2017
Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry
Discipline: Sacred Theology
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Doerle, Samuel Michael. "Military Medical Ethics: Intersections of Virtue and Duty." NEOMED College of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ne2gs1619696140569755.
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Sher, Gavin. "The artistic path to virtue." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370.
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Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
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Stervinou, Louis. "A Critical Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2027.
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This essay is a critical interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, as it attempts to reconcile the tension between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, the two virtues which Aristotle deems characteristic of man. This paper looks to include both moral and intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s conception of the happy life, through the summarization and analyzation of David Keyt, J.L Ackrill, John Cooper and Daniel Devereux’s modern interpretations of the ethics.
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Lopes, Vera Lucia. "A concepção e o lugar que a eudaimonia ocupa na ética Nicomaqueia de Aristóteles." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2017. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/19975.
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The Aristotelian ethics is articulated from the research on which is the supreme good of man and the purpose for which all things tend. Artistotle says that happiness (eudaimonia) is this good that we all seek in life and, therefore, is the end to which all things desired by man tend. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the successful accomplishment of the human being viewed as a rational political animal. Thus, the man is happy when performing the purpose for which he exists, i.e., when performing the work (érgon) of its own. This study, which focuses on the part of the Nicomachean Ethics that became known as “The treaty of virtue” (Books I-IV), aims at understanding the design and place that occupies eudaimonia in the ethics of Aristotle. Therefore, we investigate some concepts of Aristotelian ethics closely linked with his conception of eudaimonia. In conclusion to the paper, we present a recent debate that has become paradigmatic in studies of Aristotelian ethics. This is the debate between the positions of two great contemporary Aristotelians, Hardie and Ackrill on the conception of eudaimonia as a supreme good, to be understood as an inclusive one (Hardie) or a dominant one of all the others (Ackrill)
A ética aristotélica se articula a partir da investigação de qual é o bem supremo do homem e o fim a que tendem todas as coisas. Aristóteles afirma que a felicidade (eudaimonia) é esse bem que todos buscam na vida e, por isso, é o fim ao qual devem tender todas as coisas desejadas pelo ser humano. Para Aristóteles, a eudaimonia é a realização bem-sucedida do ser humano entendido como animal político racional. Desta forma, o homem é feliz quando realiza o fim para qual existe, isto é, quando realiza a obra (érgon) que lhe é própria. A presente dissertação, que se concentra na parte da Ética Nicomaqueia conhecida como “O tratado da virtude” (livros I-IV), tem por objeto compreender a concepção e o lugar que a eudaimonia ocupa na ética de Aristóteles. Para tanto, investiga-se alguns conceitos da ética aristotélica estreitamente ligados com a sua concepção de eudaimonia. Em conclusão, apresenta-se um debate recente que se tornou paradigmático aos estudos da ética aristotélica. Trata-se do debate entre as posições de dois grandes aristotélicos contemporâneos, Hardie e Ackrill, acerca da concepção da eudaimonia como bem supremo, a ser entendida como um bem inclusivo de todos os outros (Hardie) e um bem dominante de todos os outros (Ackrill)
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Wagner, Thaiani Rafaela. "A definição de virtude moral na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156943.
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O tema central da Ética Nicomaquéia é a investigação do sumo bem humano, a eudaimonia ou boa vida. Aristóteles define a eudaimonia em EN I.7 1098a1719 como “atividade da alma [racional] segundo a virtude ( arete ), e se houver mais de uma virtude ( aretai) , segundo a melhor e mais perfeita (t eleiotanton )”. A virtude ( arete ) de algo é aquilo que permite a este algo realizar corretamente sua função própria. A função do homem consiste em uma atividade em acordo com a razão, logo a atividade humana virtuosa será aquela atividade (ou mesmo um conjunto delas) na qual o homem expresse um uso excelente da razão. A concepção de arete, portanto, tem um papel fundamental na definição de eudaimonia. Se o filósofo deseja investigar adequadamente o fim último dos seres humanos, ele precisa incluir nessa investigação o estudo das virtudes. No presente trabalho, nos dedicamos a esclarecer e definir a virtude da parte desiderativa da alma (que não é racional, mas pode ouvir e obedecer a razão): a virtude moral. Para isso, analisamos os principais pontos apresentados pelo Estagirita com relação à aquisição e caracterização dessa virtude. Ao longo do trabalho, mostramos que a virtude de caráter é uma disposição para escolher aquilo que é correto e bom nas ações e paixões (aquilo que é intermediário em relação a nós) conforme determinado pela razão prudencial.The main subject in the Nicomachean Ethics is the inquiry on the highest human good, eudaimonia or good life. Aristotle defines eudaimonia in EN I.7 1098a1719 as “activity of [racional] soul in conformity with excellence ( arete ), and if there are more than one excellence ( aretai) , in conformity with the best and most perfect (t eleiotaton) ”. The virtue ( arete ) of something is what allows it to properly accomplish its own function. The function of man consists in an activity in accordance with reason, thus virtuous human activity is that (or those) in which a man shows excellent use of reason.The notion of arete, therefore, has a fundamental role on the definition of eudaimonia. If Aristotle wants to properly investigate the final end of human beings, he should include in this inquiry the study of virtue. In this work we are devoted on making clear and defining the desiderative part of the soul (which isn’t rational, but can listen to and obey reason): moral virtue. For that, we analyzed the main points presented by Aristotle related to the acquirement and description of this virtue. Throughout this work, we show that character virtue is a tendency for chosing what is right and good in our actions and passions (that which is intermediary regarding ourselves) according to what is established by prudential reason.
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Gessinger, Rafael Koerig. "A causação das virtudes : virtude adquirida e virtude infusa em Tomás de Aquino." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/149555.
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A tese tem por objeto as noções de virtude adquirida e de virtude infusa na obra de Tomás de Aquino, e pretende defender uma leitura integracionista da ética de Tomás, segundo a qual a os conceitos de virtude, lei e graça formam um conjunto harmônico e têm, entre si, relações de dependência recíproca. As virtudes adquiridas por atos humanos tornam-se inteligíveis à luz do conceito de sindérese e dos primeiros princípios da lei natural. As virtudes infusas são explicadas como efeitos da graça e da lei divina. O conceito de habilidade (habitus) é analisado como o gênero das virtudes e ajuda a resolver objeções contra os dois tipos de virtudes. Prova-se que a causação das virtudes adquiridas e das virtudes infusas segue uma estrutura espelhada, que tem Deus como causa eficiente remota, por meio dos princípios exteriores da lei e da graça. A origem exterior, porém, não compromete a natureza da virtude como perfeição interior, em ambos os casos, graças ao conceito de habilidade. A leitura integracionista é concluída com a subordinação das virtudes adquiridas ordenadas a uma felicidade imperfeita às virtudes infusas, que têm a felicidade perfeita como objeto e fim.The thesis analyses the notions of acquired and infused virtue in the work of Thomas Aquinas in order to present an integracionist reading of his ethics, by which concepts like virtue, law and grace are treated as parts of a harmonic set, having reciprocal relations among each other. The idea of virtues acquired by human acts becomes intelligible in the light of the concept of synderesis and the first principles of natural law. Infused virtues are understood as effects from grace and divine law. The concept of hability (habitus) is analysed as the gender of all virtue and helps to resolve objections raised against both kinds of virtue. It proves that the causation of virtues, acquired and infused, follows a simetrical sctructure in which God works as the remote efficient cause, by means of the external principles of law and grace. However, the external provenance of these principles does not jeopardise the virtue’s character as an interior perfection, in both cases of acquired and infused virtue, thanks to the concept of hability. The integracionist reading ends with the subordination of the acquired virtues that aims to an imperfect happiness to the infused virtues that have perfect happiness as their proper object and goal.
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Thompson, Allen Andrew. "Virtue and reason in nature /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5718.
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Björkman, Barbro. "Virtue Ethics, Bioethics, and the Ownership of Biological Material." Doctoral thesis, KTH, Filosofi, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-4814.
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The overall aim of this thesis is to show how some ideas in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can be interpreted and used as a productive way to approach a number of pressing issues in bioethics. Articles I-II introduce, and endorse, a social constructivist perspective on rights (as opposed to the more traditional natural rights idea). It is investigated if the existence of property-like rights to biological material would include the moral right to commodification and even commercialisation. Articles III-V discuss similar questions and more specifically champion the application of an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. The articles are preceded by an introductory essay on some of the central themes in the Nicomachean Ethics. This section also includes a very brief account of what the connection between virtue ethics and a theory of social construction, including rights, could look like. The thesis seeks to show that if read somewhat creatively many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems. It should be noted, however, that this thesis in no way claims to be an exegetic, or a complete, study of the Nicomachean Ethics. Article I deals with ownership of biological material from a philosophical, as opposed to a legal, perspective. It is argued that a strand in liberal political theory that treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights, as developed by e.g. Felix Cohen and Tony Honoré, is well suited for discussions on ownership of biological material. Article II investigates which differences in biological material might motivate differences in treatment and ownership rights. The article draws on the social constructivist theory of ownership which was developed in Article I. Article III employs virtue ethics to explain why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell organs such as kidneys. It is suggested that the former action will bring the agent closer to a state of human flourishing. Article IV argues that virtues like philia, justice, beneficence and generosity — traditionally all seen as other-regarding — contain strong self-regarding aspects. The central claim is that these self-regarding aspects of the other-regarding virtues are necessary components of complete virtue and thus that the fully virtuous agent has to act virtuously both in her dealings with herself and others. Article V applies the ideas that were developed in Article IV to the case of living organ donations to next of kin. It is proposed that such an act, although noble and fine, is supererogatory, rather than obligatory, as the donor is morally entitled to be partial to herself. This argument is made against the backdrop of a discussion on some Aristotelian ideas on philia and partiality.QC 20100709
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Shihadeh, Ayman. "Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on ethics and virtue." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.249942.
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Pang, Mei-che, and 彭美慈. "From virtue to value: nursing ethics in modern China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1998. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29812951.
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Krueger, Barbara Murphy. "Climate Change Virtue Ethics and Ecocriticism in Undergraduate Education." Thesis, Prescott College, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1583209.
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This thesis explores the question: can an ecocritical approach to environmental virtue ethics (EVE) in undergraduate climate change education inform students' understanding of the ethical issues of climate change and promote environmental responsibility and action? Philosophical theories of virtue ethics will be discussed from an historical perspective as well as to its renewal in the 20th century, especially within the context of the wicked dimensions of the climate change crisis. Dominant themes in climate change ethics including concerns over the scientific complexity, global dimensions, temporal issues, intergenerational fairness and responsibility, justice, and human rights will be presented and used to devise a compendium of climate change virtues and vices. Environmental and climate change education research will be reviewed as well as the reasons for its failure to produce a substantial shift in attitudes and behavior of people especially in the global North will be deliberated. Ecocriticism, which studies the relationship between literature and visual and audial art will be explored, and a novel curriculum based on theoretical elements from climate change virtue ethics and supported with examples of the ecocritical arts will be proposed. It is my belief that an interdisciplinary framework supported and illustrated by climate change ecocriticism from any and all of the literary, visual, audial, and performance arts will create deeper understandings of climate change complexity.
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Armstrong, Alan Eric. "Towards a strong practice-based virtue ethics for nursing." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/1567.
Full textAbstract:
Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including vulnerability, powerlessness and dependence on others for help. The nursing literature is saturated with debate about a 'therapeutic' nurse-patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. Instead, the moral virtues and virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion and courage, (2) using judgment and (3) using moral wisdom - moral perception, sensitivity and imagination. Merits and problems of this approach are examined. Following Macintyre, I conceive nursing as a practice; nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong (action-guiding) practice based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further.
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Pang, Mei-che. "From virtue to value : nursing ethics in modern China /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1998. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B21021429.
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