Academic literature on the topic 'Ethics, Buddhist'

In recent decades, Buddhist scholars have begun serious exploration into the theoretical dimensions of Buddhist ethics. However, due to the diversity of moral proclamations found in traditional texts and commentaries, it has been difficult to formulate a widely acceptable theory of Buddhist ethics. Working with the textual analyses of the Buddhist Pāli Canon and recent scholars of Buddhism, I present arguments for viewing early Buddhist ethics as broadly Kantian (deontological) in nature. The methodology follows that of previous authors in Buddhist ethics and in Comparative Religious Ethics with a focus on philosophical ethics and historical and textual studies. In constructing a framework of Buddhist ethics, this work draws from the ancient sources, primarily the Buddhist Pāli Canon, as well as the philological and historical work of previous Buddhist commentators and scholars. A similar construction of the ethics of Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) is based primarily on the recent writings on both the philosophy and life of Kant, and for source material critical English editions of Kant's primary works. The uniqueness of this work is found in the discussion of Buddhist ethics in the context of its theories of human nature and cosmology and secondarily in its revaluation of Kantian thought as a legitimate interlocutor for scholars of Buddhist ethics. This Kantian perspective, when combined with the insights gained from virtue ethics and consequentialist perspectives, provides a fuller understanding of Buddhist ethics. The findings suggest that Buddhist ethics may claim not only many of the same strengths, but also suffer the same weaknesses, as Kantian deontological moral theory.

The extent of the ethical component in the Buddha's teachings is often commented upon but has received disproportionately little attention from scholars. This thesis is intented to make a contribution in this area by (i): examining the substantive content of Buddhist ethical categories; (ii) locating ethics and the goal of ethical perfection in the context of the overall soteriological framework elaborated by the Buddha; (iii) offering a characterisation of the formal structure of Buddhist ethics according to the typology of philosophical ethical theory. The scope of the enquiry will include ethical data from both the Small and Large Vehicles. Previous research has concentrated almost exclusively on the Theravāda system and this has resulted in a truncated presentation of Buddhist ethics which has failed to reveal the underlying structure and its development through time. The present discussion therefore proceeds in a roughly chronological sequence in the selection of its data, considering first of all material from Theravādin sources (both Canonical and commentarial) and passing on to an investigation of the systematisation of ethical categories in the Abhidharma of the Small Vehicle as found in the scheme of the Sarvāstivāda preserved in the Abhidharmakośa. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, an account of Mahayana ethics is offered drawing mainly on the Śila-paṭala of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The final two chapters (5 and 6) discuss two influential theories of ethics elaborated in the Western tradition which bear a prima facie resemblance to the theoretical structure of Buddhist ethics. Chapter 5 will deal with Utilitarianism and its resemblance to Buddhism, and Chapter 6 will be devoted to the Aristotelian ethical system. My conclusion will be that the Aristotelian model provides the closest analogue to Buddhism and a preliminary attempt will be made to pursue certain points of contact as an indication of the direction for future research. The overall argument, which is cumulative throughout the thesis, will be that ethical perfection in Buddhism is an integral and inalienable component in the perfection of human nature envisaged and attained by the Buddha. This, together with the intellectual perfection epitomised by the attainment of insightful knowledge (paññā). constitutes the Summum Bonum or complete good for man.

Despite its considerable influence Damien Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics has not received an extended criticism, and the goal of this thesis is to attempt this task. I direct two general criticisms against the text. The first questions its teleological model of Buddhist ethics and the second interrogates its binary model of human psychology, which excludes the notion of the will.

The Buddhist tradition offers a reductionist view of the subject – the ‘weak’ view - which appears to undercut concern for the consequences of action. The doctrine of morally conditioned rebirth – that is, the perpetuation of a persistent individual through death - entails a ‘strong’ view. Each view has a bearing on morality, and each is problematic: the two seem incompatible. The notion of rebirth and the associated doctrine of karman are deeply connected with this. It is in this complex that I find what I call ‘the identity problem’. I give a general account of Buddhist ethics, placing it within the tradition of ‘virtue ethics’. I show the impact of the identity problem to be large but not total. I deal also with some related topics in Buddhist doctrine: anātman, the heterodox ‘Person school’ and the ‘two-truths’ notion. I consider the bearing of Parfit’s arguments for his version of reductionism on the problem’s solution. Their support for the ‘weak’ view is real but limited. When Parfit deals with the consequences of reductionism for morality, his conclusion is uncertain. When I consider these arguments on their merits, I find them largely unpersuasive. Parfit’s account of reasons for action, with some qualifications, is acceptable, and welcome in its vindication of disinterestedness. I consider how it stands with Buddhist ethics in this light and offer restatements of the doctrines of karman and rebirth. In the case of karman, I develop the idea of a guiding metaphor and suggest how it may be applied; in that of rebirth I draw on a broader Buddhist tradition of meditation practice and benvolence. This restatement leaves the ‘strong’ view more sustainable, and its compatibility with the ‘weak’ view less problematic for morality. I then present the Buddhist ethical scheme as largely intact, if with slightly diminished coercive force.

Filial piety is regarded the most fundamental values of the Chinese culture, and the root of all good virtues. When Buddhism first came to China, it faced the criticisms from Chinese scholars, especially from the Confucianism, the dominant ideology of Chinese society, on ethical grounds. Confucian scholars criticized the life of Buddhist monks, who were required to leave their homes and families, shave their heads, and live in celibacy, was incompatible with the Confucian practice of filial piety. In order to survive in Chinese society, Buddhism had to search for the converging point with the Confucianism. This thesis attempts to explore the importance and practice of filial piety in early Buddhism. It also discusses how Chinese Buddhists responded to the criticisms both in theoretical argumentation and in practice. Finally, it concludes the main content and features of filial piety in Chinese Buddhism. This thesis divides into four chapters. The first chapter discusses the origins of filial piety in Chinese society, from particularly due to the agriculture economy, worship of ancestors, patriarchal clan system, and the development of ideology of filial piety from Confucius. The second chapter mainly illustrates the importance and practice of filial piety in early Buddhism. The third part concentrates on Chinese Buddhists’ respondents on the “unfilial practice” accusations by (i) translations of and references to Buddhist sutras that taught filial behavior; (ii) writing scholarly refutations to defend the “unfilial practices” charges, and (iii) interpreting Buddhist precepts are equivalent of the concept of Confucian filial piety. In practice, they responded by (i) composing apocryphal scriptures, (ii) annual celebration of the Yulanpen (ghost) festival, popularizing stories and parables as by way of painted illustrations, public lectures. The third chapter discuss the main content and features of filial piety in Chinese Buddhism, which are(i)to requite parents and all sentient beings with gratitude and equality; (ii) to differentiate “this worldly filial piety” and “supramundane filial piety”; (iii) to infuse Buddhist precepts and Confucian filial piety together;(iv)to chant the name of Amitābhaḥ Buddha as a way of religious discipline and the practice of filial piety.<br>published_or_final_version<br>Chinese Language and Literature<br>Master<br>Master of Arts

The purpose of this thesis is to comprehensively explore Theravāda missionary activity. The philological, textual, theoretical, and ethnographic methods used to investigate the historical, sociopolitical, religious, and ethical aspects of early Theravāda, the U.S. Vipassanā (Insight) meditation movement, and modern Burmese Theravāda revealed nuanced meanings in the descriptions of these adherents’ endeavors with respect to proselytizing, converting, and the concept of missionary religions. By exploring the secular features that contributed to their religious appearances, a more developed contextualization of Theravāda “activity” reshapes understandings of the larger concept of missionary religions. I argue that what has been maintained in the establishment of early Theravāda, and continuance of Theravāda thereafter, is the preservation of a secular activity with respect to resolving diverse sociopolitical and ethical tensions through religious articulations and practices of tolerance and egalitarianism. In brief, the first chapter is a philological study on the Pāli word “desetha” or “preach.” The word desetha, and thus its meaning, is traced to its Prākritic form—a contemporaneous language more likely spoken by Gotama Buddha—to posit a more accurate translation for this word. Next, a theoretical examination into early Theravāda’s sociopolitical, ethical, and religious environment demonstrates the larger secular, rather than religious, features that contributed to this ancient movement’s emergence. A contextual analysis comparing the emergence and establishment of the “secular” U.S. Vipassanā (Insight) meditation movement to that of early Theravāda follows, in order to explore how the former aligns with Theravāda missionizing. Lastly, an ethnographic study on Burmese Buddhist monastics is presented. In relation to missionary activity, the Abhidhamma, a Buddhist doctrinal system, not only provides Burmese Buddhist monastics with a system of applied ethics that shapes how they interact with Buddhists and non-Buddhists in America, but also helps to explain the larger concern of viewing such activity as strictly “religious.”

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Francisco with the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009.<br>Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-04, Section: A, page: 1333. Adviser: Sharon Kaufman.

The present work addresses the notions of poverty and poverty relief in Buddhist social and economic ethics, comparing them to current approaches to conceptualizing poverty used in the development community. Given the Buddhist preoccupation with ceasing suffering and removing its causes, and the key Buddhist principle of Right Livelihood that is found in the Ennobling Eightfold Path to enlightenment taught by the Buddha, economic ethics appear to be central to the Buddhist path and a concern for the suffering caused by extreme poverty therefore ought to be a key point of concern in Buddhist ethics. Buddhist ethics has developed into a field of study all its own over the last few decades, addressing issues in applied ethics from bioethics to human rights and environmental concerns, but little has been written by virtually any standard on the important topic of poverty relief. The present work makes a step toward filling that gap by examining relevant passages in the Pāli Canon as well as popular and influential Mahāyāna sūtras to demonstrate that a concern for deprivation or non-voluntary impoverishment is evident in key Buddhist doctrines and teachings from the earliest recorded history of the Buddhist tradition. The thesis further discusses the duties to relieve poverty outlined in Buddhist social ethics as well as the development of Buddhist economics and its critique of dominant mainstream economics. It also offers a comparison of Buddhist conceptions of poverty with contemporary notions of poverty, such as the capabilities approach to poverty developed by Amartya Sen and currently in use by the UNDP. In both of these cases poverty is portrayed in a comprehensive and multi-dimmensional manner which views income as only one aspect of poverty. Additionally, this dissertation examines the contemporary Socially Engaged Buddhist movement and identifies historical and contemporary examples of Buddhist poverty relief efforts.