Academic literature on the topic 'Ethiopia – Economic policy'

China–Ethiopia economic cooperation in the period of 2000–2020 is marked by the convergence between the industrial policy of Ethiopia, the orientations of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the infrastructure development strategy which is the cornerstone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China, the largest foreign investor in Ethiopia during this period, has had a major role in terms of investment and financing in the energy sector and the transportation infrastructure: Addis Ababa Airport, roads, railway, seaport terminal, and gas pipeline. The flagship project — the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway — connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti City and Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal, inaugurated in 2018, provided landlocked Ethiopia with a good connection between the hinterland and the seaport: the economic corridor accounts for more than 95% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade. The development of Ethiopian Industrial Parks on the model of Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was the second pillar of the strategy of development of an export-oriented manufacturing sector. Chinese companies operating in Ethiopian Industrial Parks in the textile and leather industries have been pioneering this activity contributing to Ethiopia’s participation in the Global Value Chains (GVCs). Ethiopian government is also planning the development of agro-industrial parks specialized in added-value agricultural products such as coffee or cut flowers exported to Europe via Addis Ababa Airport and Ethiopian Airlines Cargo. Ethiopia’s main challenges in that direction are the necessity to go up the value chain to further penetrate European markets and, most likely, to identify the products or services which could be integrated into the African markets in the new context of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement that entered into force in January 2021.

The motives, instruments and effects of China's Africa policy have spurred a lively debate in European development policy circles. This paper assesses the “competitive pressure” that China's growing presence in Africa exerts on the European development policy regime. Drawing on interviews conducted in China, Ethiopia and Europe between 2008 and 2011, the paper analyses Ethiopia as a case study. Ethiopia has emerged as one of the most important countries in Chinese as well as European cooperation with Africa. Yet, Chinese and European policies toward Ethiopia differ greatly. The EU mainly engages Ethiopia as an aid recipient, whereas China has developed a comprehensive political and economic partnership with the East African state. China has thereby become an alternative partner to the Ethiopian government, a development that both sheds light on the gap between European rhetoric and policy practice and puts pressure on the EU to make more efforts to reform its development policy system.

This piece of paper analyzes post-1991 Ethio-China political and economic relations by raising the following questions: What is the nature of the bilateral political and economic relations? What are the factors which enhanced the bilateral political and economic relations between Ethiopia and China? What are the arguments raised by different scholars about Ethiopia and China relations? There are a number of factors that contributed to the growth of bilateral relations. Ethiopia needs China for economic assistance; as an alternative source to the west and China’s development is generally considered as a role model for Ethiopia to follow. China also supports Ethiopia on different international issues. On the part of China, there are also several factors egging China to look towards Ethiopia especially in terms of Ethiopia’s strategic importance and market potential. Ethiopia could be a commercial launch pad for Chinese companies and China is also getting diplomatic support from Ethiopia for its policy on Taiwan among others. There are also common factors both from Ethiopia and China’s side which enhanced the bilateral relations. However, there are many arguments raised following Chinese deep engagement to Ethiopia. Among others on the economic front the bilateral relations are imbalanced; dumping of low price export; underbidding local companies and ideological differences among others.Generally, the paper agues the ethio-Chinese relations motivated by political and economic factors.

When foreign policies of states are examined, pride of place often goes to what are called high politics: the politics of diplomacy and war. However, for most developing nations, especially those in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, economic foreign policy, or low politics, may be as, or even more, important. In fact, the foreign policies of African nations are often seen as an extension of strategies to consolidate domestic political power. African leaders routinely place themselves in charge of foreign policy as a means of controlling these resource flows as well as to create some autonomy from competing domestic political forces. This is not to say that external state forces do not impinge on the ability of leaders to stay in power; however, in sub-Saharan Africa, this has been less of a priority, perhaps with the significant exception of Ethiopia. This paper seeks to show that the general foreign policy perspectives of Ethiopia from 1991 to the present have been an extension of the leaders and ruling elites trying to obtain significant sources of financial resources by exploring the general trends of how Ethiopia has engaged in international flows of resources. Examining Ethiopian foreign policy on three levels—international, regional, and domestic—this paper explains how, despite being a potential regional hegemon, Ethiopia has significant problems stemming from domestic issues of poverty and legitimacy. Moreover, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be highlighted as a case to explore how it affects, and is impacted by, all three levels.

This article deals with the Sudanese–Ethiopian conflict (1885–89) from a Mahdist perspective, in the wider context of the European scramble for Africa. Focusing on Sudanese representations of Ethiopia as well as on the causes underlying the conflict, I confront a Mahdist chronicle of particular historiographical significance with a range of historical sources. Departing from a purely jihadist framework of analysis, I highlight various Mahdist conceptualizations of Christian Ethiopia as well as historical, political, military, and economic processes conducive to the outbreak of an armed confrontation between the two independent African states. I argue that the Sudanese ruling elite resorted to jihadist discourse as a legitimizing device rather than as an inflexible policy and examine more specific rhetoric instruments meant to justify Mahdist attitudes toward the Christian kingdom. Whereas prophetic visions were used to make the khalifa's Ethiopian policy acceptable to Mahdist eyes, the ambivalent legacy of early Muslim–Aksumite contacts was reactivated in the framework of a dialogue with the Ethiopian enemy.

Pastoralism is a culture, livelihoods system, extensive use of rangelands. It is the key production system practiced in the arid and semi-arid dryland areas. Recent estimates indicate that about 120 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists life worldwide, of which 41.7% reside only in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Pastoralists live in areas often described as marginal, remote, conflict prone, food insecure and associated with high levels of vulnerability. Pastoral communities of Ethiopia occupy 61% of the total land mass and 97% of Ethiopian pastoralists found in low land areas of Afar, Somali, Oromiya, and SNNPR. In spite pastoral areas have significance role in national economy, yet very little consideration was given to pastoral development and policy makers often neglect them, focusing on the interests of agriculture and urban people. The constitution of Ethiopia gives pastoral communities the right to free land grazing, fair use of natural resources, have market access and receive fair price, and not displaced from their own lands. However, pastoralists have faced new problems in recent years, including competition for water and pasture; unrepresented in socio-economic and political activities, ethnic based conflicts, poverty, and uneven drought and climate changes. The government of Ethiopia began large scale efforts to develop the pastoral areas and initiated different projects, but pastoral development policies and strategies seem to be state centrally-driven. In Ethiopia the current nature of pastoralism and pastoral communities’ life style is changing. Therefore, government needs to develop policies and strategies which are based on local customs and practical knowledge.

Since both inflation and economic growth are not a new concept rather their relationships are waited still now as a debatable issue among macro-economists, policy makers, policy analysts, politicians and even the population itself by giving their own analysis by conduct a research and assumption based on the trend as before. Basically, the aims of this seminar paper are to review the relationship between inflation and economic growth as well as to review the causes, sources, determinants and impacts of Ethiopian inflation. Most of the studies indicated above shown that, higher and volatile inflation is bad for the economy. On the other hand, lower and stable inflation is considered as a promoter of the economy. Then the question should focus on what level of inflation is harmful to economic growth? Many economists have made researches on estimating the threshold level of inflation using panel data for a number of countries and time-series data for single country cases and these researchers fix the threshold level of inflation for both developing and developed country. But in this seminar paper, quantifying or fix the exact number of threshold level of Ethiopian inflation and decide below this level inflation has a positive effect on growth and beyond this level it has negative impact on growth is very difficult by simply review previous literature without conducting actual research and make a deep analysis. Even if it is the case, based on the literature it is surely possible to conclude the inflation rate has a serious negative effect on the growth of one country’s economy especially in Ethiopia, if inflation has a double digit of an annual growth.

The floriculture sector is booming in Ethiopia, making the country the second largest flower exporter in Africa and one of the largest suppliers of flowers globally. Despite the enormous advantages of the Ethiopian floriculture industry to the country’s economy, the industry’s unsustainability related to environmental and human rights is growing. Failure to protect the environment can have profound negative impacts on long-term economic development and human rights, including the right to life, adequate food, water and housing. The floriculture industry has been identified as having the potential to grow and contribute positively to the agricultural transformation and economy of Ethiopia. Policy, laws and regulations play a vital role in the implementation of any regulatory objective. During the last decade, Ethiopia has developed many policies and laws that link to improving the environment, and the flower farm industry itself has adopted self-regulation and standards, enhancing the protection of workers and the environment. But there is increasing evidence that the economic benefits of the flower industry come at the expense of the environment. So, what is the impact of these State and non-State regulations on a safe and clean environment? This paper aims to analyse how, why and under what circumstances environmental policy implementation might work or fail, by investigating the challenges for the floriculture industry relating to the intensive use of pesticides and water, and inappropriate waste disposal in the policy implementation process. It is safe to say that Ethiopia has developed a lot of legislation on the environment but the challenge of effective monitoring and enforcement remains. This paper concludes with recommendations, based on the fact that the principles of environmental rights, the right to life and the right to development cannot be realised in the absence of the right to a healthy environment.

The escalation of tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of the Grand Renaissance is at least partly based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the risks this dam poses to Egypt. There is a two-part, win–win deal that can defuse tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. First, Ethiopia needs to agree with Egypt and Sudan on rules for filling the Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD) reservoir and on operating rules during periods of drought. Second, Egypt needs to acknowledge that Ethiopia has a right to develop its water resources infrastructure for the benefit of its people based on the principle of equitable use, and agree not to block the power trade agreements that Ethiopia needs with Sudan to make the GRD financially viable. Sudan has a big stake in Egyptian–Ethiopian reconciliation over the use of the Nile. Although Sudan's agricultural and hydropower interests now align with those of Ethiopia, there does not seem to be a formal agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan for the sale of hydropower from the GRD. Because the economic feasibility of the GRD and other Ethiopian hydropower projects will depend on such agreements, Sudan has leverage with both Ethiopia and Egypt to encourage this win–win deal.

Purpose: The aim of this paper is to investigate the inter-sectorial linkage of economic sectors and their contribution to the economic growth using time series data from 1978-2014 and 1992-2014.
 Design/methodology/approach: This study employed a Johansen cointegration test and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model.
 Findings: The Johansen cointegration and multiple regression results indicate that all economic sectors have strong, positive and significant long-run and short-run relationship with economic growth during the study period in both countries. The result revealed that MNF giant is an engine for Chinese economic growth while agriculture took the lion-share for Ethiopian economy. The MNF has bi-directional Granger cause with economic growth, agriculture and SRV for China, while GDP and AGR are the only bi-directional Granger causes variables for Ethiopia.
 Implications: Therefore, from a policy perspective, Ethiopian policymakers need to formulate agro-processing industries to ensure the transformation of the AGR to the MNF as well as maintain inter-sectorial linkage and sustain the country’s economic growth.

In this research, the researcher is analysing the models of development in Ethiopia on ADLI policy after the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000. As a post- conflict country it is always important to know how a country reconstructs its economy after the war. The researcher will give a brief background of Ethiopia with her different regime changes. Ethiopia is a landlocked country and is found in the Horn of Africa. Her boarders are Eritrea on the north and north east, and Djibouti and Somalia on the East, Kenya on the south, on the west and south west by Sudan. (BCC) Ethiopia has been under three remarkably different political regimes; the feudal imperial era under Emperor Haile Selassie; the socialist military dictatorship of Colonel Mangistu’s Derg; and the marketoriented Western aligned democracy of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.(Devereux et al,2005:121 ) Each regime had applied different policies on agriculture which employs 80 percent of the population. Feudal policies where the land was in the hands of the landlords failed during Selassie’s regime and this was proved by the famine of 1974. He was overthrown by Derg in a coup in 1974. Derg introduced a “radical agrarian transformation based on land redistribution. His policies on agriculture were based on the Marxist egalitarian ideology and by conviction that feudal relations in agriculture had exposed millions of highland Ethiopians to intolerable levels of poverty and vulnerability.” (Devereux et al, 2005:121-122). According to Derg’s agricultural policy land was confiscated from the landlords and was redistributed to the rural farmers and it was trying to break inequalities over land control and it aimed at achieving agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Derg’s regime was overthrown by Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991. EPRDF further continued with land redistribution in the wake of 1990s and it gave farmlands to demobilised soldiers and tried to correct the inequalities that emerged with time as farming families were growing. (Devereux et al, 2005:122) In all these regimes, land was owned by the state. Ethiopian economy is based on agriculture which contributes 47 percent to GNP and more than 80 percent of exports, and employs 85 percent of the population. Ethiopia’s agriculture is plagued by periodic droughts, soil degradation emanating from poor agricultural practices and overgrazing, deforestation, high population density, underdeveloped water resources and poor transport infrastructure which makes extremely difficult and expensive to get goods to the market. (BCC, 07) The EPRDF came up with the new agricultural policy in the beginning of 1991 and it was known as Agriculture Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI). ADLI is the policy that emphasised on modernising smallholder agriculture and intensifying yield productivity through the supply of appropriate technology, certified seeds, fertilizers, rural credit facilities and technical assistance. (Getachew, 2003:9) This policy introduced some reforms in agriculture as it introduced a nationwide agricultural extension program, the propagation of laws that liberalised the purchasing and distribution of inputs and to increase and to make credit facilities available to rural farmers. In 1995 Minister of Agriculture (MoA) introduced a vehicle to drive the policy, which was called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PADETES). The PADETES started with 32047 farmers on board. The aim was to educate farmers in new farming methods which will increase productivity and make farmers self sufficient. Agriculture Sample Survey 2009/10 states that ‘country’s experience showed that farmers’ attitude and tendency to adapt and accept new innovations, modern agricultural techniques and technologies, such as use of fertilizers, irrigation, improved seeds and pesticides that help to improve their living standards through attaining enhanced productivity, do have positive impact on the development on the agricultural sector as a whole.’(Central Statistical Agency, 2010: i) Teshome (2006:1) shows complexity of Ethiopian agriculture when he says that it largest contributor to the GDP, exports and foreign earnings and it employs almost 85 percent of the population. On the contrary, despite its socio-economic importance its performance continues to be low due to many natural and manmade factors which will be discussed in this research.

The purpose of this thesis was to assess the economic implications of an export promotion policy on poverty reduction and inter-industry growth of Ethiopia. The study was conducted in four steps. The first and the second steps involved simulation scenarios. Scenario 1 simulated the change in the incidence of poverty when FDI capital was selectively introduced into non-coffee export agriculture. Scenario 2 simulated a situation in which the coffee industry received the same policy treatment as other export agriculture in accessing FDI capital. Step three analyzed inter-industry growth under the two scenarios. In the fourth step, sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the possible outcomes of Scenario 1 and 2 under fluctuations in world coffee prices and changes in substitution parameters. A micro-simulated CGE model was constructed to determine optimum production, income and consumption. A Beta frequency distribution function and FGT poverty measures were used to examine the changes in three household groupsâ income distribution and prevalence of poverty. For these analyses, the National Accounting Matrix and the Household Income and Expenditure Sample Survey data set were used. At the macro level, growth in GDP due to expansion of export agriculture was significant. But at a micro level, the magnitude and dimension of economic changes were different with respect to each policy alternative. In the selective export promotion, for instance, only rural households were able to achieve statistically significant income changes. More particularly, about 10 percent of rural households were drawn out of poverty while only 1.7 and 0.5 percent of small and large urban households overcame poverty. When export promotion was assumed to be implemented across the board of all agricultural activities, the welfare gains were extended beyond rural household groups. In this policy alternative, statistically significant mean income changes were observed for both rural and urban household members. Specifically, about 12 percent of rural, 9 percent of small urban and 5 percent of large urban households were able to escape poverty. These achievements were attributed to higher intensification of coffee production and better linkages with other industries to efficiently allocate factors of production where they provided higher rates of return. The increase in income and consumption of millions of coffee dependent households has also stimulated more agricultural and some non-agricultural productions. Simulation results were observed to deteriorate when export promotion was evaluated under world coffee price fluctuation. The negative effect of a price shock, however, was observed to be minimized under alternative an export promotion approach.<br>Ph. D.

How can political science account for the decision of African states to strengthen their ties with China, often at the expense of other alliances and often in the face of economic risks? This thesis explores this question in the context of relations between Ethiopia and China, especially in the context of investments made by Chinese sovereign wealth funds in the Ethiopian economy. To begin to answer this question this thesis recasts the China-Africa debate to focus on African, i.e. Ethiopian, agency. The focus is on how Ethiopia's political leaders make foreign policy decisions and on the factors that shape their preferences. This focus reveals the influence of cognitive variables on their foreign policy decisions; the influence of their guiding ideology, 'revolutionary democracy,' is especially key. An analysis of Ethiopia's formal institutions demonstrates they are inadequate to explain the policy choices of Ethiopian leaders; they have been designed to reflect the concepts of revolutionary democracy. Using the language of prospect theory, a descriptive theory of decision-making under risk, this thesis contends that Ethiopian leaders select foreign policy options by weighing their possible outcomes as gains or losses relative to revolutionary democracy as their reference frame. Ethiopian leaders sanctioned China's finance of the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation despite the monopoly it gave to China and its impact on Ethiopia's debt. They formed a front company between Ethiopia and China's military industrial complexes despite its negative effects on economic development. They opened Ethiopia’s regions to Chinese capital although capital flows only to state-owned enterprises. Yet in each case, ideological objectives were advanced. This examination demonstrates how non-structural factors play a critical role in a bureaucratized state. Theoretical frameworks that account for these factors, like prospect theory, are therefore valuable to more robust understandings of Ethiopia, and Africa's, deepening relations with China.

Throughout the history of capitalism, the process of industrialisation has been recognised as the engine of economic development. No region in the world ‘suffers’ more acutely from a lack of industrialisation than Africa, clearly highlighting the need for industrial policy. However, the formulation of such policies is not straightforward in the current era of globalised production. In recent years, a debate has taken hold over whether the geographical expansion and increased fragmentation of production networks—often referred to as the expansion of global value chains (GVCs)—calls for new approaches to industrial policy in developing countries. By drawing on the case of Ethiopia, this dissertation demonstrates that industrial policy in developing countries needs no new ‘magic bullet’ in the era of expanding GVCs. The dissertation applies a funnelling technique, meaning that each chapter builds on information presented and arguments made in the preceding chapters. Chapter 2 contextualises the importance of manufacturing and industrial policy for economic development in Africa. The chapter argues that the manufacturing sector continues to play an integral role in the process of economic development, and discusses the role of the state in the process of industrialisation, arguing that there are strong justifications for intervention through industrial policy. Chapter 3 looks at how the expansion of GVCs affects the productive structures of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, and asks if industrial policy has to change in this new global production environment. I argue that the fundamental problems of participating in GVCs are the same as when countries like South Korea and Taiwan industrialised between 1960 and 1990, although on a different scale. Chapter 4 analyses Ethiopia’s industrialisation trajectory and GVC-oriented industrial policies in the textile and leather industries. This analysis is based on 6 months of fieldwork in Ethiopia, where I carried out several interviews with stakeholders in the private and public sector and collected and collated datasets on industrial performance in collaboration with government agencies. While the findings of this chapter make an original empirical contribution to explaining the specific case of Ethiopia, the insights provided by the analysis offer broader conceptual conclusions as well.

Ethiopia being one of the countries in the world currently in the most need of help, has the support and financial aid of several countries, many who are part of the European Union. The objective of this essay is to examine the differences in development aid from two of these countries, France and Sweden, to Ethiopia. The compliance to the European Union’s policy for developmental aid is also considered and compared between the two concerning their development aid in Ethiopia. The subject is approached by studying firstly the European Union’s policy for developmental aid. We then examine the manner in which Sweden and France work with developmental aid, both generally in the world and specifically in Ethiopia. It was found that in the general developmental aid, France focused more on international stability and the elimination of poverty while Sweden focused on peace, free trade and democracy. Other than this they were found to have similar goals. We then continue by examining the nature of the projects that are executed by the two countries in Ethiopia and their compliance to the European Union’s policy. A comparison between the works of the two countries is performed throughout the essay to find any differences or similarities. It was found that while both France and Sweden had projects in the same fields of action, some were specific for their respective country as well. It was also found that France seemed to have fewer projects running in Ethiopia than Sweden. A possible cause to this is that the countries prioritize differently since Ethiopia is one of 19 focus countries for developmental aid in France and fourth on the list of countries receiving the most of Sweden’s developmental aid. Both of the two countries’ developmental aid in Ethiopia was largely in compliance with the EU policy.

This paper assesses the dynamics of food insecurity in Ethiopia and tests policy options and scenarios that could alleviate the problem in the future. The study assess food security based on the pillars; food availability, access to food and stability. A System Dynamics model is designed which integrate population, market and food production sectors and is used to analyze past and future developments. Model results show that both the food supplies and the purchasing power of the population were insufficient for ensuring the required daily calorie intake of the population. Land degradation contributed considerably to the poor average productivity of the land. Policy analyses show that policy options such as land rehabilitation and capacity building for skilled use of agricultural land, and inputs need to be combined carefully to account for their different implementation times. Scenarios on average rainfall and food expenditure show that the food production and the purchasing power of the population are considerably influenced by erratic rainfall and economic growth respectively.

Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are under enormous pressure to create more and better jobs for the region’s young and rapidly growing population. This chapter discusses how Africa’s demographic and economic transition differs than other developing regions. It then draws on Timmer’s Four Stages of Agricultural Transformation to conceptualize the unique role of youth participation in modernizing Africa’s agricultural sectors and rural economies. Thematic chapters covering trends in youth migration, national policy, and politics, as well as country case studies are included to shed light on whether the traditional model of agricultural transformation is still relevant for Africa today. Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania feature as case studies due to distinctions in three key components of structural change: agricultural productivity growth, sectoral diversification, and speed of urbanization.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&amp;D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&amp;D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&amp;D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&amp;D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.