Academic literature on the topic 'Eugene Gendlin'

Magister en Psicología Clínica de Adultos<br>La presente investigación es un estudio exploratorio, de análisis y síntesis teórica, que presenta una propuesta de Formulación Procesal de Caso Clínico desde la Psicoterapia Experiencial de E. Gendlin. Para este objetivo, se caracteriza el rol de la Formulación de Caso en psicoterapia, abarcando sus fundamentos teóricos y metodológicos, presentando algunos modelos y discutiendo en torno a sus aportes y limitaciones, a partir de los planteamientos de la Psicoterapia Humanista Existencial. Posteriormente, se presentan los elementos centrales del modelo de la Psicoterapia Experiencial, a fin de comprender el marco para la intervención psicológica desde este enfoque, junto con cimentar las bases para la propuesta de Formulación Procesal de Caso propia de este estudio. Se destaca la contribución que la mirada procesal de la Psicoterapia Experiencial aporta a la herramienta de Formulación de Caso, presentando los elementos que componen su estructura básica y ejemplificando la propuesta a través de un caso clínico

In establishing the core of his psychotherapeutic perspective, Eugene Gendlin constantly refers to the natural sciences in general terms and the behavioural sciences in particular terms, stressing their limitations in addressing human foundations of subjective experience. He argues, for instance, that science does not have concepts or methodologies to properly address the process of bodily felt experiencing. He argues that science is based on the empirical testing of logical statements, and that these impose an artificial order on the natural concretely felt human experience, as if everything was reducible to mathematical formulas. This paper examines Gendlin's arguments on the matter in some detail focusing on Gendlin's 1962 book (Experiencing and the creation of meaning) and 1991 book chapter (Thinking beyond patterns: Body, language, and situations), which contain his main arguments. Gendlin's reference to Logical positivism in his characterization of the ways of science is presented and critically examined. Gendlin's claims to a phenomenological perspective is also presented and critically examined. It is concluded that (1) Gendlin overlooked the possibility that the debate over what science is might not be resolved with the proposals of Logical positivism, (2) that, consequently, he overlooked the possibility that more recent views of what science is might satisfactorily address some or all of the difficulties raised by his possibly outdated view, and (3) that his phenomenology was idiosyncratic rather than profoundly rooted in the philosophical tradition. Popperian Critical Rationalism, as a philosophy of science. is shown to resolve some of the major difficulties noted by Gendlin, and the limitations of this more recent epistemological perspective vis-a-vis the understanding of the conscious flow of human experience are discussed.

This research into Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) presents the results of 60 first-person psycho-phenomenological interviews with 30 New Zealand women. The participants were recruited from the Canterbury and Wellington regions, 10 had recovered. Taking a non-dual, non-reductive embodied approach, the phenomenological data was analysed semiotically, using a graph-theoretical cluster analysis to elucidate the large number of resulting categories, and interpreted through the enactive approach to cognitive science. The initial result of the analysis is a comprehensive exploration of the experience of CFS which develops subject-specific categories of experience and explores the relation of the illness to universal categories of experience, including self, ‘energy’, action, and being-able-to-do. Transformations of the self surrounding being-able-to-do and not-being-able-to-do were shown to elucidate the illness process. It is proposed that the concept ‘energy’ in the participants’ discourse is equivalent to the Mahayana Buddhist concept of ‘contact’. This characterises CFS as a breakdown of contact. Narrative content from the recovered interviewees reflects a reestablishment of contact. The hypothesis that CFS is a disorder of action is investigated in detail. A general model for the phenomenology and functional architecture of action is proposed. This model is a recursive loop involving felt meaning, contact, action, and perception and appears to be phenomenologically supported. It is proposed that the CFS illness process is a dynamical decompensation of the subject’s action loop caused by a breakdown in the process of contact. On this basis, a new interpretation of neurological findings in relation to CFS becomes possible. A neurological phenomenon that correlates with the illness and involves a brain region that has a similar structure to the action model’s recursive loop is identified in previous research results and compared with the action model and the results of this research. This correspondence may identify the brain regions involved in the illness process, which may provide an objective diagnostic test for the condition and approaches to treatment. The implications of this model for cognitive science and CFS should be investigated through neurophenomenological research since the model stands to shed considerable light on the nature of consciousness, contact and agency. Phenomenologically based treatments are proposed, along with suggestions for future research on CFS. The research may clarify the diagnostic criteria for CFS and guide management and treatment programmes, particularly multidimensional and interdisciplinary approaches. Category theory is proposed as a foundation for a mathematisation of phenomenology.

This thesis discusses the explication of the implicit side of language, from the perspective of the self, the social, and the text, as situated in the wider context of thinking about language 'beyond post-modernism.' Language is first discussed as an intricacy, an intricate and changing complex of explicit signs and implicit elements and processes. It is shown that the implicit processes, such the speaking of being (Heidegger), focusing (Gendlin), and the interrelatedness of language and culture (Agar), are ruptured by processes like deconstruction (Derrida) and the semiotic breach of the symbolic (Kristeva). Explication brings a part of the implicit to the surface in the form of creativity (Deleuze) and critique, which is also discussed in the examples of play (Gadamer) and care. The transformations involved are illustrated in reflections on writing (Plato), poetry (Trakl), life as immigrant, and on translation as a philosophical practice.