Academic literature on the topic 'Européens Tunisie Tunisie'

AbstractA politicalspringis an abrupt, broad, sustained increase in public dissent in a state that has prohibited it, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Tunisia in early 2011. Some springs produce offspring – clusters of events within neighbouring states (civic unrest, increased state repression, co-option of dissent, revolution) and among those states (intensification of international rivalries, foreign interventions). An English Spring in 1558–9 produced such a cluster in Northwestern Europe. This article addresses the underlying causal mechanism connecting springs and their offspring, rather than the related correlational question (viz. under what conditions a spring is followed by offspring). That mechanism istransnational group polarisation, or the progressive separation of preferences across a population into pro- and anti-government groups. Transnational polarisation along a pro-versus-anti-government axis is an endogenous process triggered by exogenous events, such as violence or public demonstrations that raise the status of, or threat to, one of the groups. It presents powerful actors across states with new threats and opportunities and can help explain how the Tunisian Spring of early 2011 produced throughout the Arab Middle East infectious unrest, serial repressions and reforms, heightened international tensions, and foreign interventions.

Introduction: The procedures and requirements for the clinical trial application (CTA) to Ethics Committees (ECs) and/or Competent Authorities (CAs) are not fully harmonised, and this is even more evident when non-EU countries are involved. This lack of harmonisation makes more difficult the approach in the case of 'small populations', such as children and patients affected by rare diseases. A phase III efficacy-safety comparative trial (DEEP-2) involving paediatric patients affected by transfusion dependent haemoglobinopathies from seven European and non-European countries (Albania, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom, Egypt, Tunisia) was carried out in the context of a FP7 project (HEALTH-F4-2010-G.A. n. 261483) and included in an agreed Paediatric Investigation Plan. Aims: The aims of this paper are to describe in a complex multi-national/multi-ethnic framework the different provisions and procedures to authorise a paediatric trial in EU/non-EU countries and to evaluate the possible impact of the following key indicators on the timing of ECs approval and CAs authorisation: complexity of the national/local provisions and procedures to authorise a paediatric trial, including the number of ECs and CAs to be addressed; number and type of additional local/national documentation; number of queries from CAs and ECs; geographic setting (EU and non-EU). Methods: The following information was collected from official websites and through a survey addressed to Principal Investigators: The regulatory and legal frameworks in force at the time of the submission of DEEP-2 in each involved country;The procedures required at local/national level (i.e. number of ECs and CAs to be addressed, parallel or subsequent submission to the CA and the EC, preparation of the CTA form and documents required from CAs and ECs);The timing of ECs approval and CAs authorisation, including number and types of queries, were collected from DEEP-2 Trial Master File. Descriptive analysis, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test and General Linear Model (GLM) analysis were used to describe results and to analyse significance of the considered indicators. Results: In the EU countries, relevant legislative acts apply and include GCP and specific procedures for paediatric trials, in non-EU countries GCP guidelines apply but have not been implemented in the national laws regulating clinical trials. Moreover, within the 4 EU Member States a different approach was in place, even if under the same rules (i.e. Directive 2001/20/EC as implemented in the national law) with distinctive documents required for the CTA in almost all the EU countries compared with the EC provisions. The CTAs were performed in the period June 2012 - September 2015 in 23 trial sites. The EC approvals and CA authorisations were issued between January 2013 - September 2015. In the EU countries, the authorisation process was completed within 7,3 to 33,8 months (median = 15 months), while in non-EU countries, the authorisation process was completed by 7 months (median = 4 months) (figure 1). In particular, the comparison of the CA time authorisation shows a significant difference between EU and non-EU clusters (p = 0.001); however, if the statistical model is adjusted for the number of EC requests as covariate, the difference is not significant. Thus, it seems that the main factor influencing the time for EC approval is the number of requests for changes/clarifications (mainly on informed consent/assent, study protocol, insurance) (figure 2). Conclusion: Delays in completion of the authorisation phase in many countries seems to be a relevant issue and the timeframes for the authorisation in EU countries are not compliant with the European requirements (60 days for single opinion release and 30 days for its acceptance, as stated in Directive 2001/20/EC). The main reasons for delay is the complexity of the procedures and the requests from the ECs/CAs. In non-EU countries, procedures are different and faster with less requests from ECs and CAs. The upcoming application of a stronger set of rules, CT-Regulation (EU) 536/2014, is expected to harmonise practices in Europe and possibly outside Europe. The final aim of this change should be to assure a good balance between a timely approval and a high-level of children protection. Disclosures Reggiardo: CVBF: Consultancy. Tricta:ApoPharma: Employment.

The concept of war is inextricably linked to violence, and military action almost always resounds with the emotion and language of rage. Since the War on Terror began in September 2001, post-9/11 expressions of terror and rage have influenced academics to evaluate rage and its meanings (Gildersleeve and Gehrmann). Of course, it has directly influenced the lives of those affected by global conflicts in war-torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa. The populace there has reacted violently to military invasions with a deep sense of rage, while in the affluent West, rage has also infiltrated everyday life through clothes, haircuts, and popular culture as military chic became ‘all the rage’ (Rall 177). Likewise, post-9/11 popular films directly tap into rage and violence to explain (or justify?) conflict and war. The film version of the life of United States Iraq veteran Chris Kyle in American Sniper (2014) reveals fascinating depictions of rage through the perspective of a highly trained shooter who waits patiently above the battlefield, watching for hours before taking human life with a carefully planned long-distance shot. The significance of the complexities of rage as presented in this film are discussed later. Foundations of Rage: Colonial Legacy, Arab Spring, and ISISThe War on Terror may have purportedly began with the rage of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda missions and the responding rage of George Bush’s America determined to seek vengeance for 9/11, but the rage simmering in the Middle East has deeper origins. This includes: the rejection of the Shah of Iran's secular dictatorship in 1979, the ongoing trauma of an Arab Palestinian state that was promised in 1947, and the blighted hopes of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalism that offered so much in the 1950s but failed to deliver. But these events should not be considered in isolation from events of the whole 20th century, in particular the betrayal of Arab nationalism by the Allied forces, especially Britain and France after the First World War. The history of injustice that Robert Fisk has chronicled in a monumental volume reveals the complexity and nuances of an East-West conflict that continued to fracture the Middle East. In a Hollywood-based film such as American Sniper it is easy to depict the region from a Western perspective without considering the cycle of injustice and oppression that gave birth to the rage that eventually lashed out at the West. Rage can also be rage against war, or rage about the mistreatment of war victims. The large-scale protests against the war before the 2003 Iraq invasion have faded into apparent nothingness, despite nearly two decades of war. Protest rage appears to have been replaced by outrage on behalf of the victims of war; the refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and those displaced by the ever- spreading conflict that received a new impetus in 2011 with the Arab Spring democracy movements. One spark point for rage ignited when Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi embarked on his act of self-immolation in protest against harassment by public officials. This moment escalated into a kaleidoscope of collective rage as regimes were challenged from Syria to Libya, but met with a tragic aftermath. Sadly, democratic governments did not emerge, but turned into regimes of extremist violence exemplified in the mediaeval misogynistic horror now known as ISIS, or IS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Hassan). This horror intensified as millions of civilised Syrians and Iraqis sought to flee their homelands. The result was the movement of peoples, which included manipulation by ruthless people smugglers and detention by governments determined to secure borders — even even as this eroded decades of consensus on the rights of refugees. One central image, that of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi’s corpse washed up on a beach (Smith) should invoke open rage. Here, the incongruity was that a one-time Turkish party beach for affluent 18 to 35-year-olds from Western Europe would signify the death place of a Syrian refugee child, now displaced by war. The historical significance of East/West conflicts in the Middle East, recent events post- Arab Spring, the resulting refugee crisis in the region, and global anti-war protests should be foremost when examining Clint Eastwood's film about an American military sniper in Iraq.Hot Rage and Cold Rage Recent mass shootings in the United States have delineated factions within the power of rage: it seems to blow either hot or cold. US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan was initially calm when he embarked on a public expression of rage, wounding 30 people and murdering 13 others in a mass shooting event in 2009 (MacAskill). Was this to be categorised as the rage of a nihilist, an Islamist - or as just another American mass shooting like events in Orlando or Sandy Hook? The war journalist and film maker Sebastian Junger authored a study on belonging, where he linked mass shootings (or rampage killings) to social stress and disunity, as a “tendency rising steadily in the US since the 1980s” (115-116). In contrast, the actions of a calm and isolated shooter on a rooftop can be justified as acceptable behaviour if this occurs during war. Now in the case of Chris Kyle, he normalised his tale of calm killing, as an example identified by action “built on a radically asymmetric violence” (Pomarede 53).Enemy at the Gates The point is that sniper killings can be presented in film as morally good. For example, the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates portrays a duel of two snipers in Stalingrad, Russia. This is a fictionalised contest of a fictionalised event, because there was only tangential evidence that Russian sniper hero Vasily Zaytsev actually engaged in a three-day sniper duel with his German enemy during the Second World War. Enemy at the Gates presents the sniper as an acceptable figure in mass popular culture (or even a hero?), which provides the justification for American Sniper. However, in this instance, viewers could recognise a clear struggle between good and evil.Politically, Enemy at the Gates, whether viewed from a conservative or a progressive perspective, presents a struggle between a soldier of the allies (the Soviet Union) and the forces of Nazism, undeniably the most evil variant of fascism. We can interpret this as a defence of the communist heartland, or the defence of a Russian motherland, or the halting of Nazi aggression at its furthest expansion point. Whichever way it is viewed, the Russian sniper is a good man, and although in the movie’s plot the actor Ralph Fiennes as political commissar injects a dimension of manipulation and Stalinist authoritarian control, this does not detract from the idea of the hero defeating evil with single aimed shots. There is rage, but it is overshadowed by the moral ‘good.’American Sniper The true story of Chris Kyle is quite simple. A young man grows up in Texas with ‘traditional’ American values, tries sport and University, tries ranch life, and joins the US Navy Special Forces. He becomes a SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) team member, and is trained as a specialist sniper. Kyle excels as a sniper in Iraq, where he self-identifies as America's most successful sniper. He kills a lot of enemies in Iraq, experiences multiple deployments followed by the associated trauma of reintegration to family life and redeployment, suffers from PTSD, returns to civilian life in America and is himself shot dead by a distressed veteran, in an ironic act of rage. Admired by many, the veracity of Kyle’s story is challenged by others, a point I will return to. As noted above, Kyle kills a lot of people, many of whom are often unaware of his existence. In his book On Killing, Lieutenant-Colonel David Grossman notes this a factor that actually causes the military to have a “degree of revulsion towards snipers” (109), which is perhaps why the movie version of Kyle’s life promotes a rehabilitation of the military in its “unambiguous advocacy of the humility, dedication, mastery, and altruism of the sniper” as hero (Beck 218). Most enlisted soldiers never actually kill their enemies, but Kyle kills well over 100 while on duty.The 2012 book memoir of United States Navy sniper Chris Kyle at war in Iraq became a national cultural artefact. The film followed in 2014, allowing the public dramatisation of this to offer a more palatable form for a wider audience. It is noted that military culture at the national level is malleable and nebulous (Black 42), and these constructs are reflected in the different variants of American Sniper. These cultural products are absorbed differently when consumed by the culture that has produced them (the military), as compared to the way that they are consumed by the general public, and the book American Sniper reflects this. Depending upon readers’ perspectives, it is a book of raw honesty or nationalistic jingoism, or perhaps both. The ordinary soldier’s point of view is reiterated and directed towards a specifically American audience. Despite controversy and criticism the book was immensely successful, with weeks on the New York Times bestseller list. While it naturally appealed to many in its primary American audience, from an Australian perspective, the jingoism of this book jars. In fact, it really jars a lot, to the point of being quite challenging to read. That Australian readers would have difficulty with this text is probably appropriate, because after all, the book was not created for Australians but for Americans.On the other hand, Americans have produced balanced accounts of the soldier experience in Iraq. A very different exemplar is Garry Trudeau’s Doonesbury blog that became the book The Sandbox (2007). Here American men and women soldiers wrote their own very revealing stories about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in autobiographical accounts that ranged from nuanced explanations of the empathy for the soldier’s predicament, to simple outright patriotism. TIn their first-hand accounts of war showed a balance of ordinary pathos, humour – and the raw brutality of a soldier finding the neck stem of a human spine on the ground after a suicide bomb attack (Trudeau 161) – and even this seems more palatable to read than American Sniper. A similar book on the US military sniper experience (Cavallaro and Larsen) also shows it is possible to incorporate a variety of perspectives without patriotic jingoism, or even military propaganda being predominant.In contrast to the book, the film American Sniper narrates a more muted story. The movie is far more “saccharine”, in the words of critical Rolling Stone reviewer Matt Taibbi, but still reflects a nationalistic attitude to war and violence — appropriate to the mood of the book. American producer/director Clint Eastwood has developed his own style for skipping around the liminal space that exists between thought-provoking analysis and populism, and American Sniper is no exception. The love story of Chris Kyle and his wife Taya looks believable, and the intensity of military training and war fighting, including the dispassionate thoughts of Kyle as sniper, are far more palatable in the film version than as the raw words on the page.The Iraq War impacted on millions of Americans, and it is the compelling images shown re-living Chris Kyle’s funeral at the film’s conclusion that leaves a lasting message. The one-time footballer’s memorial service is conducted in a Texas football stadium and this in itself is poignant: but it is the thousands of people who lined the highway overpasses for over 200 miles to farewell him and show respect as his body travels towards the funeral in the stadium, that gives us an insight into the level of disenchantment and rage at America’s loss. This is a rage fuelled by losing their military ‘empire’ coupled with a traumatised search for meaning that Jerry Lembcke sees as inextricably linked to US national failure in war and the tragedy of an individual soldier’s PTSD. Such sentiments seem intimately connected to Donald Trump’s version of America, and its need to exercise global power. Kyle died before Trump’s election, but it seems evident that such rage, anger and alienation experienced by a vast segment of the American population contributed to the election result (Kluger). Calm Cold Calculation Ironically, the traditional sniper embodies the antithesis of hot-blooded rage. Firing any long- distance range weapon with accuracy requires discipline, steady breathing and intense muscle control. Olympic shooting or pentathlons demonstrate this, and Gina Cavallaro and Matt Larsen chronicle both sniper training and the sniper experience in war. So, the notion of sniper shooting and rage can only coexist if we accept that rage becomes the cold, calculating rage of a person doing a highly precise job when killing enemies. In the book, Kyle clearly has no soldierly respect for his Iraqi insurgent enemies and is content to shoot them down one by one. In the film, there is greater emphasis on Kyle having more complex emotions based around the desire to protect his fellow soldiers by shooting in a calm and detached fashion at his designated targets.Chris Kyle’s determination to kill his enemies regardless of age or gender seems at odds with the calm detached passivity of the sniper. The long-distance shooter should be dispassionate but Kyle experiences rage as he kills to protect his fellow soldiers. Can we argue he exhibits ‘cold rage’ not ‘hot rage’, but rage none the less? It would certainly seem so. War Hero and Fantasist?In life, as in death, Chris Kyle presents a figure of controversy, being praised by the political far right, yet condemned by a diverse coalition that included radicals, liberals, and even conservatives such as former soldier Michael Fumento. Fumento commented that Kyle’s literary embellishments and emphasis on his own prowess denigrated the achievements of fellow American snipers. Reviewer Lindy West described him as “a hate filled killer”, only to become a recipient of rage and hatred from Kyle supporters. Paul Rieckhoff described the film as not the most complex nor deepest nor provocative, but the best film made about the Iraq war for its accuracy in storytelling and attention to detail.Elsewhere, reviewer Mark Kermode argues that the way the film is made introduces a significant ambiguity: that we as an audience can view Kyle as either a villain, a hero, or a combination of both. Critics have also examined Kyle’s reportage on his military exploits, where it seems he received less fewer medals than he claimed, as well as his ephemeral assertion that he shot looters in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Lamothe). In other claims, the US courts have upheld the assertion of former wrestler turned politician Jesse Ventura that Kyle fabricated a bar-room brawl between the two. But humans are complex beings, and Drew Blackburn sees it as “entirely plausible to become both a war hero and a liar” in his candid (Texas-based) assessment of one person who was, like many of us, a multifaceted figure.Conclusion This article has addressed the complicated issues of rage originating in the historical background of military actions that have taken place in the East/West conflicts in the Middle East that began in the region after the Second World War, and continue to the present day. Rage has become a popular trope within popular culture as military chic becomes ‘all the rage’. Rage is inextricably linked to the film American Sniper. Patriotism and love of his fellow soldiers motivated Chris Kyle, and his determination to kill his country’s enemies in Iraq and protect the lives of his fellow American soldiers is clear, as is his disdain for both his Iraqi allies and enemies. With an ever- increasing number of mass shootings in the United States, the military sniper will be a hero revered by some and a villain reviled by others. Rage infuses the film American Sniper, whether the rage of battle, rage at the moral dilemmas his role demands, domestic rage between husband and wife, PTSD rage, or rage inspired following his pointless murder. But rage, even when it expresses a complex vortex of emotions, remains dangerous for those who are obsessed with guns, and look to killing others either as a ‘duty’ or to soothe an individual crisis of confidence. ReferencesAmerican Sniper. Dir. Clint Eastwood. Warner Brothers, 2014.Beck, Bernard. “If I Forget Thee: History Lessons in Selma, American Sniper, and A Most Violent Year.” Multicultural Perspectives 17.4 (2015): 215-19.Black, Jeremy. War and the Cultural Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.Blackburn, Drew. “How We Talk about Chris Kyle.” Texas Monthly 2 June 2016. 18 Feb. 2019 <https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/chris-kyle-rorschach/>.Cavallaro, Gina, and Matt Larsen. Sniper: American Single-Shot Warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Guildford, Connecticut: Lyons, 2010. Enemy at the Gates. Dir. Jean-Jaques Annaud. Paramount/Pathe, 2001.Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.Fumento, Michael. “American Sniper’s Myths and Misrepresentations.” The American Conservative 13 Mar. 2015. 18 Feb. 2019 <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/clint-eastwoods-fabricated-sniper/>.Gildersleeve, Jessica, and Richard Gehrmann. “Memory and the Wars on Terror”. Memory and the Wars on Terror: Australian and British Perspectives. Eds. Jessica Gildersleeve and Richard Gehrmann. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 1-19.Grossman, Dave. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995.Hassan, Hassan. “The True Origins of ISIS.” The Atlantic 30 Nov. 2018. 17 Feb. 2019 <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/>.Kermode, Mark. “American Sniper Review – Bradley Cooper Stars in Real-Life Tale of Legendary Marksman.” The Guardian 18 Jan. 2015. 18 Feb. 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/jan/18/american-sniper-review-bradley-cooper-real-life-tale-legendary-marksman>.Kluger, Jeffrey. “America's Anger Is Out of Control.” TIME 1 June 2016. 17 Feb. 2019 <http://time.com/4353606/anger-america-enough-already>.Kyle, Chris. American Sniper. New York: Harper, 2012. Junger, Sebastian. Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging. London: Fourth Estate, 2016.Lamothe, Dan. “How ‘American Sniper’ Chris Kyle’s Truthfulness Is in Question Once Again.” 25 May 2016. 19 Feb. 2019 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/05/25/how-american-sniper-chris-kyles-truthfulness-is-in-question-once-again/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d8806f2b8d3a>.Lembcke, Jerry. PTSD: Diagnosis and Identity in Post-Empire America. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.Pomarède, Julien. “Normalizing Violence through Front-Line Stories: The Case of American Sniper.” Critical Military Studies 4.1 (2018): 52-71. Rall, Denise N. “Afterword: The Military in Contemporary Fashion.” Fashion and War in Popular Culture. Ed. Denise N. Rall. Bristol: Intellect, 2014. 177-179. Rieckhoff, Paul. “A Veteran's View of American Sniper.” Variety 16 Jan. 2015. 19 Feb. 2019 <https://variety.com/2015/film/opinion/a-veterans-view-of-american-sniper-guest-column-1201406349/>.Smith, Heather, and Richard Gehrmann. “Branding the Muscled Male Body as Military Costume.” Fashion and War in Popular Culture. Ed. Denise N. Rall. Bristol: Intellect, 2014. 57-71.Smith, Helena. “Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Refugees.” The Guardian 2 Sep. 2015. 17 Feb. 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees>.Stanford, David (ed.). The Sandbox: Dispatches from Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kansas City: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 2007.Taibbi, Matt. “American Sniper Is Almost Too Dumb to Criticise.” Rolling Stone 21 Jan. 2015. <https://www.rollingstone.com/movies/movie-news/american-sniper-is-almost-too-dumb-to-criticize-240955/>.Trudeau, Garry B. The Sandbox: Dispatches from Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kansas City: Andrew McMeel Publishing, 2007.West, Lindy. “The Real American Sniper Was a Hate-Filled Killer: Why Are Simplistic Patriots Treating Him as a Hero?” The Guardian 6 Jan. 2015. 19 Feb. 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/06/real-american-sniper-hate-filled-killer-why-patriots-calling-hero-chris-kyle>.

Travailler sur la Tunisie dans les expositions universelles du XIXème siècle permet d'articuler une réflexion sur les expositions comme révélatrices d'un mouvement de mondialisation à une interrogation sur les mutations des rapports entre Orient et Occident. Le choix de l'Afrique du Nord permet d'analyser un Orient proche, connu des Européens au milieu du XIXe siècle mais gardant des zones d'ombre, favorables à la création de fantasmes et à la fabrication de stéréotypes. Cette étude permet d'appréhender une diplomatie des expositions tunisiennes qui se déroule sur fonds de réformes et de crise financière. Quels sont les transferts culturels et techniques, réalisés ou montrés par la régence de Tunis, à l'occasion des expositions ? Quels sont les intermédiaires, les diplomates officiels et officieux, qui organisent les expositions tunisiennes avant 1881 ? L'analyse d'une Tunisie colonisée permet ensuite d'examiner dans quelle mesure la perte de souveraineté politique de la régence a un impact sur sa représentation internationale dans le cadre des expositions universelles. L'exposition de la Tunisie voulue par la France est celle d'un modèle colonial - le protectorat - et celle d'un pays oriental original, qui demeure exotique et pittoresque, comme doivent le montrer les nombreux Tunisiens devenus professionnels de l'animation des expositions universelles et coloniales
Working on Tunisia at the world fairs of the XIXth century enables us to combine a reflection on fairs as an indicator of a trend towards globalization with an investigation on the change of relationships between the east and the west. Choosing North Africa enables us to analyze the near east, familiar to Europeans in the mid XIXth century, but still containing grey areas giving rise to fantasy and manufactoring stereotypes. This study helps to understand tunisian fairs as diplomacy taking place against a backdrop of reforms and financial crisis. What are the cultural and technical transfers, performed or displayed by the regency of Tunis, on the occasion of the fairs ? Who are the intermediaries, official and unofficial diplomats who organize fairs in Tunisia before 1881 ? The analysis of Tunisia under colonial rule can then show us to what extent the loss of the political sovereignty of the regency has an impact on its international representation within the world fairs. France wanted to show Tunisia as a colonial model - that of the protectorate - and as an original oriental contry, wich remains exotic and colonial fairs

L'objectif de cette recherche est d'évaluer la compétitivité du secteur textile-habillement en Tunisie afin d'identifier les moyens de consolider son positionnement compétitif, de manière à résister au nouveau contexte mondial, marqué par l'élargissement de l'Europe aux pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale (PECO) et par le démantèlement des quotas survenu le 1er janvier 2005, qui a entraîné l'irruption mondiale des produits en provenance de Chine. Pour traiter cette question, nous avons procédé à une analyse comparative de la compétitivité prix et hors-prix de cette industrie entre la Tunisie et les PECO. Afin de mettre en évidence les mécanismes réels qui fondent la compétitivité du textile-habillement tunisien, nous avons dû croiser deux approches complémentaires. Tout d'abord, l'étude de la compétitivité objective de l'offre tunisienne et Est-européenne, en nous appuyant sur les données relatives aux environnements industriels, économiques, sociaux et réglementaires. Ensuite, nous avons évalué la compétitivité perçue de l'industrie tunisienne et Est-européenne à travers les points de vue respectifs des acteurs économiques, et ce, en nous appuyant sur les résultats d'une campagne d'interviews semi-directives auprès de donneurs d'ordre français, de chefs d'entreprises tunisiennes ainsi que d'experts internationaux du secteur. L'analyse croisée montre que l'avancée enregistrée par les PECO sur le marché européen serait imputable aux nombreux avantages comparatifs qu'ils offrent aux investisseurs étrangers tels que des coûts salariaux plus compétitifs et une meilleure qualification de la main d'oeuvre. Cette analyse montre, par ailleurs, que la compétitivité tunisienne est entravée, notamment par la faible capacité du secteur textile et son faible potentiel de créativité. Il apparaît, en outre, d'après les premières statistiques de l'année 2005, que la Roumanie et la Bulgarie sont relativement moins vulnérables que la Tunisie et semblent mieux résister face à la Chine et au démantèlement des quotas. Il ressort de cette étude que la Tunisie doit restructurer ce secteur selon un plan stratégique qui doit comporter notamment les éléments suivants : valorisation de l'offre des entreprises tunisiennes afin de l'affranchir d'une logique pénalisante de sous-traitance et regroupement des industriels tunisiens performants à travers la constitution de plate-formes dédiées à l'exportation
This research focuses on the evaluation of the textile-clothing sector's competitiveness in Tunisia in order to identify the necessary ways to consolidate its competitive position, so as to better respond to the new world context, marked by the enlargement of Europe to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC's) and by the total removal of quotas on January 2005, which have generated a world irruption on Chinese goods. To treat this question, we proceeded to a comparative analysis of both price and out-price competitiveness of such an industry between Tunisia and the CEEC's. In order to highlight the real mechanisms which found the competitiveness of Tunisian textile-clothing, we have crossed two complementary approaches. First, we studied the objective competitiveness of the East-European and Tunisian supplies based on regulation, social, economical and industrial environment data. Second, we evaluated the competitiveness perceived of Tunisian and East-European industry through the respective points of view of the economic actors based on the results of a campaign of semi-directive interviews near French clients, heads of Tunisian enterprises as well as international experts of the sector. The cross analysis showed that the performance recorded by the CEEC's on the European market would ascribable to the numerous comparative advantages that they offer to foreign investors such as more competitive wage costs and a better-qualified labour force. This analysis showed also that the Tunisian competitiveness seems impeded by the weakness of its textile sector capacity and its low potential of creativity. In addition, the 2005 first statistics showed that Bulgaria and Rumania are relatively less vulnerable than Tunisia and seem better resisting to China competition and to the total removal of quotas. We concluded that Tunisia must rethink its International Market Position by rebuilding a new strategic plan based on the valorisation of the Tunisian companies supply in order to free it from subcontracting penalty logic and regrouping performant Tunisian industrials through the constitution of platforms dedicated to export

La comparaison des systèmes d'inventaire du patrimoine archéologique en France, Espagne, Grande-Bretagne et Tunisie consiste à observer l'organisation et les résultats de ces inventaires, au niveau national lorsqu'il existe, ou le cas échéant, au niveau régional. Il s'agit d'identifier, pour chaque pays, le mode de réalisation d'une base de données, dont les objectifs sont la protection et la mise en valeur du patrimoine archéologique. Ainsi, la naissance des premiers recensements, le cadre réglementaire, la structure institutionnelle, les conditions d'accessibilité, et la forme actuelle des inventaires ont été observés. L'analyse critique des différents cas, à l'issue des descriptions et des tests, permet de mettre en avant des paramètres conditionnant d'une part, l'existence réelle d'un inventaire national du patrimoine archéologique, d'autre part, le niveau d'accessibilité des données regroupées par ces inventaires.

L'etude porte sur deux types de matiere organique: l'une provient des sediments argileux et phosphates du bassin de gafsa-metlaoui en tunisie, l'autre est une serie de charbon presentant tous les stades de houillification et provenant du bassin houiller lorrain. On utilise la spectrometrie de resonance paramagnetique electronique et la spectrometrie infra-rouge a transformee de fourier (irtf) afin de determiner les groupements presents et la structure du materiau

Entre l'année 1800, date de l'occupation de Malte par la Grande Bretagne et 1896, année signifiante par bien des aspects pour l'organisation de cet espace ne serait-ce qu'en raison de l'onde de choc qu'a constitué la défaite italienne d'Adoua, l'espace du canal de Sicile fut un enjeu de la compétition internationale qui échappait encore à l'emprise des puissances méditerranéennes. On n'a pas assez connaissance du fait que les migrations au XIXe siècle prenaient une direction exactement contraire à celles qui existent de nos jours dans le canal de Sicile car les territoires africains semblaient alors nettement plus prometteurs du point de vue des migrants. Le canal de Sicile n'était pas alors jaugé uniquement à l'aune du contrôle plus ou moins efficace qui y était exercé. Les tentatives de prise en main étatiques et les enjeux des zones exclusives n'étaient alors que tâtonnants. En fait, il est possible de l'envisager comme un espace qui a été partagé entre des populations riveraines qui ne vivaient pas toujours en bonne harmonie mais qui cohabitaient. L'espace compris entre la Sicile et la Tunisie était donc un espace partagé caractérisé par l'importance des circulations. Comment s'organisaient les passages? Quels étaient les ressorts des migrations? Les îles et les insulaires présents constituaient une composante essentielle de ces mouvements. Pourtant au fil du siècle, les puissances européennes ont tenté de prendre le contrôle de cet espace car la maîtrise des passages entre l’ Afrique et l’Europe mais surtout entre l’ouest et l’est de la Méditerranée, avait commencé à apparaître fondamentale. Comment ces tentatives de mainmises se sont-elles manifestées?

Cette recherche se propose d'étudier les spécificités de l’intégration des systèmes d’information dans les alliances stratégiques asymétriques. Il s’agit, plus particulièrement, d’analyser l’articulation de la forme organisationnelle de l’alliance avec le choix des partenaires de leur niveau d’intégration informationnelle. Fondé sur une analyse qualitative de dix cas d’alliances entre des entreprises européennes et tunisiennes, le dispositif de recherche adopté a reposé sur cinquante neuf entretiens semi-directifs répartis entre partenaires européens et tunisiens complétés par une analyse documentaire. Il ressort de cette recherche que les alliés doivent définir leur niveau d’intégration informationnelle en cohérence avec la forme organisationnelle retenue, leur degré d’interdépendance ainsi qu'avec la nature de l'intégration organisationnelle convenue. Ce niveau d’intégration est le plus souvent déterminé par le partenaire étranger de l’alliance qui peut amener son partenaire local à mettre en place un nouveau système d’information permettant de l'impliquer davantage dans l’activité développée conjointement sans pour autant avoir nécessairement participé au capital
This research aims to study the specificities of the integration of information systems in asymmetric strategic alliances. The objective is mainly to understand how the alliance form determines the scope of information system integration. Thus, we adopt a qualitative methodology based on 10 case studies of Euro-Tunisian strategic alliances. 59 semi-structured interviews between Tunisian partners and European partners were conducted to meet our research objective. Our results highlight that the development of interdependencies between the asymmetric alliance partners is likely to reduce gaps and minimize opportunistic behavior. Also, the level of integration of Information Systems varies according to many criteria such as the organizational form of the alliance, the level of interdependence between partners and the type of their organizational integration

Le commerce électronique B to C se popularise de plus en plus et le nombre de ses adeptes ne cesse de croître d'année en année. Ses avantages, pour les consommateurs, en termes de rapidité, de commodité et de proximité ne sont plus à prouver. Néanmoins, la particularité du medium utilisé pour effectuer des transactions en ligne et les spécificités de l'environnement électronique, notamment l'immatérialité, l'interactivité et l'internationalité influent considérablement sur la confiance des cyberconsommateurs en même temps qu'elles accroissent leur vulnérabilité, d'où la nécessité d'un cadre juridique adapté afin que l'essor du commerce électronique B to C ne néglige pas la protection des cyberconsommateurs. Conscients de cet impératif, les législateurs communautaire, français et tunisien, ont mis en place un certain nombre de mesures de nature à rassurer ces derniers et leur permettre de s'engager dans des transactions de commerce en ligne en toute confiance. Ces mesures sont de deux ordres : les unes sont destinées à assurer au cyberconsommateur une protection intrinsèque au processus de la transaction en ligne ; cette protection se manifeste en amont de la transaction, lors de la phase précontractuelle, mais également pendant la période contractuelle, c'est-à-dire au moment de la finalisation de la transaction en ligne et de son exécution. Les autres ont pour objectif de garantir au consommateur une protection extrinsèque au processus de la transaction du commerce électronique. Deux aspects sont, à cet égard, pris en compte : la protection des données à caractère personnel traitées dans le cadre d'une transaction en ligne et les aspects du droit international privé de la protection du cyberconsommateur
B to C e-commerce is increasingly gaining popularity. The number of its followers has seen a drastic surge throughout the few recent years. Its advantages in terms of speed, convenience and proximity are not any more questionable by consumers. Nevertheless, the characteristic of this medium used to carry out online transactions as well as the specificities of the electronic environment - in particular the immateriality, the interactivity and internationality - influence considerably cyber-consumers confidence. Simultaneously, they increase their vulnerability. Thus, the need for an appropriate legal framework to regulate the rise of B to C e-commerce and protect cyber-consumers. Taking into account these requirement, community, French and Tunisian legislators set up a number of measures to reassure the latter and allow them to engage confidently in online commerce transactions. These measures have two targets: some of them were intended to grant cyber-consumers an intrinsic protection in the process of the online transaction. This protection is set to be an upstream transaction protection at the pre-contractual phase as well as during the contractual period; i.e. at the level of on line transaction finalization and execution. The others aim to guarantee the consumer an extrinsic protection throughout the process of e-commerce transaction. In this respect, two aspects are taken into account, namely: personal data processed during transactions and the aspects of private international law of cyber-consumer protection

Why did the last of the major European campaigns to reclaim Jerusalem wind up attacking Tunis, a peaceful North African port city thousands of miles from the Holy Land? In the first book-length study of the campaign in English, Michael Lower tells the story of how the classic era of crusading came to such an unexpected end. Unfolding against a backdrop of conflict and collaboration that extended from England to Inner Asia, the Tunis Crusade entangled people from every corner of the Mediterranean world. Within this expansive geographical playing field, the ambitions of four powerful Mediterranean dynasts would collide. While the slave-boy-turned-sultan Baybars of Egypt and the saint-king Louis IX of France waged a bitter battle for Syria, al-Mustansir of Tunis and Louis’s younger brother Charles of Anjou struggled for control of the Sicilian Straits. When the conflicts over Syria and Sicily became intertwined in the late 1260s, the Tunis Crusade was the shocking result. While the history of the crusades is often told only from the crusaders’ perspective, in The Tunis Crusade of 1270, Lower brings Arabic and European-language sources together to offer a panoramic view of these complex multilateral conflicts. Standing at the intersection of two established bodies of scholarship—European History and Near Eastern Studies—The Tunis Crusade of 1270, contributes to both by opening up a new conversation about the place of crusading in medieval Mediterranean culture.

This chapter surveys the limited evidence on Islamic palatial architecture in the Western Mediterranean during the Early Modern Period. Northern Africa was weakly incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as the Barbary States. In the capital cities– Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers – leaders took on the trappings of traditional Islamic rulers and preserved the earlier architectural styles and concepts of space in their palace designs. In Morocco a succession of Berber and Arab dynasties resisted the Ottomans and united the far-western Maghreb. These rulers underpinned their rule by religious ideology and built huge palatial cities featuring a diversity of architectural forms at the “royal cities” (Fes, Marrakesh, Rabat and Méknes) – though, for the most part, the chief typologies and spatial concepts were developed in previous centuries. Towards the end of the period, the growing influence of European colonialism brought an end to the tradition of Islamic architecture in both regions.

This paper explores two interlinked questions: why Tunisia and Egypt were faced with the international financial control after their default in 1868 and 1876, and why the international financial control eventually led to the colonization of these two polities by France and Britain in 1881 and 1882. The chapter maintains that the emergence of international financial control was a multilateral solution to a range of private financial claims against the Egyptian and Tunisian governments following defaults. Yet, international financial control organizations were unable to successfully address the conflicting interests among foreign bondholders, as the existence of foreign bondholders from different European powers acted as a check over the concentration of the power in the hands of a single European country. Only after colonization, when the legal pluralism and multilateral nature of the financial control organizations came to an end, the creditworthiness of Egypt and Tunisia started recovering in international financial markets. At odds with other cases of international financial control in the region, this chapter shows that the success of multilateral international financial control organizations in the first age of financial globalization was not unconditional. Although other cases of international financial control before 1914 offered a solution to competing imperial and bondholder interests, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, international financial control organizations became obstacles to the ongoing colonization process by Britain and France.

In 2004, the European Commission adopted its ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) to guide relations with the states on its periphery, including its ten ‘Southern Partners’ (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended in 2011), and Tunisia). The ENP promoted the Southern Partners as a ‘ring of friends’, each of which would develop bilateral relations with the EU under the common ENP framework. The ENP and the bilateral Euromed Association Agreements (EMAAs) emphasise the linkage of democracy, human rights, rule of law, trade, economic development, and security relations. Historical European interference in the region, however, in particular the colonial rule of several European countries, has left an enduring taint of hypocrisy and double standards. As of today, none of the ten states, with the arguable and qualified exception of Israel, has developed a representative democracy. Respect for human rights and the rule of law remains a challenge in the region. At the same time, the EU frequently prioritises its ‘hard interests’ in trade and security over its ‘soft values’ of promoting human rights. It is recommended that the EU adhere to its official policies rather than employ mere human rights rhetoric, and to require its Southern Partners to effectively implement their EMAAs (presumably through the ‘essential-elements clauses’). The EU is capable of using its vast and disproportionate economic influence to implement its ‘more for more’ policy: the more the Southern Partners comply with the EMAAs, the better will be economic relations with the EU.

This chapter discusses The Holocaust and North Africa (2019), a collection of fifteen essays edited by Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein. As this collection makes clear, the Holocaust did not target European Jewry exclusively. North African Jews of Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan, and Libyan origin were also subjected to German, French, or Italian occupation. While the focus is on North Africa, no attempt is made to remove it from the geographical margins of Holocaust history. Instead, almost all of the essays point to what was clearly unique to North Africa: the link between antisemitism and colonialism. The book is divided into four sections, with the first two parts examining the interface between the Holocaust and colonial North Africa. Topics covered include the application of race laws, the expropriation of Jewish property, and the internment of Jews in forced labor camps.