Journal articles: 'European security and defence'

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BAILES, ALYSON J. K. "European Defence and Security." Security Dialogue 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 55–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010696027001007.

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Rogers, Bernard W., and John Killick. "Western security and european defence." RUSI Journal 131, no. 3 (September 1986): 11–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071848608522747.

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Erdağ, Ramazan. "Towards European Security Integration: Boundaries of European Security and Defence Policy." Journal of European Integration 38, no. 2 (December 14, 2015): 211–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1115240.

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Volodin, D. "Canada in New European Security System." World Economy and International Relations, no. 5 (2010): 72–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2010-5-72-82.

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The article is dedicated to Canada–Europe relations in the security and defence sphere in 2000s. The main attention is paid to Canada’s reaction to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the significance of this new European initiative for the overall complex of Canada’s transatlantic ties. NATO and its role in Canada's defence policy are also covered in this study.

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Deighton, Anne. "The European Security and Defence Policy." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (November 2002): 719–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00395.

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Schmidt, Peter. "Defence and security—a European perspective." RUSI Journal 140, no. 6 (December 1995): 11–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849508445966.

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Smouts, Marie-Claude. "France: Its Defence and European Security." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 40, no. 1 (March 1985): 86–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070208504000105.

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de Puig, LluisMaria. "The european security and defence identity." Air & Space Europe 1, no. 1 (January 1999): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1290-0958(99)80028-8.

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Brylonek, Marek. "Bieżące trendy wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej." Przegląd Europejski, no. 1-2014 (June 29, 2014): 68–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/1641-2478pe.1.14.4.

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In 1999, soon after the European Union member states had decided to establish the European Security and Defence Policy, the processes of appointing adequate tools for its accomplishment also started. Decisions were made to create organs and institutions and to elaborate appropriate procedures which would enable fast and precise decision-making of planning and conduct in the field of security and defence. Since that time the European Union and its Security and Defence Policy have evolved in many aspects and are still evolving. Security researchers currently attempt to provide the answer to an important problem: what are the trends characterising changes in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The author, basing on research and own experiences of work in the politico-strategic planning structures of the European External Action Service, analyses current trends in the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially regarding the evolution of the Union’s organs and institutions, crisis management procedures, implementation of comprehensive approach and tendencies in the newly-deployed missions. This material is a result of extensive discussions and consultations conducted within a broad international and interinstitutional crisis management environment. It is based on interviews with high-level subject-related personnel and the listed bibliography

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Knutsen, Bjørn Olav. "A Weakening Transatlantic Relationship? Redefining the EU–US Security and Defence Cooperation." Politics and Governance 10, no. 2 (May 18, 2022): 165–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i2.5024.

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The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU’s role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

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Csernatoni, Raluca. "The Evolving Role of the European External Action Service in Security and Defence." European Foreign Affairs Review 26, Issue 1 (February 1, 2021): 87–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021008.

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While significant scholarly work has been dedicated to the institutionalization of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its role in shaping the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy goals, less attention has been given to the Service’s wider competencies and agenda-setting power in the case of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This article aims to assess the growing role of the EEAS in defence and in spearheading new ways of bridging foreign policy and security in a comprehensive manner. In doing so, the research explores how the security and defence dimensions were incorporated into the EEAS, by examining the processes of institutionalization in the EEAS crisis management structures in the post-Lisbon context, and by zooming in on the intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in the European security and defence architecture. The article finds that continued organizational innovation and the reinforcement of supranational mechanisms in the EEAS and the European Commission have had a positive impact on the EU’s security and defence, representing a step further in bridging the foreign policy, security and defence divides at the EU level. European Union, European External Action Service, European Security and Defence, High Representative

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Dorosh, Lesia, and Vasyl Romanyk. "PESCO, CARD, EDF: Strategy, Analysis, and Financing in the European Union Security Guaratee." Humanitarian vision 6, no. 2 (November 25, 2020): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.23939/shv2020.02.001.

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In the article the authors analyze the institutional basis for strengthening the EU security and the implementation of specific projects designed to expand cooperation between the Member States in the defence and security sectors. The point at issue is about Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). The relevance of the comprehensive study of PESCO, CARD, EDF, which activities are aimed at ensuring the strategic component of cooperation, the analysis of the defence sector and funding priorities in the security sphere of the Union have been proved. The authors claim that PESCO has become a key strategic initiative of the EU, CARD allows coordinating the development of military capabilities in the Member States; the EDF was created to coordinate, increase investment and improve defence interoperability between EU member states. The challenges faced within the functioning of these initiatives have been analyzed. It is alleged that a key challenge for the CARD is the unwillingness of Member countries to share national defence plans, as well as the available and potential coordination and harmonization of defence planning within NATO’s Defence Planning. The peculiarities of specific projects financed within the European Defense Fund (“Ocean 2020”, “Eurodrone”, “SPIDER”, “EuroSWARM”, “TRAWA”, “ACAMSII”, “Gossra”, “Vestlife”) have been analyzed. There is continued progress in the field of the EU security and defence: numerous defence projects have been initiated under PESCO; there is a synchronization of defence planning through the CARD; the investments in defence are stimulated by financing the defence research projects through the EDF, the improving military mobility is continuing; coordination of the EU-NATO cooperation is improving, etc.

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Grigoraş, Constantin, and Florian Ianoşiu-Hangan. "European Armed Forces Where to?" International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 25, no. 1 (June 1, 2019): 66–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2019-0010.

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Abstract The permanent structured cooperation in the security and defence policy has been introduced through the Lisbon Treaty. It considered an opportunity for countries that are members of the EU to cooperate more tightly in the security and defence domain. This permanent state of cooperation in the defence domain will allow the member countries that are willing and able to develop common defence capabilities to invest in common projects and improve the contribution and operational availability of their armed forces.

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Rapp-Jung, Barbara, and Karl von Wogau. "The case for a European system monitoring foreign investment in defence and security." Common Market Law Review 45, Issue 1 (February 1, 2008): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2008003.

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European defence and security interests are at risk if undertakings and governments from other than EU countries can easily gain control of European defence and security equipment and technology. The authors therefore plead for the adoption of European rules designed to monitor foreign investments in the defence and security sectors. At this stage, such investments undergo no screening at all at EU level. National schemes exist in some Member States but can in an internal market easily be circumvented. Common rules designed to review the acquisition of substantial participations in European defence and security operators would considerably increase the autonomy, the security and the efficiency of the defence of the European Union and its Member States, particularly if implemented at EU level. Moreover they would form a corollary to the establishment of an internal defence market while at the same time supporting the reciprocity of the access of European industries to third country markets.

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Baranovsky, V. G. "Common European Security and Defence Policy: Horizons of the Russian Perception." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 1, no. 1 (2002): 22–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.01.1.04.

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16

Sidorov, Alexander. "European Defenсe through the prism of France’s interests and capabilities." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 4 (2020): 137–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2020.04.07.

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The article is devoted to the analysis of the complex of problems associated with the organization of the defence structures of the European Union and the role of France in this process. The focus of the project «European defenсe», the possibility of its implementation within the EuroAtlantic space are investigated. The continuity and evolution of the European defence potential building program are shown. The concepts of «European defenсe», «European army» are analyzed and their real content is revealed. The pairing of France’s national efforts with partners in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) projects is shown; the importance of a pragmatic approach to building a «European defenсe» on the basis of a number of interstate programs of military-industrial cooperation is highlighted. The connection between the new stage of scientific and technological progress and the revitalization of plans to strengthen the defence potential of the EU is revealed. The evolution of the French leadership’s approach to building a «European defenсe» is presented, its assessment of the current state of this project, and in connection with this, features of its views on the prospects for developing a dialogue with Russia. Against the background of a slowdown in the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the role of interstate initiatives outside the EU, aimed at accelerating and increasing the effectiveness of military operations, has been highlighted. The examples of individual actions emphasize the key role of states, in particular France, in the implementation of missions of a pan-European character. As a result of the analysis, a conclusion was made about the sustainable and non-opportunistic nature of the transformations in the field of military construction in the EU. A forecast is given regarding the possible scale and real fulfillment of European defence construction plans. The conclusion about the significance of the «European defenсe» project for the implementation of France’s geopolitical plans and the strengthening of its positions in the EU and in the Euro-Atlantic field is substantiated.

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17

Altenburg, Wolfgang. "Defence and European security: The transitional phase." RUSI Journal 135, no. 4 (December 1990): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849008445467.

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18

Bailes, Alyson J. "European defence and security: The British approach." RUSI Journal 140, no. 6 (December 1995): 6–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849508445965.

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19

Dietl, Ralph. "Towards a European Security and Defence Policy." Cold War History 3, no. 3 (April 2003): 144–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682740312331391678.

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20

Ivančík, Radoslav. "O Európskej bezpečnostnej a obrannej integrácii v kontexte prístupu malých členských štátov Európskej únie k nej." Vojenské reflexie 17, no. 2 (2022): 28–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.52651/vr.a.2022.2.28-47.

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The European Union is a community of currently twenty-seven member states. Most of them are classified as smaller or small states in terms of geographical area and economic strength as well as military power. Therefore, one of the most researched topics within the European Union's foreign, security and defence policy concerns its small member states and their approaches to security and defence integration. Their interests in this area may differ significantly from those of the larger member states of the Union, as well as their strategies. Considering the already achieved progress in European integration in the field of security and defence, the author therefore deals in the study with the challenges and opportunities that the small member states of the European Union had to deal with. In the above context, within the framework of interdisciplinary theoretical scientific research, it assesses the previous research of small member states within the European security and defence policy, examines developments in the field of security and defence integration, and at the same time analyses the main discussions taking place in the professional literature about small member states of the European Union and their approach to security and defence integration.

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Cohen, Richard. "European Defense: Spreading Cooperative Security." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 1, no. 1 (2002): 14–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.01.1.03.

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22

Rieker, Pernille. "Differentiated Defence Integration Under French Leadership." European Foreign Affairs Review 26, Special Issue (August 1, 2021): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021029.

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Studies dealing with EU security and defence policy tend to focus exclusively on what is formally included in the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other initiatives taken outside this framework are frequently seen potentially undermining the development of EU defence – even when the intention is to strengthen defence capacity. This has been the case with the various initiatives taken within or closely linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the recent French approach involving the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). An alternative perspective is to see these as integrated parts of a more flexible and differentiated European security framework where all these initiatives combined contribute to strengthening European defence capacity. Building on the argument presented in the introduction to this Special Issue, this article argues that France, as a leader in promoting ‘l’Europe de la défense’, has been instrumental in promoting this differentiated approach to European defence integration, especially under the Macron presidency. (This article is an output of a research project entitled ‘Balancing between integration and autonomy. Understanding the drivers and mechanisms of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy’ (EUFLEX), funded by the Research Council of Norway (project number 287131) for the period 2018-21. France, differentiated integration, CSDP, European intervention initiative, security and defence

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Karpchuk, Nataliia. "European Union Security Policy: Historical Retrospection." Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії, no. 1 (May 29, 2017): 14–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.29038/2524-2679-2017-01-14-22.

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The EU security policy is an inseparable part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy elaborated within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sucurity and defence issues are quite vulnerable for any state sovereignty that is why it took Member Statets rather long time to agree on principles, directions and priorities of their common security policy as well as on cooperation with the NATO. With the development of the European Community, in the sphere of security policy a number of structures were established and a number of principled documents were adopted. The article researches the evolution of the EU security policy influenced by external cgallenges and threats

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Podberezkin, A. I., and J. Y. Parshkova. "The Threat from European Missile Defence System to Russian National Security." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 1(34) (February 28, 2014): 54–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-1-34-54-63.

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The article analyses the political and military aspects of progress in the dialogue between Russia and the U.S./NATO on cooperation in missile defense; investigates the past experiences and current state of cooperation between Russia and the Alliance on missile defense issues; examines the technical features of American missile defence systems today; finds a solution to question whether or not the European Missile Defence Program actually threatens Russia's nuclear deterrent and strategic stability in general; identifies both potential benefits and possible losses for Russia stemming from the development of cooperation with the United States and NATO in countering ballistic missile threats, or from refusal to have such cooperation. Evidently, the initiative of creation of a missile defense in Europe surely belongs to the USA. Washington has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities in the field of a missile defense, exceeding by far other NATO member-states. In February 2010, the President of the United States B. Obama adopted a project "European Phased Adaptive Approach" (EPAA) as an alternative to G. Bush's global strategic missile defense plan. The first two stages of the Phased Adaptive Approach are focused on creating a system capable of intercepting small, medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The possibility of intercepting long-range missiles is postponed to the third (2018) and forth phases (2020). Moscow finds especially troublesome the third and the fourth phases of Washington's project of creating a European segment of the global antiballistic missile system, considering prospective capabilities of the U.S. interceptor missiles 61 and the envisioned areas of their deployment. The U.S. counter-evidence is that phase four interceptors do not exist yet. Russia insists on getting the political and legal guarantees from the U.S. and NATO that their missile defense systems will not slash the efficiency of Russian nuclear deterrence forces.

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25

Cutler, Robert, and Alexander Von Lingen. "The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defence Policy." European Security 12, no. 2 (June 2003): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830412331308036.

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Hoijtink, Marijn, and Hanna L. Muehlenhoff. "The European Union as a Masculine Military Power: European Union Security and Defence Policy in ‘Times of Crisis’." Political Studies Review 18, no. 3 (November 1, 2019): 362–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919884876.

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Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary ‘hard’ military power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised masculinities associated with it.

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27

Paterek, Anna. "Traktat lizboński i jego implikacje dla francusko-niemieckiej współpracy w obszarze Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej." Politeja 15, no. 54 (February 10, 2019): 287–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.15.2018.54.19.

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The Lisbon Treaty and Its Implications for French‑German Cooperation in EU’s Common Security and Defence PolicyFaced with internal and external pressures the EU’s security and defence policy has become one of the most dynamic fields of European integration. This paper describes declared ambition of Franco‑Germancooperation to strengthening the EU in European security and defence. In light of a more demanding security environment Berlin and Paris have awakened the so‑called „Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty”, The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), introduced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. They managed to find a compromise and to turn PESCO into a process as much as to create a new framework to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States. The conclusions argue that the relaunch of the Franco‑German motor is key to European defence.

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Kaynar, Mete Kaan, and Gökhan AK. "THE EU/CFSP AND NATO: POSSIBILITY OF A CO-EXISTENCE AS BROTHERS-IN-ARMS?" International Journal of Research -GRANTHAALAYAH 5, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 111–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.29121/granthaalayah.v5.i1.2017.1728.

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At the outset, Europe needed to develop its defense policy and structure in line with its foreign policy while the Union was evolving in institutional enlargement process during every other 10 years of time. The reason was not behind it, but in the façade of the Union building. Otherwise the Union would not be able to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs while the ‘security’ was gaining a key-role in the international politics and relations. Since there was a security vacuum in Europe after WW’, the US urged European states to create a sort of defence structure embedded to already-formed NATO or integrated with NATO, but including German Army in both cases. Decades had passed and in the late 1990s the European Security Defence Identity and Policy was formed up as a parallel structure to NATO systems. Eventually in the start of 2000s, the EU system turned into a Common Security and Defence Policy for member states only. This research tries to explore and analyze the effects, paradigms, prospects and coexistence possibilities of this two polar-defence-system in the Europe, that’s to say between NATO and the CFSP.

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Cheshire, John. "European defence and security‐keeping pace with change." RUSI Journal 139, no. 5 (October 1994): 8–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849408445849.

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Lloyd, Tervor, and Anne Deighton. "Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration." International Journal 53, no. 2 (1998): 369. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40203313.

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31

Ellis, James O. "NATO and the European security and defence identity." International Spectator 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 47–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729908456862.

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Davies, Hywel, and Jean-Pierre Sanfourche. "‘GALILEO’ and the European Security & Defence Identity." Air & Space Europe 2, no. 6 (November 2000): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1290-0958(01)80024-1.

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Shikhov, D. V. "UK in European Security: New Opportunities or a Path to Nowhere?" MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(41) (April 28, 2015): 102–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-2-41-102-107.

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Despite Britain's traditionally ambivalent attitude towards deepening the European integration, in late 1990s - early 2000s London seemed to become a key driver of European defence and security cooperation. T.Blair and J.Chirac have set ambitious goals including the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force. However most targets have never been achieved due to concerns about undermining NATO's role and Britain's as well as other EU members' unwillingness to undertake real steps to strengthen defence and security cooperation. In late 2000s the prospects of defence integration within the EU were becoming more and more vague, and the D.Cameron coalition government opted for bilateral Franco-British cooperation. Today London remains among key opponents to the European defence but the paradox is that EU defence integration without Britain - which is along with France a leading EU military power-would be at least ineffective. With US activities gradually shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific Britain may well take the lead in European security without any damage to Transatlantic Relations.

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Igrutinovic, Milan. "Transformation of joint EU defence capacities: A review of european defence action plan." Medjunarodni problemi 69, no. 1 (2017): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1701005i.

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The paper deals with activities aimed at the implementation of the EU Global Strategy tied to the effort to further integrate research and development of defence technologies through European Defence Action Plan adopted in November 2016. The author analyses the combined effect of multi-faceted security challenges that the European Union faces and the perception of a decreased and inadequate defence spending in the previous years. The part of the analysis focuses on the political aspect of security challenges and how Brussels? administration responds to those challenges. The author maintains that new European Union Global Strategy is based on the drive for the more rational development of defence industry, which is clearly manifested in setting up a new European Defence Fund as an instrument of the European Defence Action Plan. The recently designed institutional framework followed by adequate financial support may serve as a nudge to the EU Member States to make concrete steps towards the integration of their respective national defence capacities.

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de Grave, Frank. "European Security and defence policy as a framework for defence co‐operation." RUSI Journal 147, no. 1 (February 2002): 13–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840208446732.

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Grant, Mark Lyall. "Updating Security and Defence Policy." National Institute Economic Review 250 (November 2019): R40—R46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002795011925000116.

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Executive SummaryThreats to the security of the UK are evolving with the changing nature of conflict and balance of power in the world. They are multiple and fragmented, and domestic and online as well as overseas in nature: principally state-based threats such as posed by Russian activity; terrorism; cyber-attacks; and serious organised crime. To respond, the United Kingdom will need flexible capabilities aimed at fostering infrastructural and societal resilience as much as conventional defence. Above all, the UK needs to focus on maintaining, promoting, and defending the international rules-based order, as represented by the UN and NATO among other institutions.The UK possesses significant assets to these ends, including its continuing status as one of eight acknowledged nuclear powers – a status that it should not abandon unilaterally; permanent membership of the UN Security Council; membership of the ‘Five Eyes' intelligence community; and its internationally respected armed forces.But effort and resources are required to support these commitments, for example in helping to encourage other European states to spend more on defence; in contributing to UN peace-keeping operations or other collaborative overseas actions; and most of all in ensuring that army and navy manpower is rebuilt. Two per cent of GDP is no longer sufficient for the proper defence of the nation. Even allowing for the demands of other parts of government, the target for defence spending should be raised in the next review to 2.2 per cent.The principal focus will need to be on efficiency and redeployment of resources as the current equipment-heavy procurement cycle comes to an end. In particular, investment needs to continue to be rebalanced towards new capabilities such as drone technology, offensive and defensive cyber and intelligence manpower.But, to avoid any weakening of the country's security, priority should be given to negotiating a new agreement on security and intelligence cooperation with its European allies to replace the arrangements it had within the EU.

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Lübkemeier, Eckhard. "European security and defence policy: A key project for European unification." RUSI Journal 146, no. 6 (December 2001): 19–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840108446714.

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Węc, Janusz J. "Reforma wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej w latach 2016-2017." Politeja 15, no. 54 (February 10, 2019): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.15.2018.54.03.

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The Reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union in 2016‑2017The subject of the article is the reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2016‑2017 following the adoption of the new EU External Security Strategy by the European Council in June 2016. The first part of the article analyzes the European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. However, the second part of the article reconstructs the process of implementing the global strategy and describes the successes and failures of the reform.

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Arzamanova, Tatyana. "European Defence: a puzzle with many unknowns." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 4 (2020): 21–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2020.04.02.

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Under the pressure of the growing turbulence of EuroAtlantic space due to the increasing isolationism of the United States and the fact that Global security is now determined by the confrontation between the two centers of power – the United States and China, as well as the shift of strategic decision-making into the USA-Russia-China triangle, Europe is forced to admit that the period of solidarity of the collective West is over. If earlier differences between the allies were exclusively tactical, now they affect already fundamental foundations. In the current situation, Europe will try to intensify the development of the European defence component and strengthen integration in the field of security policy in order to achieve full strategic sovereignty. This process is complicated by the low level of European defence capacity, the shortage of funds of the European defence budget, weak strategic planning, and the unresolved issue of limits of supranational competences of the command of the European Armed Forces. With the use of comparative, event and content analysis, it is concluded that the key problem is that EU member states have a different scale of assessment of risks and security threats, they find it difficult to reach a common understanding, without which the development of a strategic concept of European defence will be largely decorative. The author cosiders that it is first and foremost necessary to establish a Pan-European consensus on basic points, including a set of definitions. A serious challenge for the European defence project was coronavirus COVID-19. The pandemic revealed a global crisis of leadership, a lack of solidarity, and the world's lack of preparedness for a large-scale biological threat. In the near future, states will consider biological attacks among the priority security threats, and this seems to the author to be a promising field for cooperation within the framework of European defence. It is about the development of a Pan-European system of recognition, warning and opposition to the bacteriological threat using developments in the field of artificial intelligence.

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Butler, Graham. "The European Defence Union and Denmark’s Defence Opt-out: A Legal Appraisal." European Foreign Affairs Review 25, Issue 1 (March 1, 2020): 117–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr2020008.

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When Denmark failed to ratify the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the heads of state and government meeting within the European Council concluded the Edinburgh Decision that established a number of opt-outs for Denmark, so it could subsequently ratify the treaty. One of these opt-outs was in regard to EU defence matters. Nearly three decades on, the Union is now seeing concrete steps being made across the treaties to deliver on a true European Defence Union. Given these developments, the Danish defence opt-out is coming under increased scrutiny. This article analyses the law, policy, and practice of the Danish defence opt-out contained in Article 5 of Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU treaties, in light of the litany of initiatives that now make up the contemporary European Defence Union. Notably, these developments underscore and rationalize the basis of the EU’s internal market for deeper European integration. Moreover, with only one Member State possessing such opt-out, it is arguably detrimental to overall EU defence interests. This article contends that the time has come for Denmark to forgo its defence opt-out – a legacy of the past – and participate in the complete range of initiatives contributing to these new endeavours that form the contemporary European Defence Union. Denmark, Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, Opt-out, EU law, Union law, Protocols, Security Law, European Defence Union.

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Bunde, Tobias. "Defending European integration by (symbolically) integrating European defence? Germany and its ambivalent role in European security and defence policy." Journal of European Integration 43, no. 2 (February 17, 2021): 243–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.1877693.

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BROŽIČ, LILIANA. "EDITORIAL, SECURITY PERSPECTIVES." CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES 2022, no. 24/3 (September 30, 2022): 11–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.24.3.00.

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This is the title of the third issue in the twenty-fourth volume of the Contemporary Military Challenges. We started from the changes that have taken place over the last few years. We have had in mind the increased migration flows towards the European Union, the experience of the Covid 19 epidemic, the climate change that surprises us time and time again, despite the fact that we are aware of it, and that we are trying to adapt and respond to it accordingly. In March this year, the "Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security" was launched, and at the end of June, the new NATO Strategic Concept. Both with the aim of rethinking, aligning and unifying the way we look at existing security challenges and developing new security perspectives. At the beginning of this year, we were taken by surprise by the Russian Federation's armed attack against Ukraine. Some had predicted it; others only foresaw it. Many were convinced, however, that such a phenomenon was not possible in a modern democratic society. Huntington's theory of a clash of civilisations, which seemed to have outlived its usefulness in modern European society, has become relevant again. A realistic view of the contemporary security, social and political situation in the world and, above all, the crisis of values and the consequent need for unification have encouraged the European Union to aspire to become a global security actor in the international environment. The war in Ukraine is forcing the European Union to act. It has prepared a package of economic measures or sanctions to influence the Russian Federation in terms of expressing its disapproval of its unilateral moves. However, the Member States are not entirely united on how to confront and counter the situation. Without unity, united political positions and united action, the European Union cannot become the global security actor that it has claimed to be in its strategic compass. In this context, it is also worth mentioning its Common Security and Defence Policy, which is first and foremost a policy, and the fact that the European Union does not have its own military capabilities to manage. The Member States have military capabilities, and they spend varying amounts on their defence. Over the last decade, most Member States have been reducing their defence expenditure, despite the fact that it was agreed at the NATO summit in Wales in 2012 that it would amount up to 2% of GDP. Not all Member States of the European Union are members of the Alliance, but there are twenty-one of them that are members of both. Douglas Barrie and his colleagues produced a special report in 2020 on 'European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition', which concluded that, assuming that all Member States did indeed spend 2% of GDP on defence, the European Union and its Member States would need ten to fifteen years to be adequately prepared in terms of security capabilities for a possible aggression by a country with the military capabilities of the Russian Federation today. With investments in this area as they are in 2022, it would take twenty years. This leads to the logical conclusion. There are only two ways of stopping the Russian Federation in its territorial and, of course, political ambitions. The first and most appropriate is political, the second military. Since the European Union does not represent a serious opponent in defence and military terms to this large and militarily powerful country, the only way for it to achieve its status as a global security actor is politically. The military conflict in Ukraine is a major test for both the Union and the Alliance. The European Union now has the opportunity to test how strong and credible its ideals, values and beliefs are. Are its senior representatives wise and innovative enough to look beyond economic sanctions to other diplomatic avenues to achieve what they have written in their strategic compass – to be a global player? Time will answer this question. Until then, however, scholars and other experts will be studying the various influences and phenomena in the security domain. Some of them will also share them with the readers of Contemporary Military Challenges. In a time of economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, Tamas Somogyi and Rudolf Nagy focus on the protection of critical infrastructure, of which the financial sector is an important part. In their article Cyber threats and security challenges in the Hungarian financial sector, they explore the security risks facing the banking system in their country. The paper Geostrategic perspectives of Slovenia in a changing world draws on two geopolitical theories by Mackinder and Spykman, who develop their views on the European space. Uroš Tovornik explored Slovenia's geostrategic position on the basis of their theories, focusing on its geopolitical characteristics. He summarised his findings into four possible scenarios, which are determined by these characteristics and from which possible future geopolitical orientations are derived. Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire explored the influence of the world’s major powers and how this is reflected in the case of each country. Africa, as a very large continent, is made up of many and diverse countries. The influence of the major powers has always been very strong and integral to African life and the security of its people. In his article An assessment of the impact of relations with major powers on national security: Nigeria in perspective, the author presents how this has changed in recent years and how it affects the security of each country in. Mariann Minkó-Miskovics and Csaba Szabó note that there is an inconsistency between European and Hungarian legislation in the field of dual-use regulation, i.e. for civil and defence purposes. Moreover, they are convinced that this inconsistency may pose a security risk. What this means in practice is presented in the article Interpretation of civil vs. military equipment in European case law - EU and Hungary. Jarosław Włodarczyk writes on the importance of a proper understanding of language between different stakeholders in the international military environment. His study focuses on the teaching of English among military personnel in Poland and on those types of words that do not have a direct translation from Polish into English or vice versa. A particular challenge here is how to adequately explain and teach this to military personnel in the educational process. He summarised his findings in his paper The problem of lexical gaps in teaching military English.

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Espaliú Berdud, Carlos. "Taking European defence seriously: The naval operations of the European Union as a model for a Security and Defence Union." Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, no. 58 (March 28, 2018): 157–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-58-2018pp157-183.

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The two naval operations set up until now by the EU, Atalanta and Sophia, have demonstrated a growing level of consensus and willingness by Member States, a great number of which participating in both operations. Furthermore, and more clearly in the case of Atalanta but also in the first stages of Sophia, it can be said that these CSDP activities have been highly successful, taken into consideration the level of accomplishment of their respective goals. Having shown its potential, the launching of naval operations in crisis management could be seen as a step forward in the creation of a Security and Defence Union. Therefore, the next step in European integration regarding security matters can be the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation anticipated in Article 42.2 and 46 of TEU and developed in Protocol No 10 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. That achievement would be the landmark that would generate the nucleus from which a Security and Defence Union can emergeReceived: 14 December 2017Accepted: 10 January 2018Published online: 28 March 2018

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Taylor, Trevor. "West European security and defence cooperation: Maastricht and beyond." International Affairs 70, no. 1 (January 1994): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2620713.

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Mahncke, Dieter. "Russia's Attitude to the European Security and Defence Policy." European Foreign Affairs Review 6, Issue 4 (December 1, 2001): 427–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/391109.

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Rynning, Sten. "French Defence Reforms and European Security: Tensions and Intersections." European Foreign Affairs Review 4, Issue 1 (February 1, 1999): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr1999006.

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Fiott, Daniel. "Debating European Security and Defence Policy: Understanding the Complexity." RUSI Journal 160, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 100–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1031532.

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Mérand, Frédéric. "Social Representations in the European Security and Defence Policy." Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 2 (June 2006): 131–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836706063659.

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Keane 1, Rory. "European security and defence policy: from cologne to sarajevo." Global Society 19, no. 1 (January 2005): 89–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1360082042000316068.

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King, Anthony. "The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy." Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 1 (April 2005): 44–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260500116075.

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Journal articles on the topic 'European security and defence'

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