Journal articles: 'Euthyphro dilemma'

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Mounce, Daniel. "Euthyphro dilemma." British Journal of General Practice 63, no. 611 (2013): 293.2–293. http://dx.doi.org/10.3399/bjgp13x668131.

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Misselbrook, David. "The Euthyphro dilemma." British Journal of General Practice 63, no. 610 (2013): 263. http://dx.doi.org/10.3399/bjgp13x667286.

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Walden, Kenneth. "The Euthyphro Dilemma." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90, no. 3 (2013): 612–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12055.

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Mawson, T. J. "THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA." Think 7, no. 20 (2008): 25–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175608000171.

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Is something good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? This lies at the heart of our debate on “Good without God”. Here Tim Mawson explains how he thinks the theist can solve it.

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Peoples, Glenn. "A NEW EUTHYPHRO." Think 9, no. 25 (2010): 65–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175610000084.

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It is my contention that what is generally construed as the Euthyphro Dilemma as a reason to deny that moral facts are based on theological facts is one of the worst arguments proposed in philosophy of religion or ethical theory, and that Socrates, the character of the dialogue who poses the dilemma, was both morally bankrupt in his challenge to Euthyphro, but more importantly here, ought to have lost the argument hands down. But in any dialogue, the author controls what people say. Plato was able to easily give Socrates the victory by writing the ending of the story himself, where Euthyphro, believing that piety is what the gods approve of, loses the argument abysmally. The version of events presented here is different. This time, Euthyphro is permitted to offer a reasonable defence of his position, and he has the benefit of having been able to read all that has been said on the Euthyphro dilemma over the last couple of millennia, and especially the last fifty years. Under such circumstances, Socrates does not stand a chance. We arrive at our scene, the steps of the Dunedin High Court, in Dunedin, New Zealand, on a cool mid-winter July morning.

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Chappell, Timothy. "Euthyphro's "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion and Plato's God." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 1 (2010): 39–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350.

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In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato’s Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.

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Wisdo, David. "Kierkegaard and Euthyphro." Philosophy 62, no. 240 (1987): 221–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064056.

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In Plato's dialogue the Euthyphro, Socrates poses a question that has come to be known as the ‘Euthyphro dilemma’. Since the first formulation of this problem is surely the best, I will quote from Socrates himself:… For consider: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

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Brady, Michael S. "PAINFULNESS, DESIRE, AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA." American Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2018): 239–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/45128618.

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Abstract The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.

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Joyce, Richard. "Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma." Journal of Religious Ethics 30, no. 1 (2002): 49–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9795.00098.

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O'Connor, David. "MORAL RELATIVISM AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA." Think 15, no. 42 (2015): 71–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000391.

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What makes a morally right action morally right and a morally wrong action morally wrong? For clarity's sake, let us divide the question. First, what makes a particular action the morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally obligatory? Second, what makes a particular action a (but not the) morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally permissible (and optional)? And third, what makes a morally wrong action morally wrong (that is, morally impermissible) in some situation?

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Bojanowski, Jochen. "Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma." Philosophia 44, no. 4 (2016): 1209–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9747-2.

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Skiles, Alexander. "There is no haecceitic Euthyphro problem." Analysis 79, no. 3 (2018): 477–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/any061.

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Abstract Jason Bowers and Meg Wallace (‘The Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem’, Analysis, 2018) have recently argued that those who hold that every individual instantiates a ‘haecceity’ (or ‘individual essence’) are caught up in a Euthyphro-style dilemma when confronted with familiar cases of fission and fusion. Key to Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma are certain assumptions about the nature of metaphysical explanation and the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities. However, I argue that the dilemma only arises due to a failure to distinguish between providing a metaphysical explanation of why a fact holds vs. a metaphysical explanation of what it is for a fact to hold. In the process, I also shed light on the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities.

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Sztuden, Alex. "Judaism and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Towards A New Approach." TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2, no. 1 (2018): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.14428/thl.v2i1.1703.

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This article attempts to utilize representative talmudic source-material that bears on the Euthyphro dilemma, and more widely, that discusses the central role of human agency in the foundations of Jewish law, in order to sketch a modified version of divine command theory (DCT), under which both horns of the traditional dilemma are grasped. That is, the proposed modified DCT, based on talmudic sources, is one in which God is properly placed at the foundation of the moral law, while simultaneously providing a central role for human moral reasoning. The first main section presents and evaluates Michael Harris’s pioneering analysis of the Euthyphro dilemma in classical Jewish sources, while the second main section attempts to sketch a new approach out of classical Jewish sources.

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ZANGWILL, NICK. "A way out of the Euthyphro dilemma." Religious Studies 48, no. 1 (2011): 7–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000752.

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AbstractI defend the view that morality depends on God against the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that the reasons that God has for determining the moral–natural dependencies might be personal reasons that have non-moral content. I deflect the ‘arbitrary whim’ worry, but I concede that the account cannot extend to the goodness of God and His will. However, human moral–natural dependencies can be explained by God's will. So a slightly restricted version of divine commandment theory is defensible.

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Koons, Jeremy. "Can God's Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro?" European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (2012): 177–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i1.313.

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Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although God’s commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, God’s nature is the standard of moral goodness, and God’s commands are the source of all obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips God’s nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible. An adequate solution to the Euthyphro dilemma may require that God be constrained by a standard of goodness that is external to Himself – itself a problematic proposal for many theists.

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Farnell, Derrick. "God and morality." Think 4, no. 10 (2005): 43–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600001184.

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Is morality laid down by God? Many think there is a fatal objection to this view, an objection rooted in Plato's famous Euthyphro dilemma. Derrick Farnell explains why he is not convinced by the objection.

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Archer, Alfred. "Divine moral goodness, supererogation and The Euthyphro Dilemma." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79, no. 2 (2015): 147–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9510-9.

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MAWSON, T. J. "God's creation of morality." Religious Studies 38, no. 1 (2002): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250100587x.

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In this paper, I argue that classical theists should think of God as having created morality. In form, my position largely resembles that defended by Richard Swinburne. However, it differs from his position in content in that it evacuates the category of necessary moral truth of all substance and, having effected this tactical withdrawal, Swinburne's battle lines need to be redrawn. In the first section, I introduce the Euthyphro dilemma. In the second, I argue that if necessary moral truths are seen as analytically/logically so, then, pace Swinburne, they cannot be regarded as substantive principles. Thus, seeing necessary moral truths as analytically/logically necessary and independent of God does not threaten God's power or sovereignty and leaves open the possibility that all value is contingent upon His will. In the third section, I turn to consider how the claim that all value is contingent upon God's will might best be understood, arguing that classical theists will want to commit themselves to a relatively strong form of objectivism about moral value (even though this is not needed in order to solve the Euthyphro dilemma). I then give and defend an account of God's creation of contingent moral truths which coheres with what I argue is the most plausible form of this commitment. In the following section, I argue that this account avoids the charge that God is arbitrary in His choice of values and, finally, I argue that it avoids the charge that God may not be said to be good without vacuity. Thus, I conclude that the Euthyphro dilemma does not threaten classical theism.

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Rahimi, Simin. "Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?" Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (2008): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.02.

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Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

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Rahimi, Simini. "Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?" Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (2008): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/forphil20081312.

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Griffioen, Amber L. "Why Jim Joyce Wasn’t Wrong: Baseball and the Euthyphro Dilemma." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 42, no. 3 (2015): 327–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2015.1036874.

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Wilkinson, M. B. "GOD, GOODNESS, FACT AND VALUE." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 42, no. 134 (2016): 397. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v42n134p397-422/2015.

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Resumo:Desenvolvimentos recentes na "loso"a da religião, devidos especialmente a John Cofingham, chamaram a atenção para as questões da moralidade e sua relação com Deus. Para Cofingham a natureza obrigatória dos mandamentos morais, ainda que não a prove, aponta para a existência do ser de Deus, mas a experiência moral sugere a realidade e autoridade de Deus. O artigo defende uma base da moralidade que é natural, enraizada em uma metafísica mínima e na natureza humana como uma criatura imaginativa e criativa. Com isso sugerem-se possíveis soluções tanto para o problema fato/valor como para o dilema do Euthyphro. Esta narrativa naturalística parece apontar para uma compreensão criativa de Deus e da atividade moral humana, que, no entanto, vai além das trivialidades da ética de situação e do relativismo.Abstract: Recent developments in the philosophy of religion, notably by John Cofingham, have focused afention on the questions of morality and its relationship to God. For Cofingham, the obligatory nature of moral commands points to, but does not prove, the existence of being of God, but the experience of the moral suggests the reality and authority of God. This paper argues for a basis of morality which is natural, rooted in a minimal metaphysic and the nature of the human as an imaginative and creative creature. In doing so, possible solutions to both the Fact/Value problem and the Euthyphro Dilemma are suggested. This naturalistic account seems to point to a creative understanding of God and human moral activity, which nevertheless moves beyond the simplicities of situation ethics or relativism.

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Ambury, James M. "Colloquium 3 Commentary on Kosman." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2016): 113–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00311p09.

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In this commentary I offer a reply to Professor Aryeh Kosman’s stimulating discussion of the Euthyphro dilemma in his paper, “Why the Gods Love the Holy.” After a brief summary of the paper, I pose some specific questions for Professor Kosman’s interpretation and wonder generally about the notion of cause for which he argues. I suggest the language of Platonic Forms as an alternative to Professor Kosman’s approach, though I believe the two approaches can be reconciled. I conclude with some thoughts on the latter parts of the paper that deal with the relation between our judgments and objective reality.

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Rees, Dafydd Huw. "Habermasian Constructivism: An Alternative to the Constitutivist Argument." Kantian Review 25, no. 4 (2020): 675–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415420000382.

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AbstractJürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality should be understood, in metaethical terms, as a constructivist theory. All constructivist theories face a Euthyphro-like dilemma arising from how they classify the constraints on their metaethical construction procedures: are they moral or non-moral? Many varieties of Kantian constructivism, such as Christine Korsgaard’s, classify the constraints as moral, albeit constitutive of human reason and agency in general. However, this constitutivist strategy is vulnerable to David Enoch’s ‘shmagency’ objection. The discourse theory of morality, by classifying the constraints on the metaethical construction procedure (principles (D) and (U)) as non-moral, can avoid this problem.

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Koehn, Glen. "Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(2) (February 27, 2018): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2011.1.1.

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While Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.

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Martin, Kraig, and J. Caleb Clanton. "On Moral-Natural and Moral-Positive Duties: A Combination Metaethical Theory in the Restoration Tradition." Studies in Christian Ethics 30, no. 4 (2016): 429–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946816680138.

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This article elucidates a unique metaethical theory implicit in the work of several thinkers associated with the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement. After positioning that theory within a broader landscape of metaethical positions endorsed by several prominent contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians, we address the concern that, when attending to the Euthyphro dilemma, the Restoration-inspired combination metaethical theory inevitably collapses into either an unalloyed divine command theory or an unalloyed natural law theory. In explaining how this sort of worry can be mitigated, we offer reason to think that the nonreductive, combination metaethical theory in question constitutes potentially fertile territory for further scholarly work in Christian ethics.

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Moreso, J. J. "On Deontic Truth and Values." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 49, no. 146 (2017): 61–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181.

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This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.

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Westacott, Emrys. "The Contemporary Relevance of Socrates' question to Euthyphro." Think 2, no. 5 (2003): 69–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600002621.

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Johnson, Sarah. "The Angel in the Juniper." After Dinner Conversation 2, no. 4 (2021): 32–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/adc20212434.

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Are the pious loved by the gods because they are pious, or are they pious because they are loved by the gods?” In this work of philosophical short story fiction, Professor Adamson and the narrator discuss Euthyphro’s dilemma. The narrator is invited by her professor to follow her into the woods and to meet a reclusive revolutionary leader. The professor, and the revolutionary group, want to overthrow the government because voting rights, and other civil rights, have been severely restricted by the government. The legal ability to change the government through voting is a “near impossibility.” On her way to meet the leader, the narrator meets an angel who informs her that the future revolution will fail, and many will be hurt in the process. The angel tells the narrator she must kill her professor to help humanity. The narrator is unsure what to do and, during their walk, discusses the dilemma she is in; a practical application of Euthyphro’s dilemma. The story ends in the final moment, knife in hand, when the narrator is about to decide what she will do.

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Korostichenko, Ekaterina. "Christian view on treating animals: theological criticism of P. Singer." St. Tikhons' University Review 104 (December 29, 2022): 46–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.15382/sturi2022104.46-67.

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P. Singer is called one of the most influential living philosophers in the world, and one of the most controversial. The author of "Animal Liberation", "Practical Ethics", "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" created his own project of preference utilitarianism, in which he placed animals as moral subjects equal to man. In this, he questions Christian anthropocentrism: a human in his system of ethics is intrinsically no better than a chimpanzee or a dog. He recognizes the uniqueness of all species, speaking out against speciesism (discrimination on grounds of species). Singer's ethics is completely independent of religion. Raising issues related to abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc., the philosopher inevitably arrived to confrontation with Christian ethics and religious worldview in general. Religion, especially Christianity, plays a significant role in his works, since he considers many of the provisions of Christianity: the special position of humans in the natural world, the attitude to the sanctity of life - to be morally problematic. The article analyzes Peter Singer's critical theses on the Christian religion, including Christian ethics. The second section considers the responses of a number of modern religious thinkers to Singer's criticism of Christianity. In conclusion, the arguments of both sides are analyzed, their strengths and weaknesses are outlined, involving a broader tradition of secular-religious dispute. Conclusions are made about the validity of P. Singer's criticism of religion. Although said criticism is broadly integrated into the works of the philosopher, it is hardly a focus point - rather a tool to solidify Singer's position on practical questions like abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc. The negative attitude to religion has roots in Singer's early acquaintance with the Bible and the unhappy past of his family (two of the philosopher's grandparents died in concentration camps). The question of the meaninglessness of suffering largely determines the philosophy and practical ethics of P. Singer. Arguing with theologians, he most often resorts to the classical argument from evil. Singer's criticism of Christian religion is limited, reduced to the problem of the meaninglessness of suffering, the Euthyphron dilemma, criticism of the sanctity of human life, the "dominion" of man over nature. With the exception of a detailed analysis of the bias of Christianity against animals, the criticism is not original.

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Koritansky, Peter Karl. "Thomas Aquinas and the Euthyphro Dilemma." Heythrop Journal, November 28, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/heyj.13116.

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Gericke, Jaco W. "Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible." HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 65, no. 1 (2009). http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v65i1.160.

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Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

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Schmidt, Benedikt. "homo ethicus – A theological-ethical definition of principles from a Christian perspective in an interreligious context." Turn - Zeitschrift fuer islamische Philosophie, Theologie und Mystik, no. 3 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.53100/75345572523.

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Benedikt Schmidt examines the notion of homo ethicus from a Christian theological perspective. If one starts from the definition of ethics as a methodical reflection of reason on human action, then insofar as this is affected by the distinction between good and evil, it should be regarded as a general human phenomenon – independent of religion. Accordingly, theology sees itself faced with the task of dealing with ethical questions from the perspective of its own religion. Using the »Euthyphron dilemma« the author argues that this is a fundamental challenge for both Christian and Islamic theologians, because the answer to this fundamental question depends on which conception of ethics a religion has developed and what understanding of humans as ethical beings informs this. Based on four theses, the author tries to clarify homo ethicus from a Christian-ethical point of view. The »Christian ethos« is thereby to be understood as referring to the values, convictions and basic moral patterns that characterize Christian teachings, and for him Christian ethics is the reflection of this ethos by various actors who feel themselves to be Christians. Because the reflections have an effect on practice, there is a kind of interaction here. According to Schmidt, from a Christian point of view homo ethicus is to be located on the border between anthropology and theology. As the »Euthyphron dilemma« has already shown, he must maintain a difficult balance here. At the same time, for the author, homo ethicus is the figure that can function as an important and easily accessible bridge both to the secular pluralistic society and to other religions. Accordingly, it can also play an important role in the Christian-Islamic dialogue. However, there must be a certain basic consensus as to what is to be understood under homo ethicus.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Euthyphro dilemma'

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