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Journal articles on the topic 'Excess compensation'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

ChoiWooseok, Maria A. Leach-López, and 이은서. "Excess Compensation and Corporate Governance." Korea International Accounting Review ll, no. 86 (August 2019): 165–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.21073/kiar.2019..86.008.

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2

Feito-Ruiz, Isabel, and Luc Renneboog. "Takeovers and (excess) CEO compensation." Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 50 (September 2017): 156–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.06.003.

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3

Byun. Seol-Won and 박상봉. "Accounting Conservatism and Excess Executive Compensation." Management & Information Systems Review 37, no. 2 (June 2018): 187–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.29214/damis.2018.37.2.010.

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4

Sauerwald, Steve, Zhiang (John) Lin, and Mike Peng. "Board Social Capital and Excess CEO Compensation." Academy of Management Proceedings 2013, no. 1 (January 2013): 12567. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.154.

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5

Choi, Kyong－Soo, and Kyung－Hye Kim. "CEO’s Excess Compensation and Real Earnings Management." Korea Association of Business Education 34, no. 2 (April 30, 2019): 347–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.23839/kabe.2019.34.2.347.

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6

Ting, Hsiu-I. "Why Do Board Members Receive Excess Compensation?" Managerial and Decision Economics 37, no. 8 (July 7, 2015): 552–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2744.

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7

Rodda, Gordon H., and Kathryn Dean-Bradley. "Excess density compensation of island herpetofaunal assemblages." Journal of Biogeography 29, no. 5-6 (May 2002): 623–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2699.2002.00711.x.

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Kalelkar, Rachana, Sarfraz Khan, and Sung Jin Park. "Excess audit committee compensation and audit pricing." International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 14, no. 2/3 (2018): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijaape.2018.091062.

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Park, Sung Jin, Rachana Kalelkar, and Sarfraz Khan. "Excess audit committee compensation and audit pricing." International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 14, no. 2/3 (2018): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijaape.2018.10012071.

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10

Robinson, John R., Yanfeng Xue, and Yong Yu. "Determinants of Disclosure Noncompliance and the Effect of the SEC Review: Evidence from the 2006 Mandated Compensation Disclosure Regulations." Accounting Review 86, no. 4 (April 1, 2011): 1415–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10033.

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ABSTRACT We investigate the economic forces that influence noncompliance with mandatory compensation disclosures and the effect of a subsequent focused enforcement action. We utilize SEC evaluations of compensation disclosures mandated by rules adopted in 2006 to examine whether noncompliance is associated with excess CEO compensation, proprietary costs, or previous media attention. We further test whether subsequent CEO compensation declines after the SEC publicly identifies noncompliance. We construct measures of defective disclosures from SEC critiques and find that disclosure defects are positively associated with excess CEO compensation and media criticism of CEO compensation during the previous year. We find no evidence supporting the contention that compensation disclosure defects are associated with proprietary costs. Furthermore, we are unable to document that the level of disclosure defects identified by the SEC is associated with a reduction in excess CEO compensation in the subsequent year. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M52, G32, G38.

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Peng, Qing, Xuesong Tang, and Yuxin Zheng. "The impact of board secretaries’ excess compensation on corporate disclosure quality." Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 2 (June 3, 2019): 306–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-05-2017-0027.

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Purpose Extensively public concern on “Huge Executive Compensation” makes it urgent to investigate the reasonability of high executive compensation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on the specific responsibility of executives. More specifically, this paper is to examine whether high compensation is helpful to mitigate agency problems. Design/methodology/approach Considering that board secretaries of listed companies are responsible for information disclosure in China, this paper examines the effect of board secretaries’ excess compensation on firms’ disclosure quality using listed company data from 2007 to 2015. The first measure of disclosure quality is based on the disclosure violation behavior of firms, and the second is KV value that represents the extent to which the investors relay on the stock trading volume. To provide additional confidence that the findings are robust, this paper further conducts two indirect tests based on rumors and cost of equity capital. Findings The results show that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively associated with the probability of information disclosure violation and also negatively associated with firms’ KV value, suggesting firms that pay high compensation to their information providers are more likely to provide high-quality disclosures. Besides, this paper further finds that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively related to the incidence of rumors, the number of rumors incurred or the cost of equity capital. Research limitations/implications Overall, the findings provide support to the efficient contracting of executive compensation, which implies that highly paid board secretaries would be better information providers than those poorly paid. Practical implications This paper provides empirical evidence that firms’ disclosure quality can be improved by modifying the compensation contract of information providers. This may indicate a new way to improve the quality of disclosures, so as to mitigate the agency problem. Social implications In spite of the public criticism on executive excess compensation, the high compensation is not always a signal of manipulation, collusion and self-interest. It also can be a signal of individual talents and great efforts. Board secretaries are worth to be highly paid if they can improve firms’ disclosures, thereby reducing the incidence of rumors and reducing the cost of equity capital. Originality/value This paper is the first research to examine the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on information providers’ disclosure responsibility in the Chinese context. It documents a positive relation between board secretaries’ excess compensation and corporate disclosure quality.

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12

Chung, Huimin, William Q. Judge, and Yi-Hua Li. "Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value." Journal of Corporate Finance 32 (June 2015): 64–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.04.001.

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13

Aleinik, A. S., I. G. Deineka, M. A. Smolovik, S. T. Neforosnyi, and A. V. Rupasov. "Compensation of excess RIN in fiber-optic gyro." Gyroscopy and Navigation 7, no. 3 (July 2016): 214–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s2075108716030020.

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14

Parsons, Linda M., and Austin L. Reitenga. "College and University President Pay and Future Performance." Accounting Horizons 28, no. 1 (November 1, 2013): 125–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-50660.

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SYNOPSIS Just as with executive compensation in the corporate environment, the pay of university presidents has come under scrutiny. In this study, we examine the link between the level of abnormal compensation for university presidents in the current period and the subsequent performance of the university. We find that private schools awarding “excess” compensation (relative to schools with similar characteristics) improve their reputation and resources to a greater extent in the next two years than private schools not awarding “excess” compensation. Our results suggest that some portion of what appears to be excess pay in private schools is related to differences in the president's ability to deliver performance changes that would be valued by the university's stakeholders. Specifically, we find that private schools reward improvements in academic quality, but do not reward improvements in the academic environment such as reductions in class size. Conversely, what appears to be excess compensation in public schools is not related to performance metrics that are commonly used by the business press to rank universities, suggesting that performance metrics differ significantly between private and public schools.

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15

Brady, Andrew, Rolf Zaiss, and Nyron Persaud. "SEC proposes new compensation clawback rules." Journal of Investment Compliance 16, no. 4 (November 2, 2015): 43–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/joic-08-2015-0048.

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Purpose – To examine the proposed rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which, if adopted, would require national stock exchanges to establish listing standards that would require listed issuers to adopt so-called clawback policies for the recovery of excess incentive-based compensation in the event that an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement resulting from material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement. Design/methodology/approach – The article discusses the SEC’s proposed rules, including the circumstances that would require recovery of excess incentive-based compensation, the types of compensation that, and the individuals whose compensation, would be subject to recovery, and certain new disclosure requirements for listed issuers. Findings – The SEC’s proposed rules will, if adopted, impose additional burdens on listed issuers to adopt and comply with recovery policies for excess incentive-based compensation and adhere to new public disclosure requirements. Originality/value – Expert analysis from experienced securities and executive compensation lawyers.

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16

Reid, Colin D. "CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?" Business Horizons 61, no. 5 (September 2018): 721–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.05.004.

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17

Gaver, Jennifer J., and S. Mary Im. "Funding Sources and Excess CEO Compensation in Not-for-Profit Organizations." Accounting Horizons 28, no. 1 (August 1, 2013): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-50588.

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SYNOPSIS We examine the relation between funding composition and excess CEO compensation in not-for-profit organizations (NFPs). Our sample consists of 105,400 observations from 15,412 unique organizations during 1992 to 2007. The results suggest that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to funding from government grants, government-paid program service revenues, and public donations. Excess CEO compensation is positively related to funding from investment income. Our findings generally support the view that the demand for monitoring by fund providers is associated with agency costs in NFP organizations. JEL Classifications: D23; L31; M48. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the National Center for Charitable Statistics.

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18

Webb, K., and H. Song. "Compensation Scheme of a 50 Ω Bond Wire Interconnect Using Time Domain Reflectometry." Journal of Microelectronics and Electronic Packaging 8, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 114–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4071/imaps.301.

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A compensation scheme that reduces the impact of the excess reactance of bond wires is introduced. From the 3D finite element code and the time domain reflectometry (TDR), physical models were evaluated and the excess reactance of the signal path was determined to optimize the compensation structure. The presented method can be employed to reduce the negative impact caused by the excess reactances in bond wires for high signal integrity integrated circuit (IC) packaging applications.

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19

Bhattacharya, Anasua, and Robert M. Park. "Excess healthcare costs associated with prior workers' compensation activity." American Journal of Industrial Medicine 55, no. 11 (September 11, 2012): 1018–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajim.22112.

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20

Guha, Sanjib, and Niazur Rahim. "The effect of managerial horizon on cash holdings." Managerial Finance 45, no. 8 (August 12, 2019): 1092–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-09-2018-0442.

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Purpose US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics. Design/methodology/approach Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding. Findings The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash. Originality/value There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.

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21

Amdouni, Sarra, and Sabri Boubaker. "Multiple Large Shareholders And Owner-Manager Compensation: Evidence From French Listed Firms." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 31, no. 3 (May 4, 2015): 1119. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i3.9243.

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The objective of this study is to examine the relation between complex ownership structures and managerial compensation. More specifically, we examine the impact of the owner-managers excess control and the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the owner-managers compensation. Using a sample of French publicly listed firms, the results reveal several important points. First, the owner-managers compensation increases with the owner-managers excess control. This finding indicates that managers use their power to increase their pay, hence expropriating minority shareholders. Second, the presence of MLS decreases managerial opportunism and prevents owner-managers from diverting corporate resources for their own benefit. Hence, MLS play an important monitoring role.

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22

Conyon, Martin J., and Lerong He. "Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms." Journal of Management Accounting Research 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35.

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This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

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23

Xie, Yi, Wei Wan, Fei Zhou, Liang Chen, Chao-Hong Li, and Mang Feng. "Linear ion trap imperfection and the compensation of excess micromotion." Chinese Physics B 21, no. 6 (June 2012): 063201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1674-1056/21/6/063201.

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24

Kidder, Deborah L., and Ann K. Buchholtz. "Can excess bring success? CEO compensation and the psychological contract." Human Resource Management Review 12, no. 4 (December 2002): 599–617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1053-4822(02)00071-2.

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25

Pavan, Shanthi. "Excess Loop Delay Compensation in Continuous-Time Delta-Sigma Modulators." IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs 55, no. 11 (November 2008): 1119–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tcsii.2008.2008051.

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26

Wang, Feng, Lijun Wu, Chao Ma, Dong Su, Yimei Zhu, and Jason Graetz. "Excess lithium storage and charge compensation in nanoscale Li4+xTi5O12." Nanotechnology 24, no. 42 (September 25, 2013): 424006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0957-4484/24/42/424006.

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27

Hanafi Alamdari, H., K. El-Sankary, and E. El-Masry. "Excess loop delay compensation for continuous-time modulators using interpolation." Electronics Letters 45, no. 12 (2009): 609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/el.2009.0584.

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28

Li, Han. "Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Excess Perks." Accounting and Finance Research 8, no. 2 (March 10, 2019): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/afr.v8n2p32.

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This paper sheds light on the relationship between accounting conservatism and managerial excess perks. In general, there are two views about managerial perks, agency cost view and management incentive view. Under the assumption that considers managerial perks as agency costs, the abnormal managerial perks erode the value of firms. Accounting conservatism can significantly restrict the managerial excess perks. Due to the strict compensation regulation in China’s SOEs, the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess perks in China’s SOEs is stronger than in non-SOEs. Further, in the robustness tests, this paper finds that negative relationship is stronger in the firms of lower level accounting conservatism or higher level financial leverage.

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Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, and Yun Zhu. "Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation." Managerial Finance 45, no. 7 (July 8, 2019): 810–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2018-0123.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis. Findings With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests. Research limitations/implications Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms. Originality/value It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.

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30

Sakaue, Taichi, Chang-Jun Ahn, Tatsuya Omori, and Ken-Ya Hashimoto. "Time Domain Replica Signal Based Interference Compensation for SP-MIMO/OFDM with Large Delay Spread Channel." International Journal of Distributed Systems and Technologies 5, no. 4 (October 2014): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijdst.2014100101.

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In mobile communications, MIMO-OFDM transmission performance suffers severe degradation caused by the large delay spread channel greater than guard interval (GI). This is because the excess delay results in considerable inter-symbol interference (ISI) between adjacent symbols and inter-carrier-interference (ICI) among subcarrier in the same symbol. In case of scattered pilot (SP), the interference of pilot signals causes the deterioration of channel estimation. To mitigate this problem, in this paper, we propose the interference compensation scheme using the time domain replica signals. We make the time domain replica signals from detected signals and the excess channel impulse responses over GI. After compensation of the time domain replica signals and the received signals, we recalculate the channel state information (CSI) and the CSI is updated. Finally, we carry out the channel compensation with updated CSI for obtaining accurate compensated signals.

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31

Gubin, V. P., Y. V. Przhiyalkovskiy, N. I. Starostin, S. K. Morshnev, and A. I. Sazonov. "A broadband Faraday fiber-optic current sensor with excess noise compensation." Results in Physics 18 (September 2020): 103286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rinp.2020.103286.

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32

Uhde, André. "Risk-taking incentives through excess variable compensation: Evidence from European banks." Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 60 (May 2016): 12–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2015.11.009.

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33

Garner, Jacqueline L., and Teresa D. Harrison. "Boards, Executive Excess Compensation, and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms." Financial Review 48, no. 4 (October 8, 2013): 617–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fire.12018.

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34

Jabbour, C., V. T. Nguyen, V. Srini, and S. Aggarwal. "Digital excess loop delay compensation for high speed delta–sigma modulators." Electronics Letters 51, no. 15 (July 2015): 1155–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/el.2015.0949.

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35

Schlichtig, Robert, Alan W. Grogono, and John W. Severinghaus. "Human PaCO2 and standard base excess compensation for acid-base imbalance." Critical Care Medicine 26, no. 7 (July 1998): 1173–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00003246-199807000-00015.

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36

Walters, Bruce, Tim Hardin, and James Schick. "Top executive compensation: Equity or excess? Implications for regaining American competitiveness." Journal of Business Ethics 14, no. 3 (March 1995): 227–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00881437.

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37

Hill, Mary S., Thomas J. Lopez, and Austin L. Reitenga. "CEO excess compensation: The impact of firm size and managerial power." Advances in Accounting 33 (June 2016): 35–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2016.04.007.

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38

Couret, Jose, and Gary Venter. "Using Multi-Dimensional Credibility to Estimate Class Frequency Vectors in Workers Compensation." ASTIN Bulletin 38, no. 01 (May 2008): 73–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ast.38.1.2030403.

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The US workers compensation system is different from those in many countries, but it is reinsured in the world-wide market and so has international impact. From its origin in the early 20th century it has been a laboratory for actuarial credibility techniques. In recent years deductibles have been increasing, so that fairly high excess coverage is now commonplace. This puts growing emphasis on estimation of the percentage of loss that is excess of high deductibles. A key element of the excess percentage is the frequency of loss by injury type. Fatalities and permanent disabilities cost more than other injury types, so when they have high relative frequency, more of the claims cost arises from large losses. The vector of claim frequency by injury type can be estimated by class of business using multi-dimensional credibility techniques. Historically the fraction of costs excess of various retentions has been calculated for large groups of classes (hazard groups) and not individual classes. We show, by testing a hold-out sample, that credibility estimation by class does produce additional information in comparison to a widely-used seven-hazard-group system.

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Couret, Jose, and Gary Venter. "Using Multi-Dimensional Credibility to Estimate Class Frequency Vectors in Workers Compensation." ASTIN Bulletin 38, no. 1 (May 2008): 73–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0515036100015063.

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The US workers compensation system is different from those in many countries, but it is reinsured in the world-wide market and so has international impact. From its origin in the early 20th century it has been a laboratory for actuarial credibility techniques. In recent years deductibles have been increasing, so that fairly high excess coverage is now commonplace. This puts growing emphasis on estimation of the percentage of loss that is excess of high deductibles. A key element of the excess percentage is the frequency of loss by injury type. Fatalities and permanent disabilities cost more than other injury types, so when they have high relative frequency, more of the claims cost arises from large losses. The vector of claim frequency by injury type can be estimated by class of business using multi-dimensional credibility techniques. Historically the fraction of costs excess of various retentions has been calculated for large groups of classes (hazard groups) and not individual classes. We show, by testing a hold-out sample, that credibility estimation by class does produce additional information in comparison to a widely-used seven-hazard-group system.

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40

Lin, Ying-Fen. "Corporate governance, excess compensation, and CEO turnover in family and non-family businesses." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 2 (2007): 46–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i2p4.

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The replacement of a CEO is one of the control mechanisms that companies employ to reduce the agency problems. This paper divides companies into non-family businesses and family businesses and investigates the influence of outside directors, outside blockholders, and excess compensation in CEOs termination process. The samples used in the paper come from manufacturing companies in Taiwan listed between 1996-1997; the analytical method is logistic regression model. The conclusion is as follows: 1. the characteristics of family businesses, corporate governance, and excess compensation have no correlation on CEO turnover. 2. External board members play an important role in CEO termination in non-family businesses

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41

Paolucci, Francesco, Andre Den Exter, and Wynand Van De Ven. "Solidarity in competitive health insurance markets: analysing the relevant EC legal framework." Health Economics, Policy and Law 1, no. 2 (March 23, 2006): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133105000137.

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In this article we perform an economic analysis of different regulatory frameworks that aim at guaranteeing solidarity in competitive health insurance markets. Thereafter, we analyse the legal conformity of these intervention strategies with EC law. We find that risk compensation schemes are the first-best intervention strategy because they guarantee an ‘acceptable level of solidarity’ without hindering free trade and competition and without reducing efficiency. Second-best options are premium and excess-loss compensation schemes, which guarantee solidarity at the expense of some efficiency. Premium rate restrictions and open enrolment should be avoided because they reduce efficiency and are unnecessary, not proportional, and undesirable to the pursuit of the general good. These conclusions are relevant for EU countries that adopt premium rate restrictions and open enrolment in combination with a risk compensation scheme, such as Ireland and the Netherlands. In these countries policy makers should design the health insurance schemes in conformity with EC law, for example by replacing premium rate restrictions and open enrolment with premium and/or excess-loss compensation schemes.

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Makharadze, Guram, and David Japaridze. "Selection criteria and a mathematical model for the additional source of reactive power in a backbone network." Works of Georgian Technical University, no. 4(518) (December 15, 2020): 105–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.36073/1512-0996-2020-4-105-112.

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In a backbone network (𝑈􀯡 ≥ 220 𝑘𝑣), when the high-voltage lines are loaded with power less than natural power, we have excess reactive power. Supplying this power into the lower-voltage networks (𝑈􀯡 ≤ 110 𝑘𝑣) would be technically and economically unfeasible and requires compensation on site. In the article, in accordance with the electricity quality criterion, and taking into account the principle of a systemic approach, and using the self- and mutually reactive impedances of the network junction points, a mathematical model for selecting a compensating device in a backbone network is adopted. The quality criterion of electricity involves enforcement of requirements for the operating voltages in the junction points of a backbone network. According to the obtained mathematical model, in the junction points nodes where the operating voltages exceed their permitted values, there will be installed the compensating devices for receiving excess reactive power. However if any junction point has a high reactive load and the voltage, in this context, is below its permitted value, then, according to a model, there is a need for installing the source of reactive power in this junction point. Herewith, according to economic criterion, the model envisages the optimal redistribution of mentioned source of reactive power between the junction points of a distribution network connected to backbone network junction point.

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Chenoweth, David, and Joe Leutzinger. "The Economic Cost of Physical Inactivity and Excess Weight in American Adults." Journal of Physical Activity and Health 3, no. 2 (April 2006): 148–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jpah.3.2.148.

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Background:Physical inactivity and excess weight in American adults have reached epidemic levels. This article describes how cost data from previously conducted analyses in several states were used to quantify the costs of physical inactivity and excess weight among American adults.Methods:Medical and workers’ compensation cost data on selected medical conditions were obtained from various health plans and state agencies in seven states. Productivity loss norms were obtained from published studies.Results:The estimated financial burden which includes direct medical care, workers’ compensation, and productivity loss costs among the seven states is $93.32 billion for physical inactivity and $94.33 billion for excess weight. The estimated nationwide cost of these risk factors is approximately $507 billion with projected costs exceeding $708 billion in 2008. Projected cost-savings of $31 billion per year could be realized with a 5% drop in these risk factors.Conclusion:The cost of physical inactivity and excess weight among American adults is significant. More research on best-of-class interventions to curtail the high prevalence of these risk factors is needed.

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Abovich, N., L. Gritz, L. Tung, and M. Rosbash. "Effect of RP51 gene dosage alterations on ribosome synthesis in Saccharomyces cerevisiae." Molecular and Cellular Biology 5, no. 12 (December 1985): 3429–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/mcb.5.12.3429.

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The Saccharomyces cerevisiae ribosomal protein rp51 is encoded by two interchangeable genes, RP51A and RP51B. We altered the RP51 gene dose by creating deletions of the RP51A or RP51B genes or both. Deletions of both genes led to spore inviability, indicating that rp51 is an essential ribosomal protein. From single deletion studies in haploid cells, we concluded that there was no intergenic dosage compensation at the level of mRNA abundance or mRNA utilization (translational efficiency), although phenotypic analysis had previously indicated a small compensation effect on growth rate. Similarly, deletions in diploid strains indicated that no strong mechanisms exist for intragenic dosage compensation; in all cases, a decreased dose of RP51 genes was characterized by a slow growth phenotype. A decreased dose of RP51 genes also led to insufficient amounts of 40S ribosomal subunits, as evidenced by a dramatic accumulation of excess 60S ribosomal subunits. We conclude that inhibition of 40S synthesis had little or no effect on the synthesis of the 60S subunit components. Addition of extra copies of rp51 genes led to extra rp51 protein synthesis. The additional rp51 protein was rapidly degraded. We propose that rp51 and perhaps many ribosomal proteins are normally oversynthesized, but the unassembled excess is degraded, and that the apparent compensation seen in haploids, i.e., the fact that the growth rate of mutant strains is less depressed than the actual reduction in mRNA, is a consequence of this excess which is spared from proteolysis under this circumstance.

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45

Abovich, N., L. Gritz, L. Tung, and M. Rosbash. "Effect of RP51 gene dosage alterations on ribosome synthesis in Saccharomyces cerevisiae." Molecular and Cellular Biology 5, no. 12 (December 1985): 3429–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/mcb.5.12.3429-3435.1985.

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The Saccharomyces cerevisiae ribosomal protein rp51 is encoded by two interchangeable genes, RP51A and RP51B. We altered the RP51 gene dose by creating deletions of the RP51A or RP51B genes or both. Deletions of both genes led to spore inviability, indicating that rp51 is an essential ribosomal protein. From single deletion studies in haploid cells, we concluded that there was no intergenic dosage compensation at the level of mRNA abundance or mRNA utilization (translational efficiency), although phenotypic analysis had previously indicated a small compensation effect on growth rate. Similarly, deletions in diploid strains indicated that no strong mechanisms exist for intragenic dosage compensation; in all cases, a decreased dose of RP51 genes was characterized by a slow growth phenotype. A decreased dose of RP51 genes also led to insufficient amounts of 40S ribosomal subunits, as evidenced by a dramatic accumulation of excess 60S ribosomal subunits. We conclude that inhibition of 40S synthesis had little or no effect on the synthesis of the 60S subunit components. Addition of extra copies of rp51 genes led to extra rp51 protein synthesis. The additional rp51 protein was rapidly degraded. We propose that rp51 and perhaps many ribosomal proteins are normally oversynthesized, but the unassembled excess is degraded, and that the apparent compensation seen in haploids, i.e., the fact that the growth rate of mutant strains is less depressed than the actual reduction in mRNA, is a consequence of this excess which is spared from proteolysis under this circumstance.

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46

Belkhir, Mohamed, Sabri Boubaker, and Kaouther Chebbi. "CEO inside debt and the value of excess cash." Journal of Applied Accounting Research 19, no. 2 (May 14, 2018): 225–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jaar-02-2017-0028.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachThe sample comprises 876 US firms covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006-2013. The authors apply the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998) to examine the marginal value of excess cash as a function of CEO inside debt holdings.FindingsThis paper proposes one hypothesis. The results constitute evidence that the value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. More interestingly, excess cash holdings contribute less to firm value when shareholders expect their value to be destroyed due to managers’ conservative behavior.Research limitations/implicationsThe sample comprises only US firms, owing to a lack of firms data from other countries. It would be interesting to conduct future research on an international sample.Practical implicationsThis paper contributes to a deeper understanding of investor valuation of excess cash in the presence of CEO inside debt. The findings complement previous studies on US firms by confirming the existence of a relationship between the agency costs of debt and firm policy decisions.Originality/valueThis work is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to examine the relationship between debt-like compensation and excess cash valuation, and it supports the view that the conflict between shareholders and debtholders largely affects firm cash policy, and hence, cash valuation.

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Bannister, James W., Harry A. Newman, and Emma Y. Peng. "Is excess compensation associated with the amount and content of compensation-related risk disclosures in bank proxy statements?" International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance 5, no. 3 (2014): 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbaaf.2014.064322.

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Slade, Bradley. "COMPENSATION FOR WHAT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOME IN ARUN PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (PTY) LTD V CAPE TOWN CITY." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 19 (April 28, 2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2016/v19i0a1156.

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In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City the Constitutional Court awarded compensation for land that vested in the City of Cape Town in terms of a regulatory framework. The regulatory framework, sections 25 and 28 of the Cape Land Use Planning Ordinance of 1985 (LUPO), provides that land needed for public streets and places and indicated as such on a subdivision plan should vest in the local authority concerned, but without compensation if that land is based on the normal need of providing the particular development with such public streets and places. The appellant argued that since land in excess of the normal need also vested in the City, it had a right to be compensated for the excess land that vested in the City. The Court, overturning two Supreme Court of Appeal decisions, awarded compensation. The Court hinted that the compensation was for the expropriation of the appellant's land that was excess to the normal need. In the absence of a formal expropriation procedure, this case note investigates whether the compensation could have been awarded for statutory expropriation or constructive expropriation. Therefore, the question that is posed is whether the alleged expropriation for which the Court awarded compensation can be classified as either statutory expropriation or constructive expropriation. It is pointed out that the Court accepted that section 28 of the LUPO constitutes a development contribution for the land based on the normal need. In terms of the notion of development contributions, a developer has to donate land to the local authority concerned if that land is required to provide the particular development with public streets and places. A development contribution, as part of the administrative process of approving developments, is regulatory in nature and its validity is judged in terms of the requirements for a valid deprivation of property. It is argued that since the Court interpreted section 28 of the LUPO to provide for development contributions, the alleged expropriation cannot be classified as statutory expropriation. Statutory expropriation occurs when legislation expropriates property directly through mere promulgation. In this case, the excess land vested in the City only after an administrative action was taken to approve a subdivision plan. It is also argued that statutory expropriation cannot be recognised in South African law, due to the constitutional requirements for a valid expropriation in section 25(2) of the Constitution.

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Gelinas, Patrice, and Lisa Baillargeon. "CEO Perquisites in Canada, 1971-2008: Certainly Not Pure Managerial Excess." International Journal of Business and Management 13, no. 5 (April 18, 2018): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v13n5p105.

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This paper explores Canadian market data on CEO perquisites gathered by a large consulting firm over the period from 1971 to 2008. Perquisites are one of the least documented total compensation components in the academic literature on executive pay. Scant existing literature may be due to the relatively recent and limited corporate disclosures on CEO perquisites, as well as to the comparatively modest monetary value of perquisites relative to other total CEO compensation components. Meanwhile, CEO perquisites regularly capture the public’s imagination in the media because of some perceived excesses, such as immoderate personal use of corporate aircraft (see Rajan & Wulf, 2006). We document a significant evolution in CEO perquisites practices over the period. Consistent with a nascent body of literature, this paper supports empirically hypotheses arguing that CEO perquisites do not uniquely occur as a result of an agency problem, the main theoretical explanation for their existence as of yet, but that they can also serve a legitimate, value-creating, business purpose for the benefit of shareholders.

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Kim, Kyoung Jae, Roxanne Buxton, James Crowell, Meghan Downs, and Andrew Abercromby. "An Automated Excess Minute Ventilation Method To Detect The Respiratory Compensation Point." Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise 52, no. 7S (July 2020): 37–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1249/01.mss.0000670404.13236.08.

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