Academic literature on the topic 'Excessive Deficit Procedure'

European policymakers have repeatedly suggested that fiscal-policy coordination and fiscal federalism will play key roles in Europe's monetary union. This paper warns that this hope is misplaced. Fiscal federalism will not be available to offset recessionary shocks for the foreseeable future. The effects of coordination designed to internalise the cross-border spillovers of fiscal policies are too weak. Freeing up fiscal policy to replace national governments' loss of monetary independence requires allowing European countries' automatic stabilisers to operate. That in turn requires a flexible application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact.The solution suggested here is that the Excessive Deficit Procedure and any fines and sanctions associated with the Stability Pact be applied to the constant-employment budget balance, not the actual deficit. Applying them to actual deficits when European countries enter EMU up against the 3 per cent limit will render fiscal policy strongly procyclical, aggravating the problem of macroeconomic fragility created by the loss of monetary autonomy. Still, countries like Germany haunted by the spectre of fiscal pro fligacy need to be reassured that member states will not abuse their fiscal discretion. Procedural and institutional reform to offset the deficit bias in national political systems is the obvious quid pro quo.

The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) is a political mechanism that aims at ‘multilevel governance’ of state indebtedness in the European Union. As such, it has become the concern of research that asks how sovereignty becomes articulated in this process. This article approaches this question through the conceptualization of a modular notion of sovereignty elaborated through a discussion of work on the finance-security nexus. The article argues that existing accounts of the formation of sovereign power in relation to state debt can be combined into a notion of modular sovereignty when seen through the prism of critiques of contractualism that take issue with liberal notions of state sovereignty and credit security. This way, the indebted state becomes visible as the referent object of multiple, and potentially contradictory, invocations of sovereignty as exercised in the EDP. First, it figures as the seat of budget sovereignty, holding its social substrate liable for its debts while ignoring inequalities in that substrate. Second, it is appealed to, within a biopolitical rationality, as the sovereign guarantor of the financial wellbeing of its population. Third, it is seen as the executor of financial wisdom that is mobilized in struggles between different levels of financial governance in the EDP.

The aim of this article is the presentation and the attempt to analyse such phenomena as: an excessive general government deficit and public debt in EU Member States over the past 3 years. For the European Union the years 2008-2010 were the time when public finances of most member countries worsened dramatically. The average budget deficit in the EU increased during that period to a value of almost 7% compared to gross domestic product and public debt reached almost 80% of GDP. Referring the numbers to the principles of the budgetary policy in the Treaty on the European Union (the deficit should not exceed 3% in relation to GDP and public debt – 60% of GDP), the observance of budgetary discipline has been significantly violated. In consequence, the excessive deficit procedure has been initiated. in relation to almost all the countries of the EU, Its purpose was to force the member countries to take concrete actions to stabilize public finances. The economic crisis that began in the second half of 2007 in the United States of America which resulted in a significant deterioration of the finances of all the EU member countries might be regarded as the major source of violation of their budgetary discipline. The reactions of most governments TO the harmful effects caused by the financial crisis were to stimulate national economies and stem the decline of domestic demand. The higher level of public expenditures was simultaneously the cause of increased budget deficits,. To develop and present the problem of an excessive budget deficit and public debt in the EU countries some statistical methods were used and the data source statistics were mainly carried out by the European Commission and the European Statistical Office.

The author presents the importance of the new European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) for statistics of the general government sector. She pays particular attention to the development of data for the excessive deficit procedure. The article explains the methodological changes made to the studies in this field parallel to the ESA 2010. It discusses, among others, issues related to defining the deficit and debt of the general government, as well as the determination of a new way registering transfer of liabilities of pension schemes. It also presents the impact of new methodological guidelines for the relationship of deficit and debt to GDP in the Member States of the European Union.

The article describes the changes solutions in the recognition of acquired pension rights in the framework of social security in national accounts. The principles applicable to September 2014 and the new guidelines contained in the System of National Accounts (SNA 2008) and the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010) are discussed. The author indicats differences between the systems and presents European solutions. Arguments are given that determined the non-inclusion of unfunded pension liabilities of public pension systems to statistics produced for the purposes of the excessive deficit procedure.

The European Commission has recently started a project aimed at harmonizing EU public accounting systems through the development of European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS). The project is a response to the lack of coherence between primary public-sector accounts and government financial statistics, in order to strengthen the economic governance structure in the euro area. This paper aims to show that the divergences (adjustments) between the measures of surplus/deficit in governmental (working balance, WB) and national accounting (net borrowing lending, NBL) vary over time to provide future research opportunities around the factors that, affecting temporal divergences between these measures, enhance fiscal fragility within the EU public sector accounting system. By analysing the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) tables issued by 28 EU countries over the period 2010-2015, the paper uses novel approaches in measuring adjustments based on network analysis and regression models, showing that they are significantly different over time.

Aside from the United Kingdom, which is withdrawing from the European Union, only Denmark has the option of staying outside the single European currency area. All other member states which have not adopted euro as their currency have the right and obligations to do so under the Treaty of Accession. The condition to join the Eurozone is to meet all five nominal Maastricht convergence criteria and to ensure compliance of national legislation with acquis communautaire, or the EU legal order. What poses special difficulties to candidate countries is the fiscal criterion relating to the maximum allowed budget deficit. If it’s not met, the European Commission launches the Excessive Deficit Procedure, EDP. Currently, this procedure is in place for France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In 2015, EDP for Poland was lifted, but there is no certainty it won’t be imposed again at the end of the decade due to the risk of exceeding once more the threshold of public sector deficit, which stands at 3 percent GDP. It is to be expected that in the 2020s the European Monetary Union will be joined by all the countries that are still using their national currencies, including Denmark, and that the EU will be extended to include new member states, enlarging the euro area, too. Although the issue is not absolutely certain, it needs to be assumed that euro will overcome the present difficulties and come out stronger, though the economically unjustified euroskepticism of some countries, especially Poland, is not helping.

Doutoramento em Economia<br>Throughout this work we empirically analyse three important dimensions of fiscal policy -cyclicality, fiscal forecasts and consolidation episodes. While central government expenditure is, on average, weakly countercyclical in the OECD countries and procyclical in Latin American countries, we find evidence of revenue procyclicality in both groups. Higher levels of income inequality lead to less procyclical policies on the revenue side but are associated with stronger expenditure procyclicality, and better institutions seem unable to mitigate this effect. We also study the track record of fiscal forecasts reported by the EU-15 countries in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. For the budget balance, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and interest payments, we study the statistical properties of forecast errors and their politico-institutional determinants. While errors in interest and GFCF expenditure present few systematic patterns, budget balance errors are responsive to fiscal institutions and to opportunistic motivations, especially from 1999 onwards: upcoming elections induce over-optimism, whereas commitment or mixed forms of fiscal governance and numerical expenditure rules (but not deficit and debt rules) are associated with greater prudence. Finally, for the EU-27 countries between 1969 and 2006, we assess those factors that help in explaining successful fiscal consolidations. Gradual episodes (3-4 years) are more likely to be successful than cold-shower adjustments (during a single year). The probability of success also increases in the face of cuts in central government current transfers to lower tiers of government. Finally, while successful cold-shower consolidations are characterised, in the years they occur, by a very limited contribution from politically-sensitive expenditure items, such as government wages and social transfers, these items account for nearly half of the primary expenditure adjustment effort during successful gradual fiscal contractions.<br>Neste trabalho procedemos à análise empírica de três dimensões da política orçamental -ciclicidade, previsões orçamentais e episódios de consolidação. Enquanto a despesa da Administração Central é, em média, ligeiramente contra-cíclica nos países da OCDE e pro-cíclica na América Latina, encontra-se evidência de prociclicidade das políticas do lado da receita em ambos os grupos de países. A elevada desigualdade de rendimentos conduz a políticas menos pro-cíclicas do lado da receita, mas está associada a uma maior prociclicidade da despesa, sendo que este efeito não parece ser mitigado por melhores instituições. Analisamos também o desempenho das previsões orçamentais reportadas pelos países da UE-15 no contexto do Procedimento dos Défices Excessivos. Para o saldo orçamental, formação bruta de capital fixo (FBCF) e juros pagos, estudamos as propriedades estatísticas dos erros de previsão e os seus determinantes político-institucionais. Enquanto os erros para a despesa com juros e FBCF apresentam poucos padrões sistemáticos, os erros de previsão do saldo orçamental dependem das instituições e de motivações oportunistas, especialmente a partir de 1999: a proximidade de eleições induz sobre-optimismo, enquanto que processos de decisão orçamental baseados em formas ditas de compromisso ou mistas e regras numéricas de despesa (mas não as de défice e dívida) estão associados a uma maior prudência. Finalmente, para os países da UE-27 entre 1969 e 2006, avaliamos os factores que ajudam a explicar o sucesso das consolidações orçamentais. Os episódios graduais (3-4 anos) têm maior probabilidade de sucesso do que os episódios do tipo "cold-shower" (que duram apenas 1 ano). A probabilidade de sucesso também aumenta na presença de reduções nas transferências correntes da Administração Central para outros sub-sectores. Enquanto as consolidações "cold-shower" bem sucedidas se caracterizam, no ano em que ocorrem, por um contributo muito limitado de rubricas de despesa politicamente sensíveis, como os salários da Administração Pública e as transferências sociais, estas rubricas contribuem com cerca de metade do esforço do ajustamento da despesa primária durante as consolidações graduais bem sucedidas.

The analysis of the government sector gained prominence after the World War II as the Keynesian theory attributed the government sector key importance in battling economic cycle and the post-war reconstruction and development involved state interventions on a large scale. In 1990s a strength-ened interest in the government sector was triggered by the need to coordinate fiscal policies and closely monitor fiscal health in the countries forming the Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, in the context of the recent global economic crisis, the government sector returned to the centre of the economic policy debate as fiscal policy was used as a main tool to fight the economic recession and subsequently sustainability of government finances became a pressing issue for many countries around the Globe. Increasing importance of the fiscal analysis and fiscal policymaking always generated and continues to generate demand for appropriate statistical data. The international statistical standards played a key role in meeting these requirements. This dissertation offers a comprehensive historical overview, a comparative analysis and evaluation of main internationally recognised statistical standards dealing with the government sector produced by the United Nations, the OECD, the European Communities (Eurostat), the IMF and the European Central Bank. It covers a period since the first international guidelines in late 1940s up to present. It analyses evolution of the statistical treatment of the government sector including its historical roots and gradual revisions and extensions to reflect changing needs and shifts in economic environment. The study compares individual standards with each other and across time and points out differences in basic definitions, concepts and classifications, the institutional coverage of the government sector, structure of government accounts and balancing items, integration of flow accounts with balance sheets and consolidation of transactions or stocks. The dissertation shows that the international statistical standards were successful in offering common statistical guidance, recommendations and best practices. The international organizations have proven to be well suited to deliver widely acknowledged standards. Their cooperation with national statistical agencies and engagement of the most competent experts in the field contributed to building credibility of these statistical systems, if properly applied. The comparative analysis also demonstrates a clear long-term effort of the international statistical community to enhance international harmonization. The application of the international statistical standards also improved quality and availability of government statistics as individual countries are in principle bound -- through their memberships in the international organizations -- to compile agreed data on the basis of a common methodology. This was in particular the case for EU countries for which provision of statistical data according to a given standard is legally binding, as the data are relevant for budgetary and surveillance procedures. As a special case, the history since early 1990s and current situation of statistics on the government sector in the Czech Republic is presented.

Under Article 126 TFEU “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits”. Member States are still in charge of their own budgetary policies, but they are still under the scope of the Treaties. Paragraph 7 of Article 126 states that “Where the Council decides, in accordance with paragraph 6, that an excessive deficit exists, it shall adopt, without undue delay, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, these recommendations shall not be made public.” The changes brought by recent pieces of legislation reinforced the enforceability given to Recommendations on the matter of Economic and Monetary Integration. The Nature of Recommendations was addressed by the ECJ in Grimaldi and in Altair Chimica. It was there stated that Recommendations might carry legal enforceability, and that their content should be interpreted regarding its execution. It is my understanding that the current legal framework regarding Recommendations, more specifically Recommendations made under an Excessive Deficit Procedure, should be revisited in order to answer the questions of their enforceability. The answers to these questions are crucial pieces of the puzzle in which the Economic and Monetary Governance of the European Union entrenched in. As the time passes and more procedures of this kind come to their final stages, the more likely it is to a Member State or its Courts to challenge such Recommendations enforceability. This is why I believe it is relevant to revisit the question regarding Recommendations in order to make some sense of what really is the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact.

Dissertation presented as the partial requirement for obtaining a Master's degree in Statistics and Information Management, specialization in Information Analysis and Management<br>Article 104 of the Treaty on the European Community establishes that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits and that the European Commission should monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the MS. For this effect, the 28 MS of the European Union are obliged to report biannually (in March and September) the detailed deficit and debt for the four reporting years. The deficit and the debt figures are of utmost importance for the correct functioning and control of the economy and therefore essential for the international organizations to monitor the economic developments in the different countries around the world: In the European Union, to avoid an excessive deficit, the EU Member-States should keep their deficit below 3 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Considering the following, data harmonization is crucial to ensure comparability of these figures among different countries and to guarantee it´s reliability. As the EC (through Eurostat) does not compile the deficit and debt figures but relies on data compiled and reported by the statistical authorities in the MS, this work aims to provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the quality of the data disseminated by Eurostat. As most of the macroeconomic aggregates, also the deficit and the debt are subject to revisions. These will be analysed to assess whether the governments of the different European MS attempt to manipulate these figures, for example, using residual amounts like the Stock-Flow-Adjustment. Data published in the Eurostat website through the Excessive Deficit Procedure Tables was evaluated from 2002 together with the Excessive Deficit Procedure inventories.

Rozprawa doktorska Tomasza Woźnickiego zatytułowana: „Wpływ Parlamentu Europejskiego (PE) na reformy Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu (PSiW)” poświęcona została zmianom w Pakcie z perspektywy Parlamentu. Autor podjął się analizy oddziaływania jednej z głównych instytucji unijnych na reformę unijnych zasad budżetowych w trakcie procesu prawodawczego oraz następnie w toku wdrażania w życie nowych mechanizmów w pierwszych latach ich funkcjonowania. Badanie objęło kwestie określenia dynamiki kompetencyjnej związanej z rozwojem uprawnień Parlamentu na przestrzeni procesu integracji europejskiej w przededniu prac nad reformą, uwarunkowań determinujących stanowisko PE wobec modyfikacji PSiW, efektów zmian dla pozycji PE i relacji z innymi aktorami procesu decyzyjnego w tym zakresie oraz finalnego kształtu reformy pod kątem realnych możliwości (lub ich braku) wpływu PE na jego funkcjonowanie, co tłumaczy politologiczny charakter rozprawy – uzupełniony także o wątki prawno-ekonomiczne związane z procesem samej reformy. Głównym celem pracy było zbadanie jak Parlament wpływał na poszczególne etapy reformy Paktu i jak można określić jego miejsce w nowych mechanizmach fiskalnych, nadzorczych i koordynacyjnych PSiW. W opinii autora zaszło bowiem uzasadnione przypuszczenie, iż proces systematycznego zwiększania roli Parlamentu, jaki miał miejsce do wejścia w życie Traktatu z Lizbony, został zahamowany w toku zmian zasad i mechanizmów zarządzania gospodarczego UE w konsekwencji światowego kryzysu finansowego. Hipoteza przyjęta w pracy, iż pozycja Parlamentu Europejskiego w mechanizmach zreformowanego Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu jest ograniczona ze względu na potencjalny konflikt kompetencyjny – regulacyjny i funkcjonalny – z innymi aktorami procesu decyzyjnego Unii Europejskiej, została zweryfikowana pozytywnie. Po pierwsze, Parlamentowi na żadnym z etapów reformy nie udało się wzmocnić swojej pozycji. W ramach prac nad tzw. sześciopakiem i dwupakiem – mimo podejmowanych prób – deputowani nie uzyskali znaczących koncesji ze strony Rady i Komisji. Rola Parlamentu w PSiW pozostała ograniczona do prawa do otrzymywania informacji. Doszło wówczas do konfliktu kompetencyjnego – regulacyjnego, polegającego na braku traktatowych podstaw do zwiększenia uprawnień Parlamentu, co zarówno Rada, jak i Komisja wykorzystały przeciwko PE. Po drugie, porażką i rzeczywistym zagrożeniem dla pozycji instytucjonalnej PE okazał się Traktat o Stabilności, Koordynacji i Zarządzaniu w Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej. Przyjęty w ramach metody międzyrządowej, poza ramami prawnymi UE, ograniczył uprawnienia deputowanych praktycznie do roli obserwatorów. Po trzecie, prawo do informacji, jakie PE otrzymał w ramach PSiW nie może zostać uznane za szczególnie istotne - zwłaszcza w porównaniu z uprawnieniami pozostałych instytucji UE, w szczególności Komisji, Rady, Rady Europejskiej, EBC, czy Eurogrupy. Po czwarte, także praktyka funkcjonowania nowych mechanizmów PSiW nie wskazuje na zwiększenie roli PE. Państwa członkowskie nie zgodziły się na żadne wnioski Parlamentu w sprawie większego zaangażowania deputowanych w kształtowanie wytycznych kierunków polityk gospodarczych, projektów zaleceń ani decyzji w procedurze wielostronnego nadzoru, ani jakiekolwiek poważniejsze wzmocnienie Parlamentu w procedurze nadmiernego deficytu, co świadczy o przedłużonym konflikcie kompetencyjnym – regulacyjnym z Radą. Po piąte, Parlament napotkał także na konflikt kompetencyjny – funkcjonalny, najpierw z rządami, a później z parlamentami narodowymi m.in. o to jak postrzegana jest rola PE. Parlament uważał siebie za instytucję, mającą zapewnić mechanizmom zarządzania gospodarczego legitymację demokratyczną, z kolei rządy państw członkowskich traktując politykę budżetową jako ich suwerenną kompetencję podkreślały swoją demokratyczną odpowiedzialność przed parlamentami narodowymi.<br>Tomasz Woźnicki's dissertation entitled "The impact of the European Parliament on the Stability and Growth Pact reforms" was devoted to the changes in the SGP from the perspective of the Parliament. The author undertook an analysis of the impact of one of the major EU institutions on the reform of EU budgetary rules during the legislative process and then on the implementation of the new mechanisms in the first years of their functioning. The study covered the dynamics of competence related to the development of the Parliament's powers during the process of the European integration on the eve of the SGP reform; the determinants of the EP's position during the reform; the effects of the changes to the SGP on the EP's role and its relations with other actors and the final shape of the reform from the point of view of the EP’s possibilities (or their absence) to influence the functioning of the SGP, which explains the political nature of the dissertation - complemented by the legal and economic issues connected with the process of the reform itself. The main objective of the study was to examine how the Parliament influenced the various stages of the reform of the Pact and how it could be identified in the new fiscal, supervisory and coordination mechanisms of the SGP. In the opinion of the author, it was reasonable to assume that the process of systematically increasing of the Parliament’s role, which took place until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, was hampered by changes in the principles and mechanisms of EU economic governance as a consequence of the global financial crisis. The hypothesis of the dissertation, that the position of the European Parliament in the mechanisms of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact is limited due to potential competence conflict - regulatory and functional - with other actors in the EU decision-making process, was verified positively. Firstly, the Parliament failed to strengthen its position at any stage of the reform. In spite of the attempts, the MEPs did not receive significant concessions from the Council and the Commission during legislative works on the sixpack and twopack. The role of the Parliament in the SGP remained limited to the right to receive information. It was an exemplification of the regulatory competence conflict consisting of a lack of Treaty base for increasing Parliament's powers, which both the Council and the Commission used against the EP. Secondly, a failure and a real threat to the institutional position of the EP proved to be the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. Under the intergovernmental method, outside the EU legal framework, it limited the powers of the deputies to the role of observers. Thirdly, the right to receive information that the EP received under the SGP cannot be regarded as particularly important - especially in comparison with the powers of other EU institutions (the Commission, Council, European Council, ECB or Eurogroup). Fourthly, the functioning of the new SGP mechanisms does not indicate any substantial increase in the role of the EP. Member States did not agree to any requests by the Parliament to involve it in the process of shaping guidelines for economic policies, draft recommendations or decisions in multilateral surveillance, or any major strengthening of the Parliament in the excessive deficit procedure. This was a another symptom of the regulatory competence conflict with the Council. Fifthly, Parliament also encountered a second competence conflict – functional one, first with the governments and later with the national parliaments – among others, on how the role of the EP is perceived. The Parliament considered itself an institution which should provide economic governance mechanisms with democratic legitimacy, while the Member States governments treating budgetary policy as their sovereign powers emphasized their democratic accountability to the national parliaments.

The Maastricht Treaty raised the standards for transparency in the European Union to new supranational levels. Prior to Maastricht, transparency in member-state budgeting depended largely upon domestic institutions, both public and private, to assess the size, composition, and quality of public finance. Transparency at the member-state level served the traditional functions of encouraging democratic political accountability, promoting political control over bureaucratic institutions, crafting fiscal policy, and ensuring probity in financial management. Transparency for ensuring macro-budgetary treaty compliance promotes EU integration while helping to assure an often doubtful European public, international financial markets, and world press that the Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) convergence process and excessive deficit procedure rely on reasonably credible budgetary data. This chapter discusses macro-budgetary rules and the creation of compliance information systems, transparency through bureaucratic politics, and the role of Eurostat in budgetary surveillance. It also examines the twin challenges to EU budgetary transparency, those of disclosure and interpretation, faced by Greece.

This chapter provides an overview of labour market policies in Slovakia since the early 1990’s. Particular attention is given to the 2004 EU enlargement and the onset of EU fiscal stringency since 2010. Unemployment and underfunded labour market policies have been a problem well before EU institutions gained the right to evaluate national budgets and sanction member states. The difficult post-socialist transition, the fiscal discipline needed to introduce the euro and a mandatory private pension system, as well as the excessive deficit procedure between 2010-2014, allowed for limited fiscal space for labour market policies. Punitive measures and underfunded labour offices have become endemic to the system. Alongside budgetary constraints, the incumbent’s partisan leaning also plays a moderate role. Social-democratic governments have emphasised stronger employment protection and higher minimum wages, while right-of-centre parties have supported weaker employment protection, and some of them have proposed an abolition of the minimum wage.

Doctrinal legal research (DLR) is a predominant method employed by various classes of legal researchers. It involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis of multiple doctrinal strands. Doctrines are central to juridical treatment of concepts. Since legal propositions have roots in economic, social, political, and psychological factors, an inter-disciplinary approach becomes essential. Because of the need to overarch changing values, social mores, and economic factors, doctrinal research collaborates with historical, comparative, analytical, and philosophical methods of research. DLR has a long history and definite procedure. Adoption of required steps systematises DLR. It has received criticism for excessively relying on concepts rather than social inputs; for ignoring the empirical techniques; for concentrating only on court decisions or legal rules. It differs from non-doctrinal legal research in the matter of data, venue of research, and time and money utilised. Because of social character of law there is need for collaboration between DLR and NDLR for positive outcome.