Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Explanations and justifications'

"Might makes right," so the saying goes. What does this mean? What does it mean to say that humans live by this saying? How can this saying that is considered by almost all as an expression of injustice play a justificatory role practically universally and ubiquitously? How can it be repulsive and yet, nonetheless, attractive as an explanation of the ways of the world? Why its long history? I offer a non-cynical explanation, one based on a re-interpretation of the saying and of both recognized and unrecognized related phenomena. This re-interpretation relies on the notion of a tacit justification for violence. This non-cynical, re-interpretive explanation exposes the ambiguity of the saying and the consequential unwitting, self-deceptive, fallacious equivocations that the ambiguity makes possible under common conditions. While this explanation, furthermore, focuses on thinking factors--specifically on fallacious thinking, on humans' unwittingly and self-deceptively committing the fallacy of equivocation--it does not deny the possible role of non-thinking factors; it only tries to show that the thinking factors are significantly explanatory. What is the ambiguity? "Might makes right" expresses two principles. The first principle is the common meaning, namely, that the dominance of the mightier over the weaker is right. This principle is generally considered to be not a definition of justice but an expression of injustice. The second principle, which is almost universally shared in a tacit and unreflective way, is a principle of life, namely, that it is right for any living being to actualize its potential. This second principle is originary and thus primary, while the first principle is derivative and thus secondary. The use of all powers, natural or social, can be ultimately derived legitimately or illegitimately from this primary principle. A common manifestation of "might makes right" is the unwitting abuse of power, an abuse that is not recognized as such by the so-called abuser, but that is rather suffered by this latter, who misapplies the second principle in situations that fall under the first principle, thereby unwittingly living by the saying, tacitly justifying abusive ways by it. This unwittingness calls for critical control and forgiveness.

Autores neopiagetianos como, por exemplo, Stambak et al. (1990), Verba (1999), Gardner (1994), Flavell (1999), Astington (2003) não têm medido esforços para mostrar o percurso e a importância do jogo simbólico para o desenvolvimento integral da criança. Nesta linha de raciocínio, o presente trabalho enfatiza o papel do jogo de ficção (Stambak et al. e Verba) nas produções discursivas infantis (Veneziano e Hudelot, 2002), reiterando a tese da força motriz do imaginário no e para o desenvolvimento da linguagem na criança. Considerando, portanto, que é pela manifestação de suas ações, sentimentos e emoções que o indivíduo atua sobre o outro, estamos admitindo que a linguagem assume um papel de destaque no processo de comunicação, pois garante diferentes operações intelectuais, e possibilita a criação de mundos e, conseqüentemente, de perspectivas. É ainda por meio da linguagem que o pensamento se organiza, que a criança se identifica como pessoa, argumenta, explica e/ou justifica, quando interage com o meio em que vive. Logo, seu estudo não pode estar desvinculado de suas condições de produção. Com este propósito, e no quadro de uma abordagem funcional e interacional, observamos as condutas explicativas e justificativas (CEJs), que aparecem durante o jogo de ficção com fantoches, onde os espectadores da animação são a própria criança, o boneco e o adulto, na construção do imaginário, na prática do “querer-fazer” e do “fazer-fazer”. Assim, os resultados apontam para um número significativo de CEJs motivado pela linguagem e pelo prazer lúdico. O real e o imaginário aliam-se e criam um cenário onde a criança conquista, forma e domina novos territórios, promovendo o seu crescimento individual e coletivo.<br>Authors as Stambak et al. (1990), Verba (1999), Gardner (1994), Flavell (1999), Astington (2003) they have not been measuring efforts to show the course and the importance of the symbolic game for integral child development. For this reason, the present work emphasizes the paper of the fiction game (Stambak et al. and Verba) in the child discursive productions (Veneziano and Hudelot, 2002), reiterating the thesis of the imaginary force for the language development. Considering it is for the manifestation of actions, feelings and emotions that the person acts to the other, we are admitting that the language assumes a prominence paper in the communication process because it guarantees different intellectual operations, and it makes possible the creation of worlds and consequently perspectives. It is still through the language that the thought is organized, that the child identifies as person, she argues, she explains and/or she justifies, when she interacts with the environment she lives. Therefore, the investigation cannot be disentailed of the production conditions. With this purpose, and in the picture of a functional approach and interacional, we observed the explanation and justification conducts (EJCs), that appear during the fiction game with puppets, where the spectators of the animation are the own child, the puppet and the adult in the imaginary construction. The results appear for a significant number of EJCs motivate by the language and by the pleasure to play. The real and the imaginary ally and they create a scenery where the child conquers, she forms and she dominates new territories and she promote her individual and collective growth.

This thesis explores the relationship between anti-discrimination rights in employment and equality, on the one hand, and the right to work, on the other hand, in an attempt to achieve a full understanding of this relationship, in terms of three different dimensions: the analytic, the moral and the socio-legal. Firstly, the thesis aims to examine analytically the relationship between anti-discrimination rights in employment and the two values. Secondly, the thesis considers whether such a relationship is morally desirable. Thirdly, it looks at how the current relationship between anti-discrimination rights in employment and equality was established. The thesis adopts three different kinds of methodology, corresponding to each of the three aspects of the relationship mentioned above: conceptual analysis, moral evaluation and socio-legal studies. In a methodological sense, the thesis will explore the conceptual and socio-legal explanation and the justification of anti-discrimination rights with reference to the two values. This thesis firstly concludes that the right to work approach to anti-discrimination in employment, as an alternative to the equality approach, would explain anti-discrimination rights in employment more clearly and consistently. Secondly, it shows that, with reservations in relation to some parts of the prohibition of indirect discrimination, the right to work approach would transform the prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination in a more justifiable way than the equality approach, as the former would solve the justifiability issues caused by the latter. Nonetheless, the socio-legal study of the anti-discrimination laws of the US and UK demonstrates that equality was established as their underlying value in a particular socio-legal context, where economic liberty was dominant in the regulation of the workplace and the social movements were separated from the trade unions, mainly reflecting male or white workers and neglecting the voices of those who were vulnerable to the then prevalent forms of discrimination.

This essay engages with the problems of the justification of deduction, Carrollian regress, and deductive inferential knowledge. Also, it is considered whether Lewis Carroll's tale of what the tortoise said to Achilles can be interpreted as suggesting an argument against the possibility of logically valid argument. Such an argument is presented and shown to be unsound. Any justification of one of our basic rules of deductive inference, such as modus ponens, will inevitably make use of the very rule it means to justify. It will be a 'rule-circular' argument and invite charges that it begs the question and 'keeps bad company'. Following Paul Boghossian, the contention in this essay is that a thinker need not know that the rule according to which a given inference proceeds is sound in order to be entitled to carry out the inference. Thus, a rule-circular argument for the soundness of modus ponens does not beg the question. Also, by a conceptual role semantics which takes as its starting point that of Boghossian, and with insights gained from Robert Brandom's inferentialism, it is argued that a thinker who carries out an inference which is meaning-constituting of some concept for her is entitled to that act of inference, in part because she is epistemically blameless in it. One of the ways to counter a Cartesian sceptic is to maintain that some of our beliefs are beliefs we are entitled to have no doubt about. To make that claim good, it is argued, one must hold two things: first, that some of our beliefs are such that we have conclusive evidence for them, evidence which guarantees their truth; and second, that for some of these beliefs, we know that we have conclusive evidence for them - there are infallibilist and intemalist constraints on the possibility of us having knowledge that is certain. Pace Boghossian, the contention here is that anyone who carries out an inference which is meaning-constituting of some concept for her, in fact knows that inference to be valid.

This thesis defends the view that the role of applied mathematics is a representational one, and develops a mapping account of the applicability of mathematics that does justice to this representational conception. The first chapter outlines some philosophical problems of applicability and some of its history. In the second chapter I explain in detail what the mapping account is, examining mappings, and representation theorems, and give any account how mathematics can represent derived attributes and laws. In chapter three I argue against the possibility of genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena. This is necessary as if there were such explanations they would entail that platonistic mathematics is not extrinsic to what actually goes on in the physical world, and that a purely representational conception of the applicability of mathematics is either straightforwardly false or radically incomplete. In chapter four a positive proposal, based largely upon the work of Hartry Field, is given for showing how it is that we can state scientific theories in such a way that platonistic mathematics does not appear as part of scientific theories. This is essential, since although the previous chapter argued that such genuine explanations are impossible, it did not show positively how we could dispense with platonistic mathematics in scientific explanations. Chapter five concerns a philosophical problem of applicability, the ’descriptive problem of applicability’ which, it has been argued, goes beyond mere ’representational’ issues and poses a problem for the mapping account of applicability. I identify three species of descriptive problems and reject the possibility of anthropocentrism as a solution to the descriptive problem.

Au XIXe siècle, l’obligation de motivation du juge, conquête lente et difficile de par son lien fort avec l’autorité de la justice, est présentée comme « une des conquêtes les plus heureuses dans l’administration de la justice ». Instaurée à l’époque révolutionnaire pour lutter contre l’arbitraire, quatre mots satisfont à l’énoncer « il doit être motivé ». Entendue comme la simple justification des mobiles du juge, elle s’appréhende selon une pure logique déductive. Or, divers chamboulements au sein de notre société révèlent les multiples facettes de ce principe. L’influence de la Cour européenne fait sortir la motivation de son carcan procédural où, la simple justification se mue en explication persuasive, pour devenir un acte fort de rhétorique. Parallèlement, la loi perd de sa sacralité. Sa complexité croissante démontre ses limites à une époque où notre société en mutation revendique une justice davantage démocratique. La motivation devient ainsi une condition de légitimité des décisions de justice et un gage de légitimation du juge. Étudiée en matière pénale, elle s’avère particulièrement propice de par son rôle particulier au sein de notre société, invitant notre justice contemporaine à considérer à l’inverse, la nature subjective, relative des émotions. Simple obligation processuelle rattachée aux droits de la défense, la demande de connaissance démontre l’émergence d’une obligation autonome qui, tiraillée entre technique rédactionnelle et outil politico-social, pousse notre réflexion sur la place de la justice pénale. Apparaissant en crise, ce principe, loin de s’amenuiser, ne s’avère être que le miroir d’une justice pénale nécessitant d’être redéfinie<br>In the nineteenth century, the obligation to state reasons of the judge, slow and difficult conquest due to its strong link with the authority of justice, was presented as "one of the happiest conquests in the administration of justice". Introducing the revolutionary era to fight against the arbitrary, meet four words to state "it must be motivated." Understood as the simple proof of the judge’s mobile, she apréhende as a pure deductive logic. However, various upheavals in our society reveal the many facets of this principle. The influence of the European Court brings out the motivation of its procedural straitjacket where the simple justification turns into persuasive explanation, to become a strong act of speech. Parallèment, the law loses its sacredness. The increasing complexity seems to show its limits, at a time when our changing society claims a more democratic justice. Motivation becomes a condition of legitimacy of judicial decisions and judge the legitimacy of quality. Studied in criminal matters, it is particularly suitable because of its particular role within our society, inviting our contemporary Justice to consider on the contrary, the subjective nature on emotions. Simple procedural obligation attached to the defense of rights, the application for knowledge demonstrates the emergence of an autonomous obligation, editorial torn between technical and political-social tool, pushing our reflection on the role of criminal justice. Appearing in crisis, this principle far from dwindling, turns out to be not the mirror of criminal justice need to be redefined

Il est souvent arrivé que, par le passé, les scientifiques affirment l'existence d'objets inobservables dont ils rejettent aujourd'hui l'existence. Quelle leçon tirer de ce fait ? On est tenté d'en conclure que les méthodes qu'emploient les scientifiques pour connaître l'inobservable ne sont pas fiables, de sorte que cette connaissance serait située hors de leur portée. Cette thèse identifie et rejette deux présupposés qui conduisent à cette conclusion, à savoir que la méthode de l'hypothèse serait la seule manière de produire des connaissances des inobservables, et que cette méthode se déploierait de manière instantanée. Si, au contraire, les modalités concrètes de l'activité expérimentale et la dimension diachronique de la recherche théorique sont prises en compte, chacun de ces deux présupposés doit être rejeté comme abstrait. La connaissance des effondrements théoriques passés légitime alors la croyance en la vérité des théories actuelles<br>History of science presents us with numerous cases in which scientists conclude that an unobservable entity previously posited as real actually does not exist. What the lesson is to be drawn from this fact ? One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the methods employed by scientists to produce knowledge of unobservable objects are not reliable: gaining this knowledge would be beyond their reach. This thesis identifies and rejects two presuppositions that lead to this conclusion: that the method of hypothesis is the only way to produce knowledge of unobservables and that it can be employed in an instantaneous manner. On the contrary, if the concrete modalities of the experimental activity and the diachronical dimension of theoretical research are taken into account, each of these two presuppositions appear to be too abstract and should be rejected. Knowledge of past theoretical collapses then legitimates the belief in the truth of current scientific theories

The advent of social media has provided an arena where barriers to entry are low. Individuals may persuade, question others and defend both their philosophies and their actions. This study examines the classic role of rhetorical criticism as it may apply in new media venues. A blog written by a public figure was examined through a synthesis of rhetorical criticism analyses derived from Ware and Linkugel, Vartabedian, and Downey. Four strategies and associated positioning in the practice of apologia were identified in selected blog posts, indicating the genre of apologia applies to social media apologies and extends the genre of apologia. Rhetorical criticism was found to be an effective tool in identifying rhetorical postures and strategies used in social media.

Text in Afrikaans with abstracts in Afrikaans, English and Zulu. Translated title in English supplied<br>Die hoofdoel van die verhandeling is om die fundamentele aanspraak van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk aan te spreek dat sy belydenisskrifte, met spesifieke verwysing na daardie leerstellings wat met die vraag oor die ontstaan van die mensdom en die oorsprong van sonde handel en wat in 1619 deur die Sinode van Dordrecht aanvaar is, waar is. Hierdie leerstellings word (teologies) as waarhede voorgehou dat dit op die Bybel as die Woord van God gegrond is. Die vertrekpunt van die verhandeling is dat die betrokke leerstellings vanuit ’n toepaslike historiese konteks benader moet word wanneer die vraag van hulle geldigheid aangespreek word. Nog meer, betoog die verhandeling dat dit vandag epistemologies geregverdig is om te glo dat die betrokke leerstellings deur hedendaagse wetenskaplike bevindings en ander tersaaklike bewyse onwaar gemaak is. Die kwessie van waarheid moet daarom (her-)aangespreek word vanuit ’n perspektief wat moderne wetenskaplike bevindings insluit. Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk het egter in 2010 suggereer dat sy fundamentele leerstellings met daardie (wetenskaplike) bewyse wat dit onwaar maak, kan medebestaan. Die verhandeling demonstreer dat dit nie moontlik is nie.<br>Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology<br>M.A. (Philosophy)