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Journal articles on the topic 'Export subsidies'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 30 July 2024

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1

Yeh, Yeong-Her. "Export subsidies vs. production subsidies." Atlantic Economic Journal 14, no. 2 (July 1986): 71–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02316796.

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2

Mendez-Naya, Jose, and Tomas Gomez-Arias. "Export Subsidies and Customs Unions." Journal of International Business and Economy 9, no. 2 (December 1, 2008): 22–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.51240/jibe.2008.2.3.

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This paper explores how the formation of customs unions affects the argument for export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. It is shown that the existence of customs unions may eliminate the incentive for their members to subsidize exports as customs unions grow larger. Therefore, it can be affirmed that regionalism and multilateralism are complementary processes.
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3

Man Kim, Sang. "Export Credit Guarantee and Prohibited Subsidies Under the SCM Agreement." Journal of World Trade 54, Issue 3 (June 1, 2020): 439–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2020020.

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Export credit guarantee or insurance covers non-payment risks in exports. Many countries have established export credit agencies (ECAs) to promote exports through export credits including export credit guarantee or insurance. Officially supported export credits have brought the concern that they may distort fair competition in international trades. Export credit guarantee or insurance programmes with inadequate premium rates are likely to fall under the prohibited subsidies. ECAs need to understand the requirements of the prohibited subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). This article will discuss features and functions of export credit guarantee or insurance in international trades. This article will also discuss some issues concerning the elements of a subsidy and illustrated list of prohibited export subsidies with regard to export credit guarantee or insurance by analysing the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement and WTO Panel or Appellate Body Reports. countervailing measure, export credit, export credit insurance, export credit guarantee, prohibited subsidy, the SCM Agreement, subsidy
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4

Haley, Stephen L. "Multicommodity Export Subsidies." North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 11, no. 1 (January 1989): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1349280.

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5

Melitz, Jacques, Patrick Messerlin, Francesco Giavazzi, and John Vickers. "Export Credit Subsidies." Economic Policy 2, no. 4 (April 1987): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1344555.

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6

RICHARDSON, MARTIN, and SIMON WILKIE. "Incremental Export Subsidies." Economic Record 62, no. 1 (March 1986): 88–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1986.tb00885.x.

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7

Haley, Stephen L. "Multicommodity Export Subsidies." Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 11, no. 1 (January 1989): 27–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aepp/11.1.27.

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8

Alston, Julian M., Colin A. Carter, and Vincent H. Smith. "Rationalizing Agricultural Export Subsidies." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75, no. 4 (November 1993): 1000–1009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243987.

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9

Itoh, Motoshige, and Kazuharu Kiyono. "Welfare-enhancing Export Subsidies." Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 1 (February 1987): 115–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261444.

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10

WANG, YU-TER. "THE PROFITS OF FIRMS AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS." Singapore Economic Review 55, no. 04 (December 2010): 749–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590810004036.

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This paper studies the relationship between the profits of firms and countervailing duties in vertically related markets characterized by oligopolies. It is shown that a countervailing duty equal to the foreign export subsidy is required to neutralize the impact of foreign export subsidies on the profits of domestic firms. The domestic country has an incentive to impose a countervailing duty on foreign final goods even though foreign governments only subsidize exports of intermediate goods. In addition, foreign exporting firms may benefit from a countervailing duty more than a foreign export subsidy.
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11

Narayana, M. R. "Export Subsidies in India: Need for A Strategic Approach." Foreign Trade Review 27, no. 1 (April 1992): 35–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0015732515920103.

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The persisting trade imbalances, mounting external debt and its servicing burden, depleting foreign exchange reserves, etc., have often led to considering export promotion as a policy alternative for India. However, our continuing reliance on industrial market economies for exports underlines the importance of competition (imperfect) in product quality and price. The analytical re!lults of this paper show that if the underlying imperfect market structure of India's export trading is characterized by Cournot duopoly, the impact of export subsidies can be favourable in terms of larger market share for home exporting firms. This short-term advantage is mainly attributed to rent, or profit sharing of home firms initially earned by foreign firms in home market. These results offer strong economic support for the strategic export policy, yet to be formulated in India, or justification for the current export policy if only the subsidized exporting domestic firms behaviour is strategic, and provide the economic basis for empirical estimation of export earnings by a strategic export subsidization policy as compared to the existing nonstrategic policy.
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12

Flett, James. "From Political Pre-occupation to Legitimate Rule against Market Partitioning: Export Subsidies in WTO Law after the Appellate Body Ruling in the Airbus Case." Global Trade and Customs Journal 7, Issue 2 (February 1, 2012): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2012007.

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Since its inception, GATT/WTO subsidies law has been troubled by two distinct but related questions: what are export subsidies and why should they be specifically regulated? The parameters of the first question have been blurred, inter alia, by ambiguous references to de facto export subsidies. And perplexity about the second question has been driven by the observation that export subsidies tend to be either ineffective or to enhance welfare in the importing country. In the Airbus case, the Appellate Body confirmed that an export subsidy is a subsidy contingent upon export. The Appellate Body further confirmed that assessing whether or not there is a subsidy contingent in fact upon export does not involve changing the legal standard but merely the consideration of different evidence. In particular, the Appellate Body faulted the panel for equating the legal standard of contingency with an enquiry into the reasons for which a subsidy is granted. Rather, the adjudicator must explain how the evidenced facts, working together in specifically explained ways, permit the existence of a contingency to be inferred. The concept of an export subsidy in WTO law has thus evolved from an intuitive if imprecise and irrational pre-occupation with exports, into a contemporary and legitimate concern with market partitioning, as in EU State aid law. From that perspective, it is logical to conclude that certain other market partitioning contingent subsidies are also inconsistent with various provisions of the WTO Agreement.
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13

Gardner, Bruce L. "Rationalizing Agricultural Export Subsidies: Comment." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, no. 1 (February 1995): 205–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243902.

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14

Alston, Julian M., Colin A. Carter, and Vincent H. Smith. "Rationalizing Agricultural Export Subsidies: Reply." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, no. 1 (February 1995): 209–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243903.

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15

Yeh, Yeong-Her. "Consumption Taxes Vs. Export Subsidies." American Economist 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 71–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/056943458803200111.

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16

Phaup, E. Dwight, Chauncey H. Winters, and Meredith Auten. "Responses to foreign export subsidies." International Trade Journal 2, no. 3 (March 1988): 287–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08853908808523646.

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17

KLEIMAN, E., and J. J. PINCUS. "Incremental Export Subsidies: A Rejoinder." Economic Record 62, no. 1 (March 1986): 93–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1986.tb00886.x.

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18

Tanaka, Yasuhito. "Export subsidies under dynamic duopoly." European Economic Review 38, no. 5 (May 1994): 1139–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90041-8.

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19

Desai, Mihir A., and James R. Hines. "Market reactions to export subsidies." Journal of International Economics 74, no. 2 (March 2008): 459–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.04.006.

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20

Gruenspecht, Howard K. "Export subsidies for differentiated products." Journal of International Economics 24, no. 3-4 (May 1988): 331–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(88)90041-4.

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21

Collie, David. "Export subsidies and countervailing tariffs." Journal of International Economics 31, no. 3-4 (November 1991): 309–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(91)90041-4.

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22

Hwang, Hong, and Chao-cheng Mai. "Optimal Technology Subsidies vs Export Subsidies: A Strategic Approach." Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 14, no. 2 (August 2007): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2007.9720791.

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23

Dhingra, Swati, and Timothy Meyer. "Leveling the Playing Field: Industrial Policy and Export-Contingent Subsidies in India–Export Related Measures." World Trade Review 20, no. 4 (August 2, 2021): 606–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147474562100032x.

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AbstractIn India–Export Related Measures, the United States challenged a range of Indian measures as prohibited export-contingent subsidies, and a WTO panel largely agreed. This article examines the factors at play in the United States’ decision to bring the challenge. At the level of policy, the United States case reflects India's graduation from the protections afforded developing nations’ export-contingent subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. A closer examination, however, shows that India ramped up its export-contingent subsidies just as the SCM Agreement required it to wind those subsidies down. Moreover, the expanded Indian subsidies led to increased import competition with the politically influential metals and pharmaceutical sectors in the United States, which pushed the US challenge. We reflect on the larger implications of the challenge for the future of trade rules on industrial policy. In particular, we note that the United States pursued a trade enforcement policy that would have the effect of increasing pharmaceutical prices in the United States, by reducing subsidies for imported generic drugs, at a time when the Trump administration allegedly was trying to reduce the price of prescription drugs. This disconnect suggests the need for both greater transparency in trade policy and greater governmental coordination on the connection between trade policy and other policy priorities.
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24

Krzyżanowski, Julian. "Are export refunds necessary?" Zeszyty Naukowe SGGW w Warszawie - Problemy Rolnictwa Światowego 10, no. 3 (September 30, 2010): 41–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/prs.2010.10.3.31.

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The paper deals with the problem of export refunds in the EU agricultural trade. While examining Polish exports of beef and veal, an answer to the question is sought, if the exports refunds are necessary. The answer is positive, despite the fact that most probably the export subsidies in the EU will cease to exist after 2012
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25

Dhar, Biswajit. "WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Worsening India’s Agrarian Crisis." Indian Economic Journal 71, no. 1 (January 2023): 152–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00194662221146638.

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India’s accession to the WTO in 1995 brought a new set of challenges for its agriculture. Most of the policies supporting agriculture, especially price support and input subsidies, labelled by the agreement on agriculture (AoA) as domestic support measures, were under the scanner. The price support measure that India uses, namely, the minimum support price (MSP) provided to most of the major crops now faces a problem as the methodology of calculating the extent of subsidies on account of MSP is working against India. Further, the AoA prevents India from using export subsidies since it was not using this instrument in the past. But the agreement allows the advanced countries that were using export subsidies to continue using this instrument, albeit at a lower level. Equally problematic for India is the fact that AoA rules are constraining the implementation of the National Food Security Act, which provides subsidised foodgrains to the disadvantaged sections. JEL codes: F13, Q17, Q18
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26

Apostolakis, Bobby E. "Concessionary export subsidies and the US Export-Import Bank." International Review of Applied Economics 5, no. 2 (May 1991): 208–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/758533098.

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27

Mawad, Shady. "Legal Analysis of Export Subsidies under the Agreement of Subsidy and Countervailing Measures." ELTE Law Journal, no. 2 (December 14, 2023): 87–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.54148/eltelj.2023.2.87.

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Export subsidies, for several decades now, have attracted significant attention due to their undesirable impacts on international trade. In the Uruguay Round 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) generated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) which contains global rules to regulate the different types of subsidies and to offset their adverse effects on other WTO Members. This paper, through its three sections, therefore aims to provide a legal analysis of the provisions of export subsidies contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the ASCM. By doing so, this paper answers the question of whether the ASCM is sufficient to cease the distortive effect of the export subsidy. To that end, doctrinal legal research has been conducted through analysis of the black letter of law and the case laws. In conclusion, the ASCM succeeded in giving the export subsidies per se prohibited nature, either in law or in fact. Unfortunately, the mere repayment of the amount of the subsidy is not always a sufficient remedy. As such, punitive countermeasures must be introduced to implement remedial provisions and to deter export subsidies.
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28

Wang, Yu-Ter. "Export subsidies, countervailing duties, and welfare." Revista de Economia Política 25, no. 4 (December 2005): 391–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31572005000400005.

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29

Collie, David, and Morten Hviid. "Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, no. 3 (September 1993): 327. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3440359.

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30

COPELAND, BRIAN R. "TOURISM AND WELFARE-ENHANCING EXPORT SUBSIDIES*." Japanese Economic Review 63, no. 2 (March 19, 2012): 232–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00566.x.

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31

Raimondos, Pascalis. "Export subsidies and foreign capital inflows." Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 2, no. 2 (November 1993): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638199300000008.

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32

CONCONI, PAOLA. "Comment: EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar." World Trade Review 7, no. 1 (January 2008): 179–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745608003753.

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33

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Koushik Ghosh. "Offshoring Quotas and Strategic Export Subsidies." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 54, no. 7 (February 5, 2018): 1578–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2017.1310100.

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34

Ahmed Qureshi, Tehseen, and Anwar Shah. "Trade Agreements and Export Creation: An Empirical Analysis of Pakistan’s Exports at Industry Level." LAHORE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 25, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 93–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.35536/lje.2020.v25.i2.a4.

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This paper examinespatternsof export creation and diversion by analyzing Pakistan’s trade agreements at the two-digit industry level for all 88 export-oriented industries. We compare the net change in exports with nine free trade agreement (FTA) partners and the top15 partners with most-favored nation (MFN)status. We find that 45 industries account for USD4.1 billion inexport creation across all Pakistan’s FTA partners.Here, net exports increase after FTAs with both FTA and MFN partners. Conversely, export diversion worth USD137million occurs in 10 industries with all FTA partners as net exports to FTA partners rise while net exports to MFN partners fall. In the same manner, we find that net exports in 33 industries declined by USD500 million with FTA and MFN partners. The totalnet exports addition after FTAs was USD3.5 billion or,on average,USD350 million annually,accounting for about 1.4 percent of Pakistan’s total annual goods exports. On average, Pakistan has successfullycreatedexports in half itsexport-oriented industries, althoughhighly subsidized industries exhibit either export diversion or a net decline with both MFN and FTA partners. A difference-in-differenceanalysis shows that exports to China and Mauritius rose significantly while the remainingseven FTA partners did not have a significant increase in exports after the FTAs were implemented. In view of these findings, wesuggest revisiting the policy of export subsidies.
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35

Costinot, Arnaud, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, and Iván Werning. "Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy With Firm Heterogeneity." Econometrica 88, no. 6 (2020): 2739–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta14763.

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The empirical observation that “large firms tend to export, whereas small firms do not” has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of international trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self‐selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. In contrast, our analysis does not provide any rationale for export subsidies or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms.
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36

ISHIKAWA, JOTA, and TOMOHIRO KURODA. "EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS." Japanese Economic Review 58, no. 1 (March 2007): 118–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00349.x.

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37

Moreno, Bernardo, and José L. Torres. "Uniform Output Subsidies in Economic Unions versus Profit-shifting Export Subsidies." Journal of Economic Integration 16, no. 4 (December 15, 2001): 617–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2001.16.4.617.

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38

Janow, Merit E., and Robert W. Staiger. "US – Export Restraints: United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies." World Trade Review 2, S1 (2003): 201–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745603001125.

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This study examines the dispute brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning the United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (WT/DS 194), euphemistically referred to herein as US – Export Restraints. In this dispute, Canada challenged the US treatment of export restraints under US countervailing duty law and practice. The principal legal focus was therefore on the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. This is one of a handful of WTO cases where the complainant (Canada) was not challenging the application of a governmental measure (by the US here) but rather the WTO consistency of existing legal measures. Essentially, Canada claimed that certain US legislation along with established practice by the US Department of Commerce constitute a violation of US obligations under the SCM Agreement.
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39

Oluyeju, Olufemi, and Nelly C. Rotich. "Fiscal incentives in Kenya's free zones: To what extent are they consistent with the WTO rules on subsidies?" Law, Democracy and Development 26 (November 4, 2022): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2077-4907/2022/ldd.v26.9.

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In Kenya, free zones take the form of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and are offered a myriad of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives. At the same time, Kenya, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a signatory to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), which prohibits subsidies that are contingent on export performance or use of domestic over imported products. Although free zones are not mentioned specifically, fiscal incentives constitute subsidies since they are financial contributions, incomes or price supports given by the government or their agencies which confer benefits. In this regard, the article examines whether the fiscal incentives offered in Kenya's free zones meet the specificity test and are therefore consistent with the provisions on prohibited and actionable subsidies under the ASCM. The conclusion is that though the fiscal incentives offered in Kenya's free zones constitute financial contributions, they meet the specificity test and are consistent with ASCM rules on subsidies contingent on export performance and use of domestic over imported products, given that Kenya is allowed to grant export subsidies and none of the subsidies offered under the EPZs Act and SEZs Act require the use of domestic over imported products.
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40

Leetmaa, Susan, Barry Krissoff, and Monika Hartmann. "Trade Policy and Environmental Quality: The Case of Export Subsidies." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 25, no. 2 (October 1996): 232–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500007887.

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The United States and the European Union both employ export subsidies to stimulate wheat trade and to increase their competitiveness in world markets. The environmental consequences of these policies are being questioned. We stimulate reducing or removing export subsidies for wheat from the United States and the EU using a multicountry partial equilibrium model, and we analyze the impact of export subsidy policy reform on nitrogen fertilizer and other chemical use. Our findings indicate that the U.S. EEP program cannot be blamed for environmental degradation in terms of nitrate leaching, while EU wheat subsidies make only a small contribution to nitrate pollution.
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41

Hayashibara, Masayuki. "Competition Policy, Export Subsidies and Economic Welfare." International Economy 2007, no. 58 (2007): 90–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.5652/kokusaikeizai.2007.90.

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42

Buffie, Edward F. "Are Export Subsidies Less Inflationary than Devaluation?" Canadian Journal of Economics 30, no. 4b (November 1997): 1046. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/136309.

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43

Paarlberg, Philip L. "Agricultural Export Subsidies and Intermediate Goods Trade." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, no. 1 (February 1995): 119–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243894.

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44

Hoffmaister, Alexander W. "Credibility and the Cost of Export Subsidies." IMF Working Papers 91, no. 129 (1991): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451855081.001.

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45

Tokarick, Stephen. "Export promotion: the role of transportation subsidies." Journal of Economic Studies 23, no. 4 (October 1996): 50–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443589610149915.

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46

Lin, Hwan C. "Coordinating bilateral export subsidies under monopolistic competition." Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 5, no. 3 (November 1996): 319–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638199600000018.

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47

COLLIE, DAVID. "EXPORT SUBSIDIES, ENTRY DETERRENCE AND COUNTERVAILING TARIFFS." Manchester School 60, no. 2 (June 1992): 136–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1992.tb00216.x.

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48

Hwang, Hong, Chao-Cheng Mai, and Hiroshi Ohta. "EXPORT SUBSIDIES, COST DIFFERENTIAL AND PRODUCT QUALITY." Pacific Economic Review 15, no. 1 (February 2010): 32–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00487.x.

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49

Abbott, Philip C., Philip L. Paarlberg, and Jerry A. Sharples. "Targeted Agricultural Export Subsidies and Social Welfare." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69, no. 4 (November 1987): 723–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1242181.

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50

Orbay, Hakan, and Benan Zeki Orbay. "Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass-through." Review of International Economics 21, no. 4 (August 15, 2013): 627–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12060.

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