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Books on the topic 'Extended Rationality'
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1
Coliva, Annalisa. Extended Rationality. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137501899.
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Extended rationality: A hinge epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
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Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency. Oxford University Press, 2020.
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Bratman, Michael E. The Interplay of Intention and Reason. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0008.
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In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”
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Tenenbaum, Sergio. Rational Powers in Action. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851486.001.0001.
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Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.
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Bratman, Michael E. Agency, Time, and Sociality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0005.
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Our planning capacities are a fundamental ground of our capacities for temporally extended agency, shared intentional activity, and self-governance. This is the fecundity of planning agency. This essay explores relations between our planning capacities and this further trio of basic capacities. In particular, a defense of this connection to self-governance involves a development of a Frankfurtian model of self-governance, one that draws on resources from the planning theory of our agency. This connection with self-governance, both at a time and over time, helps explain the normative force of the rationality norms involved in our planning agency. This leads to a sketch of a defense of a norm of intention stability over time, a norm that involves a kind of practical conservatism.
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Proust, Joëlle. Consensus as an Epistemic Norm for Group Acceptance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0008.
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What are the propositional attitude(s) involved in collective epistemic agency? There are two opposing camps on this question: the ascribers have defended an extended notion of belief, while the rejectionists have claimed that groups form goal-sensitive acceptances. Addressing this question, however, requires providing responses to four preliminary queries. (1) Are group attitudes reducible to the participants’ attitudes? (2) Is epistemic evaluation sensitive to instrumental considerations? (3) Does accepting that p entail believing that p? (4) Is there a unity of epistemic rationality across levels? Both “believing” and “accepting as true”, as applied to plural subjects, fail to provide satisfactory answers to these four queries. An alternative analysis for epistemic group attitude called “accepting under consensus” is proposed. This attitude is shown to reflect actual group agency, and to offer consistent and independently justified answers to the queries. On this analysis, an individualist epistemology cannot simply be transferred to collective agents.
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Bratman, Michael E. Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0006.
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Is there a diachronic rationality constraint on an agent’s intentions over time, one that favors stability of intention? I argue that there is reason to think that there is some such diachronic rationality constraint and that a plausible approach to this matter draws on our understanding of a planning agent’s self-governance over time. On natural assumptions, we normally have a reason of diachronic self-governance to conform to this constraint. This argues against what we can call brute shuffling in cases (of a sort discussed by John Broome) of continued incomparability over time. And we can embrace this norm without endorsing unacceptable forms of bootstrapping of normative reasons. In this way we extend the self-governance strategy for supporting basic norms of plan rationality from a focus on synchronic norms to this focus on a diachronic norm.
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Brown, Nathan. Rationalist Empiricism. Fordham University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823290000.001.0001.
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Twenty-first century philosophy has been drawn into a false opposition between speculation and critique. In this important intervention, Nathan Brown argues that the key to overcoming this antinomy is rethinking the relation between rationalism and empiricism. If Kant’s transcendental philosophy attempted to displace the opposing claims of those competing schools, any speculative critique of Kant will have to reopen and consider anew the conflict and complementarity of reason and experience. Rationalist Empiricism shows that the capacity of reason and experience to both extend and delimit one another has always been at the core of philosophy and science, and that coordinating their discrepant powers is what enables speculation to move forward in concert with critique. Sweeping across ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy, as well as political theory, science, and art, Brown engages with such major thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Bachelard, Althusser, Badiou, and Meillassoux, while showing how the concepts he develops illuminate recent projects in the science of measurement and experimental digital photography. With conceptual originality and argumentative precision, Rationalist Empiricism is a book that reconfigures the history and the future of philosophy, politics, and aesthetics.
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Ekblom, Paul. Evolutionary Approaches to Rational Choice. Edited by Wim Bernasco, Jean-Louis van Gelder, and Henk Elffers. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199338801.013.2.
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This chapter seeks to enrich and extend thinking about the rational choice perspective to offender decision making and its pivotal application in situational crime prevention by taking an evolutionary approach, which is still uncommon in crime science and criminology. The chapter introduces basic concepts of evolution, covering the brain and behavior, levels and types of explanation, the strained relationship with social science, and the evidencing of evolutionary processes. The focus then shifts to rationality, covering decision making; the wider suite of processes needed to understand rationality in action; and specific discussions of cooperation, humans’ wider “sociocognitive niche,” and development. Although evolutionary issues are addressed throughout, the penultimate section discusses how rationality in the broadest sense has unfolded over evolutionary history and the significant connection between maximization of utility in contemporary rational choice and maximization/optimization of fitness in evolution. The conclusion raises practical, empirical, and theoretical questions for crime science.
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Siegel, Harvey. Education's Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190682675.001.0001.
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This collection extends and further defends the “reasons conception” of critical thinking that Harvey Siegel has articulated and defended over the last three-plus decades. This conception analyzes and emphasizes both the epistemic quality of candidate beliefs, and the dispositions and character traits that constitute the “critical spirit”, that are central to a proper account of critical thinking; argues that epistemic quality must be understood ultimately in terms of epistemic rationality; defends a conception of rationality that involves both rules and judgment; and argues that critical thinking has normative value over and above its instrumental tie to truth. Siegel also argues, contrary to currently popular multiculturalist thought, for both transcultural and universal philosophical ideals, including those of multiculturalism and critical thinking themselves. Over seventeen chapters, Siegel makes the case for regarding critical thinking, or the cultivation of rationality, as a preeminent educational ideal, and the fostering of it as a fundamental educational aim. A wide range of alternative views are critically examined. Important related topics, including indoctrination, moral education, open-mindedness, testimony, epistemological diversity, and cultural difference are treated. The result is a systematic account and defense of critical thinking, an educational ideal widely proclaimed but seldom submitted to critical scrutiny itself.
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Weirich, Paul. Rational Responses to Risks. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001.
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A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act’s risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act’s risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act’s risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent’s preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act’s expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. It takes account of an agent’s attitudes to an act’s risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. Applications cover hedging, return-risk evaluation, professional advice, and government regulation.
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Sugden, Robert. The Invisible Hand. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825142.003.0006.
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Chapter 6 presents a new formulation of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ argument. The underlying idea is that markets are valuable because they provide opportunities for voluntary transactions (rather than because they satisfy preferences). I propose a ‘Strong Interactive Opportunity Criterion’ which requires that all opportunities for feasible and non-dominated transactions within groups of individuals are made available to those individuals. I define competitive equilibrium without making assumptions about the rationality of individuals’ choices and show that the Strong Interactive Opportunity Criterion is satisfied in every competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy. This result is analogous with the classic theorems that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient and is in the ‘core’ of the economy. I extend these results to ‘storage economies’ in which trade and consumption take place over time and in which individuals’ choices may be dynamically inconsistent.
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Taska, Lucy. Scientific Management. Edited by Adrian Wilkinson, Steven J. Armstrong, and Michael Lounsbury. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198708612.013.2.
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This chapter reviews the continuing impact of Scientific Management, particularly in relation to the field of education. By outlining how Taylor and his followers used the language of science, efficiency and rationality to extend the application of Scientific Management to the reform of learning methods in the workplace and in educational institutions, it questions the assumption that managerialism in higher education emerged out of thin air in the 1990s. The chapter argues that the diffusion of Taylor’s philosophy, principles and methods to education resulted in the replacement of traditional co-operative modes of learning with a new orientation that privileged co-operation with managers and the managerialization of educational practices and institutions. It concludes by demonstrating how Taylor’s ghost continues to exert influence through standardized courses, metric measurements of student outcomes and academic research, and regulatory, accrediting and disciplinary mechanisms and organizations.
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Buch-Hansen, Gitte. The Johannine Literature in a Greek Context. Edited by Judith M. Lieu and Martinus C. de Boer. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198739982.013.8.
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This chapter focuses on the scholarly debate in the twentieth century about the relationship between John’s Gospel and Greek philosophy. Initially, attention is drawn to the link, which characterizes the discussion in the first part of the century, between the dating of the Fourth Gospel and its ideological worldview. Next, it turns toward the alleged inspiration from Jewish Wisdom traditions in the composition of the Prologue and demonstrates how scholars’ references to Wisdom have served the most diverse—and even opposing—purposes: to ward off philosophical speculation, to replace Jewish mythology and apocalypticism by Greek rationality, to illustrate the Prologue’s Middle Platonism, and to introduce Stoicism into John’s thinking. Finally, it demonstrates how readings of the Prologue in light of Aristotle’s theory of epigenesis have displaced the focus from the logos to the pneuma and thereby managed to extend the discussion about influence from Greek philosophy beyond the Prologue.
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Peng, Mike W., and Theodore A. Khoury. Unbundling the Institution‐Based View of International Business Strategy. Edited by Alan M. Rugman. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234257.003.0010.
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Critics suggest that the industry-based view has the five forces framework and the resource-based view converges on the VRIO framework, yet what specific propositions or frameworks does the institution-based view of IB strategy have? This article addresses this important and legitimate question, by identifying and articulating the two core propositions underpinning the institution-based view: (1) individuals and firms act rationally according to formal and informal institutional structures; (2) when formal institutions fail, informal institutions regulate exchange relationships. In other words, this article endeavours to advance the institution-based view of IB strategy by unbundling the broad proposition that ‘institutions matter’. It leverages and extends contemporary research to illustrate the explanatory and predictive power of the two propositions underpinning the institution-based view of IB strategy.