Academic literature on the topic 'Failed consociationalism'

This article examines the break-ups of post-communist Czechoslovakia and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro under consociationalism. According to Arend Lijphart, social divisions may be neutralized at the elite level with power-sharing mechanisms. Lijphart's theory has been abundantly criticized, particularly because, while its intention is to induce cooperation, consociationalism does not give leaders actual incentives to cooperate. Czechoslovakia and the Union qualified as consociations; however most favorable factors were absent. The states failed to overcome their divisions and broke apart. Both states were going through a democratization period, experienced differently in each republic. The article argues that the application of consociationalism at this time magnified the divisions. Stirring up the ethnic sensitivity of the population was the most reliable strategy for politicians to secure popular support. In this context, and with the EU enlargement prospect, the consociational structure, instead of bringing elites together, weakened the federal power and provided elites the opportunity to defend republican interests at the expense of the federations. Hence, while a consociation requires certain conditions and favorable factors, the context in which consociationalism is implemented, and particularly democratization periods, may have a decisive influence on the leaders’ ability to cooperate, on their decisions, and thereby on the state.

This paper argues that current Western-backed approaches to conflict resolution in Kosovo have failed to alter Serbia's policy toward the region and have contributed to the exacerbation of political tensions between Belgrade and Brussels, while deepening ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities. While there is no possibility of Kosovo returning to Serbia's control, there is an equal unlikelihood that Serbian-populated regions of Kosovo, especially the north, will submit to Pristina's authority. Most importantly, there is little hope that Kosovo can gain full international recognition and membership in international organizations without a compromise settlement with Serbia. While territorial partition has long been a suggested option, I conclude that the best possible solution for Kosovo, given the positions of all parties involved, is a process of significant decentralization beyond the internationally supported measures in the Ahtisaari Plan. A model of consociational power sharing is one in which Serbian and Albanian municipalities are granted high levels of autonomy similar to arrangements made for Bosnia. While this solution may not be ideal and further weakens central authority, I argue that consociationalism reduces the problems of ethnic conflict, encourages local self-government, and preserves the overall territorial integrity of Kosovo.

Since Arend Lijphart's development of the theory of consociationalism in 1969, dominant schools of thought have accepted that ‘power sharing’ and ‘group autonomy’ are the basic preconditions of democratic governance in divided societies. The constitution and electoral framework adopted by post-invasion Iraq instituted many of Lijphart's recommendations, including proportional representation, federalism and a parliamentary system with a weak presidency. But this democratic framework has failed Iraq. Eight months on from its 2010 parliamentary election and still struggling to establish an effective government, Iraq is facing constitutional crisis. This article uses the case study of Iraq to uncover fundamental flaws in orthodox arguments about democracy in divided societies and it goes on to recommend changes that would better enable stable and effective governance.

For many decades, Northern Ireland has been characterized by a tense conflict of identities with frequent outbreaks of political and religious violence. At the end of the 20th century, a consensus was reached between the opposing sides on the need for a peaceful settlement of the contradictions, which was reflected in the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The most important part of the agreement was a transition to the consociational model of governance. Consociationalism was assumed to “cure” the Northern Irish region, save it from violence and antagonism, and help to establish a dialogue between the representatives of the region’s key collective identities — unionists and nationalists. However, although 22 years have passed since the introduction of the consociational system, the settlement of the conflict has not seen any obvious progress. The article attempts to trace the reasons for this state of affairs and, in particular, to find out whether consociational model could, in principle, live up to the expectations. Based on the analysis of the fundamental characteristics of this model, as well as the institutional patterns in the Northern Irish politics, P.Maksimova comes to the conclusion that consociational practices not only failed to contribute to the elimination of the antagonistic moods in the society, but also helped to preserve them. According to the author, consociational system is merely an instrument of crisis management, which, if misinterpreted, can only intensify confrontation and block the final settlement of the conflict. This is exactly what happened in Northern Ireland, where the specific features of the consociational system made it almost impossible to abandon group identities.

The failure of a power-sharing attempt at peace in Burundi in 1993 led to the killing of hundreds of thousands of Burundians and played a significant role in feeding tensions leading up to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which another 800,000 people lost their lives. A look at the specifics of this power-sharing arrangement in the framework of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy leads to some interesting conclusions and insights into why the effort at peace failed and how future efforts could be improved. The paper looks at the arrangement in terms of Lijphart's four main pillars for successful consociationalism in deeply divided states: a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, minority overrepresentation or parity, and a minority veto. The extent to which Lijphart's recommendations were implemented is assessed along with the impact of their presence or absence. The analysis leads to some important lessons and further questions which are of particular importance as Burundi heads into its latest attempt at a stable and peaceful society.

The communal identities rooted in the millet system are still salient in post-Ottoman lands. Cyprus and Lebanon offer two cases where ethnic and sectarian identities are more prominent than national identities. In this respect both countries represent highly divided societies in post-Ottoman territories. This article discusses the failure of power-sharing systems in Cyprus and Lebanon, arguing that the lack of cultivation of a common national identity at the founding of these republics remains even today a central obstacle to implementing stable multinational/sectarian democratic systems. As a part of Greater Syria, today’s Lebanon is a homeland to many ethnic and sectarian communities. Lebanese politics historically has been governed by a system of consociationalism, which prevents any one group from dominating the political system. This system of power sharing dates back to the 1943 National Pact, and as a result of the sectarian nature of this arrangement, religious communal identities have a stronger pull than a Lebanese national identity. These communal identities crystallized over the course of a 14-year civil war, and were exacerbated by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. In the case of Cyprus, the possibility of cultivating a shared national identity between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots has historically been suppressed by kin-state relations and colonial policies which have, in turn, resulted in inter-communal conflict. An understanding of this conflict and the nature of the nationalisms of each community helps explain how the 1960 Constitution of a bi-communal and consociational Republic of Cyprus hindered inter-communal relations – a precondition for the cultivation of a common national identity – and ultimately failed. From enosis to taksimto the April 2004 referendum on the UN’sAnnan Plan, the contentious interaction between external constraints and collective self-identification processes subsequently reinforced ethno-religious identifications. Through an examination of such processes, this article aims to identify and illuminate the shifting forces that shape deeply divided societies in general, and that have shaped Cyprus and Lebanon in particular. Understanding such forces may help break down barriers to the development of common national narratives.

Abstract South Sudan has not escaped the world’s attention even after the signing of the infamous Revitalized Peace Agreement in September 2018 that for the 12th time brought the two antagonists – Kiir and Dr. Machar – to the negotiation table since the conflict began in 2013. Even with the aura of a shaky peace, the main question is whether the new agreement will stand the test of time going by the history of the failed implementation of peace agreements. This paper recognizes the vital nature of the prevailing peace and questions about whether consociational democracy can be propped up during this period of relative peace. Discussions are hinged on the consociationalism theory that contains a broad array of principles, including power sharing, requisite for consociational democracy. It argues that although South Sudan’s context could favor consociational democracy, there are several barriers characterizing Sudan’s social and political spheres that should be alleviated. We elucidate on the barriers and suggest in broad strokes the need for strong independent institutions and vibrant civil society amongst others. We also recognize that overreliance on individuals in resolving the conflict is detrimental to the young nation, and there is a need for a citizen-centered approach that entrenches consociational principles in South Sudan’s political sphere.

Lebanon is seen as a failed state by the international community and this study aims to look at the causes that have made Lebanon dysfunctional. The study uses Andrej Lijpharts consociational power sharing model and the international relations theory realism to analyse the internal and external causes that have made Lebanon a failed state. The study is based on interviews from the three major sects in Lebanon and a text analysis. The study shows that Lebanon is suffering from a corrupt elite that uses the state institutions to benefit their own families. The elite uses clientelism by manipulating consociational power sharing to make the ethnoreligious groups dependant on the elite’s own success. Different regional and international powers use Lebanon in their struggle for power and dominance over the Middle East. The external actors support different ethnic and religious groups by financing and arming them. That in turn deepens the divide between the sectarian groups and hinders the political progress.

This thesis examines the evolution of Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia (I am Malaysian) from a civil society organisation [CSO] to a social movement organisation [SMO] leading to a social movement with broader networks for reform. Formed at the end of 2007, when Malaysia was undergoing a turbulent time due to repression and victimisation of the non-Malay/Muslim communities, political scandals, and economic mismanagement caused by the UMNO-led BN (Khoo, 2018), SABM had two goals. Firstly, to create a Bangsa Malaysia through its “One Nation, One People” Malaysian civic nationalism campaign, a counter-hegemonic movement to challenge the United Malay National Organisation’s [UMNO] Malay/Islamist ethnic nationalism, and secondly, to form a new left-inclined ‘hegemonic articulation’ free from ethnic- and religious-based politics (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). As a CSO, SABM aimed to enlighten fellow Malaysians through its “think and act Malaysian” socialisation process to participate in a ‘Malaysian’ political community instead of narrowly a ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ or ‘Indian’ political community. SABM hoped this would encourage the creation of a Bangsa Malaysia which is reminiscent of Anderson’s (1991) inclusive ‘imagined community’. Although the consociational democratic framework was put in place prior to the nation’s liberation from Britain with the hope that it would unite the deeply divided society and encourage the development of a Malaysian nationalism, this power-sharing agreement has only entrenched ethnic divisions and identity-based politics. This failure has also been caused by the so-called ‘social contract’, a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among the Alliance leaders to grant the UMNO the dominant position within the coalition in exchange for the Chinese’ and Indians’ rights to citizenship (Puthucheary, 2005). This has enabled the UMNO to impose its ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and ketuanan Islam (supremacy of Islam) on the non-Malay communities. During the period in which SABM was formed at the end of 2007, there was also a significant rise in other pro-reform CSOs and non-governmental organisations [NGOs], and this saw the emergence of the Malaysian reform social movement. To extend this movement, SABM became a SMO, in which it assisted and participated in various social movement activities organized by the Malaysian reform social movement (Christiansen, 2009). Despite operating in a repressed political environment, the internet and social media enabled the Malaysian reform social movement to mobilise Malaysians for collective action. This also applied to SABM, which employed both the ‘logic of connective action’ and ‘logic of collective action’ to expand its own social movement (Bennett & Segerberg 2012). Whilst the former is a strategy which makes use of personalised action frames that are disseminated and shared through its website and social media networks, the latter utilises conventional methods used by advocacy groups including collaborating with other CSOs and NGOs that are autonomous in their own right and share SABM’s aspiration for a Malaysian civic nationalism. Commencing with an in-depth analysis from a historical materialist perspective in how Malaysia became a deeply divided society, this thesis then proceeds to examine the voices of counter-power and resistance of SABM members to understand how and why they disaffiliated themselves from the UMNO’s dominant discourse, and how they conceptualised their notion of “One People, One Nation” to create a Bangsa Malaysia. This is followed by a discussion of the strategies they employed, connective and otherwise, to advance this social movement, and the various challenges it faced.