Academic literature on the topic 'Failed negotiations'
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Journal articles on the topic "Failed negotiations"
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Prestwich, Roger. "Cross-Cultural Negotiating: A Japanese-American Case Study from Higher Education." International Negotiation 12, no. 1 (2007): 29–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/138234007x191902.
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AbstractThis article discusses a cross-cultural negotiation process between a new Japanese university and an established American university to create a joint business venture – a dual-degree program. The parties failed to sign a contract, and there were indicators during negotiations pointing to the likelihood of a failed outcome. Negotiation style convergence was evident, with the Japanese adopting an erabi ('either-or') style and the Americans an awase ('more-or-less') style. The 7-Step framework used to structure the negotiation discussion may be better suited to analyzing Japanese negotiation processes than American. The implications will be of value to Japanese and American/Western businesspeople or educational administrators involved in joint venture-type negotiations.
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Alemanno, Alberto. "What the TTIP Leaks Mean for the On–going Negotiations and Future Agreement?" European Journal of Risk Regulation 7, no. 2 (2016): 237–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1867299x00005602.
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On 1May 2016,GreenpeaceNetherlands released 248 pages of TTIP negotiating texts stemming from previous negotiating rounds. Although it is not the first (and will not be the last) leak since the inception of the negotiation in 2013, this is the first to reveal the US negotiating position regarding 13 out of the 24 TTIP chapters.As such, the TTIP leaks provide an unprecedented opportunity to not only analyse the contrasting positions of the EU and US on several issues in the ongoing negotiations, but also to test the veracity of the competing narratives devised by opponents and proponents of the agreement. To what extent do their respective storylines find support in the actual texts?Supporters of TTIP have proposed fact-checking as an antidote against them is information around TTIP. Yet, having been predominantly advocated and provided for by the EU Commission rather than by the media, institutional fact-checking failed to counter the massive misinformation characterizing the public and political discourse surrounding the negotiations. Unfortunately, when it comes to public perception, the line between pedagogy and propaganda is fuzzy.
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Matesan, Ioana Emy. "Failed Negotiations and the Dark Side of Ripeness: Insights from Egypt." International Negotiation 25, no. 3 (2020): 463–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-25131249.
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Abstract This article revisits ripeness theory and examines whether conflicts with armed Islamist groups can also be ripe for negotiation. The article argues that armed Islamist organizations can be willing to negotiate and demobilize, but talks are particularly vulnerable to spoilers and public backlash. To examine these dynamics, the article investigates the case of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. Relying on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including organizational documents and testimonies by the leaders, the analysis shows that the absence of ripeness can indeed explain some of the failures of negotiations. However, when the conflict was finally ripe, talks broke down because of elite divisions and public backlash. The case reveals that there is a dark side to ripeness: the conditions that lead to a mutually hurting stalemate can also lead to public outrage, elite divisions, and opposition to negotiations.
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Poast, Paul. "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945." International Organization 66, no. 2 (2012): 277–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818312000069.
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AbstractThough scholars widely claim that issue linkage—the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement—can help states conclude international agreements, there exist some notable skeptics. Resolving this debate requires empirical evidence. However, beyond a few case studies, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement. I address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database. Using matching techniques, I find that, for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement. Besides confirming issue linkage's ability to help clinch an agreement, this article's research design and evidence have far-reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances. The research design illustrates the value of considering the “dogs that didn't bark” as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations. The article's evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process.
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Reiner, David M. "Climate Impasse How The Hague Negotiations Failed." Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 43, no. 2 (2001): 36–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00139150109605123.
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Murphree, David W., Stuart A. Wright, and Helen Rose Ebaugh. "Toxic Waste Siting and Community Resistance: How Cooptation of Local Citizen Opposition Failed." Sociological Perspectives 39, no. 4 (1996): 447–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1389417.
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Cooptation is used as a conceptual framework for analyzing a case of environmental conflict over a proposed toxic waste site that ended with allegations of betrayal aimed at community leaders who participated in structured negotiations with a waste disposal company. Though the negotiations committee challenging the waste company's proposal was stacked with veteran environmental activists, evidence suggests that they were effectively coopted. However, cooptation eventually failed when local activists not on the committee lost confidence in the negotiating process and accused committee members of “selling out” to the waste company and compromising the interests of the community. As a result of protests and citizen awareness campaigns, the opposition forces successfully convinced the regulatory agency to deny the company's permit. We find that cooptation theory helps to explain the short-lived success of corporate efforts during the early stages of negotiations, as well as the dynamics of failure in the long run. Three major components of cooptation are identified and discussed: (a) channeling, (b) inclusion/participation, and (c) salience control. The eventual failure of the siting process is linked to the latent demise of salience control.
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Sprinz, Detlef F., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Steffen Kallbekken, Frans Stokman, Håkon Sælen, and Robert Thomson. "Predicting Paris: Multi-Method Approaches to Forecast the Outcomes of Global Climate Negotiations." Politics and Governance 4, no. 3 (2016): 172–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i3.654.
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We examine the negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change in Paris, December 2015. Prior to these negotiations, there was considerable uncertainty about whether an agreement would be reached, particularly given that the world’s leaders failed to do so in the 2009 negotiations held in Copenhagen. Amid this uncertainty, we applied three different methods to predict the outcomes: an expert survey and two negotiation simulation models, namely the Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s Game. After the event, these predictions were assessed against the coded texts that were agreed in Paris. The evidence suggests that combining experts’ predictions to reach a collective expert prediction makes for significantly more accurate predictions than individual experts’ predictions. The differences in the performance between the two different negotiation simulation models were not statistically significant.
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Lehrs, Lior. "The Road Not Taken: The Amirav-Husayni Peace Initiative of 1987." Middle East Journal 74, no. 1 (2020): 72–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/74.1.14.
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In the summer of 1987, Israeli citizens Moshe Amirav and David Ish Shalom initiated a secret unofficial negotiation channel with Palestinian leaders Faysal al-Husayni and Sari Nusseibeh, with the approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership and the acknowledgment of senior members of Israel's ruling Likud party. But the attempt to turn the Amirav-Husayni initiative into official negotiations failed. This article analyzes the negotiations, examines the actors involved and the agreement, and discusses the historical importance of the initiative and the reasons for its failure.
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Radchenko, Sergey, and Lisbeth Tarlow. "Gorbachev, Ozawa, and the Failed Back-Channel Negotiations of 1989–1990." Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 2 (2013): 104–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00339.
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This article analyzes the evolution, content, and fate of the back-channel negotiations between senior Soviet and Japanese officials in 1989–1990, a time of radical changes in most aspects of Soviet foreign policy. Sources that have recently become available—especially the private papers of Aleksandr Yakovlev and Anatolii Chernyaev and several recently published collections of documents—not only confirm what has long been suspected about this critical channel of negotiation but shed valuable light on motives and complications in Moscow that precipitated the channel's ultimate failure. Because Japanese documents on the matter have not yet been declassified, the article cannot offer a full account of these talks, but the Soviet documents are sufficient to indicate why a bilateral rapprochement has been so elusive.
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Zakaria, Mohamad. "Knowledge management and global climate change regime negotiations." Foresight 17, no. 1 (2015): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/fs-11-2013-0066.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the important factors that negotiators and policy-makers need to take into account while putting their strategies to negotiate global climate change regimes. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on qualitative research using the deductive approach. Integrating the theoretical and empirical material in the analysis is used to enhance the readers’ value and interest in the paper. Findings – Without deep understanding of why some international negotiations related to climate change have previously failed, it is difficult to successfully negotiate them in the future. Flexibility and openness during negotiations and to consider the views and concerns of all global actors in finding optimum solutions and cooperation are among the many essential factors that bring the world leaders into a compromise agreement and a global climate change regime. Knowledge management including taking into account the discussed factors may help the negotiators and public to be more prepared to understand the obstacles that may complicate negotiating the international climate change regimes. Research limitations/implications – This paper is not intended for those who have years of experience in climate change negotiations nor for those seeking deep theoretical knowledge about this topic. Practical implications – This paper has practical implications as it combines the theories of international relations with practical evidences from previous Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Social implications – This paper is an essential read to students and young scientists, as well as to young policy-makers within the environmental politics. Originality/value – The paper deals with a very important and current issue and little has been published on the process of preparation for negotiating climate change negotiation. It covers some critical issues and determining factors in such negotiations.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Failed negotiations"
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Korotana, Mohammed Shabir Blahi. "The concept of good faith and the failed negotiations : a comparative study of the rules of the English law, American law and the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320956.
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This thesis deals with the concept of good faith and the failed negotiations. It is a comparative and analytical study which comprises of the analysis of the rules of three legal systems namely English law, American law and the U.J. Convention on International Sale of Goods. The notion of good faith is similar to the doctrine of cu2pa-icontra. bendo in civil law. This means that damages are recoverable against the party whose 'blameworthy conduct' during negotiations for a contract has caused it to be invalid or prevented its completion. It is a general phenomenon that there is no general duty to negotiate in good faith in English and American law. Relief for bad faith negotiations is available only after the negotiations have resulted in a contract, where a party's conduct during negotiations has caused it to be invalid. This situation provides adequate remedies under the established concepts e.g. fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and unequal bargaining power. However, this study deals only with the situation where the negotiations fail to result in a contract, because of the bad faith behaviour of either of the parties during the negotiations. The research suggests that in such a situation relief may also be available through the various notions of good faith applicable during the negotiating stage, i.e. equitable estoppels, proprietary estoppel, promissory estoppel, fraud and misrepresentation in the context of the law of tort, restitution and implied-in-fact contract. Under the American law it is comparatively easier to persue these goals because of the acceptability of the notions of contract to contract, contract to negotiate and the unified theory of estoppel, whereas English law is still unwilling to accept these ideas. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel obligations may be created on the basis of detrimental reliance which may in certain cases be equal to the expectation interest and in the others to the out-ofpocket- expenses, depending upon the circumstances of the case. The rationale behind the doctrine of promissory estoppel is similar to that of proprietary estoppel. Both are equitable estoppels. Therefore, it has been argued that there is not any logical or practical reason why promissory estoppel should not also be capable of creating a cause of action. Such a unified concept of estoppel would not cause the demise of the bargain theory. Consideration will still remain an essential ingredient in a contract; but alongwith this a new unified theory of estoppel may be introduced to deal with those cases where bargain theory does not apply. Thus, the creation of a cause of action on the basis of promissory estoppel would merely be an addition to the existing bargain theory. This argument has been accepted by some American courts and the other common law countries e.g. Australia, Canada and India. English law, particularly in lower courts, has also tempted some advances in this direction. The U.L Convention does not generally obligates the parties to negotiate in good faith, Article 7(1) states that Nj the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be had to ... the observance of good faith .... However, Article 16(2) like the Restatement (Second) of the Contract incorporates the notion of promissory estoppel with a wider scope of its application. It seems that Article 16(2) may be a useful tool in the context of duty to negotiate in good faith. This study concludes that although English and American law provide some notions 1 of good faith, it is advisable for these systems to introduce either a unified theory of estoppel or a general principle of good faith negotiations (Culpa-ln-Contrabendo) which would achieve a higher standard of behaviour from the parties.
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Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. "Divided and conquered why states and self-determination groups fail in bargaining over autonomy /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2007. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3270971.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007.<br>Title from first page of PDF file (viewed Aug. 13, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-204).
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Cook, Justin. "Faire la paix par la reconnaissance : l’étude de cas de la transformation des relations moldo-pridnestroviennes de 1989 à 1998." Thesis, Lille 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL20013/document.
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Le conflit civil moldave entre 1989 et 1992 a laissé un pays et une population divisés entre le fleuve Dniestr/Nistru. Malgré la victoire de la Pridnestrovie (RMP) dans sa guerre d’indépendance, elle n’a pas atteint son objectif de devenir un Etat reconnu. L’Accord de cessez-le-feu de 1992 qui a mis officiellement fin à la guerre a renforcé la séparation de la RMP par la création d’une zone tampon et l’établissement des forces de maintien de la paix. Comme convenu dans cet accord, la fin du nouveau statu quo et donc la résolution finale du conflit devraient passer obligatoirement par la détermination d’un nouveau statut politique pour la RMP. Faute d’avoir réussi à déterminer un statut officiel, le conflit est resté gelé. Lors de la période d’après-guerre, l’équilibre des pouvoirs a favorisé la RMP sur le plan économique, énergétique et sécuritaire, la plaçant dans une position de force vis-à-vis de la Moldavie. Cependant, puisqu’une reconnaissance étatique n’a jamais été accordée à la RMP, cette dernière a donc hérité d’un déficit symbolique que seule la Moldavie pouvait lui octroyer par la reconnaissance. Une politique active de reconnaissance envers la RMP entre 1994 et 1998 a été le facteur déterminant dans la transformation du conflit, conduisant à la signature de trois « grands accords ». Le célèbre Mémorandum de Moscou de 1997 a souligné ce processus transformatif au travers duquel les deux « opposants » se sont dès lors considérés comme « partenaires » au sein des négociations. Au cours de l’année 1998, Chisinau et Tiraspol se sont engagées sur le chemin de la paix en adoptant des mesures de confiance et de sécurité avec l’Accord d’Odessa<br>The Moldovan civil conflict between 1989 and 1992 left the country and the people permanently divided between the banks to the Dniestr/Nistru River. Despite Pridnestrovia’s (PMR) victory in its war of independence, it would not achieve its goal of being a recognized state. The ceasefire agreement of 1992 officially put an end to the war and solidified Prinestrovia’s separation through the creation of a security zone and the establishement of peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict and the end of the new status quo had to be synchronized with the accordance of a new political status for the PMR. As an official status was never determined, the conflict has remained frozen. During the post-war period, the balance of power favored the PMR from an economic, energy and security perspective, providing it with major leverage over Moldova. However, given that the PMR was never attributed statehood meant that it inherited a symbolic deficit because only Moldova could provide it with recognition. Moldova’s policy of recognition towards the PMR between 1994 and 1998 would be the determing factor in the transformation of the conflict, leading to the signing of three “major accords”. The historic Moscow Memorandum of 1997 highlighted this transformative process by which the two “opponants” considered eachother as “partners” within the negociation process. By 1998, Chisinau and Tiraspol embarked upon the path of confidence building and security measures with the Odessa Accord of 1998
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Hsu, Ming-Fang, and 徐敏芳. "Probe into a Failed Corporate Merger and Negotiation Strategy－." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96pqj3.
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碩士<br>國立臺灣科技大學<br>管理研究所<br>107<br>The development of the semiconductor industry nowadays focuses on Industry 4.0, the Internet of Things (IoT), and Artificial Intelligence (AI), the company in this case is Anstek, which is an IC agent in the semiconductor supply chain, ever since its establishment, Anstek has specialized in the industrial control field, the production lines of agent products have kept abreast of industry developments, and the products have been widely applied in many fields, in addition, the features in the industrial field include small quantities, diverse features, and customization, the company is thus required to cultivate more technology engineers than general agents, therefore, the gross margin of the company is higher than other consumer agents despite the growth revenues may be catch up with them, the company has a very high value and has been a merger target by larger agents.
This situation occurred in 2015, despite Anstek's products being very competitive in the market, and the value of the company being higher than other small and medium-sized agents, Anstek was still facing adverse conditions, during that time, the production line which accounted for the second-largest amount of revenue was acquired, and the agency rights were terminated, this urgent situation tested the crisis management ability of the management team. After resolving this crisis, the company was determined to adopt merger and acquisition methods to respond to the industrial crisis, their aim was to continue operations and prevent the company being affected by the termination of agency rights.
Mergers are commonly used by corporations to rapidly increase scale, economic benefits, and company value, however, a detailed merger strategy must be planned along with a properly-adjusted valuation which takes into consideration the future plans of the company or industry. When conducting its first merger, Anstek encountered an obvious error in the early stages of its strategy. When bidding, Anstek ignored the fact that it was a cross-border merger, and its valuation was thus not appropriate; The merger was unsuccessful due to the fact that there were different opinions between the leadership and those executing the details, and between Anstek and the merger target.
By exploring this case, the keys to success in a corporate merger can be identified, in addition, the following questions can be answered: How to plan a successful merger strategy?
How to judge whether the price is reasonable? How to decide which negotiation strategy should be adopted to meet the expectations of both parties?
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Erasmus, Helena Catharina. "The theory of thwarted belongingness and its relation to youth violence." Thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/25586.
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The thesis titled “The theory of thwarted belongingness and its relation to youth violence” presents the findings of a qualitative study that focussed on late adolescents who have committed physical assault and who were referred to a diversion programme by a court. The study followed a grounded theory methodology approach for which convenience sampling, purposeful sampling and theoretical sampling were used to obtain participants. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and the data were analysed through constant comparative analysis. From the analysis the theory on thwarted belongingness emerged that explains how the adolescents attempt to negotiate a sense of belonging. The theory further explains how failed negotiations are dealt with and when one could expect violent behaviour to occur. In general, the current research study creates awareness of the psychological non-shared environment and its potential role in the development of behaviour. Future research should be focussed on the saturation of categories and dimensions that have not been fully saturated in the current study and to test the theory of thwarted belongingness since it is a newly generated theoretical stance that needs to be validated.<br>Psychology<br>Ph. D. (Psychology)
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Yarali, Serkan. "Why do peace negotiations fail? : a case study of the 2012-2015 peace talks between Turkey and the PKK." Thèse, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/19135.
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Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles? Pour répondre à cette question, ce mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs.<br>Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.
Books on the topic "Failed negotiations"
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Explaining failed free trade agreement negotiations: Cases from Latin America. Nomos, 2010.
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South African Institute of International Affairs, ed. One size doesn't fit all: Deal-breaker issues in the failed US-SACU free trade negotiations. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2007.
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González, Martín Abel. The genesis of the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict: Argentina, Britain and the failed negotiations of the 1960s. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
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Behrendt, Sven. Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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Inclán, María. Opportunities for Success. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190869465.003.0004.
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This chapter first identifies democratization processes in which insurgents have successfully achieved their goals. It then compares those scenarios to one in which insurgents failed to better distinguish the conditions that might work as opportunities for them to succeed. These conditions are (1) being able to negotiate directly with the authorities, (2) having their interests included within democratizing pacts, and (3) counting with allies among elite actors negotiating peace and democratizing reforms. By applying these expectations to the case of the Zapatista movement, the chapter argues that when peace negotiations between insurgents and authorities occur separately from democratizing pacts among political elites, concessions to insurgent interests can be limited. Although insurgents might have allies in power and among those negotiating the new, more democratic order, if they are excluded from democratizing negotiations, their demands can easily be ignored.
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Behrendt, Sven. The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed (Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series). Routledge, 2007.
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Haines, Daniel. The Phantom of Cooperation. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190648664.003.0008.
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This chapter examines the Indus Waters Treaty’s problematic reputation for symbolising India–Pakistan cooperation. Even though the treaty failed to resolve broader geoplitical tensions in South Asia, the principle of river basin-scale negotiations reappeared in American and World Bank proposals for resolving an India–Pakistan dispute over the Farakka Barrage on the River Ganges in West Bengal and East Pakistan during the later 1960s and 1970s. The spectacular failure of basin-scale negotiation in Bengal, due to Indian policy-makers’ determination not to “compromise” their river-development plans in the face of external pressure, contrasted with the relative success of negotiations over the Indus Basin. The strange afterlife of the Indus Waters Treaty, in which Indian politicians used it as a warning against further cooperation, further demonstrated its historical peculiarity. The treaty is not a model for improving bilateral relations.
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Poast, Paul. Arguing about Alliances. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501740244.001.0001.
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Why do some attempts to conclude alliance treaties end in failure? From the inability of European powers to form an alliance that would stop Hitler in the 1930s, to the present inability of Ukraine to join NATO, states frequently attempt but fail to form alliance treaties. This book sheds new light on the purpose of alliance treaties by recognizing that such treaties come from negotiations, and that negotiations can end in failure. It identifies two conditions that result in non-agreement: major incompatibilities in the internal war plans of the participants, and attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement for various parties to the negotiations. As a result, the book focuses on a group of states largely ignored by scholars: states that have attempted to form alliance treaties but failed. It suggests that to explain the outcomes of negotiations, specifically how they can end without agreement, we must pay particular attention to the wartime planning and coordinating functions of alliance treaties. Through exploration of the outcomes of negotiations from European alliance negotiations between 1815 and 1945, the book offers a typology of alliance treaty negotiations and establishes what conditions are most likely to stymie the attempt to formalize recognition of common national interests.
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Gomez Arana, Arantza. The second attempt to negotiate the association agreement. Manchester University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719096945.003.0007.
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From the moment the European Union and Mercosur stopped their negotiations there was not progress or a real intention to re-start the negotiations again until 2010. Officially the EU and Mercosur “continued” negotiating the Association Agreement but it is fair to say that after such a failure at the last minute in October 2004, both sides becoming cautious in their hopes for a successful agreement. Considering that the negotiations failed publicly it is understandable to expect some years of “healing” before considering a new attempt. One more time, the right momentum was necessary to facilitate the re-launching of the negotiations. The economic environment was completely different from 2004. At this moment Europe is the one recovering from a financial crisis and from a weak Eurozone, while in Latin America this international crisis did not have that much of an effect. However in 2004 Brazil and Argentina were recovering from the economic crisis of the late 1990s early 2000s. The negotiations between the EU and other Latin American regional groups or individual countries were being successful. At the same time a third major investor and trader became an important piece of the puzzle, China. To some extent this could be seen as a better scenario for a successful agreement between both regions. The facilitator of the re-launching of the negotiations was one more time the Spanish presidency of 2010. Since then, several meetings have taken place between the EU and Mercosur, the last one in mid June in Brussels 2015.
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Ó Dochartaigh, Niall. Deniable Contact. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894762.001.0001.
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Despite the importance of secret negotiations during the Northern Ireland conflict there is no full-length study of the use of back-channels in repeated efforts to end the ‘Troubles’. This book provides a textured account that extends our understanding of the distinctive dynamics of negotiations conducted in secret and the conditions conducive to the negotiated settlement of conflict. It disrupts and challenges some conventional notions about the conflict in Northern Ireland, offering a fresh analysis of the political dynamics and the intra-party struggles that sustained violent conflict and prevented settlement for so long. It draws on theories of negotiation and mediation to understand why efforts to end the conflict through back-channel negotiations repeatedly failed before finally succeeding in the 1990s. It challenges the view that the conflict persisted because of irreconcilable political ideologies and argues that the parties to conflict were much more open to compromise than the often-intransigent public rhetoric suggested. The analysis is founded on a rich store of historical evidence, including the private papers of key Irish republican leaders and British politicians, recently released papers from national archives in Dublin and London, and the papers of Brendan Duddy, the intermediary who acted as the primary contact between the IRA and the British government during key phases of engagement, including papers that have not yet been made publicly available. This documentary evidence, combined with original interviews with politicians, mediators, civil servants, and republicans, allows a vivid picture to emerge of the complex maneuvering at this intersection.
Book chapters on the topic "Failed negotiations"
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Hollihan, Thomas A. "The Failed Negotiations: What We Learned." In Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70167-3_10.
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Karlsson, Håkan, and Tomás Diez Acosta. "The Failed Negotiations between Cuba and the U.S." In The Nixon Administration and Cuba. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003162612-21.
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Rama, Shinasi A. "Failed Negotiations, Intervention, and Ethnocide: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of the Security Syntheses." In Nation Failure, Ethnic Elites, and Balance of Power. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05192-1_4.
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Schimmelfennig, Frank. "Rhetorical Entrapment in EU–Turkey Relations." In EU-Turkey Relations. Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70890-0_6.
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AbstractThis chapter describes and applies the rhetorical action approach to EU–Turkey relations. Generally, rhetorical entrapment denotes the mechanism by which actors are compelled to act in conformance with their prior argumentative commitments. In the context of EU enlargement, member states have committed themselves to enlargement norms and promises in line with the fundamental purpose and values of the EU (such as pan-European community building, liberal democracy and supranationalism). Rhetorical entrapment played an important role in bringing about Eastern enlargement when the Eastern European countries faced significant resistance among the old member states. Finally, the chapter analyzes the rhetorical entrapment mechanism in the accession process of Turkey, which had an even more unfavorable starting position. As long as Turkey progressed on meeting the official political criteria for EU membership, however, the opponents of Turkish membership were bound by their normative commitment and felt compelled to decide in favor of accession negotiations. The rhetorical entrapment mechanism also elucidates why accession negotiations began to stall soon after their start. The opponents of Turkish membership were released from the rhetorical trap when Turkey failed to heed its own promises and honor its own obligations as a candidate state.
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Kumar, Mohan. "The Millennium Round That Failed." In Negotiation Dynamics of the WTO. Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8842-1_2.
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Roeder, Larry Winter, and Albert Simard. "Failed and Weak Nation-States." In Diplomacy and Negotiation for Humanitarian NGOs. Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7113-4_8.
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Throsby, Karen. "Normalising IVF: Negotiating Nature and Technology." In When IVF Fails. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230505704_3.
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Throsby, Karen. "Negotiating “normality” when IVF fails." In Considering Counter-Narratives. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sin.4.10thr.
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Çiçekoğlu, Feride. "The Secular Army or the New Ottoman Fantasy? Negotiating Hegemonic Masculinity in the Image of İstanbul." In The Dubious Case of a Failed Coup. Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1141-3_5.
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Wolff, Jonas. "Negotiating Interference: U.S. Democracy Promotion, Bolivia, and the Tale of a Failed Agreement." In Justice and Peace. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25196-3_9.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Failed negotiations"
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Barhoumi, Ines, Ilhem Kallel, and Adel M. Alimi. "ARG_FuzzySim: Concluding Failed Multilateral Argumentation-Based Negotiation." In 2008 International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Modelling Control & Automation. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cimca.2008.159.
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Golobic, Mojca. "Simulation Model of Regional and Urban Development Impacts: An Approach for Transparent and Communicative LILRW Disposal Siting Process." In ASME 2001 8th International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Remediation. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2001-1253.
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Abstract In most of the failed nuclear objects sitting processes the main barriers were not the technical or safety questions, but the problem of communication and reaching the public acceptance about decision. The paper presents one of the possible approaches that could contribute to the more community sensitive, transparent, communicative and finally successful siting process. The computer-supported approach for assessment of LILRW disposal impacts on regional and urban development is one of several modules loosely connected to a spatial simulation model in GIS. The results are shown as cartographic representation of impacts on different land uses and a possible future land use pattern. This model will be used for evaluation of alternative sites from regional and urban development impact aspects and for negotiating compensation schemes for local communities. One of the very important findings of this work is that the modeling outcomes depend more on value assumptions, according to which the input parameters are chosen, than on accuracy of computations. Therefore any conclusion based on the model outcomes should be verified in a wide panel of experts, interest groups and also wider public.