Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Faith and reason Islam and philosophy'

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science, 2008.
Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on May 11, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: A, page: 3302. Adviser: Jeffrey C. Isaac.

This thesis argues that the shortcomings of modernist liberal defences of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses have helped to draw debate over the book into a stalemate. It also attempts to demonstrate how aspects of this stalemate might be broken. Chapter One contains a brief philosophical survey of the debate, juxtaposing the framework relativism propounded by Rushdie and many of his advocates with the absolutism of Rushdie's Muslim detractors. The chapter closes with an analysis of the contradictions present in Rushdie's relativistic defence of his novel.
Chapter Two opens with a short argument against existing blasphemy laws. The philosophical sketches in Chapter One are applied to the contents of the novel itself, producing an outline of the contending views of "literary contest" and "authorial intention" held by the two sides in the debate, and illuminating Rushdie's apparent confusion about the purposes of his novel.
Chapter Three proposes a solution--based on philosopher Alasdair McIntyre's thought--to defects in modernist liberal defences of The Satanic Verses.

Political philosophers widely assume that public reason liberalism is hostile to religious contributions to liberal politics. My dissertation argues that this assumption is a mistake. Properly understood, public reason liberalism does not privilege religious or secular reasoning; a compelling conception of public reason liberalism can balance the claims of secular citizens and citizens of faith. I develop a framework that can resolve the tensions between liberalism and faith not only at a theoretical level but in the practical matters of dialogue, public policy, institutional design and constitutional law.

In this study, the relationship between medical thought and philosophy is investigated through the works of the famous Islamic thinker, Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Zakariya al-Razi (ca. 250-323/864-935). In one of the texts we shall be examining Razi thought that he could resolve the problem of the world's creation through allegory. Razi's interlocuter was concerned to defend the idea of epistemological "revelation." Although Razi agrees that the Intellect was sent by the Creator, he insists that this was done primarily for the benefit of the "self," which had become entangled in "material confusion." He is particularly concerned to counter the authoritarian implications of his opponent's epistemological position, which appears to emphasize doctrinal truth at the expense of all other considerations. These considerations are taken up by Razi in another work, the Kitab al-tibb al-ruhani. There, he draws on the science of medical treatment for application in ethics, but with some interesting implications for the problem of knowledge. The real object must be to bring man to his proper destination, and in this Razi's views coincide with the early mystical tradition in Islam, from al-Hujwiri to al-Ghazzali, where the problem essentially consists of existential realization rather than a merely abstract or intellectual process.

Syftet med denna uppsats är främst att försöka ge en nyanserad bild av förekomsten av antisemitism i Nation of Islam men även att försöka ge möjliga förklaringar till varför den uppstått. Utgångspunkten är att försöka förstå situationen snarare än att enbart fördöma den, men jag vill poängtera att det naturligtvis inte är likgiltigt med acceptans.

Uppsatsen koncentrerar sig på följande frågeställningar:

• Hur understödjer/legitimerar man antisemitiska uttalanden?
• Vilken utveckling följer de genom organisationens utveckling?
• I vilket sammanhang förekommer de och till vilket ursprung kan man härleda dem?

The present work is an exploration of the relationship between love and law in Islam and Christianity through the works of al-Ghazālī (c.1056-7-1111 C.E.) and Thomas Aquinas (c.1224/5-1274 C.E). In doing so, it aims to provide the historical theological perspective of two thinkers, each pivotal to their respective tradition, with a view to contributing to contemporary Christian-Muslim discourse, which, since the 2007 Common Word initiative, has had a strongly scholarly focus on love. Notably, however, this discourse has tended to avoid discussion pertaining to how we ‘act out’ such love, particularly in regard to legal frameworks. To redress the balance of scholarly discourse, this thesis aims to present key aspects of al-Ghazālī’s and Aquinas’ thought in order to provide the conceptual background necessary to understand and then synthesize how they likely conceived of the love-law relationship. From this, it becomes clear that for al-Ghazālī, the relationship between the heart, intellect, and various categories of knowledge is integral in fostering love for God. In a similar manner, the intellect for Aquinas is integral and its formation is based on our cumulative knowledge and experience. The key facet of the intellect for both is its ability to abstract from particulars to universals. This position is essential to the thought of both writers as God for them is beyond creation and yet in some sense also reflected in and intimately related to creation. As such, the intellect acts as a ‘bridge’ between the immanent and the transcendent. It is both affected by the knowledge gained through this-worldly legal frameworks and the other-worldly divine attributes in which it can share: this includes the divine attribute of love. The extent to which one can share the latter is dependent on the extent to which one is formed by the former. The intellect is, however, aided in this process by the gratuitous gift of revelation, which acts as immanent ‘certain’ knowledge of the transcendent. Such thinking provides the background for a detailed exploration of love and law. Towards this end, first noted is how both authors consider this-worldly law to be an appropriation of other-worldly law, represented by The Preserved Tablet for al-Ghazālī and the eternal law for Aquinas. Reasoning is essential in mankind’s attempt to understand this divine, other-worldly paradigm, although man is aided by a partial manifestation of ‘certain’ knowledge within the created order by way of revelation. Human reasoning on law results in this-worldly legal frameworks, which, in some sense, aim to provide knowledge of God either explicitly or implicitly by way of orientating towards the maintenance of the common good. However, as all good is derivative of God, this-worldly law, whether orientated to a temporal or ultimate good, should be understood as orientation to God. Inclining to our good according to our nature is something both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas maintain is ‘in-built’ within us. At its most fundamental level this good is God, but it does not exclude the material goods and objects that constitute the necessities of life. Thus law orientated towards the good (to whatever degree) encourages orientation to God (to some degree). Inclination to the good is natural within our being, and both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas define love, in the first instance, as inclination to the good according to our nature. The more we are inclined to the good, the more ‘goodness’ is made manifest within us; that is, the more we ‘participate’ in or ‘reflect’ the divine attributes. Thus the more law-abiding we are, the more we are drawn to the good. This eventually forms the intellect in such a way that it is drawn to the good in itself: al-Ghazālī calls this ‘contentment’ and Aquinas calls this ‘charity’. Based on their respective positions, this thesis will therefore firstly argue that the relationship between love and law for al-Ghazālī and Aquinas is as follows: before one can love, one must know, and law provides knowledge; however, such knowledge reflects a gratuitous gift from the creator and therefore divine love underpins the knowledge that enables human love. In course of this study, it will become evident that both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas have a strong apophatic-cataphatic emphasis to their work. That is, their methodologies affirm issues of immanence and transcendence, the knowability and unknowability of God. The only ‘certain’ knowledge for both authors is that which is represented by revelation, and to which all other knowledge should be correlated. However, all other knowledge is reflective of acquired knowledge and human reasoning, which are by nature imperfect. Providing we deploy ‘reason’ effectively in relation to the ‘certain’ knowledge of revelation, we can talk about God to an extent. In such an instance, human language points towards and reflects the divine, but does not totally encapsulate or definitively define the divine. Ultimately, the divine is beyond comprehension while equally somehow reflected or detectable within creation. Indeed, for both authors, genuine experience of the divine exhausted their prolific works and words; this realisation resulted in each adopting a state of ‘silence’ at various points in their respective careers. That is, both come to an appreciation of the insufficiency of words and concepts in the face of a transcendent, immutable God. Noting the centrality of this emphasis in both authors, this study then turns to the present day Christian-Muslim milieu touching upon the ‘reason debate’ that formed the background to the Common Word initiative. Using this as a platform, this thesis argues for a ‘re-emphasis’ or ‘re-discovery’ of the apophatic-cataphatic reasoning that both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas display for contemporary Christian-Muslim discourse. The final hope for the study is two-fold. Firstly, to encourage further discourse on how ‘love’ is ‘acted out’ between the two traditions. And secondly, to remind Christians that law has an important theological tradition within their heritage with a view to providing encouragement for further studies in the neglected area of comparative law in Christian-Muslim discourse.

Denna uppsats syftar till att ge en bild av förbundet Humanisternas debatt och porträttering av islam och muslimer. Detta med hjälp av utländska ateister som även förekommit i förbundets egen tidskrift Humanisten. Mina frågeställningar är: Hur framställs islam och muslimer av media och av förbundet Humanisterna? Vilken kritik har framförts av Humanisterna angående islam och muslimer? Bidrar förbundet till en ökad schablonisering av islam och muslimer? För att nämna kortfattat vad jag kommit fram till kan det sägas att Humanisterna, när de skriver om islam eller muslimer, delvis är intoleranta i sin retorik. Den kritik som framförts mot förbundet är bland annat att de vill tvinga på en sekulär livsåskådning och att de tror dig ha ett slags monopol på sanningen. Eftersom den mediebild som redan existerar av islam och muslimer är negativt laddad, så hjälper Humanisterna till att öka den bild av islam som finns som den ”onda, mörka” religionen i vår tid, det vill säga, man bidrar till redan existerande schablonisering av muslimer.

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Kierkegaard’s thinking is placed in the context of the philosophical critique of religion, which started with Hegel. Kierkegaard is opposed to the perspective of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, reducing Christianity to a system dominated by logic, as well as the union between religion and philosophy, where philosophical speculation justifies and explains faith in a rational manner. The problem of the relationship between reason and faith is the starting point for the defence of faith as passion. In the book Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard analyses the essence of the Christian faith in the biblical passage of the sacrifice of Isaac, asked by God to Abraham, in Genesis 22. Faith is understood as a dimension of subjectivity and, for Kierkegaard, “subjectivity is truth”. Such truth is attained in interiority and must make sense in the individual's life. It is from this emphasis on interiority that the philosopher establishes the discussion of authenticity and its criticism of Christianity. The objective of this paper is to outline the essence of the Christian faith in Kierkegaard, the passion of faith, to deepen the reflection on the meaning of Christianity and being a Christian today – in face of the confusion and crisis of values in contemporary society, the religious mercantilism of the Christian faith, the inconsistencies of fundamentalism and religious intolerance – giving directions to the discussion of otherness and Christian faith nowadays.
O pensamento de Kierkegaard está inserido no contexto da crítica filosófica da religião iniciada com Hegel. Kierkegaard opõe-se à perspectiva da Filosofia da Religião de Hegel de redução do cristianismo a um sistema dominado pela lógica. Ele discorda igualmente da junção entre religião e filosofia, em que a especulação filosófica justifica e explica racionalmente a fé. O problema da relação entre a razão e a fé é o ponto de partida da defesa da fé como paixão. No livro Temor e Tremor, Kierkegaard analisa a essência da fé cristã na passagem bíblica da história do sacrifício de Isaac, solicitado por Deus a Abraão, em Gênesis 22. A fé é compreendida como dimensão da subjetividade, e para Kierkegaard a “subjetividade é a verdade”. Essa verdade é apropriada na interioridade e precisa fazer sentido na vida do indivíduo. É a partir dessa ênfase na interioridade que o filósofo estabelece a discussão sobre a autenticidade e fundamenta a sua crítica à cristandade. A perspectiva do presente trabalho é esboçar a essência da fé cristã em Kierkegaard, a paixão da fé, para o aprofundamento da reflexão sobre o significado do cristianismo e do ser cristão hoje – diante da confusão e crise de valores da sociedade contemporânea, do mercantilismo religioso da fé cristã, das incoerências do fundamentalismo e da intolerância religiosa –, apontando direções para a discussão sobre alteridade e fé cristã na contemporaneidade.

An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus.

The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.

Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: o propósito básico deste estudo é procurar compreender a vontade débil a partir da relação conceitual entre a décadence e o Cristianismo. Para trilhar tal caminho, é imprescindível que sigamos as pegadas de Nietzsche, desenvolvendo uma crítica à religião, mais especificamente ao Cristianismo. O estudo tem início com a discussão acerca do fenômeno da crença religiosa, buscando o seu significado e fundamento. Um dos alicerces básicos deste primeiro momento é a atenção dedicada à estruturação do conceito de fé, tal como aparece em O Anticristo. Desenvolvida esta questão, num segundo momento procuramos compreender a vontade débil a partir do Cristianismo - segundo Nietzsche, melhor representante desse tipo de vontade. Alicerçamos este estudo na configuração do Cristianismo como um "mau inimigo", nos conceitos de "corrupção da vontade" e "compaixão" - elementos conceituais de importância considerável na caracterização do Cristianismo desenvolvida por Nietzsche. Esta discussão encaminha para o desenvolvimento do capítulo que trata do conceito de décadence. O estudo tem início com a apresentação do que Nietzsche considera sua "experiência pessoal com a décadence", da qual ele se considera um "mestre". Na seqüência do capítulo, aprofundamos a discussão do conceito de décadence, apresentando a influência que Nietzsche teve da leitura da obra Essais de psychologie contemporaine, de Paul Bourget, a partir das críticas que faz à Richard Wagner, em O Caso Wagner. Talvez seja nessas críticas que se pode perceber de uma forma melhor sistematizada as características do processo de décadence. Processo este que encontra na vontade asceta o seu melhor representante e no Cristianismo a sua melhor sustentação. Feitas discussões conceituais básicas, no final do capítulo procuramos mostrar, nas pegadas de Nietzsche, o Cristianismo como "religião da décadence". Por fim, no quarto e último capítulo, buscamos perceber os fundamentos da afirmação de que o Cristianismo é o principal represente da décadence, a partir de sua origem e caracterização histórica. Para tanto, seguimos o percurso conceitual desenvolvido por Nietzsche em O Anticristo, passando pela história de Israel, a interpretação do tipo psicológico de Jesus e sua desfiguração histórica, cujo principal responsável foi o apóstolo Paulo. Uma das principais preocupações da filosofia de Nietzsche foi a denúncia de um tipo de vontade que se quer forte negando os fundamentos da própria força, na afinnação de valores que enfraquecem o tipo homem.E aqui nos deparamos com o Cristianismo, como a religião responsável pela universalização desses valores. Desenvolvendo o percurso teórico apresentado neste estudo, procuramos compreender alguns dos traços da indignação filosófica nietzscheana
Abstract: The basic purpose of this research is to try to comprehend the weak wish from the conceptual relation between décadence and the Christianity. To thresh such way, it is essential to follow Nietzsche's footprints, developing a criticism to the religion, more specifically to the Christianity. The study has beginning with the discussion conceming the religious belief phenomenon, seeking your meaning and foundation. One of the basic foundations of this first moment is the dedicated attention to the faith concept structuring, just as it appears on The Antichrist. Developed this matter, in a second moment we try to comprehend the weak wish from Cristianity - according to Nietzsche, the best representative of this kind of wish. We base this study on the Christianity configuration as a "bad enemy", in the "wish corruption" concepts" and "compassion" - conceptual elements with considerable importance in Christianity's characterization developed by Nietzsche. This discussion forwardfor the chapter development that care for décadence concept. The study has beginning with the presentation that Nietzsche considers his "personal experience with décadence", in which he considers himself as a "master". In the chapter sequence, deepen décadence concept discussion, introducing the influence that Nietzsche had of the work reading Essais de psychologie contemporaine, of Paul Bourget, from his criticisms to Richard Wagner, in The Case of Wagner. Perhaps is in these criticisms that is possible to realize in a better systematized form the characteristics of décadence process. Process that finds in the weak wish your best representative and in the Christianity its best support. Done basic conceptual discussions, at the end of the chapter we try to show, in the footprints of Nietzsche, the Christianity as a "décadence religion". Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, we seek to realize the affinnation of the foundations that the Christianity is the principal representative of décadence, from its origin and historica1 characterization. For so much, we follow the conceptual route developed by Nietzsche in The Antichrist, passing through Israel's history, the interpretation of Jesus's psychological type and his historical disfigurement, which principal responsible was the apostle Paulo. One of the principal philosophy preoccupations of Nietzsche was the accusation of a kind ofwish that is wanted strongly denying the foundations ofthe force, in the values affinnation that weaken the man. And here we come across to the Christianity, as the responsible religion for universalization of these values. Developing the introduced theoretical route in this study, we try to comprehend some of the philosophical indignation nietzscheanna traces
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

This thesis is a comparative analysis of Ibn Taymiyya of Damascus and Gregory of Rimini within their respective religious and philosophical traditions. Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini rejected the use of Aristotelian logic in the valorization of divine revelation in Islam and Christianity respectively. The translation movements, in Baghdad and then in Toledo, ensured the transmission of Greek scientific and philosophical works to both the Islamic world during the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Catholic Christian European milieu beginning in the eleventh century. By the fourteenth century both the Islamic and the Catholic European religious traditions had a long history of assimilating Aristotle's Organon. Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini rejected the notion, adopted by the kalam and scholastic traditions respectively, that logical demonstration could be used to validate religious doctrine as taught in the Qur'an and the Bible. Ibn Taymiyya rejected demonstration completely but Gregory accepted its qualified use.

Med hjälp av den fenomenologiska metoden visade det sig att fenomenet TV innehåller ångest. Programformen såpa serverar sina tittare en existentiell ångest. I sport bjuds tittaren på patologisk ångest. I ljuset av P. Tillichs existentiella ontologi (1977) framkom det att ångest beror på att samhället har fråntagit oss ödet och döden.

Uppsatsförfattaren har senare bytt efternamn till "Fredriksson".

This work will explore some of the possible relationships between the teachings and spiritual practices of two religious teachers – Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection and Ajahn Sumedho. Brother Lawrence was a Discalced Carmelite brother that lived in France during the 17th century. Ajahn Sumedho is a monk within the Thai Forest Tradition of Theravadan Buddhism, who currently lives in Hertfordshire, UK. This exploration will include even a description of their respective religious heritage, together with a short discussion of the value or shortcomings of the comparative method of research.

Temat för kursen är religion och förändring. Syftet är att undersöka hur religions- och samhällsförändringar påverkar varandra. Denna relation kan även vara ömsesidig. Denna uppsats är ett försök att belysa det komplexa fenomenet graffiti. Jag ska med denna litteraturstudie undersöka graffitimålarens belägenhet i samhället och religionens roll.

Uppsatsens syfte är att göra en deskriptiv beskrivning av två olika föreställningsvärldar samt att förklara och tolka det konfliktladdade mötet mellan dessa. Jag ämnar använda två olika teorier för att belysa samhällets struktur och människans existens. Med detta förfaringssätt vill jag uppnå en förståelse av orsaken till konflikten mellan samhällets- och ungdomarnas föreställningsvärld.

Hegels teori används som analysinstrument 1 för att belysa samhällets struktur och förklara varför samhället jagar ungdomar som utövar graffiti. I ljuset av analysinstrument 2 som utgörs av Karl Jaspers teori vill jag förklara varför ungdomar ritar graffiti trots motståndet från samhället. Jag ska även undersöka religionens roll i dessa två föreställningsvärldar.

Uppsatsförfattaren har senare bytt efternamn till "Fredriksson".

Den här uppsatsen är en studie av läromedel från 1960-talet och fram till idag. Syftet med min uppsats är att undersöka hur ämnesområdet ateism tas upp samt i vilken omfattning man gör det i läroböcker från 1960-talet fram till idag. Det jag kommit fram till utifrån mina frågeställningar är följande: Av alla de läroböcker som jag tagit upp i undersökningen är det bara de två böckerna från 1960-talet som låter ateismen få ha en egen rubrik. I de böcker jag nämner från 70-talet och fram till 90-talet tycker jag att de kapitel som tar upp ateism har en viss negativ laddning i sitt uttryck. Religionslös, religionskritik och frågan: ”Finns Gud? Till skillnad från dessa böcker så har läroböckerna från 1990-talet och framåt kapitel, där man tar upp ateism, som har ett positivare uttryck. ”Livets mening”, ”Sökande efter en livskompass”, ”Livsåskådningar utan Gud” och ”Religioner och livsåskådningar”. Ateismen får även en negativ innerbörd när den förknippas så intimt med marxismen och därmed också med de hemskheter som gjorts i marxismens namn. Det kan bli svårt för elever att skilja på att ateismen inte är likställt med marxismen. Det är i princip bara i böckerna från 60- och 70-talen som det görs en åtskillnad mellan olika former av ateism. Den starka kopplingen till marxismen gör även att begreppet ateism ofta beskrivs ur ett historiskt perspektiv. De senare böckerna beskriver hur det ser ut för den enskilda människan vad det gäller troende och ateism. Man uttrycker här ateismen som ett aktuellt och meningsfullt valalternativ. Efter 1970-talets böcker blir det mindre viktigt att precisera olika former av ateism samt att ateismen får mindre utrymme, det skulle man kunna tolka som att ateismen blir mindre intressant som livsåskådning att lära ut. Genom min undersökning tycker jag att det växer fram en bild av att ateismen får ett allt mindre utrymme i läromedlen för gymnasieskolan. Detta tycks ske i två steg. I ett första steg kan man se att i böckerna efter 1970-talet faller preciseringarna av olika former av ateism bort. I ett andra steg faller den historiska beskrivningen av ateism bort i böckerna från 1990-talet fram till idag.

De troende i USA tycks öka i antal efter den 11 september 2001 och det har fått mig att fundera över varför befolkningen i landet är så beroende av att tro på Gud. För att finna svaret på dessa funderingar presenteras i detta arbete en del av den amerikanska religionshistoriken. Redan när emigranterna kom till det nya landet förde de med sig flera olika trosinriktningar och de ansåg att de fått i uppgift av Gud att bebygga det nya landet. Ett flertal olika församlingar bildades varav några var mer strikta än andra och ur dessa striktare grupper ”föddes” fundamentalismen och den religiösa högern. Än idag är dessa grupper starka och påverkar varje amerikans liv på ett eller annat sätt eftersom de har stark inverkan på den politik som förs i landet.

I Sverige minskar antalet kyrkomedlemmar samtidigt som förbund som Humanisterna märker av en ökning av medlemmar, därför har jag nu tittat lite närmare på vad de sekulära humanisterna i Sverige tror på. För att kunna göra det har jag bland annat intervjuat en tjej som arbetar för förbundet via e-post. Det visade sig att dessa medlemmar inte tror på någon Gud eller något högre väsen utan lever för att förverkliga tron på människan och att alla människor själva bör ta ansvar för sitt eget liv. De arbetar också för att förverkliga demokrati och värna om vår jord till kommande generationer.

Slutligen har en liten jämförelse mellan de sekulära humanisterna och den religiösa högern gjorts. Frågan är om det finns något som förenar dessa två olika inriktningar. Svaret på det blev att jag inte hittade något som förenar dem. Möjligtvis kan det finnas någon fråga som de kan ha en likartad syn på men inte i någon av de frågor som har tagits upp i detta arbete.

Jag ämnar med den här uppsatsen att belysa det teologiska språket som den mänskliga konstruktion jag anser det vara. Mitt syfte är att fokusera på faran att ensidigt betona metaforen om Gud som en man, som personlig och opersonlig varelse, och att diskutera den metaforiska innebörden hos den bibliska Gudsbilden och att påskina den revidering jag anser vara nödvändig i det metaforiska språket av Gudsbilden, som är genomsyrat av en patriarkalisk anda. Det andra blir litteraturstudier med anknytning till ämnet och en slutlig avhandling och diskussion med hjälp av vad jag fått fram.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo
The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Thomas Aquinas has long been understood to have reconciled faith and reason. Typically, he is understood as having provided justification for faith by means of proof, particularly, that the Five Ways prove the existence of God. Under this interpretation, faith becomes a species of justified belief, and the justification for faith rests upon the success of the Five Ways (or, alternatively, on the success of other justificatory evidence). In this dissertation, I argue that Aquinas' account of faith is not one of justified belief, at least as it is understood in contemporary philosophy. Instead, I argue, faith has its own basis for epistemic “reasonableness”—a reasonableness that does not derive from ordinary evidence nor proof. Rather than requiring evidence accessible to the natural light of reason, Aquinas holds that faith has its own sort of “evidence”—that which results from the light of faith. Aquinas “Aristotelianizes” faith and argues that faith has the Aristotelian epistemic virtue of certitude, and in so doing reconciles faith and Aristotelian reason, at least as Aristotle was understood by Medieval philosophers. This reconciliation resolves important tensions between Aristotelian science and Christian doctrine. Further, I examine three contemporary accounts of what counts as an epistemically “responsible” belief (namely, justified belief, practical rationality and warrant) and argue that under Aquinas' account, faith should be counted as rational, and in an important, though modified sense, as justified.

A puzzle about some of the basic commitments of Leibniz's metaphysics is that they fail to come anywhere near approaching the self-evidence one should expect of metaphysical principles. Notwithstanding that Leibniz's adherence to Christian theology has not generally been granted as having had a decisive impact on his metaphysics, the latter, in fact, was largely the result of a life-long project to give a comprehensive rational defense of Christianity. In particular, a close study of four theological commitments and six metaphysical commitments in the context of Leibniz's thought reveals that the former are in a sense more basic than, are motivationally prior to, the latter. Namely: that God the perfect being exists, that Real Presence is true, that the Lutheran, Catholic, and perhaps even Calvinist accounts of the Eucharist are compatible, and that Original Sin is true. Each had a resolute impact on the formation of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments: that the actual world is the best possible world, that teleological explanation is indispensible for scientific understanding, that the substance of body is not its extension but its active principle, that natures are complete concepts, that there are no material atoms, and that actual substances were created all at once. It is not surprising that Leibniz's best-possible-world theory and his commitment to the universal applicability of teleology have their roots in his commitment to the existence of God the perfect being. But it is also the case that his anti-materialist stance on substances was formed in defense of Real Presence and in response to a reconciliatory envisionment of the Eucharist that could resolve denominational disputes; that his commitment to natures as complete concepts and his anti-atomism derive largely from a commitment to God's omniscience; and that his commitment to the all-at-once creation of substances stems from his attempts to understand Original Sin. In short, Leibniz's metaphysics is Revelation-inspired. Yet although there are some good reasons in favor of calling it a "Christian metaphysics", as he had hoped, there are some serious drawbacks to its being considered such.

This dissertation critically reconsiders the dichotomy drawn in modern philosophy between faith and reason, especially as formalized by the German Idealists. The latter, I suggest, continue to influence how the philosophy of religion is conceived and what it is considered to be capable of accomplishing. Though originally used to reconcile religious faith with the philosophical reason that had animated forceful skepticism, this dichotomy also underscores a tension between the conceptualization of a rational public good and private religious values within pluralistic societies. I focus on the efforts of Kant, Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling to develop a philosophy of religion that distinguished philosophical reason and religious faith as distinct sources of theory while nevertheless establishing meaningful dialogue between each. The first chapter surveys Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of religion and argues that they struggled to maintain the otherness of religious faith relative to philosophical interpretation. The subsequent chapters each focus on a period of Schelling's intellectual development — his early criticisms of Kant, his mature rejection of German Idealism's subjective metaphysics, and his late philosophy of religion — as he developed an alternative philosophical approach to religion. This provides a means of exploring the challenges that a philosophy of religion must navigate to move beyond the problematic opposition of faith and reason. I conclude by considering the university as a promising context for reformulating this problematic dichotomy central to the philosophy of religion. The professional division of faculties embodies the abstract delineation of faith and reason and indicates the social and political dimension of such academic efforts. I argue that Schelling's contributions to the philosophy of religion point to the idea of the university as a vital framework for both reconsidering the opposition of faith and reason and moving beyond this schema in order to conceptualize effectively the contemporary conflicts between rational and religious authority within pluralistic societies.

The sixteenth-century Reformation in Germany is often viewed as having made a radical change by breaking with the thinking of the past and starting something new. One example given is the Reformation's perceived rejection of philosophy (that is, philosophy's method, subject matter, and purpose), although the regard for philosophy has often been assessed only on the basis of second-order data. Past research has looked at various individuals' keeping or breaking with the preceding era and at the question of continuity between individuals within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century. This interdisciplinary study examines the regard for philosophy and both the keeping and breaking of the whole movement, by considering how philosophy is used in The Book of Concord, which contains Reformation documents from the earlier and later sixteenth-century that were widely accepted and given authoritative status. The specific Book of Concord uses of philosophy considered are second-order statements about philosophy and its cognates and about logic, as well as first-order uses of organization by [ancient Greek topoi] ("topics") or loci ("places") and of argumentation by both induction (namely, example and analogy) and deduction. The study's taking philosophical uses as indicators of regard for philosophy has been called for in previous research and is relatively unique. Another significant contribution of this study is a detailed treatment of syllogisms used in arguing, for example, for the Reformers' position that justification, or righteousness before God, is only on account of faith in Jesus Christ. The study also considers the Reformers' formal distinction between justification and sanctification, or holy living, as a case study for philosophy in service to theology as its handmaiden in a ministerial role. More than finding an inexplicable, eclectic use, the dissertation concludes that The Book of Concord where necessary rejects philosophy and logic but nevertheless at the same time makes use of them, except where the use of such methods contradicts or goes beyond the Reformers' understanding of God's revelation in the Bible. Such rejection but simultaneous use both keeps and breaks with the preceding medieval period and continuous within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century.

Est-il encore légitime de distinguer, d’une part, la « simple raison », apte à convaincre n’importe quel penseur honnête et lucide, et d’autre part, le domaine de la foi religieuse, où les différences de conviction seraient a priori irréductibles, parce que soumises à des conditions de validité sui generis? Dans quelle mesure ce « partage des voix » entre la raison et la foi, que commandait au siècle des Lumières l’« exigence de l’émancipation » ou de l’affranchissement des tutelles autoritaires (le Selberdenken, le « penser par soi-même »), est-il encore d’actualité pour nous? Les temps ne sont-ils pas mûrs pour une autre attitude de la raison philosophique par rapport à la foi religieuse, qui se proposerait de mettre en question la théorie qui opposait la raison et la révélation comme deux « sources » irréductibles de vérité? Le présent travail poursuivra trois objectifs principaux, dont la visée commune consistera à clarifier les tenants et aboutissants de la critique de la « simple raison » (reason alone) chez Charles Taylor, au regard de la totalité de son œuvre. Dans un premier temps, nous soulignerons que notre auteur récuse le paradigme épistémologique de la philosophie moderne au nom d’un paradigme herméneutique, plus sensible à la finitude langagière et historique de la raison humaine. Notre auteur reconnaît en effet au « débat herméneutique » (hermeneutical debate) une importance cruciale dans le contexte de la sécularité (ou de notre « âge séculier »), qui se caractérise par la coexistence d’une pluralité croissante de perspectives éthiques et spirituelles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous soutiendrons que ce paradigme herméneutique admet une distinction fondamentale entre deux modes de réflexion, l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité, et montrerons que l’argumentation transcendantale peut à son tour être comprise comme une modalité particulière de la « simple raison » dans le contexte du paradigme herméneutique. Ces deux premiers moments de nos analyses, de nature essentiellement exégétique, constitueront la majeure partie de notre thèse. Dans un troisième temps, nous examinerons la distinction entre l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité de façon à mettre en question les limites assignées par notre auteur à la première. Plus précisément, notre intention est de démontrer que la critique herméneutique de la simple raison proposée par Taylor présuppose elle-même la viabilité d’une « éthique transcendantale » et, par conséquent, la viabilité d’une conception transcendantale de la simple raison dans la sphère de la rationalité pratique. Cette éthique transcendantale affleure en plusieurs lieux dans son œuvre sous la forme d’un « humanisme » de type néo-aristotélicien, solidement ancré dans ses analyses des conditions d’arrière-plan inéluctables (ou transcendantales) de l’agir humain, sans toutefois être explicitement conçue et assumée en tant que telle.
Is it still legitimate to distinguish, on the one hand, ‘‘reason alone’’ or nonreligiously informed reason, whose conclusions are in principle able to satisfy any honest and lucid thinker, and on the second hand, the domain of religious faith, where differences of conviction would be a priori irreducible? Is this divide between reason and faith, which was prompted at the time of the Auflkärung by a great call to ‘‘emancipation’’ (to ‘‘think for yourself’’, Selberdenken), still relevant for us today? Are the times not ripe for another philosophical attitude in relation to religious faith, which would call into question the theory that opposed reason and revelation as two irreducible ‘‘sources’’ of truth? This dissertation will pursue three main objectives, whose common aim is to clarify the motives and implications of the critique of ‘‘reason alone’’ in Charles Taylor’s work. First, we will show that Taylor rejects the ‘‘epistemological’’ paradigm of modern philosophy in the name of a hermeneutic paradigm, more sensitive to the linguistic and historical finitude of human reason. Our author maintains, indeed, that ‘‘hermeneutical debates’’ are now obligatory in our secular age, characterized by the coexistence of a growing plurality of ethical and spiritual perspectives. Secondly, we will argue that this hermeneutic paradigm admits of a fundamental distinction between two modes of reflection, that of ‘‘transcendental arguments’’ and the ‘‘quest for authenticity’’, and will show that transcendental arguments can in turn be understood as a specific modality of ‘‘reason alone’’ in the context of the hermeneutic paradigm. These two first stages of our analysis, mainly of an exegetical nature, will constitute the major part of our dissertation. Thirdly, we will examine the distinction between transcendental arguments and the quest for authenticity, to challenge the limits assigned by Taylor to the first domain. Specifically, we intend to demonstrate that the hermeneutical critique of reason propounded by Taylor presupposes the viability of a ‘‘transcendental ethics’’ and, therefore, the viability of a transcendental conception of reason in the domain of practical rationality. This transcendental ethics emerges at several occasions in his work as a kind of neo-Aristotelian ‘‘humanism’’, firmly anchored in his analysis of the inescapable background conditions of human agency, without being explicitly recognized as such.

It was certainly a primary concern of the Second Vatican Council, facing the Third World in a post-colonial era, to show a maximum respect for humanity's invincible cultural pluralism (GS, 44, 58). Hence the emphasis on the primordial and unique missionary principle of incarnation, is derived directly from the scandalous belief that God became one of us in everything except sin (cf Heb. 2:14-18; 4:15). The Christian understanding of the relationship between God and humankind is dominated by this incarnationcd theme, which takes seriously the meaning of finitude, flesh and history. The incarnational self-donation, through which humanity is embraced from within, involved an incomprehensible self-emptying (cf. Phil 2:6-8). In giving himself to us in this intrinsic manner the divine Logos discounts his divinity and humbles himself that he might become truly one of us. Jesus of Nazareth is not a disguise used by God, not a human outer garment covering the divinity, not something foreign to what we are.
Systematic Theology
M.Th. (Systematic Theology)

Text in Afrikaans with abstracts in Afrikaans, English and Zulu. Translated title in English supplied
Die hoofdoel van die verhandeling is om die fundamentele aanspraak van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk aan te spreek dat sy belydenisskrifte, met spesifieke verwysing na daardie leerstellings wat met die vraag oor die ontstaan van die mensdom en die oorsprong van sonde handel en wat in 1619 deur die Sinode van Dordrecht aanvaar is, waar is. Hierdie leerstellings word (teologies) as waarhede voorgehou dat dit op die Bybel as die Woord van God gegrond is. Die vertrekpunt van die verhandeling is dat die betrokke leerstellings vanuit ’n toepaslike historiese konteks benader moet word wanneer die vraag van hulle geldigheid aangespreek word. Nog meer, betoog die verhandeling dat dit vandag epistemologies geregverdig is om te glo dat die betrokke leerstellings deur hedendaagse wetenskaplike bevindings en ander tersaaklike bewyse onwaar gemaak is. Die kwessie van waarheid moet daarom (her-)aangespreek word vanuit ’n perspektief wat moderne wetenskaplike bevindings insluit. Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk het egter in 2010 suggereer dat sy fundamentele leerstellings met daardie (wetenskaplike) bewyse wat dit onwaar maak, kan medebestaan. Die verhandeling demonstreer dat dit nie moontlik is nie.
Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology
M.A. (Philosophy)