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Journal articles on the topic 'Feminist moral philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 13 February 2022

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1

Mullin, Amy. "Feminist Moral Philosophy (review)." University of Toronto Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2004): 325–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/utq.2005.0163.

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2

Sommers, Christina. "The Feminist Revelation." Social Philosophy and Policy 8, no. 1 (1990): 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003782.

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In the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association for the fall of 1988, we find the view that “the power of philosophy lies in its radicalness.” The author, Tom Foster Digby, tells us that in our own day “the radical potency of philosophy is particularly well-illustrated by contemporary feminist philosophy” in ways that “could eventually reorder human life.” The claim that philosophy is essentially radical has deep historical roots.Aristotle and Plato each created a distinctive style of social philosophy. Following Ernest Barker, I shall call Aristotle's way of doing social philosop

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3

Roth, Amanda. "Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy." Hypatia 25, no. 2 (2010): 316–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01079.x.

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I argue that Stephen Darwall's account of second-personal respect should be of special interest to feminists because it opens up space for the development of certain feminist resources. Specifically, Darwall's account leaves room for an experiential aspect of respect, and I suggest that abilities related to this aspect may vary along with social position. I then point out a potential parallel between the feminist critique of epistemology and a budding feminist critique of moral philosophy (specifically relating to respect).

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4

Bell, Macalester. "A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion." Hypatia 20, no. 4 (2005): 80–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2005.tb00537.x.

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In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. 1 argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male'dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. 1 begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the nature and moral significance of contempt, and argue that

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5

Held, Virginia. "Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990): 321. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108046.

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6

Wright, Charles. "Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality." Hypatia 19, no. 4 (2004): 49–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb00148.x.

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Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim th

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7

Sherwin, Susan. "Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens." Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1991): 327–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011690.

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Abortion has long been a central issue in the arena of applied ethics, but, the distinctive analysis of feminist ethics is generally overlooked in most philosophic discussions. Authors and readers commonly presume a familiarity with the feminist position and equate it with liberal defences of women's right to choose abortion, but, in fact, feminist ethics yields a different analysis of the moral questions surrounding abortion than that usually offered by the more familiar liberal defenders of abortion rights. Most feminists can agree with some of the conclusions that arise from certain non-fem

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Walker, Margaret Urban. "Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren." Hypatia 5, no. 1 (1990): 151–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00401.x.

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In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.

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Nicholas, Barbara. "Exploring a Moral Landscape: Genetic Science and Ethics." Hypatia 16, no. 1 (2001): 45–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb01048.x.

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This project draws on scholarship of feminist and womanist scholars, and on results of interviews with scientists currently involved in molecular genetics. With reference to Margaret Urban Walker's “practices of moral responsibility,” the social practices of molecular geneticists are exphred, and strategies identified through which scientists negotiate their moral responsibilities. The implications of this work for scientists and for feminists are discussed.

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10

Oliver, Amy A. "The Roots of Carlos Vaz Ferreira’s Philosophy." Genealogy 3, no. 4 (2019): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/genealogy3040057.

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Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1872–1958) was Uruguay’s leading twentieth-century philosopher. He worked on social and political philosophy, moral philosophy, aesthetics, and feminism. Considered to be one of Latin America’s most original thinkers, Vaz Ferreira’s philosophy was nonetheless responsive to and, in some cases, influenced by the work of a number of other figures. This article explores Vaz Ferreira’s roots in the thought of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, Dr. Gregorio Marañón, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro, Harald Höffding, Hugo Münsterberg, Wilhelm Dilthey, Miguel de Unamuno, John Stu

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11

French, Marilyn. "Is There a Feminist Aesthetic?" Hypatia 5, no. 2 (1990): 33–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00415.x.

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Literary art that is identifiably feminist approaches reality from a feminist perspective and endorses female experience. A feminist perspective demystifies patriarchal assumptions about the nature of human beings, their relation to nature, and the relation of physical and moral qualities to each other. To endorse female experience, the artist must defy or stretch traditional literary conventions, which often means offending or alienating readers. Traditional literary conventions are rooted in philosophical assumptions several thousand years old and still widely current. A third principle of f

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12

Keller, Jean. "Dialogue among Friends: Toward a Discourse Ethic of Interpersonal Relationships." Hypatia 23, no. 4 (2008): 158–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01438.x.

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Despite clear parallels between Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics and recent scholarship in feminist ethics, feminists are often suspicious of discourse ethics and have kept themselves mostly separate from the field. By developing a sustained application of Habermas's discourse ethics to friendship, Keller demonstrates that feminist misgivings of discourse ethics are largely misplaced and that Habermas's theory can be used to develop a compelling moral phenomenology of interpersonal relations.

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Jeske, Diane. "Feminism, Friendship, and Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 28 (2002): 63–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2002.10717583.

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In recent years, more and more philosophical work has come to be done under the rubric of ‘feminist philosophy.’ In particular, more and more work in philosophical ethics has come to be identified by both those who produce it and those who read it as within the domain of ‘feminist ethics.’ As a philosophical ethicist and a feminist, the question naturally arises as to whether I do feminist ethics. The question seems particularly natural in my case, because a great deal of my research has focussed on the nature of intimate relationships, the types of reasons to which such relationships give ris

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Bailey, Alison. "Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy." Hypatia 26, no. 4 (2011): 715–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01168.x.

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My project here is to argue for situating moral judgments about Indian surrogacy in the context of Reproductive Justice. I begin by crafting the best picture of Indian surrogacy available to me while marking some worries I have about discursive colonialism and epistemic honesty. Western feminists' responses to contract pregnancy fall loosely into two interrelated moments: post‐Baby M discussions that focus on the morality of surrogacy work in Western contexts, and feminist biomedical ethnographies that focus on the lived dimensions of reproductive technologies and how they are embodied and neg

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15

Nickel, Justin. "I Cannot Get It into My Heart So Strongly." Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 39, no. 1 (2019): 129–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jsce2019423.

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According to a common interpretation, Martin Luther holds that pride is humanity’s basic sin. This account of sin has occasioned numerous feminist critiques. In this paper, I argue against this reading. I contend that unbelief, which can take the form of either pride or despair, is the central issue in Luther’s moral psychology. This shift from pride to unbelief means that Luther’s moral psychology could be helpful to the work of Christian feminists.

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Powers, John, and Deane Curtin. "Mothering: Moral Cultivation in Buddhist and Feminist Ethics." Philosophy East and West 44, no. 1 (1994): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1399802.

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Superson, Anita M. "Feminist Ethics: Defeating the Why-Be-Moral Skeptic." Journal of Social Philosophy 29, no. 2 (1998): 59–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00108.x.

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18

Schild, Verónica. "Emancipation as Moral Regulation: Latin American Feminisms and Neoliberalism." Hypatia 30, no. 3 (2015): 547–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12162.

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The article argues that feminist emancipation, understood as practices and discourses of self‐development and of solidarity as empowerment, has become entangled with the neoliberal project. Indeed, emancipation as self‐improvement has become synonymous with moral regulation projects that seek to adapt women to global capitalism. The article explores the relation between emancipation and neoliberal regulation from a situated approach by addressing the experience of Latin American feminisms, with a particular focus on Chile. This approach recognizes by implication that Latin American feminisms a

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19

Warren, Virginia L. "Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics∗." Hypatia 4, no. 2 (1989): 73–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1989.tb00574.x.

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I explore some new directions—suggested by feminism—for medical ethics and for philosophical ethics generally. Moral philosophers need to confront two issues. The first is deciding which moral issues merit attention. Questions which incorporate the perspectives of women need to be posed—e. g., about the unequal treatment of women in health care, about the roles of physician and nurse, and about relationship issues other than power struggles. “Crisis issues” currently dominate medical ethics, to the neglect of what I call “housekeeping issues.” The second issue is how philosophical moral debate

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20

Friedman, Marilyn. "Feminist Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and Moral Luck." Hypatia 24, no. 1 (2009): 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.00004.x.

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Can men who dominate women nevertheless be happy or lead flourishing lives? Building on Claudia Card's exploration of moral luck, this paper considers the belief that male dominators cannot be happy. The discussion ranges over both virtue theory and empirical research into the “belief in a just world.” I conclude that there are reasons to avoid believing that male dominators cannot be happy or flourish, and that feminism does not need that belief.

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21

Dimock, Susan. "Why All Feminists Should Be Contractarians." Dialogue 47, no. 2 (2008): 273–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002614.

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ABSTRACTIn this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible explanation of what is wrong with patriarchy and so can serve as the theoretical

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22

Walker, Margaret Urban. "Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson." Hypatia 8, no. 3 (1993): 167–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00042.x.

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In a comment on my paper “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory” (Walker 1992), Keith Burgess-Jackson argues that I have misdiagnosed the problem with modem moral theory. Burgess-Jackson misunderstands both the illustrative—“theoretical-juridical”—model I constructed there and how my critique and alternative model answer to specifically feminist concerns. Ironically, his own view seems to reproduce the very conception of morality as an individually internalized action-guiding code of principles that my earlier essay argued is the conception central to modern moral theories.

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23

Walker, Margaret Urban. "Moral Understandings: Alternative “Epistemology” for a Feminist Ethics." Hypatia 4, no. 2 (1989): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1989.tb00570.x.

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Work on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral “epistemology,” identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.

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24

Harvey, Celeste. "Eudaimonism, Human Nature, and the Burdened Virtues." Hypatia 33, no. 1 (2018): 40–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12389.

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This article explores the prospects for a eudaimonist moral theory that is both feminist and Aristotelian. Making the moral philosophy developed by Aristotle compatible with a feminist moral perspective presents a number of philosophical challenges. Lisa Tessman offers one of the most sustained feminist engagements with Aristotelian eudaimonism (Tessman 2005). However, in arguing for the account of flourishing that her eudaimonist theory invokes, Tessman avoids taking a stand either for or against the role Aristotle assigned to human nature. She draws her account of flourishing instead from th

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25

Imafidon, Elvis. "Is the African Feminist Moral Epistemology of Care Fractured?" Synthesis philosophica 33, no. 1 (2018): 165–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp33110.

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U ovom radu ispitujem do koje se mjere konkretno živo iskustvo i razumijevanje svijeta kod afričkih žena ozbiljno uzima u obzir posljednjih desetljeća u dominantno akademskim afričkim feminističkim diskursima, te usmjerava na njih. Argumentiram da je domorodačka (tradicionalna) afričko-¬feministička perspektiva svijeta bila ponajviše razlomljena suptilnom feministič¬kom epistemološkom pozicijom određenom Zapadom, kolonijalizmom i teorijskom opresijom. Afrički feministi učeni su analizirati feminističke probleme na afričkom prostoru (domaćem i u dijaspori) upravo iz zapadnjačke, kolonijalne per

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Dalmiya, Vrinda. "Particularizing the moral self: A feminist buddhist exchange." Sophia 40, no. 1 (2001): 61–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02894579.

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27

Lindgren, J. Ralph. "Beyond Revolt: A Horizon for Feminist Ethics." Hypatia 5, no. 1 (1990): 145–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00400.x.

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The suggestion here is that casting the project of feminist ethics in confrontational language, rooted in a rebellion picture of moral epistemology, impedes the further development of that very project. Four commonplace examples are offered to make this suggestion plausible. I urge instead a pluralistic approach to styles of moral thinking and propose that the project of feminist ethics would be better served by casting it in the language of reconciliation.

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Nicki, Andrea. "The Abused Mind: Feminist Theory, Psychiatric Disability, and Trauma." Hypatia 16, no. 4 (2001): 80–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb00754.x.

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I show how much psychiatric disability is informed by trauma, marginalization, sexist norms, social inequalities, concepts of irrationality and normalcy, oppositional mind-body dualism, and mainstream moral values. Drawing on feminist discussion of physical disability, I present a feminist theory of psychiatric disability that serves to liberate not only those who are psychiatrically disabled but also the mind and moral consciousness restricted in their ranges of rational possibilities.

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Foust, Mathew A. "The Feminist Pacifism of William James and Mary Whiton Calkins." Hypatia 29, no. 4 (2014): 889–905. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12115.

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In this paper, I accompany William James (1842–1910) and Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) in the steps each takes toward his or her respective proposal of a moral equivalent of war. I demonstrate the influence of James upon Calkins, suggesting that the two share overlapping formulations of the problem and offer closely related—but significantly different—solutions. I suggest that Calkins's pacifistic proposal is an extension of that of her teacher—a feminist interpretation of his psychological and moral thought as brought to bear on the problem of war. Calkins's brand of pacifism widens the sco

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Hämäläinen, Nora. "Reduce Ourselves to Zero?: Sabina Lovibond, Iris Murdoch, and Feminism." Hypatia 30, no. 4 (2015): 743–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12172.

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In her book Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy, Sabina Lovibond argues that Iris Murdoch's philosophical and literary work is covertly dedicated to an ideology of female subordination. The most central and interesting aspect of her multifaceted argument concerns Murdoch's focus on the individual person's moral self‐scrutiny and transformation of consciousness. Lovibond suggests that this focus is antithetical to the kind of communal and structural criticism of society that has been essential for the advance of feminism. She further reads Murdoch's dismissal of “structuralism” as proof of Murd

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Wendling, Karen, and Paul Viminitz. "Could a Feminist and a Game Theorist Co-Parent?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 1 (1998): 33–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10715970.

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Game theorists assume that rational defensibility is a necessary condition for moral, social, or political justification. By itself, this is a fairly uncontroversial claim; most moral or political philosophers would agree. And yet game theorists tend to be advocates of the free market. External critics of game theory usually claim this is because game theorists assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested. Game theorists themselves deny this, however, for what strike us as good reasons. In principle, game theory has no necessary ties to right-wing distribution schemes. Why, then,

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Keller, Jean. "Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics." Hypatia 12, no. 2 (1997): 152–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1997.tb00024.x.

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While care ethics has frequently been criticized for lacking an account of autonomy, this paper argues that care ethics’ relational model of moral agency provides the basis for criticizing the philosophical tradition's model of autonomy and for rethinking autonomy in relational terms. Using Diana Meyers s account of autonomy competency as a basis, a dialogical model of autonomy is developed that can respond to internal and external critiques of care ethics.

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Malik-Goure, Archana. "Feminist Philosophical Thought in Colonial India." IRA-International Journal of Management & Social Sciences (ISSN 2455-2267) 4, no. 3 (2016): 579. http://dx.doi.org/10.21013/jmss.v4.n3.p8.

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<div><p><em>Savitribai Phule and Pandita Ramabai, Tarabai Shinde, Dr Anandibai Joshi, Ramabai Ranade, the greatest women produced by modern India &amp; one of the greatest Indians in all history, the one who lay the foundation for a movement for women’s liberation in India. Their goal was freedom from Indian tradition, freedom from religious practices and rituals. Despite coming from diver’s social background they talk about individual development. They wanted to introduce practical philosophy of human being. In their philosophy they are talking about individual growth, c

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Radden, Jennifer. "Relational Individualism and Feminist Therapy." Hypatia 11, no. 3 (1996): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb01016.x.

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My aim here is to clarify the practice of honoring and validating the relational model of self which plays an important role in feminist therapy. This practice rests on a tangle of psychological claims, moral and political values, and mental health norms which require analysis. Also, severe pathology affects the relative “relationality” of the self. By understanding it we can better understand the senses of autonomy compatible with and even required for a desired relationality.

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Ross, Sheryl Tuttle. "Raising Responsibility: Motherhood and Moral Luck." Hypatia 24, no. 1 (2009): 56–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.00006.x.

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This paper extends Claudia Card's account of agency in the face of moral luck in order to theoretically ground the activities of feminist mothers who endeavor to raise responsible human beings. The paper addresses those who mother in gray areas—areas where mothers are victims of the evils of the institution of motherhood while having authority and influence over their children.

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Moody-Adams, Michele M. "Feminist Inquiry and the Transformation of the “Public” Sphere in Virginia Held's Feminist Morality." Hypatia 11, no. 1 (1996): 155–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb00511.x.

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Virginia Held's Feminist Morality defends the idea that it is possible to transform the “public” sphere by remaking it on the model of existing “private” relationships such as families. This paper challenges Held's optimism. It is argued that feminist moral inquiry can aid in transforming the public sphere only by showing just how much the allegedly “private” realms of families and personal relationships are shaped—and often misshapen—by public demands and concerns.

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Meyers, Diana Tietjens. "Moral Reflection: Beyond Impartial Reason." Hypatia 8, no. 3 (1993): 21–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00034.x.

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This paper considers two accounts of the self that have gained prominence in contemporary feminist psychoanalytic theory and draws out the implications of these views with respect to the problem of moral reflection. I argue that our account of moral reflection will be impoverished unless it mobilizes the capacity to empathize with others and the rhetoric of figurative language. To make my case for this claim, I argue that John Rawls's account of reflective equilibrium suffers from his exclusive reliance on impartial reason.

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Derry, Robbin. "Toward a Feminist Firm: Comments on John Dobson and Judith White." Business Ethics Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1996): 101–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857243.

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AbstractThis response to Dobson and White's call for a feminine firm argues that such a concept is based on a misinterpretation of Gilligan's research. Moreover, virtue ethics and feminine ethics do not share a common approach to nurturing relationships or the moral orientation of care. Acknowledging the worthwhile goals of Dobson and White's endeavor, the feminist firm is presented as offering greater potential to achieve these goals.

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Dillon, Robin S. "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect." Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992): 52–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00697.x.

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The concept of self-respect is often invoked in feminist theorizing. But both women's too-common experiences of struggling to have self-respect and the results of feminist critiques of related moral concepts suggest the need for feminist critique and reconceptualization of self-respect. I argue that a familiar conception of self-respect is masculinist, thus less accessible to women and less than conducive to liberation. Emancipatory theory and practice require a suitably feminist conception of self-respect; I propose one such conception.

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Jaggar, Alison M. "Does Poverty Wear a Woman's Face? Some Moral Dimensions of a Transnational Feminist Research Project." Hypatia 28, no. 2 (2013): 240–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12022.

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This article explains some moral dimensions of a transnational feminist research project designed to provide a better standard or metric for measuring poverty across the world. The author is an investigator on this project. Poverty metrics incorporate moral judgments about what is necessary for a decent life, so justifying metrics requires moral argumentation. The article clarifies the moral aspects of poverty valuation, indicates some moral flaws in existing global poverty metrics, and outlines some conditions for a better global metric. It then explains the methodology used in our project, p

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Peach, Lucinda J. "An Alternative to Pacifism? Feminism and Just-War Theory." Hypatia 9, no. 2 (1994): 152–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1994.tb00438.x.

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Only rarely have feminist theorists addressed the adequacy of just-war theory, a set of/principles developed over hundreds of years to assess the justice of going to war and the morality of conduct in war. Recently, a few feminist scholars have found just-war theory inadequate, yet their own counterproposals are also deficient. I assess feminist contributions to just-war theorizingand suggest ways of strengthening, rather than abandoning, this moral approach to war.

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Reader, Soran. "Abortion, Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority." Hypatia 23, no. 1 (2008): 132–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01169.x.

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A threat to women is obscured when we treat “abortion-as-evacuation” as equivalent to “abortion-as-killing.” This holds only if evacuating a fetus kills it. As technology advances, the equivalence will fail. Any feminist account of abortion that relies on the equivalence leaves moral room for women to be required to give up their fetuses to others when it fails. So an account of the justification of abortion-as-killing is needed that does not depend on the equivalence.

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Houston, Barbara. "In Praise of Blame." Hypatia 7, no. 4 (1992): 128–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00722.x.

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Recent writers in feminist ethics have been concerned to find ways to reclaim and augment women's moral agency. This essay considers Sarah Hoagland's intriguing suggestion that we renounce moral praise and blame and pursue what she calls an “ethic of intelligibility.” I argue that the eschewal of moral blame would not help but rather hinder our efforts to increase our sense of moral agency. It would, I claim, further intensify our demoralization.

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Buchhammer, Brigitte. "Feministische Religionsphilosophie - ein innovatives Projekt." Labyrinth 16, no. 2 (2014): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.25180/lj.v16i2.4.

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Feminist Philosophy of Religion - an innovative ProjectThis essay seeks to launch a systematic basis for a feminist philosophy of religion. The critical thrust is explained with reference to latent sexism in a great part of the traditional philosophy of religion, with reference to Vatican documents, which are marked by perceptions and observations that have resulted in an attitude of discrimination against women. Furthermore, many theories in the field of feminist theology are flawed by argumentative deficiencies as well. These problem areas warrant a necessity to develop a new approach, which

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Benson, Paul. "Feminist Second Thoughts About Free Agency." Hypatia 5, no. 3 (1990): 47–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00605.x.

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This essay suggests that common themes in recent feminist ethical thought can dislodge the guiding assumptions of traditional theories of free agency and thereby foster an account of freedom which might be more fruitful for feminist discussion of moral and political agency. The essay proposes constructing that account around a condition ofnormative‐competence. It argues that this view permits insight into why women's labor of reclaiming and augmenting their agency is both difficult and possible in a sexist society.

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Friedman, Marilyn. "Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 13 (1987): 87–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10715931.

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Carol Gilligan heard a ‘distinct moral language’ in the voices of women who were subjects in her studies of moral reasoning. Though herself a developmental psychologist, Gilligan has put her mark on contemporary feminist moral philosophy by daring to claim the competence of this voice and the worth of its message. Her book, In a Different Voice, which one theorist has aptly described as a best-seller, explored the concern with care and relationships which Gilligan discerned in the moral reasoning of women and contrasted it with the orientation toward justice and rights which she found to typif

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Robinson, Jenefer, and Stephanie Ross. "Women, Morality, and Fiction." Hypatia 5, no. 2 (1990): 76–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00418.x.

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We apply Carol Gilligaris distinction between a “male” mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a “female” mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novels.

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Lee-Lampshire, Wendy. "Moral “I”: The Feminist Subject and the Grammar of Self-Reference." Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992): 34–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00696.x.

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Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.

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Little, Margaret Olivia. "Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology." Hypatia 10, no. 3 (1995): 117–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x.

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I develop two different epistemic roles for emotion and desire. Caring for moral ends and people plays a pivotal though contingent role in ensuring reliable awareness of morally salient details; possession of various emotions and motives is a necessary condition for autonomous understanding of moral concepts themselves. Those who believe such connections compromise the “objective” status of morality tend to assume rather than argue for the bifurcated conception of reason and affect this essay challenges.

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Pappas, Gregory Fernando. "Dewey and Feminism: The Affective and Relationships in Dewey's Ethics." Hypatia 8, no. 2 (1993): 78–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00092.x.

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Dewey provides an ethics that is committed to those aspects of experience that have been associated with the “feminine.” In addition to an argument against the devaluation of the affective and of concrete relationships, we also find in Dewey's ethics a thoughtful appreciation of how and why these things are essential to our moral life. In this article I consider the importance of the affective and of relationships in Dewey's ethics and set out aspects of Dewey's ethics that might be useful resources for feminist writers in ethics.

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