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Urian, Adriana Diana. "Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philologia 66, no. 3 (September 20, 2021): 247–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphilo.2021.3.16.
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"Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time. The present paper is a study of more traditional hermeneutics combined with a tinge of possible world modality, with the purpose of creating a thorough picture of narrative worlds and balancing it against the possible world system, with practical applications onto postmodern fiction, in Ian McEwan’s novel The Child in Time. The article focuses on exposing narrative language, worlds and characters, viewing them through Seymour Chatman’s perspective and slightly counterbalancing this approach with the possible world semantics system (as envisioned by Kripke, Lewis, Nolan, Putnam) for a diverse understanding of the inner structure and functioning of narrative text and fictional worlds. Keywords: possible worlds, possible-world semantics, narrative worlds, fictional worlds, narrative language, fiction, postmodern fiction, fictional characters "
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Weinert, Friedel. "Hypothetical, not Fictional Worlds." Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 17, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 110–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0019.
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Abstract This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints.
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Mosselaer, Nele Van de. "How Can We Be Moved to Shoot Zombies? A Paradox of Fictional Emotions and Actions in Interactive Fiction." Journal of Literary Theory 12, no. 2 (September 3, 2018): 279–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2018-0016.
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Abstract How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? By asking this question, Colin Radford introduced the paradox of fiction, or the problem that we are often emotionally moved by characters and events which we know don’t really exist (1975). A puzzling element of these emotions that always resurfaced within discussions on the paradox is the fact that, although these emotions feel real to the people who have them, their difference from ›real‹ emotions is that they cannot motivate us to perform any actions. The idea that actions towards fictional particulars are impossible still underlies recent work within the philosophy of fiction (cf. Matravers 2014, 26 sqq.; Friend 2017, 220; Stock 2017, 168). In the past decennia, however, the medium of interactive fiction has challenged this crystallized idea. Videogames, especially augmented and virtual reality games, offer us agency in their fictional worlds: players of computer games can interact with fictional objects, save characters that are invented, and kill monsters that are clearly non-existent within worlds that are mere representations on a screen. In a parallel to Radford’s original question, we might ask: how can we be moved to shoot zombies, when we know they aren’t real? The purpose of this article is to examine the new paradox of interactive fiction, which questions how we can be moved to act on objects we know to be fictional, its possible solutions, and its connection to the traditional paradox of fictional emotions. Videogames differ from traditional fictional media in that they let their appreciators enter their fictional worlds in the guise of a fictional proxy, and grant their players agency within this world. As interactive fictions, videogames reveal new elements of the relationship between fiction, emotions, and actions that have been previously neglected because of the focus on non-interactive fiction such as literature, theatre, and film. They show us that fictional objects can not only cause actions, but can also be the intentional object of these actions. Moreover, they show us that emotions towards fictions can motivate us to act, and that conversely, the possibility of undertaking actions within the fictional world makes a wider array of emotions towards fictional objects possible. Since the player is involved in the fictional world and responsible for his actions therein, self-reflexive emotions such as guilt and shame are common reactions to the interactive fiction experience. As such, videogames point out a very close connection between emotions and actions towards fictions and introduce the paradox of interactive fiction: a paradox of fictional actions. This paradox of fictional actions that is connected to our experiences of interactive fiction consists of three premises that cannot be true at the same time, as this would result in a contradiction: 1. Players act on videogame objects. 2. Videogame objects are fictional. 3. It is impossible to act on fictional objects. The first premise seems to be obviously true: gamers manipulate game objects when playing. The second one is true for at least some videogame objects we act upon, such as zombies. The third premise is a consequence of the ontological gap between the real world and fictional worlds. So which one needs to be rejected? Although the paradox of interactive fiction is never discussed as such within videogame philosophy, there seem to be two strategies at hand to solve this paradox, both of which are examined in this article. The first strategy is to deny that the game objects we can act on are fictional at all. Espen Aarseth, for example, argues that they are virtual objects (cf. 2007), while other philosophers argue that players interact with real, computer-generated graphical representations (cf. Juul 2005; Sageng 2012). However, Aarseth’s concept of the virtual seems to be ad hoc and unhelpful, and describing videogame objects and characters as real, computer-generated graphical representations does not account for the emotional way in which we often relate to them. The second solution is based on Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory, and, similar to Walton’s solution to the original paradox of fictional emotions, says that the actions we perform towards fictional game objects are not real actions, but fictional actions. A Waltonian description of fictional actions can explain our paradoxical actions on fictional objects in videogames, although it does raise questions about the validity of Walton’s concept of quasi-emotions. Indeed, the way players’ emotions can motivate them to act in a certain manner seems to be a strong argument against the concept of quasi-emotions, which Walton introduced to explain the alleged non-motivationality of emotions towards fiction (cf. 1990, 201 sq.). Although both strategies to solve the paradox of interactive fiction might ultimately not be entirely satisfactory, the presentation of these strategies in this paper not only introduces a starting point for discussing this paradox, but also usefully supplements and clarifies existing discussions on the paradoxical emotions we feel towards fictions. I argue that if we wish to solve the paradox of actions towards (interactive) fiction, we should treat it in close conjunction with the traditional paradox of emotional responses to fiction.
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Feagin, Susan L., and Thomas G. Pavel. "Fictional Worlds." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46, no. 3 (1988): 428. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431119.
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Docherty, Thomas, Thomas G. Pavel, and Tobin Siebers. "Fictional Worlds." Yearbook of English Studies 20 (1990): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3507533.
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Fitzpatrick, Noel. "The question of Fiction – nonexistent objects, a possible world response from Paul Ricoeur." Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 17, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 137–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0020.
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Abstract The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds.
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Mason, Jessica. "Experiencing fictional worlds." English in Education 55, no. 2 (March 12, 2021): 201–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04250494.2021.1894842.
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Morris, Raphael. "Interpretive Context, Counterpart Theory and Fictional Realism without Contradictions." Disputatio 11, no. 54 (December 1, 2019): 231–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0018.
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Abstract Models for truth in fiction must be able to account for differing versions and interpretations of a given fiction in such a way that prevents contradictions from arising. I propose an analysis of truth in fiction designed to accommodate this. I examine both the interpretation of claims about truth in fiction (the ‘Interpretation Problem’) and the metaphysical nature of fictional worlds and entities (the ‘Metaphysical Problem’). My reply to the Interpretation Problem is a semantic contextualism influenced by Cameron (2012), while my reply to the Metaphysical Problem involves an extension and generalisation of the counterpart-theoretic analysis put forth by Lewis (1978). The proposed analysis considers interpretive context as a counterpart relation corresponding to a set of worlds, W, and states that a sentence φ is true in interpretive context W iff φ is true at every world (w∈W). I consider the implications of this analysis for singular terms in fiction, concluding that their extensions are the members of sets of counterparts. In the case of pre-existing singular terms in fiction, familiar properties of the corresponding actual-world entities are salient in restricting the counterpart relation. I also explore interpretations of sentences concerning multiple fictions and those concerning both fictional and actual entities. This account tolerates a plurality of interpretive approaches, avoiding contradictions.
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Ajdačić, D. "IRONY AND FANTASY." Comparative studies of Slavic languages and literatures. In memory of Academician Leonid Bulakhovsky, no. 36 (2020): 116–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2075-437x.2020.36.11.
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The absence of a typology of irony in the theory of fiction stems from the fact that irony and fiction differently form and transform reality – fiction is a kind of fictional depiction of amazing worlds or phenomena. On the contrary, irony does not create worlds; in it, the subject comments on reality, adding another vision, a vision with a reassessment and deviation from what is said or presented. Irony can comment on the realities of different ontological status, that is, irony can relate to the real world and the fictional world, whether it is real or amazing. Fantasy transforms the world – it distorts, destroys or completes, or builds new worlds, and irony already adds a different vision to the ideas and views presented, regardless of whether they are real or fictional. The terminological and literary-theoretical aspects of the use of irony in works of literary fiction are discussed in the text. Dragan Stojanović’s book “Irony and Meaning” and the author’s terms “Ironical Focus” and “Meaning Pressure” are used as a theoretical starting point. After highlighting the touchpoints of irony and fiction and their special qualities and roles, is proposed a typology of the use of irony in fiction that separates ironic actions concerning the real world, the marvelous world and problematizing the relationship between the real and the marvelous world.
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Goodstein, Joshua, and Deena Skolnick Weisberg. "What Belongs in a Fictional World?" Journal of Cognition and Culture 9, no. 1-2 (2009): 69–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853709x414647.
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AbstractHow do readers create representations of fictional worlds from texts? We hypothesize that readers use the real world as a starting point and investigate how much and which types of real-world information is imported into a given fictional world. We presented subjects (N=52) with three stories and asked them to judge whether real world facts held true in the story world. Subjects' responses indicated that they imported many facts into fiction, though what exactly is imported depends on two main variables: (1) the distance that a narrative world lies from reality and (2) the types of fact being imported. Facts that are true of the real world are more likely to be imported into worlds that are more similar to the real world, and facts that are more central to the representation of the real world are more likely to be imported overall. These results indicate that subjects make nuanced inferences when creating fictional worlds, basing their representations both on how different a story world is from the real world and on what they know to be causally central to the real world.
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Klebes, Martin. "If Worlds Were Stories." Konturen 2, no. 1 (October 11, 2010): 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.5399/uo/konturen.2.1.1346.
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The metaphysics of possible worlds proposed by the analytic philosopher David K. Lewis offers an account of fictional discourse according to which possible worlds described in fiction are just as real as the actual world. In an inspired reversal of the analysis of literary fictions by such philosophical means, the French poet Jacques Roubaud makes direct reference to Lewis’ controversial ontological picture in two cycles of elegies composed between 1986 and 1990. Roubaud’s poems take up the idea of possible worlds as real entities, and at the same time they challenge the notion that philosophy could offer an account of fiction in which the puzzling collision of the possible with the impossible that fundamentally characterizes the phenomenon of fictionality would be seamlessly unravelled. For Roubaud the lyrical genre of the elegy and its thematic concern with love and death stands as a prime indicator of the quandary that results from our inability to solve paradoxes of modality such as those raised by Lewis in strictly theoretical terms.
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Maza, Antonio José Planells de la. "The expressive power of the Possible Worlds Theory in video games: when narratives become interactive and fictional spaces." Comunicação e Sociedade 27 (June 29, 2015): 289–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.17231/comsoc.27(2015).2102.
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The philosophical concept of possible worlds (Lenzen, 2004; Lewis, 1986) has been used in literary studies and narratology (Dolezel, 1998; Eco, 1979) to define the way in which we conceive different narrative possibilities inside the fictional world. In Game Studies, some authors have used this concept to explore the relationship between game design and game experience (Kücklich, 2003; Maietti, 2004; Ryan, 2006), while Jesper Juul (2005) has studied the fictional world evoked by the connection between rules and fiction. In this paper we propose a new approach to video games as ludofictional worlds - a set of possible worlds which generates a game space based on the relationship between fiction and game rules. In accordance with the concepts of minimal departure (Ryan, 1991) and indexical term (Lewis, 1986), the position of the player character determines his/her actual world and the next possible or necessary world. Lastly, we use this model to analyse the video game The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim and show that the possible worlds perspective provides a useful, flexible and modular framework for describing the internal connections between ludofictional worlds and the interactive nature of playable game spaces.
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Tan, Eduard Sioe-Hao, and Valentijn Visch. "Co-Imagination of Fictional Worlds in Film Viewing." Review of General Psychology 22, no. 2 (June 2018): 230–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000153.
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The typical experience of narrative film is characterized by a remarkable intensity as to absorption and emotion. Current explanations attribute the experience to the realistic perceptual impact of the film. This theoretical article sets out to explain the experience as the result first of the film-viewer's acts of imagination of fictional worlds. More specifically, it seems suitable to conceptualize the film experience as arising from pretense play. Pretense play can afford room for free imagination leading to intense emotion, as well as restrictions to the imagination “quarantining” ( Leslie, 1987 ) pretended fictional worlds from the real world, thus safeguarding the enjoyability and adaptiveness of the experience. Applying the concept of joint pretense for the first time to film, we follow Walton (1990) in his account of fiction as an institutionalized form of pretense play enabling intense emotional experiences in the cinema, including unpleasant ones to be appreciated by film-viewers. Thus, the model of co-imagination has as components (a) the generation of fictional film worlds—the acts of pretense in the narrower sense; (b) the participation in; and (c) the appreciation of these. We argue that the account of the experience can be improved if it is conceived as the outcome of joint pretense, in which film-viewers in their imagination activity team up with filmmakers—experts by eminence in prompting the viewers’ imagination. Finally, in our model of co-imagination in popular film joint pretense acts are layered ( Clark, 1996 ) as to the contents of the fictional worlds, with the lowest layer representing the collaboration for imagination between filmmaker and film-viewer in the actual world and the higher ones representing fictional worlds of increasing depth of imagination. Because of asymmetric access relations among layers, returns to the actual world in advanced pretense are difficult, which helps quarantining and the sense of absorption.
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Aarseth, Espen. "Doors and Perception: Fiction vs. Simulation in Games." Jouer, no. 9 (August 10, 2011): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1005528ar.
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In this paper, the author outlines a theory of the relationship of fictional, virtual and real elements in games. Not much critical attention has been paid to the concept of fiction when applied to games and game worlds, despite many books, articles and papers using the term, often in the title. Here, it is argued that game worlds and their objects are ontologically different from fictional worlds; they are empirically upheld by the game engine, rather than by our mind stimulated by verbal information. Game phenomena such as labyrinths, moreover, are evidence that games contain elements that are just as real as their equivalents outside the game, and far from equal to the fictional counterparts.
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Weisberg, Deena Skolnick. "How Fictional Worlds Are Created." Philosophy Compass 11, no. 8 (July 28, 2016): 462–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12335.
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Currie, Gregory. "Fictional Worlds (review)." Philosophy and Literature 11, no. 2 (1987): 351–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.1987.0044.
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FEAGIN, SUSAN L. "Pavel, Thomas G. Fictional Worlds." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46, no. 3 (March 1, 1988): 428–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac46.3.0428.
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Keating, Patrick. "The Fictional Worlds of Neorealism." Criticism 45, no. 1 (2003): 11–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/crt.2003.0031.
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Gašperič, Primož, and Blaž Komac. "Remapping Fictional Worlds: A Comparative Reconstruction of Fictional Maps." Cartographic Journal 57, no. 1 (December 3, 2019): 70–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00087041.2019.1629168.
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Hart, Jonathan Locke. "Aesthetics and Ethics Intertwined: Fictional and Non-Fictional Worlds." Interlitteraria 22, no. 2 (January 16, 2018): 236. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/il.2017.22.2.3.
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Montaigne and Las Casas are important thinkers and writers, as are many others, including Shakespeare, as a poet, whose work is complex enough in its modernity that it would be hard to condemn him as a poet as Plato did Homer. Aristotle analyzed Greek tragedy to see how it worked in terms of a framework of anagnorisis and catharsis, that is, recognition and the purging of pity and terror. Shakespeare revisits and reshapes Homer in Troilus and Cressida and remakes Plutarch in Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra while playing on the classical epic and mythological themes in Venus and Adonis and Rape of Lucrece. Plato, a poet as well as a philosopher, and a great writer if one does not like those categories, may have feared the poet within himself. Although assuming with Plato that philosophy is more universal and just than poetry, Aristotle takes the analysis of poetry and drama seriously in Poetics, and also discusses ethics, aesthetics and style in Rhetoric. So, while I discuss Plato as a framework, I am not presuming that writing on the relations among the good, the true, the just and the beautiful stop with him. I am also making the assumption that Las Casas, Montaigne, Shakespeare and other poets and writers deserve to be taken seriously in the company of Plato. Las Casas and Montaigne respond to radically changing realities and shake the very basis of traditional ethics (especially in understanding of the “other”) and work in harmony with the greatest poets and writers of a new era often called modernity like Shakespeare, who is in the good company of Manrique, Villon, Ronsard, Du Bellay, Juan de la Cruz, Luis de León, Lope de Vega, Quevedo and Calderón. Long before, Dante and Petrarch were exploring in their poetry ethical and aesthetic imperatives and broke new ground doing so. Nor can Las Casas and Montaigne be separated from other great writers like Rabelais and Cervantes, who carry deep philosophical and ethical sensibility in their work while responding to reality by providing aesthetically – even sensuously – shaped images that always leave a margin for ambiguity because conflicts are part of an ambiguous reality.
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Demmerling, Christoph. "Von den Lesewelten zur Lebenswelt. Überlegungen zu der Frage, warum uns fiktionale Literatur berührt." Journal of Literary Theory 12, no. 2 (September 3, 2018): 260–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2018-0015.
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Abstract The following article argues that fictional texts can be distinguished from non-fictional texts in a prototypical way, even if the concept of the fictional cannot be defined in classical terms. In order to be able to characterize fictional texts, semantic, pragmatic, and reader-conditioned factors have to be taken into account. With reference to Frege, Searle, and Gabriel, the article recalls some proposals for how we might define fictional speech. Underscored in particular is the role of reception for the classification of a text as fictional. I make the case, from a philosophical perspective, for the view that fictional texts represent worlds that do not exist even though these worlds obviously can, and de facto do, contain many elements that are familiar to us from our world. I call these worlds reading worlds and explain the relationship between reading worlds and the life world of readers. This will help support the argument that the encounter with fictional literature can invoke real feelings and that such feelings are by no means irrational, as some defenders of the paradox of fiction would like us to believe. It is the exemplary character of fictional texts that enables us to make connections between the reading worlds and the life world. First and foremost, the article discusses the question of what it is that readers’ feelings are in fact related to. The widespread view that these feelings are primarily related to the characters or events represented in a text proves too simple and needs to be amended. Whoever is sad because of the fate of a fictive character imagines how he or she would fare if in a similar situation. He or she would feel sad as it relates to his or her own situation. And it is this feeling on behalf of one’s self that is the presupposition of sympathy for a fictive character. While reading, the feelings related to fictive characters and content are intertwined with the feelings related to one’s own personal concerns. The feelings one has on his or her own behalf belong to the feelings related to fictive characters; the former are the presupposition of the latter. If we look at the matter in this way, a new perspective opens up on the paradox of fiction. Generally speaking, the discussion surrounding the paradox of fiction is really about readers’ feelings as they relate to fictive persons or content. The question is then how it is possible to have them, since fictive persons and situations do not exist. If, however, the emotional relation to fictive characters and situations is conceived of as mediated by the feelings one has on one’s own behalf, the paradox loses its confusing effect since the imputation of existence no longer plays a central role. Instead, the conjecture that the events in a fictional story could have happened in one’s own life is important. The reader imagines that a story had or could have happened to him or herself. Readers are therefore often moved by a fictive event because they relate what happened in a story to themselves. They have understood the literary event as something that is humanly relevant in a general sense, and they see it as exemplary for human life as such. This is the decisive factor which gives rise to a connection between fiction and reality. The emotional relation to fictive characters happens on the basis of emotions that we would have for our own sake were we confronted with an occurrence like the one being narrated. What happens to the characters in a fictional text could also happen to readers. This is enough to stimulate corresponding feelings. We neither have to assume the existence of fictive characters nor do we have to suspend our knowledge about the fictive character of events or take part in a game of make-believe. But we do have to be able to regard the events in a fictional text as exemplary for human life. The representation of an occurrence in a novel exhibits a number of commonalities with the representation of something that could happen in the future. Consciousness of the future would seem to be a presupposition for developing feelings for something that is only represented. This requires the power of imagination. One has to be able to imagine what is happening to the characters involved in the occurrence being narrated in a fictional text, ›empathize‹ with them, and ultimately one has to be able to imagine that he or she could also be entangled in the same event and what it would be like. Without the use of these skills, it would remain a mystery how reading a fictional text can lead to feelings and how fictive occurrences can be related to reality. The fate of Anna Karenina can move us, we can sympathize with her, because reading the novel confronts us with possibilities that could affect our own lives. The imagination of such possibilities stimulates feelings that are related to us and to our lives. On that basis, we can participate in the fate of fictive characters without having to imagine that they really exist.
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Mortensen, Torill Elvira. "Real game worlds: The emotional reality of fictional worlds." MedieKultur: Journal of media and communication research 34, no. 64 (June 14, 2018): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/mediekultur.v34i64.97015.
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There are two ways to understand play: one is to observe it, the other is to participate in it. Since 2001, game studies has promoted participation as one of the main requirements to understand play. Some play is so performative that while it can be observed, it also must be played. Game worlds, the worlds of online, multi-user games, are delicate constructs of make-believe and technology, which act as support and arenas for immersive, theatrical and/or competitive play. This is a discussion of how far virtual ethnography can take the researcher in understanding game worlds. To explore this, this article will address play, game worlds and transmediality, as well as discuss methods. I will look to Lisbeth Klastrup and Susana Tosca to discuss story worlds, as well as to discussions led by Celia Pearce, Tom Boellstorff and T. L. Taylor (among others) to discuss ethnography in games and virtual ethnographies.
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Stougaard-Nielsen, Jakob. "Wallander's Dark Geopolitics." Nordicom Review 41, s1 (September 10, 2020): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nor-2020-0014.
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AbstractA current fault line in the study of crime fiction as a transnational genre is to what extent crime novels offer readers genuine cosmopolitan windows onto other worlds and cultures or whether it simply is bound to reproduce trite imagologies and national stereotypes. The overarching premise for this article is to explore the extent to which Henning Mankell's crime novels and their adaptations engage the character Wallander's own and “other” worlds with a cosmopolitan perspective, by considering the mutations of Wallander's fictional local world as intricately tied to discursive geopolitical realities of the post–Cold War world. More specifically, I consider what may be gained from exploring the Wallander series within two distinct – yet, I shall argue, related – perspectives on geopolitics and crime fiction: on the one hand, the geopolitics of the translation, adaptation, and reception networks that have “worlded” the Wallander series (what I call Wallander's geopolitical adaptation networks), and on the other, the fictional geopolitical networks that weave the Global North and the Global South together in several of Mankell's intricate crime plots (Wallander's dark geopolitics).
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Abraham, Anna, D. Yves von Cramon, and Ricarda I. Schubotz. "Meeting George Bush versus Meeting Cinderella: The Neural Response When Telling Apart What is Real from What is Fictional in the Context of Our Reality." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20, no. 6 (June 2008): 965–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2008.20059.
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A considerable part of our lives is spent engaging in the entertaining worlds of fiction that are accessible through media such as books and television. Little is known, however, about how we are able to readily understand that fictional events are distinct from those occurring within our real world. The present functional imaging study explored the brain correlates underlying such abilities by having participants make judgments about the possibility of different scenarios involving either real or fictional characters being true, given the reality of our world. The processing of real and fictional scenarios activated a common set of regions including medial-temporal lobe structures. When the scenarios involved real people, brain regions associated with episodic memory retrieval and self-referential thinking, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the precuneus/posterior cingulate, were more active. In contrast, areas along the left lateral inferior frontal gyrus, associated with semantic memory retrieval, were implicated for scenarios with fictional characters. This implies that there is a fine distinction in the manner in which conceptual information concerning real persons in contrast to fictional characters is represented. In general terms, the findings suggest that fiction relative to reality tends to be represented in more factual terms, whereas our representations of reality relative to fiction are colored by personal subjectivity. What modulates our understanding of the relative difference between reality and fiction seems to be whether such character-type information is coded in self-relevant terms or not.
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Bardsley, Jan, and Ken K. Ito. "Visions of Desire: Tanizaki's Fictional Worlds." Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese 26, no. 1 (April 1992): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/489453.
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Rubin, Jay, and Ken K. Ito. "Visions of Desire: Tanizaki's Fictional Worlds." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 53, no. 1 (June 1993): 268. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2719478.
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Ochner, Nobuko Miyama, and Ken K. Ito. "Visions of Desire: Tanizaki's Fictional Worlds." Monumenta Nipponica 47, no. 4 (1992): 532. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2385336.
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Pavel, Thomas. "Immersion and distance in fictional worlds." Itinéraires, no. 2010-1 (May 1, 2010): 99–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/itineraires.2183.
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Wilson, Michiko N., and Ken K. Ito. "Visions of Desire: Tanizaki's Fictional Worlds." Journal of Japanese Studies 19, no. 1 (1993): 261. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/132895.
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Nelson, Jane Armstrong. "Fictional Worlds by Thomas G. Pavel." Studies in American Fiction 15, no. 2 (1987): 235–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/saf.1987.0010.
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Friend, Stacie. "The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95, no. 1 (March 10, 2016): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1149736.
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Caquard, Sébastien. "Cartographies of Fictional Worlds: Conclusive Remarks." Cartographic Journal 48, no. 4 (November 2011): 224–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/000870411x13203362557264.
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Branch, Frank, Theresa Arias, Jolene Kennah, Rebekah Phillips, Travis Windleharth, and Jin Ha Lee. "Representing transmedia fictional worlds through ontology." Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 68, no. 12 (September 12, 2017): 2771–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/asi.23886.
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Fořt, Bohumil. "Fictional Worlds of Czech Postmodern Prose." Poetics Today 38, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 731–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/03335372-4184326.
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Franzén, Nils. "A Sensibilist Explanation of Imaginative Resistance." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51, no. 3 (April 2021): 159–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.10.
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AbstractThis article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl.This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction.To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.
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Toft-Nielsen, Claus. "Worlds at Play." Nordicom Review 35, s1 (March 13, 2020): 237–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nor-2014-0115.
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AbstractThe relationship between the fantasy genre and the medium of computer games has always been a very tight-knit one. The present article explores the close connection between fantasy and computer games through different media, arguing that the fantasy genre's specific ‘mode of function’ is the ability to build complete fictional worlds, whereby it creates specific experiences for its users. Based on empirical data from focus group interviews with players of the most popular Western Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) of all times, World of Warcraft, the article develops the concept of worldness as an experiential, phenomenological understanding of player experience. I discuss how this way of framing a core quality of the fantasy genre (of world-building) functions across single fictional universes and aims to grasp a specific fantasy experience of being in the world. This experience works on the level of genre, by anchoring the specific fantasy world in the larger, surrounding fantasy genre matrix.
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Jones, Todd. "Can We Learn about Real Social Worlds from Fictional Ones?" International Journal of Applied Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2019): 275–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap2020228128.
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It is very common for social scientists to be asked whether their findings about human nature could also be learned from reading great works of literature. Literature teachers frequently assign readings partly to teach people important truths about the world. But it is unclear how looking at a work of fiction can tell us about the real world at all. In this paper I carefully examine questions about the conditions under which the fictional world can teach us about the real world.
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Troscianko, Emily. "Kafkaesque worlds in real time." Language and Literature: International Journal of Stylistics 19, no. 2 (April 27, 2010): 151–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963947010362913.
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We read in a linear fashion, page by page, and we seem also to experience the world around us thus, moment by moment. But research on visual perception shows that perceptual experience is not pictorially representational: it does not consist in a linear, cumulative, totalizing process of building up a stream of internal picture-like representations. Current enactive, or sensorimotor, theories describe vision and imagination as operating through interactive potentiality. Kafka’s texts, which evoke perception as non-pictorial, provide scope for investigating the close links between vision and imagination in the context of the reading of fiction. Kafka taps into the fundamental perceptual processes by which we experience external and imagined worlds, by evoking fictional worlds through the characters’ perceptual enaction of them. The temporality of Kafka’s narratives draws us in by making concessions to how we habitually create ‘proper’, linear narratives out of experience, as reflected in traditional Realist narratives. However, Kafka also unsettles these processes of narrativization, showing their inadequacies and superfluities. Kafka’s works engage the reader’s imagination so powerfully because they correspond to the truth of perceptual experience, rather than merely to the fictions we conventionally make of it. Yet these texts also unsettle because we are unused to thinking of the real world as being just how these truly realistic, Kafkaesque worlds are: inadmissible of a complete, linear narrative, because always emerging when looked for, just in time.
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Mouton, M. "Fiksionaliteit in die Dramawêreld." Literator 7, no. 3 (May 7, 1986): 39–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/lit.v7i3.887.
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The fictional drama world differs from the fictional world encountered in other literary genres, and the difference can be traced back to the link of the text with the performance.A general, traditional view is that the fictional world of the dramatic text takes place in a fictional “here and now” .Elam has postulated a theory following a study of the fictional drama world. He uses a term from logical semantics, viz. the “theory of possible worlds” and adjusts this to enable him to speak of a dramatic possible world. Elam mentions three aspects which help towards the establishment of the fictional drama world, viz.the discovery of this world in medias res; the making specific of this world through the fictional characters; and the representation of this world in the performance.Elam’s exposition still does not indicate which aspects of the fictional drama world within the text coincide with or differ from those in the performance. The fictionality of the drama world is linked to the aspect of the ostensible, and it is this link (implied in the text and edited in the performance) which characterizes the specific nature of the fictional in the drama genre and which distinguishes this genre from other literary genres.
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Babelyuk, Oksana, Olena Koliasa, Lidiia Matsevko-Bekerska, Olena Matuzkova, and Nina Pavlenko. "The Interaction of Possible Worlds through the Prism of Cognitive Narratology." Arab World English Journal 12, no. 2 (June 15, 2021): 364–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.24093/awej/vol12no2.25.
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The article deals with the analysis of literary narrative where a possible unreal fictional world and a possible real fictional world usually coexist. When the norms of life plausibility are consciously violated, the real and the unreal possible worlds are emphatically opposed. Hence, their certain aspects are depicted in a fantastically exaggerated form. The interaction of possible worlds in a literary narrative destroys the stereotypes of the reader’s perception. It can occur in different planes: structural (a shift of plot elements of the story, transformation, unusual, sharp turns of the borrowed plot, violations of a plotline); fictional (a combination of real and fantastic features in one image); temporal (violations of the chronological flow of time, a shift of time flow); spatial (expansion or contraction of space, magical spatial formations, displacements, deformations). By their nature, the interaction of different possible worlds can be continuous, partial, and fragmentary; resulting from their boundaries may overlap or be violated (entirely or partially). The continuous interaction of different possible worlds, destruction of their borders, although they do not disappear completely, make them largely blurred, interpenetrating each other. In the case of partial interaction of possible worlds, their boundaries intersect. In the case of fragmentary interaction of possible worlds, their common points are slightly visible, for example, only the borrowed title of a literary work or a character’s name, or a fantastic concrete event or a place of the event.
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Bruns, Cristina V. "Reading Readers: Living and Leaving Fictional Worlds." Narrative 24, no. 3 (2016): 351–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nar.2016.0021.
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Mitchell, Judith. "Fictional worlds in George Moore'sa Mummer's wife." English Studies 67, no. 4 (August 1986): 345–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00138388608598458.
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Rauf, Ramis. "Proyeksi Astral: Analisis Wacana Fiksi Posmodern dalam Naskah Film Insidious." Jurnal POETIKA 5, no. 1 (July 31, 2017): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/poetika.25994.
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This study aims to analyze astral projection as a concept of Death and Dying by using a postmodern fiction discourse analysis perspective in Insidious movie script. This study found that astral projection is a capability possessed by a person to leave physical body and explore an astral world or the spirit world. Astral projection is a death and dying concept that is presented as one of the postmodern fictional strategies known as superimposition. This strategy illustrates that there are two worlds that accumulate and co-exist with each other. Its presence is a way of deconstructing thoughts about something that is considered uncanny and unusual as well as a counterpart of totality that puts the ontological side of the existence of something. It is said by McHale (1987) that it is a sister-genre of postmodern fiction. Science fiction explores ontological issues in order to build a good story while postmodern fiction simply presents the problem without having to build a story. Furthermore, both genres can adopt each other's strategies. Meanwhile, postmodern fictional relations and fantasy fiction are the same, borrowing strategies for exploring ontological issues.
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Rauf, Ramis. "Proyeksi Astral: Analisis Wacana Fiksi Posmodern dalam Naskah Film Insidious." Poetika 5, no. 1 (July 31, 2017): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/poetika.v5i1.25994.
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This study aims to analyze astral projection as a concept of Death and Dying by using a postmodern fiction discourse analysis perspective in Insidious movie script. This study found that astral projection is a capability possessed by a person to leave physical body and explore an astral world or the spirit world. Astral projection is a death and dying concept that is presented as one of the postmodern fictional strategies known as superimposition. This strategy illustrates that there are two worlds that accumulate and co-exist with each other. Its presence is a way of deconstructing thoughts about something that is considered uncanny and unusual as well as a counterpart of totality that puts the ontological side of the existence of something. It is said by McHale (1987) that it is a sister-genre of postmodern fiction. Science fiction explores ontological issues in order to build a good story while postmodern fiction simply presents the problem without having to build a story. Furthermore, both genres can adopt each other's strategies. Meanwhile, postmodern fictional relations and fantasy fiction are the same, borrowing strategies for exploring ontological issues.
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Kütt, Madli. "Translating the Dynamics of Fictional Space: Estonian Translation of Marcel Proust’s Le Temps retrouvé." Interlitteraria 21, no. 2 (January 18, 2017): 241. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/il.2016.21.2.7.
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The article discusses the way that Proust’s text constructs dynamic and static elements of fictional space, and the further dynamisation or fixation of these elements by the process of translation. The focus of the study is on how movements of fictional space and characters can change in strength, direction and manner, when translated. In other words, rather than looking for that which is “lost in translation”, we are dealing with a comparison of two fictional worlds and the processes in them and between them.
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Lotz, C. "Possible worlds: a reading of three artworks from the Creative creatures exhibition." Literator 30, no. 1 (July 25, 2009): 77–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/lit.v30i1.70.
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The basic concern of this article is to offer an interpretation of artworks by a selected group of artists who contributed to the “Creative creatures” project. The original creatures created by the artist, Ian Marley, based on narration by his son, Joshua, seem at first glance to suggest an underlying theme of fantasy. However, certain interpretative artworks by artists such as those by Diane Victor, Flip Hattingh and Angus Taylor seem to display a shift from the originally perceived element of fantasy. The artworks rather each represents their own fictional worlds, far removed from the original composite creatures created by Marley who each seems to function in its own fictional world. The superimposition of the incongruous worlds suggests a measure of tension that hinges on progressive notions of archaeology, history and possible worlds.
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Davis, Kalan Knudson. "Book Review: Metadata for Transmedia Resources." Library Resources & Technical Services 64, no. 3 (July 31, 2020): 140. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/lrts.64n3.140-141.
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From the moment that author Ana Vukadin invokes the memory of small-town murder victim Laura Palmer on page one of Metadata for Transmedia Resources, the reader is transported into a world of intertextuality, transfictionality, and various fictional worlds that seem stranger and yet just as familiar as Twin Peaks. Using liberal amounts of examples from popular culture and literary canons—from J. K. Rowling’s Wizarding World of Harry Potter to the Wachowskis’ Matrix—Vukadin goes down the veritable rabbit hole of transmedia resources, explains why transmedia resources matter increasingly to libraries, and outlines best practices in describing and organizing the metadata for transmedia resources. Resplendent with modeling examples and illustrations from fictional worlds, the subtle differences in and complexity of transmedia resources becomes clear.
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El Hajj, Murielle. "Analyse des réseaux de personnages dans les textes de Leslie Kaplan : du postmodernisme à l’inconscient." French Cultural Studies 32, no. 2 (April 8, 2021): 91–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09571558211002449.
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The texts of Leslie Kaplan question the irreducible opposition between the real and the non-real. Her characters and their intentional absence confuse the repository and fictional worlds, not only to point out the thin margin between reality and fiction, but to underline the impossible delimitation between the real and the fictional, or even between the text and the world. This article studies the characters of Kaplan and aims to demonstrate their identity crisis through the study of their literary onomastic and the use of the neutral pronoun ‘it’ and allegoric expressions. In addition, the objective of this article is to shed light on the Kaplanian characters as Kunderian models, while stressing the particularity of their physionomy, which consists to present ‘fuzzy’ characters that are present and absent at the same time, engaging the reader in the fictional process as a try to complete the missing details. This article concludes that the Kaplanian characters are not only the prototypes of the postmodern being, but they are also introverted, psychopaths and a demonstration of different facets of the unconscious.
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Pelletier, Jérôme. "Actualisme et fiction." Dialogue 39, no. 1 (2000): 77–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006405.
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AbstractThe non-existence of fictional entities does not seem incompatible with their possible existence. The aim of this paper is to give an account of the intuitive truth of statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names in an actualist framework. After having made clear the opposition between a possibilist and an actualist approach of possible worlds, I distinguish between fictional individuals and fictional characters and between the fictional use of fictional proper names and their metafictional use. On that basis, statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names appear to say of fictional characters conceived as abstact objects that they might have been exemplified.
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Walsh, Richard. "Fictionality and Mimesis: Between Narrativity and Fictional Worlds." Narrative 11, no. 1 (2003): 110–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nar.2003.0004.
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