Journal articles: 'Finance Manager'

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Philpot, James, and Craig A. Peterson. "Manager characteristics and real estate mutual fund returns, risk and fees." Managerial Finance 32, no. 12 (December 1, 2006): 988–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074350610710481.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of individual manager characteristics on real estate mutual fund (REMF) performance. Human capital theory predicts that factors like education, experience and professional certifications improve skill sets and thus performance. Conversely, capital markets theory suggests that these things may be irrelevant in the management of mutual funds.Design/methodology/approachA total of 63 REMFs were sampled over the period 2001‐2003 and equations were estimate regressing, alternatively, risk‐adjusted return, market risk and management fees on a series of fund variables and manager characteristics including the manager's tenure, whether the fund manager holds a professional certification, whether the manager has specific real estate experience, and whether the fund is team‐managed.FindingsModest evidence is found that team‐managed funds have lower risk‐adjusted returns than solo‐managed funds. Managers with longer tenure tend to pursue higher market risk levels, and there is no relation between manager characteristics and management fees.Research limitations/implicationsThis study considers only one cross‐sectional time period. Future research might use longitudinal data.Practical implicationsDespite real estate being a specialized field of finance, there is little if any support for the predictions of human capital theory that experience, education and training result in greater performance among managers of REMFs.Originality/valueThis paper extends prior work in mutual fund management characteristics and fund performance to real estate funds.

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Scott, Bob. "Finance for the non-financial manager." European Management Journal 8, no. 1 (March 1990): 80–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0263-2373(90)90063-c.

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Bamber, Linda Smith, John (Xuefeng) Jiang, and Isabel Yanyan Wang. "What’s My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure." Accounting Review 85, no. 4 (July 1, 2010): 1131–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1131.

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ABSTRACT: Financial economics has posited a limited role for idiosyncratic noneconomic manager-specific influences, but the strategic management literature suggests such individual influences can affect corporate outcomes. We investigate whether individual managers play an economically significant role in their firms’ voluntary financial disclosure choices. Tracking managers across firms over time, we find top executives exert unique and economically significant influence (manager-specific fixed effects) on their firms’ voluntary disclosures, incremental to known economic determinants of disclosure, and firm- and time-specific effects. Managers’ unique disclosure styles are associated with observable demographic characteristics of their personal backgrounds: managers promoted from finance, accounting, and legal career tracks, managers born before World War II, and those with military experience develop disclosure styles displaying certain conservative characteristics; and managers from finance and accounting and those with military experience favor more precise disclosure styles. These plausible associations confirm that our estimated manager-specific fixed effects capture systematic long-lived differences in managers’ unique disclosure styles.

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Michaeli, Beatrice. "Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion." Accounting Review 92, no. 5 (February 1, 2017): 167–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51707.

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ABSTRACT This paper develops a Bayesian persuasion model that examines a manager's incentives to gather information when the manager can disseminate this information selectively to interested parties (“users”) and when the objectives of the manager and the users are not perfectly aligned. The model predicts that if the manager can choose the subset of users to receive the information, then the manager may gather more precise information. The paper identifies conditions under which a regime that allows managers to grant access to information selectively maximizes aggregate information. Strikingly, this happens when the objectives of managers and users are sufficiently misaligned. This finding is robust to variations of the model, such as information acquisition cost, unobservable precision, sequential noisy actions taken by the users, and delayed choice of the subset of users in “the know.” These results call into doubt the common belief that forcing managers to provide unrestricted access to information to all potential users is always beneficial.

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Muhtaseb, Majed R. "Hedge fund manager fraud through PIPEs." Journal of Financial Crime 25, no. 3 (July 2, 2018): 636–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2017-0032.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to draw lessons to investors from the conduct of a hedge fund manager who according to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) complaint made false and misleading statements before and after an auditor’s reports, misappropriated for personal benefit over $1m, misappropriated clients’ assets, failed to conduct due diligence on third-party buyer, instructed an employee to mislead investors and satisfied some investors’ redemptions with other investors’ subscriptions (Ponzi scheme) without disclosing it to investors. Ironically, the scheme was unveiled by the economic crises and not the investors, their advisers or third-party hedge fund vendors. Corey Ribotsky set up the investment adviser NIR Group to manage four AJW Funds that invested in private equity in public companies in 1999. Through manipulation of financial statements, he also managed to collect about $136m in management and incentive fees over an eight-year period. The SEC complaint alleged the AJW Funds’ assets to be $876m in 2007, yet this figure was not verified, and no assets were traced. Ribotsky did not pay any monies to SEC, as ordered by court settlement, and hence the victims did not recover any of their monies. The SEC could not produce criminal charges; hence, Ribotsky did not go to jail. This case highlights sterility of law enforcement when confronted with brazen fraud. Findings Investors fail to monitor hedge fund managers. Fraud was detected late and not through investors. Fraud was unraveled by the economic crises of 2008. The SEC had sued the fund manager. The fund manager consented to making payment to the SEC but did not make any payments. The SEC could not bring evidence to criminally charge the fund manager. Research limitations/implications The findings based on the case study are valuable to investors and hedge fund industry stakeholders. The findings are not based on an empirical study. Practical implications Investors need to carefully vet all hedge fund managers before allocating and funds and understand how managers make money through the claimed strategy. Also, there are limitations to law enforcement even with confronted with profound fraud schemes. Originality/value The case was built up from public sources to benefit investors considering making allocations to hedge fund managers. The public information about the case is of either legalistic or journalistic in nature.

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Gulbrandsen, Trygve. "Flexibility in Norwegian Family-Owned Enterprises." Family Business Review 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 57–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2005.00030.x.

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This article discusses whether family ownership affects a firm's adoption of flexible manpower and organization practices. The results presented in the article show that the important divide is not between family-owned and nonfamily businesses: family businesses with a professional top manager differ from nonfamily firms only as regards one of seven flexibility measures. More important is whether the owners choose to be in charge of the day-to-day running of the firm themselves (owner-management) or leave it to a professional manager. In owner-managed family businesses, five out of seven practices for increased flexibility prevail less frequently than in both family businesses with a professional manager and nonfamily firms. Owner-managers are, then, more skeptical of adopting new management principles and personnel policies than are professional managers.

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Grinblatt, Mark, Gergana Jostova, Lubomir Petrasek, and Alexander Philipov. "Style and Skill: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Momentum." Management Science 66, no. 12 (December 2020): 5505–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3433.

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Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

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Mehta, Bhoomi Ruchit. "Sunshine Fastech Pvt. Ltd.: working capital financing decision." Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies 10, no. 2 (April 30, 2020): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eemcs-10-2019-0273.

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Learning outcomes The learning outcomes of this paper is to understand the working capital finances offered by bank; comprehend application by the company, loan proposal and bank procedure for additional finance; compute, analyze and interpret financial statements of company and its peers; and assess various factors to be considered while taking loan sanctioning decisions. Case overview/synopsis Sunshine had expanded its business by starting in-house manufacturing of a few stages of production of fasteners. Sunshine was in urgent need of additional finance for working capital and had applied to Rajya Bank of India Ltd. (RBIL), requesting to enhance working capital finance limits and other changes. Ruchit Mehta, Relationship Manager of S.G. Highway Branch of RBIL have to assess this request and include his evaluations in the proposal, which he had to present to Assistant General Manager of RBIL. Complexity academic level MBA or related program in finance courses such as financial management, corporate finance, financial statement analysis, bank management/finance and training program on “credit management” for bank employees. Supplementary materials Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Subject code CSS 1: Accounting and Finance

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Rajan, Madhav V., and Richard E. Saouma. "Optimal Information Asymmetry." Accounting Review 81, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 677–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.3.677.

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At the heart of decentralization lies the notion that tasks are delegated by owners to managers who possess superior local information. The extent of this information asymmetry is often an endogenous construct, as it is influenced by the owner's choice of internal accounting systems and the manager's investment in acquiring local expertise. In this paper, we explore how varying levels of pre-contract, asymmetric information affect the owner-manager relationship. We provide three main sets of insights. First, we find that the owner's payoffs are initially decreasing, and strictly convex everywhere, in the quality of the manager's private information. The owner thus prefers to deal with either a perfectly informed or a perfectly uninformed manager, and we characterize conditions for either to be the preferred choice. Second, in contrast to recent work, we demonstrate that when information can be communicated internally, the optimal strength of managerial incentives unambiguously decreases as the manager becomes better informed. Third, we derive the surprising result that a self-interested manager does not always prefer to maximize his informational advantage. Our work has implications for the optimal design of organizations, and for internal accounting and control systems in particular.

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Muehlheusser, Gerd, Sandra Schneemann, Dirk Sliwka, and Niklas Wallmeier. "The Contribution of Managers to Organizational Success." Journal of Sports Economics 19, no. 6 (December 5, 2016): 786–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002516674760.

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We study the impact of managers on the success of professional soccer teams using data from the German Bundesliga, where we are exploiting the high turnover rate of managers between teams to disentangle the managers’ contributions. Teams employing a manager from the top of the ability distribution gain on average considerably more points than those employing a manager from the bottom. Moreover, estimated abilities have significant predictive power for future performance. Managers also affect teams’ playing style. Finally, teams whose manager has been a former professional player perform worse on average compared to managers without a professional player career.

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Miller, Nancy J., Margaret A. Fitzgerald, Mary Winter, and Jennifer Paul. "Exploring the Overlap of Family and Business Demands: Household and Family Business Managers' Adjustment Strategies." Family Business Review 12, no. 3 (September 1999): 253–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1999.00253.x.

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This study divided households in which at least one member is involved in managing a family business into two groups: those in which one individual performs two roles, family manager and business manager, and those in which two different individuals perform the two roles. The study compares adjustment strategies that the two groups use to manage the overlap of business and family demands within and across the two family types. Findings suggest that the individual performing dual roles is more likely than two separate managers to make adjustments by bringing the household responsibilities to the business and the business responsibilities home.

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Yin, Huaxiang. "Can Employees Exercise Control Over Managers? The Role of the Employees' Knowledge of Manager Behavior and Manager Discretion." Accounting Review 96, no. 5 (February 5, 2021): 365–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/tar-2015-0219.

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ABSTRACT I investigate whether organizations can use the “power of the employee” to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically. JEL Classifications: C91; D83; M40.

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Fatemi, Darius J. "An Experimental Investigation of the Influence of Audit Fee Structure and Auditor Selection Rights on Auditor Independence and Client Investment Decisions." AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 31, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-10289.

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SUMMARY This study uses experimental markets to gain insights into the effect of audit fee structure and auditor selection rights on auditor independence and client investment decisions. I find that firm managers are more willing to make a high cost/return investment under a lowballing setting than when auditors are paid a flat rate. Auditor behavior is primarily summarized as a response to past manager choices; when managers are especially willing to invest and honest, auditors perform fewer tests of manager disclosures. I also show that under manager selection, when lowballing exists, auditors initially attribute a higher accuracy to investigations indicating high manager investment than tests that suggest low investment, but the difference in accuracy assessments dissipates with time. Under investor selection, accuracy assessments of test results do not differ according to their outcome. Further analysis indicates that auditor retention under manager selection is negatively impacted by both unreliable auditing and disagreements with managers, with only the former affecting retention under investor selection.

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Khan, Urooj, Xinlei Li, Christopher D. Williams, and Regina Wittenberg-Moerman. "The Effect of Information Opacity and Accounting Irregularities on Personal Lending Relationships: Evidence from Lender and Manager Co-Migration." Accounting Review 94, no. 4 (September 1, 2018): 303–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52287.

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ABSTRACT We examine how personal lending relationships between lenders and managers are affected by information and accounting environments of borrowing firms. We address this question by exploring whether, following managerial turnover, lenders migrate with the manager from the firm where a relationship developed (origin firm) to the manager's new firm (destination firm). We find that the opacity of the external information environment of the destination firm significantly increases the probability of lenders' co-migration, while accounting irregularities at both the destination and origin firms decrease it. We also show that co-migration is affected by a lender's monitoring efficiency. A lender's monitoring efficiency increases its co-migration probability when a manager moves to an opaque firm, but not when she moves to a transparent one. When the destination or origin firm experiences accounting irregularities, even lenders with strong monitoring capabilities are mostly reluctant to continue their relationship with a migrating manager.

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Dessein, Wouter, and Tano Santos. "Managerial Style and Attention." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 3 (August 1, 2021): 372–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190025.

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Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result in dramatically different firm behavior, as managers devote scarce attention in a way that amplifies initial differences. In contrast, in less complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention mitigates manager fixed effects. Firm owners prefer “managers with style” only in complex environments. (JEL D21, D23, G34, M10, M31, M54)

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Rasheed, Rabia, and Sulaman Hafeez Siddiqui. "Attitude for inclusive finance: influence of owner-managers’ and firms’ characteristics on SMEs financial decision making." Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences 35, no. 3 (September 2, 2019): 158–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jeas-05-2018-0057.

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Purpose The adoption and use of financial services by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are pivotal in the development of inclusive financial markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of attitude on financial decision making of SMEs owner-manager. The attitude of SMEs owner-manager comprises of several factors; however, current study identifies few critical factors such as motivation, awareness and risk in the context of Pakistan. The study also includes the personal and firm characteristics as moderating variables to examine their effect on the relationship between attitude and financial decision making of owner-managers. Design/methodology/approach With the help of a structured questionnaire, total 285 valid responses are analyzed to accomplish the research objectives. The study uses SPSS and partial least square-structural equation modeling techniques in order to conduct analysis. The results of study highlight the importance of attitudinal factors such as awareness and risk. Moreover, the moderating effect of personal characteristics on the relationship between attitude and financial decision making has been found strong instead of firm characteristics. Findings The results show that the low awareness level of owner-managers regarding financial products and procedures significantly affects their attitude. Moreover, the less knowledge of financing terms as well as dominant role of owner-managers in taking firm decisions also increase the negative effect of risk factor on SMEs owner-manager attitude. Research limitations/implications The study suggested that policy makers should focus on the financial awareness of SMEs owner-manager to reduce the negativity of risk factor. Originality/value The study contributes toward the literature of inclusive finance and sustainability studies through better understanding of financial decision making of SMEs in emerging economies.

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Rostron, Kirk, and Barry Colvin. "Multi-Manager Funds." Journal of Alternative Investments 2, no. 2 (September 30, 1999): 56–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jai.1999.318948.

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Ateş, Nüfer Yasin, Murat Tarakci, Jeanine Pieternel Porck, Daan van Knippenberg, and Patrick J. F. Groenen. "The Dark Side of Visionary Leadership in Strategy Implementation: Strategic Alignment, Strategic Consensus, and Commitment." Journal of Management 46, no. 5 (November 12, 2018): 637–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206318811567.

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Drawing from visionary leadership and strategy process research, we theorize and test the mechanism through which middle and lower-level managers’ visionary leadership affects their teams’ strategic commitment. The management literature extols the virtues of visionary leadership. In contrast to this positive stance, we reveal a dark side to visionary leadership. Our theoretical framework suggests that team manager visionary leadership harms team strategic consensus when the manager is not strategically aligned with the CEO, which in turn diminishes team commitment to the strategy. In contrast, when a team manager is strategically aligned with the CEO, team manager visionary leadership is positively related to team strategic consensus and subsequently to team strategic commitment. Data from 136 teams from two organizations support our moderated mediation model. A supplemental analysis of the content of strategic consensus and additional qualitative interviews with managers and employees in one of these organizations provide additional insights concerning the meaning of the theorized relations in practice.

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Thakor, A. V., and T. M. Whited. "Shareholder-Manager Disagreement and Corporate Investment." Review of Finance 15, no. 2 (April 30, 2010): 277–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfq011.

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Gregory, Richard Paul. "What determines Manager and Investor Sentiment?" Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 30 (June 2021): 100499. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100499.

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Mom, Tom J. M., Yi-Ying Chang, Magdalena Cholakova, and Justin J. P. Jansen. "A Multilevel Integrated Framework of Firm HR Practices, Individual Ambidexterity, and Organizational Ambidexterity." Journal of Management 45, no. 7 (June 4, 2018): 3009–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206318776775.

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Research on strategic human resource (HR) management and organizational ambidexterity has assumed that organizational ambidexterity originates from operational managers that pursue both exploratory and exploitative activities. Yet, multilevel insights are absent about how and through which mechanisms HR practices may actually facilitate operational manager ambidexterity and how their ambidexterity may result into organizational ambidexterity. Our multisource and multilevel data from 467 operational managers and 104 senior managers within 52 firms reveals that the top-down effects of ability- and motivation-enhancing HR practices on operational manager ambidexterity are partially mediated by their role breadth self-efficacy and intrinsic motivational orientation. Furthermore, we find that the bottom-up relationship between operational manager and organizational ambidexterity is contingent on firm opportunity-enhancing HR practices. With that, our study provides important new multilevel insights into the effectiveness of strategic HR systems in supporting individual and organizational ambidexterity.

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Srivastava, Anubha, and Preeti Kulshresthra. "A study of micro finance institution’s role in developing the small scale enterprises of Ethiopia." Diponegoro International Journal of Business 1, no. 2 (December 30, 2018): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/dijb.1.2.2018.94-104.

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This study was conducted in Gedio zone small scale enterprise financed by micro finance institution. The main objective the study was to evaluate and determine the factor that determines loan repayment performance of small scale enterprise financed by yirgachefeMFI. For the success of the study both primary and secondary data were collected to determine the loan repayment performance of small scale enterprises in Gedio zone. Questionnaire were administered to 50 borrower and manager of MFI. The data gathered are tabulated and interpreted for ease of analysis and suitability for the reader.

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Contessotto, Christine, W. Robert Knechel, and Robyn A. Moroney. "The Association between Audit Manager and Auditor-In-Charge Experience, Effort, and Risk Responsiveness." AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 38, no. 3 (October 1, 2018): 121–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52308.

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SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

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Shohfi, Thomas. "RPI’s James Fund: ETFs, decision making, & manager transitions." Managerial Finance 46, no. 5 (March 5, 2019): 662–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-08-2018-0397.

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Purpose The James Fund at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute’s Lally School of Management is a small, recently established, course-driven student-managed investment fund (SMIF). The purpose of this paper is to provide insight to new and existing funds in improving individual fund operation and structure. Design/methodology/approach The James Fund seeks to outperform an 80/20 equity/fixed income benchmark by investing exclusively in exchange traded funds and to move primary emphasis away from idiosyncratic risk and individual equity valuation back toward asset allocation, the most significant driver of portfolio performance. Buy and sell decisions must receive a three-fifths majority in voting among students and adhere with the investment policy statement. Findings Groupthink, a common problem in student-managed funds, is observed in trade proposal and manager voting patterns. Originality/value Groupthink is partially addressed through the use of instructor feedback on individual student trade diaries. Student managers transition each semester; therefore, the portfolio must meet dormant period criteria limited to a specific list of broadly diversified ETFs, mitigating potential problems from knowledge transfer between management teams that are largely unexamined in the context of SMIFs.

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Tan, Hun-Tong, and Karim Jamal. "Do Auditors Objectively Evaluate Their Subordinates' Work?" Accounting Review 76, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 99–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.1.99.

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In this study, we investigate whether audit managers' assessment of the quality of work their subordinates perform is influenced by the managers' prior impressions of these subordinates, and whether managers whom the firm considers outstanding are less susceptible to such an effect. We conduct an experiment using actual audit senior-manager teams. Each senior and manager participating in the experiment has been classified by his or her firm as either outstanding or average. Each manager is paired with two audit seniors (one outstanding senior and one average senior), and each evaluates the memos written by his or her paired seniors. Managers evaluate the quality of the memos twice: (1) first, with the identities of the seniors indicated on the memos, and (2) later, when the seniors' identities are not explicitly revealed. Results show that average managers evaluate memos written by outstanding seniors more favorably than those written by average seniors when they know the identities of the memos' authors, but not when the identities of the seniors are not revealed. Outstanding managers do not appear susceptible to this effect.

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Baldenius, Tim, and Beatrice Michaeli. "Investments and Risk Transfers." Accounting Review 92, no. 6 (February 1, 2017): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51720.

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ABSTRACT We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.

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Henningsson, Johan, Ulf Johanson, and Roland Almqvist. "Fund manager trust and information complexity." Qualitative Research in Financial Markets 7, no. 4 (November 2, 2015): 346–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/qrfm-08-2014-0023.

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Purpose – This study aims to explore fund manager use of trust to reduce information complexity concerning corporate intangible resources and sustainability and what consequences this have for corporates as providers of information. Analytically, fund managers are considered part of a system with social meaning. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research approach is used. Data are obtained from two focus group discussions that occurred on two separate occasions. The first discussion was between four communications executives at leading Swedish companies. The second discussion was between four experienced fund managers in the Swedish financial market. Findings – The results suggest that fund managers oscillate between exhibiting trust and distrust when reducing the complexity of information on intangible resources and sustainability. Fund managers tend to trust the stable context of company information and strive to trust top management. Communicative dilemmas emerge when fund managers oscillate between trust and distrust. The fund manager disinterest in details emerges because of a reliance on a stable information context and company management. The representation dilemma emerges when narratives are used in corporate reporting. Research limitations/implications – This study contributes empirically to the knowledge concerning the social complexity of fund management. Practical implications – The paper increases the understanding of communicative difficulties for corporates to communicate with actors on the financial markets through narratives on intangible resources and sustainability. Originality/value – By focusing on the social meaning in the communication between companies and financial markets, we have contrasted the dominant view of financial economics of financial market actors as rational agents and the individualistic mode of theorizing in accordance with rational choice theory.

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Chen, Hung-Kun, Yan-Shing Chen, Chia-Wei Huang, and Yanzhi Wang. "Managerial Responses to Initial Market Reactions on Share Repurchases." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 12, no. 03 (September 2009): 455–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091509001708.

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While most papers in finance literature investigate how the stock market reacts to announcements of corporate events, very few study the opposite, how namely, the manager responds to the information from outside investors. In this paper, we examine this issue, using open market share repurchases. Open market share repurchase offers flexibility for the manager to decide whether or not to buy back shares. Therefore, the manager may refer to the opinions of outside investors and make the decision, based on actual buyback activities. We propose learning, over-confidence and timing hypotheses to interpret the behavior of the managerial response to initial market reaction on the share repurchase announcement. Empirically, if a repurchase announcement abnormal return is low, then the manager tends to achieve the repurchase announced ratio by purchasing more shares. In addition, the investor will positively react to this repurchase in the long run. These empirical findings are consistent with the market timing hypothesis, which implies that managers know the true value of their firms better than the market at the moment of the share repurchase announcement.

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Cumming, Douglas, and Sofia Johan. "Legality and venture capital fund manager compensation." Venture Capital 11, no. 1 (January 2009): 23–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691060802351206.

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Bagnoli, Mark, and Susan G. Watts. "Delegating Disclosure and Production Choices." Accounting Review 90, no. 3 (October 1, 2014): 835–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50944.

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ABSTRACT We study how joint delegation of production and disclosure choices alters the incentives that firm owners offer to their managers. Our first set of results shows how the incentive weights that owners place on revenues are affected by firm characteristics and by whether their manager chooses ex ante voluntary disclosure. This arises because the owners choose how sensitive the manager's compensation is to her production choice and, because this sensitivity is naturally greater if the manager opts to disclose, owners substitute disclosure for direct contractual incentives. Owners also substitute a rival firm's disclosures for direct incentives. Finally, we show that joint delegation alters the information environment for competing firms by creating incentives to provide more information about the less aggressive competitor and less information about the more aggressive competitor. All of these effects are exacerbated in industries with less product differentiation.

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Abernethy, Margaret A., and Mark S. Wallis. "Critique on the “Manager Effects” Research and Implications for Management Accounting Research." Journal of Management Accounting Research 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 3–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52030.

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ABSTRACT Management accounting researchers have been slow to explore the empirical implications of the “manager effect” on management control choices. We critique the “manager effect” literature and identify research opportunities for management accounting researchers. Since the publication of Bertrand and Schoar's (2003) seminal paper, which shows that individual managers have an effect on firm behavior, a large and growing body of accounting and finance research has used publicly available data to identify individual manager effects on a variety of firm outcomes. Management accounting researchers can add significant value to this research; for example, by exploring the control choices that a firm makes to mitigate the adverse consequences associated with some managerial characteristics. In this critique we first identify some of the theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the “manager effects” research and second identify opportunities for management accounting researchers to explore these effects while overcoming some of the limitations.

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Cooper, Martin. "How Open Banking is Democratising Finance." ITNOW 63, no. 3 (August 16, 2021): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/itnow/bwab071.

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Abstract Open banking is fuelling a fintech revolution and fostering a wave of apps which give customers more control of their money and insight into their finances. Martin Cooper MBCS interviews Constanza Castro Feijóo, Stakeholder Engagement Manager at the Open Banking Implementation Entity.

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Waring, M. Barton, Duane Whitney, John Pirone, and Charles Castille. "Optimizing Manager Structure and Budgeting Manager Risk." Journal of Portfolio Management 26, no. 3 (April 30, 2000): 90–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2000.319719.

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Wells, Kara. "Who Manages the Firm Matters: The Incremental Effect of Individual Managers on Accounting Quality." Accounting Review 95, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 365–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52505.

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ABSTRACT I investigate whether individual managers have an incremental effect on firms' accounting quality (AQ) after controlling for known determinants of AQ, time fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. To identify the manager-specific effect on firm AQ, I construct a dataset that tracks the movement of 907 managers across firms over the period 1992–2014. Results indicate that individual manager fixed effects explain a statistically and economically significant proportion of the cross-sectional variation in AQ, which is comparable to that of firm fixed effects. Variation in managerial attributes that impact AQ is applied consistently as firms switch manager-type. Using a setting of exogenous CEO turnover, I find managerial idiosyncrasies impact AQ and are not merely a reflection of firms actively choosing managers with a desired combination of managerial attributes that, in turn, impact the variability of accruals. Overall, my study underscores the importance of individual managers in the determination of AQ. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

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Messmore, Tom, and Travis L. Jones. "Pricing three cases of performance fees using options methodology." Managerial Finance 46, no. 1 (October 16, 2019): 56–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2019-0143.

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Purpose Prior research has demonstrated that investment management performance fees have the characteristic of a call option. It is important to examine whether these performance fees are consistent with traditional fee structures used by investment managers. It is also worth examining whether clients or managers benefit significantly more than the other party under performance fee structures. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach The authors use Black-Scholes options pricing methodology to examine three cases of performance fee structures. The Absolute Hurdle case examines the fee structure where the manager receives a portion of the return over a pre-defined absolute rate of return. The Benchmark Relative Hurdle case shows a fee structure based on performance in excess of the return of a benchmark portfolio. The Breakeven Relative Hurdle case illustrates the fee structure where there is revenue neutrality with the classic management fees when portfolio performance matches the benchmark. Findings The findings of this paper illustrate that a particular performance fee structure can be designed to have the same revenue as a traditional investment management fee structure. Such a structure is equally beneficial to both the investment manager and to the client and should have salutary motivational effects to improve investment results, while simultaneously rewarding the manager for value added at a fair price for both the manager and the investor. Originality/value This study is unique in that it examines three cases of performance fees and provides a comparison between performance fee structures and traditional investment management fee structures. The findings will assist investment portfolio managers in better setting management fees they charge clients. In addition, this study help with clients who feel they are being charged excessive management fees by their investment manager.

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Heinle, Mirko S., Christian Hofmann, and Alexis H. Kunz. "Identity, Incentives, and the Value of Information." Accounting Review 87, no. 4 (March 1, 2012): 1309–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50156.

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ABSTRACT We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

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Lee, Dongsoo, and Mantae Kim. "Study on the Characteristic of Finance Manager in Myeongli Science." Journal of Humanities and Social sciences 21 11, no. 4 (August 30, 2020): 1193–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.22143/hss21.11.4.84.

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Bekri, Mahmoud, Young Shin (Aaron) Kim, and Svetlozar (Zari) T. Rachev. "Tempered stable models for Islamic finance asset management." International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 7, no. 1 (April 14, 2014): 37–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imefm-10-2012-0096.

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Purpose – In Islamic finance (IF), the safety-first rule of investing (hifdh al mal) is held to be of utmost importance. In view of the instability in the global financial markets, the IF portfolio manager (mudharib) is committed, according to Sharia, to make use of advanced models and reliable tools. This paper seeks to address these issues. Design/methodology/approach – In this paper, the limitations of the standard models used in the IF industry are reviewed. Then, a framework was set forth for a reliable modeling of the IF markets, especially in extreme events and highly volatile periods. Based on the empirical evidence, the framework offers an improved tool to ameliorate the evaluation of Islamic stock market risk exposure and to reduce the costs of Islamic risk management. Findings – Based on the empirical evidence, the framework offers an improved tool to ameliorate the evaluation of Islamic stock market risk exposure and to reduce the costs of Islamic risk management. Originality/value – In IF, the portfolio manager – mudharib – according to Sharia, should ensure the adequacy of the mathematical and statistical tools used to model and control portfolio risk. This task became more complicated because of the increase in risk, as measured via market volatility, during the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007. Sharia condemns the portfolio manager who demonstrates negligence and may hold him accountable for losses for failing to select the proper analytical tools. As Sharia guidelines hold the safety-first principle of investing rule (hifdh al mal) to be of utmost importance, the portfolio manager should avoid speculative investments and strategies that would lead to significant losses during periods of high market volatility.

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Zhan, Gong. "Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives." Review of Derivatives Research 14, no. 2 (May 21, 2011): 205–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11147-011-9067-4.

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Laux, Judy. "Topics In Finance Part IV - Valuation." American Journal of Business Education (AJBE) 3, no. 9 (September 1, 2010): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/ajbe.v3i9.473.

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This article looks at security valuation from the perspective of the financial manager, accenting the relationships to stockholder wealth maximization (SWM), risk and return, and potential agency problems. It also covers some of the pertinent literature related to how investors and creditors price the stocks and bonds of corporations.

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Lopatta, Kerstin, Sebastian Tideman, Katarina Böttcher, and Timm Wichern. "Managerial Style – A Literature Review and Research Agenda." International Business Research 12, no. 2 (January 17, 2019): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v12n2p80.

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This literature review provides an overview of existing studies in the area of managerial style and its effect on firms’ strategic decisions and performance. It highlights which managers’ characteristics have been considered as determinants for managerial style so far and provides potential avenues for future research. After analyzing the content of all articles that were published in seven top-tier journals in the area of finance and banking between 2000 and 2016, the articles on managerial style were included in this literature review and categorized according to the main manager characteristic of investigation. The paper illustrates how similar characteristics are measured differently, and how different measurements of manager’s influence the managerial style−firm strategy relationship differentially. We provide avenues for future research in the area of managerial style, that is, future research may investigate board member’s characteristics at a more aggregated level (board level). Also, future research may shed more light on the argumentation of whether managers’ individual style influences the firm’s corporate decision or whether managers endogenously choose the firm due to their individual characteristics that match with the firm’s strategy and vice versa. This study is interesting for firms that aim to find a manager or director who fits well to its own strategy. Although there is a rapidly growing literature on managerial style, there is yet no literature review that analysis research themes and strings on managerial style in finance journals.

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Kartini, Justina Endang, and Bambang Ismanto. "MANAJEMEN PROGRAM AKSELERASI DI SMP PL DOMENICO SAVIO SEMARANG." Kelola: Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan 2, no. 1 (June 7, 2015): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.24246/j.jk.2015.v2.i1.p12-21.

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<p>This study aimed to describe the management acceleration program in terms of planning, organizing, actuating, and monitoring learning in PL Domenico Savio Junior High School. This research is a qualitative descriptive study. Subjects were principal, manager acceleration, acceleration secretary, and homeroom teacher. Results of research: Planning accelerated program in PL Domenico Savio Junior High School done by preparing teachers, finance, infrastructure, learners, curriculum, time, and high school. Learning plan covering the syllabus and lesson plan contains learning objectives, teaching materials, teaching methods, learning resources, and assessment of learning outcomes. Organization of human resources contained in the organizational structure of the school is equipped manager acceleration. Organizing accelerated learning includes the step before learning, implementation, and after learning. Teachers organize learning materials to learners’ learning time. Acceleration managers manage learning activities acceleration in school and outside of school. Actuating of accelerated program refers to the RPP and half of each subject program. Implementation of the learning stages: introduction, core activities, and cover. Monitoring the acceleration of learning is done directly by the students, parents of students, and managers acceleration. Learners and parents provide input on school. Manager acceleration control feasibility study. Principal using monitoring results into training materials for teachers. Accelerated learning assessment carried out by the teacher. Teacher evaluations are conducted by the principal and foundations. Reporting accelerated learning is done on the parents of learners.</p>

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Setiadi, Muhammad Chendy, Zulfiandri Zulfiandri, Fitroh Fitroh, and Gunawan Pria Utama. "Pengembangan Sistem Informasi Pengawasan Keuangan Berbasis CodeIgniter Framework." Applied Information System and Management (AISM) 4, no. 1 (April 26, 2021): 31–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/aism.v4i1.18537.

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PT. Jakarta Maju Pusaka adalah perusahaan yang bergerak dalam bidang kargo barang yang sangat berperan dalam pertumbuhan ekonomi, terutama dalam bidang ekspor-impor barang di Indonesia. Selama ini manager dalam melakukan monitoring finance perusahaan masih menggunakan proses pencatatan pada buku besar di bagian finance. Sistem informasi monitoring (dashboard system) mempunyai ide dasar dan manfaat yang dapat diperoleh sama dengan analogi kegunaan dashboard bagi pengemudi, yaitu dashboard dengan layar yang didesain yang menampilkan informasi mengenai kondisi bagian finance, yang memungkinkan para eksekutif dapat dengan cepat mengidentifikasi masalah dan menentukan langkah perbaikan untuk meningkatkan kinerja pada bagian finance PT. Jakarta Maju Pusaka secara keseluruhan. Pembangunan sistem informasi monitoring (dashboard) ini menggunakan model prototype requirement. Penelitiaan ini bertujuan membangun sistem informasi monitoring (dashboard system) yang memberikan kemudahan kepada manager dalam monitoring laporan finance PT. Jakarta Maju Pusaka.

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Laux, Judy. "Topics In Finance Part III - Leverage." American Journal of Business Education (AJBE) 3, no. 4 (April 1, 2010): 13–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/ajbe.v3i4.407.

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This article investigates operating and financial leverage from the perspective of the financial manager, accenting the relationships to stockholder wealth maximization (SWM), risk and return, and potential agency problems. It also covers some of the pertinent literature related specifically to the implications of operating and financial risk and the associated measurement dilemmas.

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König-Kersting, Christian. "oTree Manager: Multi-user oTree installations made easy." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 22 (June 2019): 177–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2019.03.006.

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Masulis, Ronald W., Cong Wang, and Fei Xie. "Employee-Manager Alliances and Shareholder Returns from Acquisitions." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, no. 2 (January 15, 2019): 473–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000036.

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We examine the potential for management-worker alliances when employees have substantial voting rights, and how such alliances affect the balance of power between managers and shareholders. We find that substantial employee voting rights exacerbate the manager-shareholder conflicts. Specifically, they entrench incumbent managers and allow them to pursue value-destroying acquisitions by undercutting the disciplinary influence of the corporate control market. Importantly, employee support for managers is conditional on favorable treatment of employees. Our findings are consistent with Pagano and Volpin’s theory of worker-management alliances and highlight the potential risks associated with large employee voting power.

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Anson, Mark J. P. "Selecting a Hedge Fund Manager." Journal of Wealth Management 3, no. 3 (October 31, 2000): 45–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jwm.2000.320337.

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Rogers, Douglas S. "Tax-Aware Equity Manager Allocation." Journal of Wealth Management 4, no. 3 (October 31, 2001): 39–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jwm.2001.320418.

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Fang, Jieyan, Alexander Kempf, and Monika Trapp. "Fund Manager Allocation." Journal of Financial Economics 111, no. 3 (March 2014): 661–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.11.003.

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Gao, Pingyang, and Gaoqing Zhang. "Accounting Manipulation, Peer Pressure, and Internal Control." Accounting Review 94, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 127–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52078.

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ABSTRACT We study firms' investment in internal controls to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show that peer managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements: one manager manipulates more if he believes that reports of peer firms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one firm's investment in internal controls has a positive externality on peer firms. It reduces its own manager's manipulation, which, in turn, mitigates the manipulation pressure on managers at peer firms. Firms do not internalize this positive externality and, thus, underinvest in their internal controls over financial reporting. The problem of underinvestment provides one justification for regulatory intervention in firms' internal controls choices. JEL Classifications: G18; M41; M48; K22.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Finance Manager'

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