Academic literature on the topic 'Financial crisis. Subprime mortgage loans'

AbstractThis paper develops a political economic explanation of the 2007–9 US subprime crisis which focuses on one of its central causes: the transformation of racial exclusion in US mortgage-markets. Until the early 1990s, racial minorities were systematically excluded from mortgage-finance due to bank-redlining and discrimination. But, then, racial exclusion in credit-markets was transformed: racial minorities were increasingly given access to housing-credit under terms far more adverse than were offered to non-minority borrowers. This paper shows that the emergence of the subprime loan is linked, in turn, to the strategic transformation of banking in the 1980s, and to the unique global circumstances of the US macro-economy. Thus, subprime lending emerged from a combination of the long US history of racial exclusion in credit-markets, the crisis of US banking, and the position of the US within the global economy. From the viewpoint of the capitalist accumulation-process, these loans increased the depth of the financial expropriation of the working class by financial capital. The crisis in subprime lending then emerged when subprime loans with exploitative terms became more widespread and were made increasingly on an under-collateralised basis – that is, when housing-loans became not just extortionary but speculative.

It has become common practice—and in particular, but not exclusively, in conservative media—to blame the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 for the U.S. subprime mortgage and foreclosure crisis that triggered the global financial crisis. It is argued that the CRA forced lenders to give mortgage loans to high–risk borrowers. This is nonsense for at least five reasons.

Three years after the global financial crisis started academic and popular publications assessing its origins, consequences and wider implications are starting to emerge. The origins of the crisis are generally explained as stemming from the rapid increase in subprime mortgage lending in the United States and the credit default swaps banks and other financial institutions traded amongst themselves based on these loans. As homeowners found it increasingly difficult to make their repayments and housing prices in the United States started to drop, a downward spiral ensued. In this cycle ever-growing numbers of homeowners defaulted on their mortgages, unable to meet interest payments or to re-mortgage, and banks foreclosed on the houses even as their own assets and investments were exposed to the losses stemming from defaulted mortgages. With the foreclosures devaluing house prices further and the exposure of banks making them less willing and able to refinance mortgages, the situation quickly spiraled downwards. The complex global trade in credit default swaps and other derivatives meant that the problems were amplified and spread beyond the United States until ultimately many national governments decided to intervene with financial assistance mainly aimed at the financial institutions.

In march 2008 the situation on the mortgage market was called a crisis. Many companies collapsed, including New Century Financial Corporation – the biggest credit company in the United States. After few months this virus infected other countries including Poland. The purpose of this article is to show the background of the subprime mortgage crisis and the possible outcomes for the Polish economy. The first part is trying to find out what are the causes and course of this financial breakdown. That part is mainly focused on subprime loans and its significance to this crisis. After that paper contain information about the main channel of infestation, the securitization of the debt by the banks and selling the securities to the investors all over the world. The next chapter contains the data about the impact that crisis have on polish economy, including GDP growth rate and what would likely happen on housing market and stock exchange. Polish banking and credit system is sounder then American one and there is no risk of insolvency but still we are feeling the consequences of the financial crash. In the end author concludes that in the globalized world financial markets are linked and it is impossible to maintain unaffected by crisis that happened on the other side of the globe.

In the fall of 2008, the U.S. subprime mortgage loans defaults have turned into Wall Street’s biggest crisis since the Great Depression. As hundreds of billions in mortgage-related investments went bad, banks became suspicious of one another’s potential undisclosed credit losses and preferred to reduce their exposure in the interbank markets, thus causing interbank interest rates and credit default swaps increases, a liquidity shortage problem and a worsened credit crunch condition to consumers and businesses. Massive cash injections into money markets and interest rates reductions have been assured by central banks in an attempt to shore up banks and to restore confidence within the financial system. Even Governments have promoted bail-out deal agreements, protections from bankruptcies, recapitalizations and bank nationalizations in order to rescue banks from disastrous bankruptcies. The credit crisis originated in the previous years when the Federal Reserve sharply lowered interest rates (Fed Funds at 1%) to limit the economic damage of the stock market decline due to the 2000 dot.com companies’ crisis. Lower interest rates made mortgage payments cheaper, and the demand for homes began to rise, sending prices up. In addition, millions of homeowners took advantage of the rate drop to refinance their existing mortgages. As the industry ramped up, the quality of the mortgages went down due to poor credit origination and credit risk assessment. Delinquency and default rates began to rise in 2006 as interest rates rose (Fed Funds at 5,25%) and poor households across the US struggled to pay off their mortgages. Many of them went bankrupt and lost their homes but the pace of lending did not slow. Banks have transformed much of the high-risk mortgage debt (securitizations) into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO), and have sold these assets on the financial markets to investment firms and insurance companies around the world, transferring to these investors the rights to the mortgage payments and the related credit risk. With the collapse of the first banks and hedge funds in 2007 the rising number of foreclosures helped speed the fall of housing prices, and the number of prime mortgages in default began to increase. As many CDO products were held on a “mark to market” basis, the paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products let to the dramatic write-downs in 2007. When stock markets in the United States, Europe and Asia continued to plunge, leading central banks took the drastic step of a coordinated cut in interest rates and Governments coordinated actions that included taking equity stakes in major banks. This paper written by the Author (on October 7th, 2008) at the rise of these dramatic events, aims to demonstrate, through solid and fact-based assumptions, that this dramatic global financial crisis could have been addressed and managed earlier and better by many of the stakeholders involved in the subprime mortgage lending process such as, banks’ and investment funds management, rating agencies, banking and financial markets supervisory authorities. It also unfortunately demonstrates the corporate social responsibility failure and the moral hazard of many key players involved in this crisis, since a lot of them probably knew quite well what was happening but have preferred not to do anything or to do little and late in order to change the dramatic course of the events.

Many reasons lie at the base of all financial crises from the past to the present. If we take into consideration the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, the only reason cannot be mortgage loans. But the mortgage issue continued to advance and created several other problems. Definitely, the source of mortgage loans problem also had many roots. One of the reasons was the lack of correct use of accounting principles and auditing. This is a strong proof and indicator that, there are many accounting based reasons behind the occurrence of the financial crises. Many examples can be given showing moving away from the basic principles of accounting rules and the general accounting concepts. Moreover, institutions being not fully independent, running creative accounting practices, having problems with fair valuation and transparency issues, presenting unreal financial reports, and sharing misleading audit reports are all related to financial crises.Furthermore, specific businesses and people abuse accounting rules, standards and related legislation for the sake of their own interests. Accounting and finance history has shown us that, even audit institutions, credit institutions and rating agencies are getting unfair advantages and generating unethical cash by making intentional accounting and finance errors, which is actually categorized as fraud.The aim of this study is to analyze financial crises and to determine if accounting practices have any relationship with financial crises. The research investigated an oil company’s financial and operational indicators before and after the 2008 financial crises with related tables and figures. Also, an interview was run with the company’s accounting officer. Based on the statements of firm’s accounting officer, correct accounting practices defended firm from several negative effects of the 2008 financial crisis.

Subprime lending in the United States was a major concern after the 2008 financial crisis. While Covid-19 is sweeping the world, how will the US government and financial institutions deal with the potential crisis of subprime mortgage will be discussed in this study. Financial market institutions and the US government should both change their strategies to deal with the crisis. In addition to controlling the spread of the epidemic, the US government should temporarily lower the minimum wage and provide a series of quantitative financial subsidies. Financial institutions should also update loan data and use better monitoring and regulation to reduce subprime risk to cope with this potential crisis.

The author of this paper (Dr. Ivo Pezzuto) has been one of the first authors to write back in 2008 about the alleged "subprime mortgage loans fraud" which has triggered the 2008 financial crisis, in combination with multiple other complex, highly interrelated, and concurrent factors. The author has been also one of the first authors to report in that same working paper of 2008 (available on SSRN and titled "Miraculous Financial Engineering or Toxic Finance? The Genesis of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Loans Crisis and its Consequences on the Global Financial Markets and Real Economy") the high probability of a Eurozone debt crisis, due to a number of unsolved structural macroeconomic problems, the lack of a single crisis resolution scheme, current account imbalances, and in some countries, housing bubbles/high private debt. In the book published in 2013 and titled "Predictable and Avoidable: Repairing Economic Dislocation and Preventing the Recurrence of Crisis", Dr. Ivo Pezzuto has exposed the root causes of the financial crisis in order to enables readers to understand that the crisis we have seen was predictable and should have been avoidable, and that a recurrence can be avoided, if lessons are learned and the right action taken. Almost one year after the publication of the book "Predictable and Avoidable: Repairing Economic Dislocation and Preventing the Recurrence of Crisis", the author has decided to write this working paper to explore what happened in the meantime to the financial markets and to the financial regulation implementation. Most of all, the author with this working paper aims to provide an updated analysis as strategist and scenario analyst on the topics addressed in the book "Predictable and Avoidable" based on a forward-looking perspective and on potential "tail risk" scenarios. The topics reported in this paper relate to financial crises; Government policy; financial regulation; corporate governance; credit risk management; financial risk management; economic policy; Euro Zone debt crisis; the "Great Recession"; business ethics; sociology, finance and financial markets. This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the change needed in the banking and finance industries and to supervisory frameworks, in order to enhance regulatory mechanisms and to improve global financial stability and sustainability.

In his recent encyclical Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI grapples with one of the most vexing paradoxes concerning the current global economic crisis. There is no question that it is a global financial crisis. The collapse of the subprime mortgage loan market in the U.S. in 2007 prefigured similar collapses of real estate bubbles in other parts of the world. The collapse of these real estate bubbles exposed the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions across the globe created by the worldwide market for the derivate investment products created on the backs of the underlying real estate loans—the mortgage-backed securities in all their complex manifestations, and the credit default swaps that were essentially insurance policies on the risks of default of these securities. Various configurations of international coordinating bodies have called for global responses to the crisis. At its root, however, the current crisis is in a very important sense fundamentally a uniquely local phenomenon. It is the result of individual consumer transactions that are about as inherently local as a commercial transaction can ever get—loans to specific individual consumers tied to specific unique, unmovable pieces of residential real estate. Every single loan packaged into the bundles of investment opportunities that became “toxic assets” held by large institutional investors originated with a contractual relationship between an individual borrower and a single lender. In addition to the global macroeconomic consequences of the collapse of this market, every one of these loans that goes into default has personal consequences for the individual borrower whose home is the collateral for that loan.

The subprime mortgage crisis was the most devastating financial crisis since the Great Depression. The steady rise of housing purchases and seemingly limitless increase in home values drew many investors to the United States real estate market. The business growth in this sector was so compelling that financial firms created new secondary markets that were perceived as diversifying risk, which in turn prompted lenders to create innovative funding vehicles and loose and fast loan qualification processes. The federal government was ill prepared to deal with this shift in the financial world to market-based demand, and the results were disastrous. Lenders embraced predatory lending practices, borrowers with bad credit overextended themselves beyond their means, and foreclosures occurred at startling rates as home values plummeted, resulting in a world-wide economic depression. Ten years later, we reflect on the events that led up to and caused the subprime mortgage crisis for lessons learned to improve management, marketing, and finance incentive practices.

The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on March 19, 2010). Thesis advisor: Dr. Charles Davis. Includes bibliographical references.

Following the collapse of property values and an increasing rate of default on high-risk mortgages, the United States experienced a subprime lending crisis that led to massive financial losses for holders of mortgage-backed securities. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The theoretical framework grounding the study was Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, which describes the basis of capitalism as economic expansionism followed by financial crises. The population consisted of 473 loan cases from archival data of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in Georgia. The method used to collect the data was a probabilistic simple random sample taken from the archival data. The use of binary logistic regression resulted in a finding that the variables of loan product and loan amount significantly predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure, Ï?2(4) = 10.65, p = .031, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. The Nagelkerke R2 value indicated that the model explained 9% of the variability in foreclosure. The findings specifically showed that Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administration loan products were significantly more likely than conventional loans to cause losses for mortgage lenders. The implications for positive social change include increased stakeholder knowledge of various factors that can contribute to foreclosure and sustainment of community value with fewer homeowners losing their home in foreclosure.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.
The use of leading indicators provides a valuable method to predict changes in macro-economic variables. However, the accuracy of the various models using leading indicators is a topic of constant debate. This study aimed to identify whether leading indicator models predicting residential house price changes performed as well during the recent global financial crisis (fourth quarter 2007 to second quarter 2012) as during the period directly before the crisis. Several potential drivers of the South African property market were identified with the help of previous studies on this topic. Following that, a quantitative analysis was done and single leading indicator models were built using regression analysis to evaluate the importance of each independent variable. This information was used to create a composite leading index for the South African housing market. The accuracy of these models were then compared to predict the changes in house prices during the period preceding the recent global economic crisis.It was found that the ability of these leading indicator models to predict house price changes during the recent global economic crisis decreased significantly.

This thesis demonstrates that consumer leverage can contribute to financial crises such as the subprime mortgage crisis characterised by increased bankruptcy prospects and tightened credit access. A recession may follow even when the leveraged sector is not a production sector and can be triggered by seeming positive events such as a technological innovation and a relaxation of borrowing conditions. The first preliminary chapter updates the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) approach with financial frictions in the production sector to a two-sector model with consumption and housing. It shows that credit frictions in the capital financing decisions of housing firms are not sufficient to capture the negative consumer experience with falling housing prices and relaxed credit access during the recession. The second chapter brings the model closer to the subprime mortgage crisis by shifting credit constraints to the consumer mortgage market. Increased supply of houses lowers asset prices and reduces the value of the real estate collateral used in the mortgage which in turn worsens the leverage of indebted consumers. A relaxation of borrowing conditions turns credit-constrained households into a potential source of disturbances themselves when market optimism allows them to raise their leverage with little downpayment. Both cases demonstrate that although households are not production agents, their worsening debt levels can trigger a lasting financial downturn. The third chapter develops a chained mortgage contracts model where both homeowner consumers and the financial institutions that securitize their mortgage loan are credit-constrained. Adding credit constraints to the financial sector that provides housing mortgages creates opportunities for risk sharing where banks shift some of the downturn onto indebted consumers in order to hasten their own recovery. This consequence is especially evident in the case of relaxed credit access for banks. Financial institutions repair their debt position relatively fast at the expense of consumers whose borrowing ability is squeezed for a long period despite the fact that they may not be the source of the disturbance. The result mirrors the recent subprime mortgage crisis characterised by a sharp but brief decline for banks and a protracted recovery for mortgaged households.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]).
Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]).
Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Like the credit boom of the 1920s, the toxic credit bubble of the 2000s precipitated a devastating global financial crisis. The desire to earn quick profits from originating and securitizing subprime loans corrupted the risk management practices of large financial conglomerates and the credit review practices of credit ratings agencies that assigned investment ratings to mortgage-related securities. By the end of 2006, U.S. credit markets resembled an inverted pyramid of risk, in which multiple layers of financial bets depended on the performance of high-risk subprime loans held in securitized pools. When housing prices began to fall and subprime loans began to default in large numbers in 2007, the leveraged bets on top of that pyramid of risk blew up and inflicted devastating losses on financial institutions and investors in the U.S. and Europe. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic were slow to recognize and respond to the severity of the crisis. The Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department missed multiple warning signs that should have caused them to increase their oversight of major U.S. banks and other large financial institutions during 2007 and early 2008.

The world financial market is currently in turmoil because of the recent housing and credit crisis. From January to November 2007, more than 1 million homes in the United States entered foreclosure. Not only are homeowners losing their homes, but paying renters are being evicted as lenders reclaim properties. Depending on the state, 48–69% of foreclosed loans come from the subprime market. Subprime refers not to interest rates but to borrower quality, determined by low credit scores, little credit history, or unstable income with limited assets. Because of the increased risk associated with loaning to them, those borrowers cannot get favorable rates and often take out loans with short-term introductory rates. These loans generally get packaged by Wall Street into residential-backed securities and structured into slices or tranches that can be priced and rated from AAA to BBB– on the basis of the credit risk inherent in each tranche. When these mortgages adjust to market rates, the borrower no longer qualifies for the existing loan and can no longer pay it back. Because techniques such as gifted down payments and no requirements to prove income were the only way to move these borrowers into mortgages, many were lured into a false sense of prosperity for which they were neither prepared nor equipped and for which they are now suffering through foreclosure.

Mortgage securitisations rose rapidly in the early 2000s through the private label securitisation vehicles that packaged subprime mortgages. The size of the asset-backed securities sector in the United States traces well the overall leverage of the financial system in the run-up to the Great Financial Crisis.

The mortgage crisis, started in 2007 in USA, turned into global financial crisis at the end of 2008. This crisis is assumed to be the largest crisis after The Great Depression occurred in 1929. Global Financial Crisis spread out from USA to developed countries and eventually other countries. Some financial institutions went bankruptcy and some of rest has been survived with governments’ financial supports. Crisis affected the real economy after financial markets, due to crisis production and employment decreased all over the countries. Excess liquidity, deterioration of the mortgage loans structure, excessive increases in house prices, securitization of subprime mortgages, lack of transparency, expansion of derivative markets, ineffectiveness of credit rating agencies and delay of regulatory agencies’ intervention are assumed as “reasonable reasons of the crisis. Before all these reasons, deregulation in financial market in USA is the main reason of this crisis. Corporate governance is against decontrol and lack of transparency which cause crisis. Corporate governance focuses on four pillars, which are fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility. These four principles are associated with measurement and development of performance of government and companies. In this study, we looked from corporate governance window to the global financial crisis, and expressed lessons and advices to be determined. With effective corporate governance, it is expected to add value to stakeholders and being responsible to social values.

Turkish mortgage system was established by the law number 5582 and the title of "The Law Amending the Laws Related to Housing Finance System" in 2007. Even though the entry into force of this act expressed as "Pay the rent as the landlord-performing”, no bring up short of the interest rates of a housing loan were observed. In fact, Mortgage application could not be branch out yet. The distinguishing feature of the mortgage system, mortgage collateral pools of consumer loans with guaranteed by mortgage backed securities to be issued, sold in the capital market, also called the mortgage money is the safeguard of cheap funds. Using this fund for financing provided by banks as a result of re-housing resource for the consumer to pay the cost of housing loan interest rate is relatively go into a decline. Meanwhile, after the abundance of finance in the world, the so-called subprime mortgage, loans to non-qualified borrower, triggered the world economic crisis occurred. May well be, Turkey was unimpressed the crisis because of the not being set secondary mortgage market. All the public in charge of economy has introduced prevention of packages of measures.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.