Academic literature on the topic 'First Emperor of China'

AbstractSculpture as an artistic medium was widely employed in the arts of Greece and the Hellenistic East, but played only a minor role in ancient East Asia. This changed dramatically with the First Emperor of China who marked his ascent to the throne in 221 bc with the erection of giant bronze sculptures outside his palace and the installation of thousands of terracotta figures in his tomb. The current text sets out to investigate the sudden and short-lived surge of sculpture making in third-century bc China and places it in the context of developments across Asia of the time. The text joins art historical, archaeological and textual evidence to investigate whether the First Emperor's extraordinary interest in sculpture may have been the result of contacts with the contemporary Hellenistic world.

The rise of China is a major feature of global politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and one that raises the question of how a rising China and global politics will adapt to each other. This study argues that historical cases are also useful in addressing this question. Four cases are compared: two during the reign of Emperor Xianfeng and another two under the rule of Emperor Guangxu. Emperor Xianfeng's view of China was that it possessed a unique culture that should be separated from alien forces, which he intuitively conceived as different, whereas Emperor Guangxu accepted exchanges with the West as a civilization and was willing to learn from them as a cultural resource. Despite this difference in their political perspectives, both emperors similarly faced constraints to their power in implementing their policies. Two cases are selected for each emperor to demonstrate how they acted differently from a cultural orientation of estrangement and exchange on one hand as well as a position of strength and weakness on the other. This comparative study provides insights into how China in the twenty-first century adapts to its expanding influence.

Many of European clocks in the Beijing’s Palace Museum (Gugong) were made in second half of the 18th century, by the Qing Emperor Qianlong’s governing (1736–1795), when an exotic “Chinese style” (chinoiserie) in the decorative arts was at its height. The research methodology proposed below, which combines art history and cultural analysis, allows us to see, that the Palace Collection’s mix determined evolution of the clock’s industry in China and some European lands, who took part in the international clock and watch market. In forms and decor of Chinese clocks the 18th century were reflected the change of European market. Together with western mechanical clock, being at the same time scientific device and work of decorative art, the European styles system was by ritual participation admitted in China. В статье показано, что западная часовая коллекция Цяньлуна (1736–1795), явившаяся первым в империи Цин (1644–1911) собранием произведений европейского искусства, связана с художественным рынком и феноменом шинуазри. Предложенная ниже методология, сочетающая искусствоведческий и культурологический подходы, позволяет увидеть, что состав этой коллекции повлиял на развитие производства механических часов в самом Китае и западных странах — участницах международного рынка искусств XVIII века. Собирательство механических хронометров в государстве Цин было обусловлено ритуализацией часов, устранившей проблему дуализма китайского и западного начал в цинской культуре и искусстве.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore how the pressures of being a Little Emperor in a rapidly changing society are reflected in consumer experiences, particularly in the meanings attached to products and brands. The paper aims to focus on young adults in urban China, specifically young professional women.Design/methodology/approachThe subject was shadowed at work for two weeks during the Spring of 2007 and for an additional two weeks during the Spring of 2008. Social interactions and purchasing behavior were carefully observed, as well as conducting a series of informal interviews. During the Summer of 2008, a formal, in‐depth interview was conducted with an informant in the USA.FindingsThe unique pressures of growing up as a Little Emperor in a changing society are widely reflected in product usage and are ways in which to ease the tension and anxiety associated with the pressure of maintaining expectations from friends, family, and society.Research limitations/implicationsThe study focused on a single informant who, while on the surface appearing to represent adult Little Emperors, may in fact have different attitudes from her contemporaries. It would be interesting to investigate the degree to which parallel themes occur in the male market, namely what categories young urban professional men who were raised as Little Emperors use to express themselves.Practical implicationsThe research provides insights into some of the conflicting expectations derived directly from the experience of growing up as a Little Emperor. It translates these insights into practical recommendations for various aspects of marketing and advertising cosmetic products in China, thus allowing multinationals to build successful marketing campaigns that appeal to managing these conflicting expectations.Originality/valueThe paper is the first work on the consumer experiences of urban young adult Little Emperors, specifically young professional women.

Moctezuma, Aztec ruler was the last of four big temporary exhibitions about ‘world rulers’ that the British Museum has put on in the past three years. Moctezuma was the king who received Cortés and the Conquistadores in 1519 and was killed the next year in their custody. The previous three exhibitions were on the First Emperor of China, the Roman Emperor, Hadrian, and Shah ‘Abbas, respectively. Hadrian and The First Emperor were archaeological (James 2008a, 2008c). So was Moctezuma. It ran from September 2009 to January 2010.Kingship is evidently in vogue among London’s galleries. During The First Emperor’s showing, Tutankhamun entertained on the other side of the river (James 2008b); and the Victoria & Albert Museum mounted Maharaja during Moctezuma’s run. There are good reasons for thinking about kings in any society, regardless of political constitution, because, in their coronations, their deeds and their deaths or funerals, they are ‘collective representations’. Whether as heroes or as scapegoats, democracies tend to promote ‘celebrities’ by the same token and, as well as governing, perhaps monarchs, ancient or contemporary, served and serve that function too. Historians, sociologists and anthropologists have tackled these themes through comparison and so have archaeologists, with epigraphy, iconography and the excavation of palaces and tombs (Blanton et al. 1996; Quigley 2005).

This article analyzes evidence of translating and interpreting activities (indiscriminately referred to as yi (譯), which also denotes translators or interpreters in classical Chinese) in first-century China between the Latter Han (25–220 AD) Chinese administration and non-Han Chinese minority tribes along the then Southwestern frontier (modern Yunnan and Sichuan provinces). The importance of this archival record to the historical study of translation and interpreting is two-fold. First, it contains crucial details pertinent to translating and interpreting activities in China in antiquity. Second, it documents concepts of yi synchronically, as perceived by three main participants in the interpreting events: the emperor, the frontier inspector, and the frontier clerk cum interpreter. The presentation of what they actually wrote, said, and did in the first-century interpreting setting in China, with close reference to standard histories, objectively depicts the meanings of yi as perceived by these figures at the time.

<p>El presente artículo analiza un acontecimiento significativo pero poco conocido: la primera embajada que Felipe II envió a China. Através de las fuentes relativas a esta expedición, podemos contemplar cómo funcionaba la administración de la Castilla del siglo XVI en lo que concierne a los asuntos diplomáticos. Además, cabe<br />prestar especial atención a la carta escrita por Felipe II y dirigida al emperador de China. Con ella, no solo podemos ampliar nuestros conocimientos sobre el monarca hispano en relación con sus perspectivas sínicas, sino que también nos permite observar las estrategias y los métodos adoptados para crear contactos con aquel imperio.</p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>The present article analyzes a profound significance but rarely known historical event: The first diplomatic mission of the Emperor Philip II sending to China.<br />We can approach and understand the decision-making mechanism of the Spanish government to complete such diplomatic missions in sixteenth century. In addition, Philip II once wrote to the Chinese emperor one letter, through which we can not only know the Spanish monarch´s familiarity and relevant knowledge of China, but also can observe the methods and tactics that Philip II used in his attempt to establish diplomatic<br />relations with that Empire.</p>

AbstractThe towering earthen mound standing at the center of the First Emperor of Qin, Qin Shihuangdi's (259–210 b.c.e.) Lishan necropolis at present-day Lintong in Xi'an, Shaanxi province was arguably the single greatest burial marker in ancient China. For centuries, this gigantic unopened monument has sparked curiosity and aroused interest among people regarding its nature. Without physically damaging the target, in 2001–2003 Chinese archaeologists used a new geophysical remote sensor to scan the surface of the mound, digitally probed into its inner structure, and detected a nine-stepped wall that bounds an aboveground burial shaft stretching down deep into the ground. This novel structure begs the following questions: what are the basic elements of this tomb mound, how do they work together within a coherent plan, and why was it made?Based on previous scholarship, this article conducts a more thorough analysis of the tomb mound and compares it with the excavated Eastern Zhou royal tombs of the Qin, Wei, Zhao, Qi, Chu, Han, Yan, and Zhongshan states. The results demonstrate that rather than following a single model of a single state, the Lishan tomb mound incorporated almost all the major features of its Eastern Zhou predecessors, including but not limited to the external tumulus, the internal stepped wall or terrace, simulated galleries, and the freestanding ritual halls. This article argues that by creatively incorporating all the provincial ingredients into one imperial unity, the complex tomb mound unified multiple funerary practices of China. What's more, the tomb mound, most likely constructed after Qin's political unification of China in 221 b.c.e., perfectly embodies the new notion of empire and the political ambition of the First Emperor who strove throughout his life for becoming the “first” in Chinese history by merging all the past traditions.

While copper-printing can be traced back to the Yuan Dynasty in China, the art of copper-engraving was introduced by the Italian missionary, Matteo Ripa, in 1711. The first work to be printed with this new technique was Illustrations of 36 Vista ofthejehol Palace (1712). The Qianlong emperor wanted pictures of his military campaigns in Eastern Turkestan engraved on copper, and so he arranged for a series of sixteen engravings to be executed in Europe. Following the success of this initiative, pictures of his subsequent military exploits were engraved on copper by Chinese artists. Thus, while the West learned a great deal from China about paper and printing, copper-engraving is a technique which China acquired from the West in spite of a supposed lack of interest in the West.

This is an interpretive study that explores the potency of consumption culture in China through a selected group that belongs to the first generation of the one-child policy – the 'Little Emperors'. This is a population that is unprecedented, not only in China but also in human history. The dawning of postmodernity has ushered in a consumption culture. Fashion and brands are chosen as the consumption sites in this study in view of their significance: they are accessible and inundated with symbolic meanings for the construction of identities. In the vertigo of postmodernity, there is a sudden excess of commodities and signs in the marketplace. Anchored in traditional Chinese values and operating from a holistic perspective, this first generation of Little Emperors has cultured a different kind of consumption literacy in the 'Postmodern(Eas)t Mall'. They are brand raisers, in the context, there is a salient socio-cultural logic in symbolic consumption, an outside-in dialectical process in the self construct, a layered self with a strong institutional influence and discipline ascribed or imagined, they are happy consumers, even though they may not know fashion or brands very well.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the historiography of Qin Shi Huang. I will focus my analysis on the perspectives of scholars from three periods: the Han Dynasty, late 19th century to early 20th century, and last the 30 to 40 years of Communist Party rule. Through analysis of sources from each of the three periods, I will trace the evolution of the shifting perspectives on Qin Shi Huang to explain why this controversial figure has remained relevant throughout the ages.

This dissertation concerns the ways in which a Chinese civilizing project intervened powerfully in cultural and social change in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang from the 1870s through the 1930s. I demonstrate that the efforts of officials following an ideology of domination and transformation rooted in the Chinese Classics changed the ways that people associated with each other and defined themselves and how Muslims understood their place in history and in global space. Chinese power is central to the history of modern Xinjiang and to the Uyghur people, not only because the Chinese center has dominated the area as a periphery, but because of the ways in which that power intervened in society and culture on the local level. The processes and ramifications of the Chinese government in late-Qing and early Republican Xinjiang demonstrates strong parallels with colonialism in the context of European empire. This dissertation does not focus on the question of typology, however, but instead draws on methods from colonial history to explore the dynamics of a linguistically and religiously heterogeneous society. In order to do so, I draw on local archival documents in Chinese and Turkic and place them into dialogue with the broader Turkic-language textual record. This dissertation thus proceeds from the inception of the ideology that drove the civilizing project, through its social ramifications, to the innovations that emerged in Islamicate literature and history in Xinjiang in this period.
East Asian Languages and Civilizations

This study is the first in a series that profiles different “friction points” among nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied States, examining issues of contention in their relations that can spark potential conflict and nuclear escalation. It considers the multipolar dynamics between the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, and examines how fundamental mistrust among the three filters into their readings of each other’s nuclear strategies, with the potential to have an impact on escalatory risk scenarios. It then outlines a series of recommendations for the ‘great powers’ to bridge strategic perception gaps and reduce relevant risks. Part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research on nuclear risk reduction, this study is intended to feed into the dialogue on taking forward risk reduction – and on the development of practical and feasible baskets of measures that can close pathways to use of nuclear weapons.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) and science and technology intelligence (STI) are realized differently in the United States and China, China putting greater value on both. In the United States’ understanding, OSINT “enables” classified reporting, while in China it is the intelligence of first resort. This contrast extends to STI which has a lower priority in the U.S. system, whereas China and its top leaders personally lavish great attention on STI and rely on it for national decisions. Establishing a “National S&T Analysis Center” within the U.S. government could help to address these challenges.

Software vulnerability discovery, patching, and exploitation—collectively known as the vulnerability lifecycle—is time consuming and labor intensive. Automating the process could significantly improve software security and offensive hacking. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Cyber Grand Challenge supported teams of researchers from 2014 to 2016 that worked to create these tools. China took notice. In 2017, China hosted its first Robot Hacking Game, seeking to automate the software vulnerability lifecycle. Since then, China has hosted seven such competitions and the People’s Liberation Army has increased its role in hosting the games.

For the first time, a Chinese company—Huawei—is set to lead the global transition from one key national security infrastructure technology to the next. How did Washington, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, fail to protect U.S. firms in this strategic technology and allow a geopolitical competitor to take a leadership position in a national security relevant critical infrastructure such as telecommunications? This policy brief highlights the characteristics of 5G development that China leveraged, exploited, and supported to take the lead in this key technology. The Huawei case study is in some ways the canary in the coal mine for emerging technologies and an illustration of what can happen to U.S. competitiveness when China’s companies do not have to base decisions on market forces.

Forced by the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis to recognize the external vulnerabilities that openness to volatile capital flows result in and upset over the post-crisis policy responses imposed by the IMF, countries in the sub-region saw the need for a regional financial safety net that can pre-empt or mitigate future crises. At the outset, the aim of the initiative, then led by Japan, was to create a facility or design a mechanism that was independent of the United States and the IMF, since the former was less concerned with vulnerabilities in Asia than it was in Latin America and that the latter’s recommendations proved damaging for countries in the region. But US opposition and inherited geopolitical tensions in the region blocked Japan’s initial proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of regional IMF. As an alternative, the ASEAN+3 grouping (ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea) opted for more flexible arrangements, at the core of which was a network of multilateral and bilateral central bank swap agreements. While central bank swap agreements have played a role in crisis management, the effort to make them the central instruments of a cooperatively established regional safety net, the Chiang Mai Initiative, failed. During the crises of 2008 and 2020 countries covered by the Initiative chose not to rely on the facility, preferring to turn to multilateral institutions such as the ADB, World Bank and IMF or enter into bilateral agreements within and outside the region for assistance. The fundamental problem was that because of an effort to appease the US and the IMF and the use of the IMF as a foil against the dominance of a regional power like Japan, the regional arrangement was not a real alternative to traditional sources of balance of payments support. In particular, access to significant financial assistance under the arrangement required a country to be supported first by an IMF program and be subject to the IMF’s conditions and surveillance. The failure of the multilateral effort meant that a specifically Asian safety net independent of the US and the IMF had to be one constructed by a regional power involving support for a network of bilateral agreements. Japan was the first regional power to seek to build such a network through it post-1997 Miyazawa Initiative. But its own complex relationship with the US meant that its intervention could not be sustained, more so because of the crisis that engulfed Japan in 1990. But the prospect of regional independence in crisis resolution has revived with the rise of China as a regional and global power. This time both economics and China’s independence from the US seem to improve prospects of successful regional cooperation to address financial vulnerability. A history of tensions between China and its neighbours and the fear of Chinese dominance may yet lead to one more failure. But, as of now, the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s support for a large number of bilateral swap arrangements and its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership seem to suggest that Asian countries may finally come into their own.

In recent years, mission-oriented approaches have received growing interest in science, technology and innovation (STI) policies against the background of two developments. First, while so-called “horizontal” or “generic” approaches to research, technology and innovation policies have largely been successful in improving the general innovation performance or the rate of innovation, there are perceived limitations in terms of insufficiently addressing the direction of technological change and innovation. Second, “grand societal challenges” emerged on policy agendas, such as climate change, security, food and energy supply or ageing populations, which call for thematic orientation and the targeting of research and innovation efforts. In addition, the apparent success of some mission-oriented initiatives in countries like China, South Korea, and the United States in boosting technological development for purposes of strengthening competitiveness contributed to boosting the interest in targeted and directional government interventions in STI. Against the backdrop of this renewed interest in mission-oriented STI policy, the OECD has addressed the growing importance of this topic and launched a project looking into current experiences with Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy (MOIP). The present study on MOIP in Austria was commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Energy, Mobility, Environment, Innovation and Technologiy (BMK) and comprises the Austrian contributions to this OECD project. The study aims at contributing Austrian experiences to the international debate and to stimulate a national debate on MOIP.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.