Academic literature on the topic 'Foreign exchange rates – Zambia'

When Zambia introduced weekly foreign-exchange auctions in October 1985 in order to determine the value of the kwacha vis-à-vis the dollar, together with other measures aiming at liberalising external and internal trade and at restructuring the pattern of production, they were widely acclaimed as a model for reforms elsewhere in the continent. The Economist praised Zambia for ‘taking one of the bravest economic gambles that any African country has taken’,1 implying that even in the view of liberal commentators the Government ran a considerable risk in trying to implement this reform programme. The new measures enabled Zambia to reach a fresh stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund in early 1986, the previous one having broken down in 1985 because the authorities failed to meet the I.M.F.'s economic targets.

Abstract The main goal of this paper is to discuss the dynamics of public debt servicing – both domestic and foreign – in Zambia, tracing the trends, reforms and challenges over the period from 1964 to 2015. The paper shows that the exceptional rise in public debt servicing obligations in Zambia over the period under review has been principally due to high domestic and foreign interest rates, frequent debt rescheduling at commercial rates, and capitalisation of non-liquidated service obligations at commercial rates. Also revealed in the paper is the fact that prior to 2005, Zambia experienced severe public debt servicing problems which eased after 2006 owing to debt relief initiatives and an economic rebound. Among the government debt service reforms discussed in the paper are structural adjustments in foreign exchange management, fiscal and monetary reforms, and aggressive engagement of traditional creditors. Primary among the identified challenges of public debt servicing in Zambia was the insistent economic crises that dogged the country during the study period. Notwithstanding the current public debt service sustainability and remarkable economic performance that characterise the country today, the paper found that the recent contraction of nonconcessional loans by the state poses a threat to debt service sustainability in future. Hence, the paper recommends, among other things, for aligning of public sector infrastructure spending with revenues to ensure budget sustainability, and to continue diversifying the economy to minimise the impact of external commodity price shocks on the economy.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis for two Southern African countries, namely: Lesotho and Zambia. Design/methodology/approach The authors utilized four econometric tests to examine the existence of the PPP hypothesis in Lesotho and Zambia. These tests include two unit root tests without structural breaks – the Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares (DF-GLS) test and the Ng-Perron test; and two unit root tests with structural breaks – the Perron test and the Zivot-Andrews test. The authors’ empirical analysis is based on an annual data set with varying time periods. The sample period spanned 1960-2010 and 1955-2010, for Lesotho and Zambia, respectively. Findings The authors found that the PPP hypothesis was supported in the case of Lesotho, but rejected in the case of Zambia. Originality/value This paper is the first to simultaneously explore the exchange rate policies, trends, and the PPP for these two countries. The implication of this finding is that Lesotho is unlikely to profit immensely from trade and investment arbitrages; whereas Zambia is more likely to profit immensely from trade and investment arbitrage by trading with the USA. Moreover, the authors’ findings indicate that the PPP doctrine may be a useful guide for the exchange rate and other macroeconomic adjustment policies in Lesotho but not in Zambia.

The exchange rate is the price of one currency against another currency or currencies of a group of countries. Real exchange rates are important because they show the external competitiveness of a country‟s economy. Thus, when the exchange rate of a country is misaligned, this will affect its trade, production and the welfare of people. This study analysed macroeconomic determinants of the real exchange rate and dynamic adjustment of the real exchange rate as a result of shocks to these determinants. The study also determined the extent of misalignment of the real exchange rate in Malawi and Zambia and identified variables that contributed to it. Such information is important to policy makers. Quarterly data were used for both countries from 1980:1-2008:4. The literature review identified those variables that determine the exchange rate and these include government consumption, foreign aid, net foreign assets, commodity prices, terms of trade, domestic credit, openness and the Balassa Samuelson effect (technological progress). To determine the long-run relationship between the exchange rate and its determinants, we employed the Johansen approach and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). For robustness check on the long-run and shortrun effects of determinants on the exchange rate, variance decomposition and impulse response analyses were used. Results in the study show that in Malawi for both models, an increase in LAID, LGCON and LTOT resulted in real exchange rate depreciation and increases in LDC, NFA and LNEER resulted in an appreciation. In Zambia, increases in LAID, LGCON, LOPEN and LTOT caused the real exchange rate to depreciate while increases in LDC, NFA and LCOPPER led to an appreciation. Lagged LREER and LNEER were found to have short run effects on the equilibrium exchange rate for Malawi and lagged LCOPPER and LDC for Zambia. Periods of exchange rate misalignment were found in both countries. It was also found that the coefficient of speed of adjustment in Malawi in models 1 and 2 indicate that 11% and 27% of the variation in the real exchange rate from its equilibrium adjust each quarter respectively. The speed of adjustment for Zambia in both models was 45% and 47% respectively, higher than that of Malawi. Foreign aid has proven to be important in exchange rate misalignment in both countries, though this was not really expected in the case of Zambia. Given these results, it may be of interest to policy makers to understand which variables impact most on the exchange rate and how misalignment due to these determinants can be minimised.

An attempt is made to create a model of exchange rates that explains the short term, daily levels of the foreign exchange spot market. The model is a monetary type that focuses on the eurocurrency markets and the current account. It has a liquidity preference form and employs daily data. The futures rate, the euro interest rate, the eurocurrency money stocks and a current account variable are the individual variables of the model. The futures rate and the euro interest rates are from the assumed Fisher's 'Covered Interest Rate Paradigm'. The eurocurrency money stock variable's justification is based on the real world structure of the spot market where the foreign exchange desks of the major world commercial banks are the dominant players. The current account variable, which is motivated by a desire to improve on the short run performance of the Purchasing Power Parity variable of other monetary models, is justified by trade theory. The liquidity preference form of the model is in keeping with current monetary models. The econometric results show that the model is better than the random walk model. However the results of the individual variables are mixed. The futures rate accounts for the vast majority of the model's success. Although the eurocurrency variable is as statistically significant as the interest rate differentials from the widely accepted Fisher's Covered Interest Rate Parity paradigm, neither was as significant as the futures rate. The current account variable results are not statistically significant. Thus, the current account variable may be discarded while the eurocurrency interest rates and euromoney variables warrant further study. As a result of the dominance of the futures rate variable, models that cry to capture rational expectations such as the News or Chaos Models are appealing. This rational expectations characteristic of the market combined with the dominance of speculation over economic fundamentals also points toward game theory as a good candidate for further study.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-219).
There is a wealth of information available on modelling foreign exchange time series data, however, research studies on modelling and predicting high frequency foreign exchange data is less prominent. Furthermore, there does not appear to be much evidence supporting work on the modelling and prediction of high frequency South African Rand/United States Dollar (ZAR/USD) exchange rates. A fair amount of noise is embedded in high frequency time series data, especially the ZAR/USD exchange rates, and the modelling of these time series requires the use of specialized models. In addition, lengthy high frequency foreign exchange data is largely unavailable for the South African market. This dissertation undertakes empirical explorations to model high frequency foreign exchange time series (primarily the ZAR/USD time series), through the use of multi-agent neural networks, linear Kalman filters and fuzzy Markov chain theory.

In the Keynesian models, such as Mundell-Fleming model, it is accepted that there is a significant relationship between interest rates and the value of national currency. When interest rate increases, demand for assets in terms of national currency rises and the value of national currency ascends, but in this case because of diminishing exports, the balance of trade deteriorates. In this study, it is stressed that the value of national currency is determined by productivity and output increasing. This study analysis export, interest rate, exchange rate and inflation relationship for Kyrgyzstan economy for the period of 2002:1-2017:4 The VAR granger causality method is used to get the relationship among the variables used in this study. The result of VAR granger causality test shows that there is causality from exchange rate to inflation. Also, it has been found that there has been causality running from inflation to interest rate.

We study how capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy tame credit supply booms, respectively targeting foreign and domestic bank debt. For identification, we exploit the simultaneous introduction of capital controls on foreign exchange (FX) debt inflows and an increase of reserve requirements on domestic bank deposits in Colombia during a strong credit boom, as well as credit registry and bank balance sheet data. Our results suggest that first, an increase in the local monetary policy rate, raising the interest rate spread with the United States, allows more FX-indebted banks to carry trade cheap FX funds with more expensive peso lending, especially toward riskier, opaque firms. Capital controls tax FX debt and break the carry trade. Second, the increase in reserve requirements on domestic deposits directly reduces credit supply, and more so for riskier, opaque firms, rather than enhances the transmission of monetary rates on credit supply. Importantly, different banks finance credit in the boom with either domestic or foreign (FX) financing. Hence, capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy complementarily mitigate the boom and the associated risk-taking through two distinct channels

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

From this edition, the Financial Stability Report will have fewer pages with some changes in its structure. The purpose of this change is to present the most relevant facts of the financial system and their implications on the financial stability. This allows displaying the analysis more concisely and clearly, as it will focus on describing the evolution of the variables that have the greatest impact on the performance of the financial system, for estimating then the effect of a possible materialization of these risks on the financial health of the institutions. The changing dynamics of the risks faced by the financial system implies that the content of the Report adopts this new structure; therefore, some analyses and series that were regularly included will not necessarily be in each issue. However, the statistical annex that accompanies the publication of the Report will continue to present the series that were traditionally included, regardless of whether or not they are part of the content of the Report. In this way we expect to contribute in a more comprehensive way to the study and analysis of the stability of the Colombian financial system. Executive Summary During the first half of 2015, the main advanced economies showed a slow recovery on their growth, while emerging economies continued with their slowdown trend. Domestic demand in the United States allowed for stabilization on its average growth for the first half of the year, while other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the euro zone, and Japan showed a more gradual recovery. On the other hand, the Chinese economy exhibited the lowest growth rate in five years, which has resulted in lower global dynamism. This has led to a fall in prices of the main export goods of some Latin American economies, especially oil, whose price has also responded to a larger global supply. The decrease in the terms of trade of the Latin American economies has had an impact on national income, domestic demand, and growth. This scenario has been reflected in increases in sovereign risk spreads, devaluations of stock indices, and depreciation of the exchange rates of most countries in the region. For Colombia, the fall in oil prices has also led to a decline in the terms of trade, resulting in pressure on the dynamics of national income. Additionally, the lower demand for exports helped to widen the current account deficit. This affected the prospects and economic growth of the country during the first half of 2015. This economic context could have an impact on the payment capacity of debtors and on the valuation of investments, affecting the soundness of the financial system. However, the results of the analysis featured in this edition of the Report show that, facing an adverse scenario, the vulnerability of the financial system in terms of solvency and liquidity is low. The analysis of the current situation of credit institutions (CI) shows that growth of the gross loan portfolio remained relatively stable, as well as the loan portfolio quality indicators, except for microcredit, which showed a decrease in these indicators. Regarding liabilities, traditional sources of funding have lost market share versus non-traditional ones (bonds, money market operations and in the interbank market), but still represent more than 70%. Moreover, the solvency indicator remained relatively stable. As for non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the slowdown observed during the first six months of 2015 in the real annual growth of the assets total, both in the proprietary and third party position, stands out. The analysis of the main debtors of the financial system shows that indebtedness of the private corporate sector has increased in the last year, mostly driven by an increase in the debt balance with domestic and foreign financial institutions. However, the increase in this latter source of funding has been influenced by the depreciation of the Colombian peso vis-à-vis the US dollar since mid-2014. The financial indicators reflected a favorable behavior with respect to the historical average, except for the profitability indicators; although they were below the average, they have shown improvement in the last year. By economic sector, it is noted that the firms focused on farming, mining and transportation activities recorded the highest levels of risk perception by credit institutions, and the largest increases in default levels with respect to those observed in December 2014. Meanwhile, households have shown an increase in the financial burden, mainly due to growth in the consumer loan portfolio, in which the modalities of credit card, payroll deductible loan, revolving and vehicle loan are those that have reported greater increases in risk indicators. On the side of investments that could be affected by the devaluation in the portfolio of credit institutions and non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the largest share of public debt securities, variable-yield securities and domestic private debt securities is highlighted. The value of these portfolios fell between February and August 2015, driven by the devaluation in the market of these investments throughout the year. Furthermore, the analysis of the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) shows that all intermediaries showed adequate levels and exhibit a stable behavior. Likewise, the fragility analysis of the financial system associated with the increase in the use of non-traditional funding sources does not evidence a greater exposure to liquidity risk. Stress tests assess the impact of the possible joint materialization of credit and market risks, and reveal that neither the aggregate solvency indicator, nor the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) of the system would be below the established legal limits. The entities that result more individually affected have a low share in the total assets of the credit institutions; therefore, a risk to the financial system as a whole is not observed. José Darío Uribe Governor