Academic literature on the topic 'Forfeiture'

In order for the proceeds of unlawful activities to be completely dislodged from the criminals’ hands, the latter should be effectively deterred from allowing their assets to be used to execute or facilitate the commission of offences. When properly exacted, in the interests of justice and within the existing constitutional framework, the legal process known as asset forfeiture should ensure that crime never pays. Asset forfeiture refers to both criminal forfeiture, which is conviction based following the United Kingdom asset forfeiture regime and civil forfeiture, which is non-conviction based following the United States of America one.2 Chapter 5 provisions of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act3 (hereafter POCA) provides for court, Basdeo M – Search, Seizure and Asset Forfeiture in the South African Criminal Justice System: Drawing a Balance between Public Utility and Constitutional Rights (2013) LLD, University of South Africa in Chapter 5 where a comprehensive comparative study of SA POCA and United States of America’s asset forfeiture and origin is undertaken. 3 Act 121 of applications for a restraint, confiscation and realisation for the recovery of proceeds of unlawful activities. The restraint is invoked when a suspect is to be charged or has been charged or prosecuted, there are reasonable grounds to believe that a conviction may follow and that a confiscation order may be made. Chapter 6 provisions of POCA provide for court applications for preservation and forfeiture order targeting both the proceeds of unlawful activities and removal from public circulation of instruments or assets used in the commission of offences where the guilt of the wrongdoer is not relevant. POCA has a Schedule with 34 items setting out examples of offences in relation to which civil forfeiture may be invoked. When the State discharges this noble professed task in the name of public safety, security and crime combating, legal challenges arise. This is more so within a constitutional democratic context where both individual and property rights are enshrined and protected. This study deals with some of these challenges. To the mind of a legal researcher, the law of asset forfeiture is, in this process, moulded and developed. South Africa (a developing country), Canada and New Zealand (developed countries in the north and southern hemispheres) have constitutional democracies. They also have asset forfeiture regimes, which attracted the attention of the researcher. The question is: can the developing country learn some best practices from the developed countries in this particular field? It would be interesting to establish this and the level of development of this field in the three countries under study. South Africa, with no federal government, has nine Provinces, single asset forfeiture legislation5 (combining both criminal forfeiture i.e. restraint, confiscation and realisation applications and civil forfeiture i.e. preservation and forfeiture applications), and a criminal statute6 applicable to all such Provinces. It also has, like Canada and New Zealand, pockets of asset forfeiture provisions embedded in various statutes. There is only one asset forfeiture office under the umbrella of the National Prosecuting Authority.7 It has branches8 in the Provinces, invoking the provisions of POCA, since 1999. It is not part of the police department. The researcher joined the South African Port Elizabeth branch in March 2003, Bloemfontein, Kimberly and Mmabatho branches from 2010 to 2011, July 2012 onwards in the Port Elizabeth and has practical experience in this regard. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. The Namibian POCA 29 of 2004 is almost a replica of the South African POCA except that the former makes express recognition of the victims of the underlying victims. The Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as amended). The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) with its Head Office situated in Pretoria under the umbrella of the National Prosecution Authority, which Raylene Keightley in Young S Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property Legal Measures for Targeting the Proceeds of Crime (2009) Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.: Northampton, MA at 94 calls a specialist implementation agency. In Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, Bloemfontein, Kimberley, Mmabatho, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. It comprises of eleven Provinces to which the Criminal Code of Canada, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 1996 and a host of other statutes apply. Eight of the eleven Provinces have their own and distinct primary stand-alone asset forfeiture statutes introducing civil forfeiture10 as more fully explained in Chapter 2 of this study.

Magister Legum - LLM<br>This research paper aims to clarify and argue the need for Ethiopia to include civil forfeiture in its assets forfeiture legal framework. It will analyse the existing domestic assets forfeiture laws and international instruments on assets forfeiture. It will show how the new Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Proclamation and the other anti-corruption laws deal with assets forfeiture in general and civil forfeiture in particular. For a number of reasons, Ethiopian law enforcement is struggling to investigate crimes such as money laundering and corruption to obtain convictions.

Even if the main criminals of an organization are incarcerated, they will be replaced by others who would continue illegal activities, unless their financial assets are removed. Thus, civil forfeiture intends to dismantle the economic infrastructure of drug trafficking networks. Civil forfeiture considers the property as guilty, rather than the owner, and it may exist even if there is not a criminal action. Therefore, it is claimed that police agencies have chosen easy targets, such as wealthy drug users rather than major drug traffickers. Consequently, it has been particularly challenged on the basis of the Excessive Fines, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses. The use of criminal forfeiture instead of civil forfeiture and the elimination of the equitable sharing provision are considered to be the primary solutions.

Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is an attempt to prove that no agent can meet the demands for true moral responsibility. The Basic Argument proceeds on the assumption that, in order for an agent to be truly morally responsible for her actions, she must be truly responsible for her reasons for performing those actions, which Strawson contends is impossible since it requires an infinite regress of truly responsible decisions to have the reasons one has. In my thesis, I take issue with the Basic Argument. I argue that, contrary to Strawson’s claims, the Basic Argument is not persuasive to those who reject that one’s reasons cause one’s actions. For those who are willing to overlook this shortcoming, I then argue that it is possible for an agent to evade the threat of infinite regress, particularly in situations where two simultaneous choices (at least partially) explain each other.

Die hoeksteen van 'n oop en demokratiese samelewing is verskans in die Handves van Menseregte, gebaseer op menswaardigheid, gelyke beskerming en vryheid. 'n Verpligting word op die staat geplaas om dienooreenkomstig hierdie regte te respekteer, beskerm en te bevorder. Die eiendomsklousule word beskou as een van die belangrikste fundamentele regte wat beskerming geniet. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, 1996 (hierna verwys as die Grondwef) bepaal dat niemand mag, behalwe ingevolge 'n algemene regsvoorskrif, van eiendom ontneem word nie. Vervolgens bepaal dit ook dat geen regsvoorskrif arbitrere ontneming van eiendom mag veroorloof nie. 'n Eienaar se reg op eiendom is egter nie absoluut nie en kan beperk word deur daargestelde wetgewing wat inmenging vanaf staatsowerhede noodsaak en regverdig. Daar rus dus 'n verpligting op wetsgehoorsame eienaars en besitters van eiendom in 'n konstitusionele staat om hulle eiendom op 'n verantwoordelike wyse te bestuur en te beheer, en word dienooreenkomstig ontmoedig om dit nie vir kriminele doeleindes aan te wend nie. Die Wet op die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 121 van 1998 vorm die basis van 'n program van die Suid Afrikaanse regering om die kommerwekkende toename in georganiseerde misdaad, geldwassery en die aktiwiteite van kriminele sindikate aan te spreek. Gemeenregtelike en ander strafregtelike maatstawwe blyk 'n onvoldoende afskrikmiddel te wees om hierdie probleem susksesvol te bekamp. Die hoe-profiel misdaadsindikate en oortreders slaag dikwels daarin om die onwettige opbrengste van misdaad te verskuil, selfs al word hulle voor die gereg gedaag en skuldig bevind. Hierdie besonder ernstige verskynsel word as 'n bedreiging beskou vir ons land se demokrasie en ekonomie. Die Wet maak voorsiening vir besondere hoe boetes, asook beslagleggings- en verbeurdverklaringsbevele van enige eiendom wat "'n middel tot 'n misdaad" daarstel, insluitende enige voordele en bates wat bekom is deur onwettige aktiwiteite. Hierdie studie noodsaak 'n kritiese analise en ondersoek na die grondwetlikheid van hierdie bevele wat moontlik aanleiding kan gee tot die aantasting van sekere gevestigde konstitusionele regte en veral die reg om nie arbitrer van eiendom ontneem te word nie. As gevolg van die sivielregterlike aard van hierdie bevele kan ook geargumenteer word dat die betrokke oortreder se grondwetlike reg op 'n regverdige en billike verhoor geskend kan word. Van besondere belang is Hoofstuk 6 wat bepaal dat 'n skuldigbevinding nie 'n voorvereiste is vir die bekragtiging van so 'n bevel nie. Die vraag ontstaan dan ook of die interpretasie en toepassing van die Wet deur die howe in gevalle waar individue betrokke was by misdaad wat nie direk verband hou met georganiseerde misdaad nie, nie ook neerkom op 'n skending van die eiendomsklousule nie. In hierdie gevalle was daar dan ook wel gepaste alternatiewe strafregterlike maatreels beskikbaar wat as voldoende afskrikmiddel kon dien. Klem word ook gel§ op die impak van sulke bevele op onskuldige eienaars, derdes en kinders, en die beskerming wat die Wet bied. Alhoewel deurgaans beklemtoon word dat die strawwe soos vervat in die Wet nie gemik is op die eienaar nie maar op die (skuldige) eiendom wat gebruik is in misdaad, bestaan die moontlikheid dat hierdie bevele neerkom op buitensporige en selfs dubbele strafmaatreels wat uiteraard grondwetlik aanvegbaar kan wees.<br>Thesis (LL.M.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

Humankind is becoming increasingly dependent on algorithms in their everyday life. Algorithmic decision support has existed since the entrance of computers but are becoming more sophisticated with elements of Articial Intelligence (AI). Though many decision support systems outperform humans in many areas, e.g. in forecasting task, the willingness to trust and use algorithmic decision support is lower than in a corresponding human. Many factors have been investigated to why this algorithm aversion exists but there is a gap in research about the eects of scenario characteristics. Results provided by this study showed that people prefer recommendations from a human expert over algorithmic decision support. This was also re ected in the self-perceived likelihood of keeping a choice when the decision support recommended the other option, where the likelihood was lower for the group with human expert as the decision support. The results also showed that the decision supports, regardless of type, are more trusted by the user in an acquisition framed scenario than in a forfeiture framed. However, very limited support was found for the hypothesized interaction between decision support and scenario type, where it was expected that algorithm aversion would be stronger for forfeiture than acquisition scenarios. Moreover, the results showed that, independent of the experimental manipulations, participants with a positive general attitude towards AI had higher trust in algorithmic decision support. Together, these new results may be valuable for future research into algorithm aversion but must also to be extended and replicated using dierent scenarios and situations.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.<br>Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, committee chair; Sebastian Rand, Timothy O'Keefe, committee members. Electronic text (58 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58).

<p>The aim of this research paper is to examine the legal framework for the recovery of corruptly-acquired assets, with particular emphasis on the Nigerian situation. Its primary focus is a detailed examination of the legal mechanisms for the recovery of such assets in the context of international asset recovery. Despite the success of the Nigerian government in recovering the Abacha loot,8 siphoning off of public funds by public office holders continues, and charges of fraud persist against top bank executives alleged to have converted depositors&rsquo<br>funds fraudulently. The prevailing criminal or conviction-based forfeiture mechanism in Nigeria appears inadequate to deal effectively with these situations. The need to enhance capacity through the adoption of civil or non-conviction based forfeiture laws therefore becomes imperative.</p>