Journal articles on the topic 'Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984 – Methodology'

Partindo dos projetos de intelectualidade representados por Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) e Michel Foucault (1926-1984) na década de 1960, este artigo pretende analisar os conceitos de intelectual universal e de intelectual específico, bem como sua influência no pensamento francês contemporâneo e no engajamento político

Em 1969, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) se tornou chefe do departamento de filosofia da Universidade de Vincennes e publicou Archéologie du Savoir. Um ano intenso, no qual Foucault passa a encarnar a figura de intelectual engajado, o que se relaciona tanto com a experiência efervescente em Vincennes como primeiro período de sua obra, a Arqueologia (década de 1960). Ou seja, diferentemente das interpretações clássicas que atribuem apenas ao seu segundo período, a Genealogia (década de 1970), uma dimensão política, havia na Arqueologia um potencial para suscitar novas formas de engajamento político

Proponho uma interpretação das sexualidades nos Atos Apócrifos dos Apóstolos, a partir de conceitos presentes nos escritos do filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984), seguindo a seguinte trajetória: (1) começo com algumas considerações mais teóricas sobre o modo como Foucault abordou a questão da sexualidade nos seus livros, artigos e cursos; (2) sigo o caminho ao falar um pouco sobre as fontes primárias que utilizarei na parte final do meu escrito e, por fim, me ocupo com diversas citações e exemplos retirados dos Atos Apócrifos dos Apóstolos, como um modo de tentar demonstrar a diversidade de conceitos e práticas relacionadas à sexualidade, em grupos alternativos de cristianismo do mundo antigo.

<p>Como reconocimiento a los aportes de Foucault a la investigación histórica, este análisis relaciona historia y crítica con la comprensión del funcionamiento de la subjetividad moderna y contemporánea, con el fin de descifrar la forma como este autor revela las matrices de subjetivación que nos constituyen como sujetos modernos. La analítica de sus obras permite entender la coherencia de su objetivo al relacionar el trabajo histórico con la comprensión minuciosa del presente, y así ubicarse en una línea de trabajo establecida por Kant. Lo cual implica entender relaciones problemáticas, como las que establecemos entre su comprensión del mundo greco-romano y la búsqueda de formas históricas de vida que permitan construir posiciones de sujeto frente a las situaciones contemporáneas de los mundos neoliberales, orientadas a darle un sentido al discurso histórico asociándolo a la búsqueda de una fundamentación ética de la existencia.</p>

Análise de 1Timóteo 4,1-16 a partir do debate sobre as técnicas de si nos últimos escritos do filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984). No primeiro subitem, discuto a hipótese de que a obra do autor pode ser analisada a partir de três fases ou eixos temáticos. No segundo, afunilo a análise para a terceira fase do trabalho de Foucault, que pode ser designada de ética do cuidado de si. Por fim, procuro citar exemplos de uso do entorno teórico foucaultiano presente na aproximação de outros “objetos” empíricos, a fim de que fique mais fácil que se compreenda a análise final que faço das orientações dadas pelo autor da Primeira Carta a Timóteo a seu discípulo.

<p>O objetivo deste artigo é resgatar na obra de Michel Foucault (1926-1984) reflexões acerca da articulação entre o saber médico moderno e o poder do Estado em instalar políticas públicas de saúde como a que vemos em todo o mundo de isolamento social como medida preventiva contra o avanço da pandemia do Covid-19 no ano de 2020, demonstrando que esta estratégia não é uma novidade dos dias de hoje e como as reflexões de Foucault acerca do surgimento da medicina moderna e do Estado pode nos auxiliar a compreender esta quarentena que muitos estejam experenciando como uma estratégia biopolítica derivada desta relação saber-poder.</p>

Este artigo apresenta pesquisa que analisou 7.023 comentários feitos por homens e mulheres na página do programa Bem Estar, da Rede Globo, no Facebook. Buscou-se saber (a) quem, entre homens e mulheres, mais usa a internet para fazer confissões sobre o próprio corpo e (b) quais os assuntos que mais despertam essas confissões. O trabalho adota etnografia de tela. Concilia estudos de jornalismo, de gênero e o conceito de confissão de Michel Foucault (1926-1984). O texto diz que as confissões na web ajudam a formar um conjunto de informações sobre homens e mulheres, e que esse conjunto permite a criação de uma série de saberes/poderes sobre os corpos masculino e feminino.

O artigo utiliza o método de pesquisa bibliográfico-reflexivo para apresentar os conceitos de “arte de viver”, “exercícios espirituais” e “práticas de si”, trabalhados, cada um a seu modo, por Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) e Michel Foucault (1926-1984). O objetivo é apontar que, mesmo em meio aos problemas trazidos e evidenciados pela pandemia de COVID-19, é possível a transformação do indivíduo, no sentido de que, em meio ao caos, sempre deve haver esperança, de modo a modificar o olhar do sujeito em relação ao outro. Com isso, trazemos duas sessões principais: uma, que retoma o contexto da pandemia e, outra, que aponta, por meio das teorias filosóficas e dos dois referenciais, uma nova maneira de viver.

In dieser Arbeit wird das Konzept der Gouvernementalität des französischen Philosophen Michel Foucault (1926–1984) vorgestellt und seine Übertragung auf die Pflegewissenschaft aufgezeigt. Der Begriff Gouvernementalität entstammt den Spätschriften Foucaults und bildet eine Fortsetzung, Erweiterung und Akzentverschiebung seiner einflussreichen Analytik der Macht. Die Problemkomplexe Staat und Subjektivität kann Foucault mit der strategischen Konzeption von Macht nicht hinreichend unter einer einheitlichen analytischen Perspektive untersuchen. Erst mit dem Begriff der Regierung und dem Konzept der Gouvernementalität findet Foucault eine befriedigende Analysemethode. Machtbeziehungen werden hierbei unter dem Blickwinkel von Führung untersucht; so lassen sich Sozialtechnologien und Technologien des Selbst in ihrer Beziehung zueinander analysieren. Mittels dieser Perspektivenerweiterung gelingt die Analyse neoliberaler Gouvernementalität. Es lässt sich eine Neudefinition des Verhältnisses von Staat und Ökonomie aufzeigen, wobei der Markt zum regulierenden Prinzip des Staates wird und das Ökonomische alle Bereiche menschlichen Handelns umfasst. Die bisherige Foucault-Rezeption in der Pflegewissenschaft schließt (bis auf wenige Ausnahmen) nicht an die Spätschriften Foucaults an und bleibt damit in ihren Möglichkeiten begrenzt. Exemplarisch wird in dieser Arbeit der Qualitätsdiskurs und die Problematik der Bedürfnisinterpretation untersucht. In beiden Feldern lässt sich zeigen, wie sowohl die Patienten als auch die Pflegenden im Sinne neoliberaler Subjektbildung geformt werden und letztlich pflegerisches Handeln zu ökonomischem Handeln transformiert wird.

<p>Tendo em vista que cada encenador exige uma determinada técnica para cada proposta estética, os atores envolvidos nesse processo devem acessar campos outros na complementação de suas técnicas. Assim, este artigo tem por objetivo realizar uma breve discussão acerca das espacialidades que compõem a formação do ator. Tomamos como base teórica o conceito de Heterotopia, formulado pelo filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984), onde o mesmo vai apresentar a temática espacial como o grande eixo temático do século XX. Lançamos mão do conceito e propomos a observância da diversidade espacial que os atores na contemporaneidade dispõem para realizar a sua formação e/ou continuá-la. </p><p><strong>Palavras- chave</strong>: Formação, Ator, Espacialidades. </p>

Este relato procura sintetizar elementos de pesquisa (e prática) docente por meio de projeto desenvolvido no âmbito do grupo de pesquisa, trabalhando, sobretudo, com estudantes de nível superior (cursos de licenciatura). Enfatiza a pesquisa a partir do conceito de genealogia do filósofo Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Por meio desse conceito, pensa a relação entre ciência e ensino, problematizado a percepção acerca do método e da historicidade do conhecimento. Nessa direção, destaca também as contribuições de Michel Foucault (1926-1984) na esteira de sua produção genealógica. Logicamente considerando a distância temporal entre os dois pensadores e a especificidade de suas obras. Por fim, questiona a superação da crítica dialética, do pensamento dualista e das matrizes reativas da ciência, apresentando o enredo de uma <em>Gaia Ciência. </em>

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre a noção de sujeito e poder caracterizada por Michel Foucault (1926-1984), considerando suas três fases intelectuais e suas possibilidades nos estudos de organizações e gestão de pessoas. Argumenta-se que os modos como o sujeito foi caracterizado em suas fases intelectuais reflete os modos como o indivíduo fora gerido nas organizações, bem como aponta o potencial que a abordagem foucaultiana oferece para as análises sobre os sujeitos e as relações de poder nas organizações. Na fase arqueológica, propõe-se priorizar o estudo dos discursos organizacionais; na genealogia, argumenta-se sobre a proposta de avançar nas análises do poder disciplinar, poder relacional e biopolítica; na ética, sugere-se a necessidade de analisar a constituição de subjetividades no espaço de trabalho.

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre a noção de sujeito e poder caracterizada por Michel Foucault (1926-1984), considerando suas três fases intelectuais e suas possibilidades nos estudos de organizações e gestão de pessoas. Argumenta-se que os modos como o sujeito foi caracterizado em suas fases intelectuais reflete os modos como o indivíduo fora gerido nas organizações, bem como aponta o potencial que a abordagem foucaultiana oferece para as análises sobre os sujeitos e as relações de poder nas organizações. Na fase arqueológica, propõe-se priorizar o estudo dos discursos organizacionais; na genealogia, argumenta-se sobre a proposta de avançar nas análises do poder disciplinar, poder relacional e biopolítica; na ética, sugere-se a necessidade de analisar a constituição de subjetividades no espaço de trabalho.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a noção de vontade de verdade sob o prisma de exercício do poder, a partir das considerações desenvolvidas por Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) e Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Neste contexto, a problemática diz respeito aos modos como a verdade se relaciona com o humano, tanto para compreender a existência, como denuncia Nietzsche, quanto para produções de discurso, como indica Foucault. Assim, buscar-se-á responder: “A vontade de verdade restringe a capacidade humana de interpretar a existência? E, ainda: quais os limites estabelecidos entre a verdade e o humano, para que este continue atuando sob a perspectiva da superação nietzschiana e da subjetivação foucaultiana?”. Com isso em vista, serão utilizadas as obras A Gaia Ciência (1882) e Para a Genealogia da Moral (1887), de Nietzsche, em que o autor aborda a vontade de verdade a partir do modo como esta se desenvolve em paralelo à filosofia socrático-platônica, além dos reflexos desta no cristianismo, que se configura em vontade de domínio no ideal ascético. Não obstante, será analisado o posicionamento de Foucault em A Ordem do Discurso (1971), interpretando a vontade de verdade enquanto regra do discurso que promove uma forma de exercício do poder dentro da sociedade e impede, por sua vez, a subjetivação do sujeito através do dizer-verdadeiro. Desse modo, será possível entrever, ainda, uma relação teórica que tange os modos como Nietzsche e Foucault avaliam a noção de vontade de verdade e os seus desdobramentos quando associados à figura humana em sociedade.

<p>Michel Foucault (1926-1984) embora não tenha sistematizado uma Teoria ou Filosofia do Direito em sentido estrito e, mesmo não sendo da área jurídica,construiu suas propostas em diversas obras, as quais acabam tecendo críticas e considerações acerca do Direito Penal e do Sistema de Justiça Criminal, a partir do modelo panóptico e das novas formas de punição no ambito do cárcere, envolvendo a transição do modelo feudal para o sistema capitalista de produção. Nesse sentido que se pode perguntar: qual a concepção foucaultiana em relação às ilegalidades nesse novo modelo punitivo? Na hipótese a ser desenvolvida, Foucault parte de uma crítica ao formato das ilegalidades de bens e as ilegalidades de direitos, repensando o aparato judicial e seu estatuto jurídico o qual tem por finalidade “não a igualdade de todos perante a lei”, mas proteção da propriedade dos bens e, por consequência, a repressão ao ilegalismo popular; por outro lado, a permissão para a prática de ilícitos pelos detentores dos meios produtivos.</p><p><strong>Palavras chave: Ilegalidade, bens, direito, capitalismo</strong>.</p>

Michel Foucault (1926-1984), no curso Em defesa da sociedade (1976), explica a relação entre o biopoder e o racismo. Dentre as modalidades de racismo praticadas desde o século XIX, Foucault inclui o socialismo, sendo que neste há um racismo de tipo evolucionista, biológico, que funciona plenamente em relação aos doentes mentais, aos criminosos, aos adversários políticos etc., que foi necessário sempre que o socialismo teve de insistir no problema da luta contra o inimigo e da eliminação do adversário no interior da sociedade capitalista, e apareceu porque foi a única maneira, nesse caso, de pensar uma razão para matar o adversário. Por outro lado, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) publicou, em 1947, o livro Humanismo e Terror, no qual invoca o problema da violência praticada pela União Soviética (URSS), pondo em evidência a teoria e a prática da violência pelo regime comunista. Para Merleau-Ponty, quando se vive numa época em que a base tradicional de uma sociedade se destrói e o homem deve reconstruí-la e reconstruir também as relações humanas, a liberdade de cada um desaparece e a violência aparece. Isso seria como foi o princípio do comunismo, com Lênin. O que Merleau-Ponty questiona é se a violência praticada em 1947 pelo mesmo regime tem o mesmo sentido que tinha no leninismo. O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se há e quais são os pontos de toque entre a visão foucaultiana do racismo de Estado praticado pela URSS e a violência revolucionária identificada por Merleau-Ponty na mesma URSS.

O presente trabalho discute a crítica realizada pelo filósofo Richard Rorty (1931-2007) ao também filósofo Michel Foucault (1926-1984), e tem como objetivo elucidar em quais aspectos a crítica de Rorty seria ou não adequada a este último. Richard Rorty ficou conhecido pelas árduas análises que fez à filosofia tradicional, preocupada em representar o mundo e sua complexidade e desinteressada em resolver os problemas humanos, e a determinados filósofos do século XX, notavelmente Heidegger e Foucault, interessados menos em apresentar soluções viáveis aos problemas sociais que em divagar sobre questões intelectuais que levam apenas à falta de esperança nos modos pelos quais a sociedade está constituída. Desse modo, Rorty concebe as análises de Foucault sobre o poder como um exemplo de tais divagações (a impossibilidade de localizar o poder ou identificá-lo põe em questão a própria possibilidade de discussão sobre o mesmo) e o fato de Foucault ter se voltado para o cuidado de si como exemplo de desesperança e alheamento social, pois o que estaria em questão no cuidado de si não seria o bem comum ou a possibilidade de mudar determinada configuração social a fim de alcançar melhorias para as vidas humanas em seu seio comum (cidade, Estado, nação), mas a perspectiva de um auto aperfeiçoamento. É certo que Foucault não menciona maneiras politicamente viáveis da sociedade alcançar um melhor desenvolvimento, para que se encontre o problema de Foucault há que se fazer um deslocamento, e não de questões mais urgentes (problemas econômicos) para questões menos urgentes (problemas relacionados a minorias), mas de foco, de modo a se ter melhor discernimento sobre qual é o problema de cada um destes filósofos (Rorty e Foucault) e quais questões cada um pretende resolver. Palavras-Chave: Crítica. Análise. Social.

In Indian culture, Vedas and Upanishads take a prominent place and are considered as ancient. These ancient scriptures teach us that “Maathru Devo Bhava” (Web) which means a mother is thefirst god and ought to be given utmost respects. This verse proves to be absurd inMahasweta Devi’s short story “Breast Giver”. Mahasweta Devi was a Bengali Fiction writer. In her writings, subaltern predicaments occupy a central position in general and the woman in particular. Her most accolade works are Hajar Churashir Maa, Rudali, and Aranyer Adhikar. “Breast Giver” is originally written in Bengali and translated into English by a feminist critic, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. In the present story, Mahasweta Devi brings in the predicaments of a woman who sacrifices her life for bringing up the family as a bread winner and breathed her last as an orphan.The title of the story is used as a synonym for wet nurse. The present paper interprets “Breast Giver” from the point of view of power relations suggested by Michel Foucault (1926-1984) a Psychologist, a Philosopher, and a Historian.

Este ensaio pretende problematizar a teoria do populismo de Ernesto Laclau (1935-2014) diante dos frequentes tratamentos caricatos do termo que acabam por reduzi-lo a uma espécie de ameaça generalizada ao campo político. Laclau delimita o terreno democrático no qual uma construção não essencialista do político como populismo se inscreve utilizando, para tanto, ferramentas retóricas. Neste sentido, a relação entre populismo e democracia será abordada de duas maneiras: primeiramente, considerando as interpretações mais recentes de Nadia Urbinati (2019) e Pierre Rosanvallon (2020) e, em seguida, a partir do conceito de “parresía”, presente nos dois últimoscursos de Michel Foucault (1926-1984) no Collège de France. A retórica aparece como uma característicaconstitutiva da má parresía e, ao mesmo tempo, como a possibilidade oferecida por Laclau da significação do povo e do social como objetos coerentes. Neste contexto, buscaremos explicar como o populismo, situado entre a democracia e a verdade, pode ser considerado sinônimo de má parresía e quais os reflexos desta caracterização na teoria do populismo de Ernesto Laclau.

Pretendeu-se refletir sobre as semelhanças entre as Lettres de Cachet e os Psicodiagnósticos (Psicodiagnósticos de sujeitos considerados portadores de dificuldades de aprendizageme produzidos em determinadas circunstâncias), documentos produzidos em contextos distintos e distantes no tempo e no espaço, as prisões reais francesas do século XVIII e as escolas/hospitais no Brasil do século XXI. Tomou-se como base teórica obras de Foucault (1926-1984), que nos permite compreender que ambos os documentos são frutos de tensões engendradas por meios de poder e contrapoder, cujos mecanismos sociais pretendem silenciar as singularidades, justificando e definindo práticas avaliativas produtoras de discursos presentes nas práticas institucionais disciplinares e médicas e no cotidiano das instituições de ensino e hospitalares, determinando valores e crenças presentes na histórica relação existente entre linguagem e poder. Como metodologia de análise adotou-se a proposta do Paradigma Indiciário.***We have intended to speculate upon the similarities between the Lettres de Cachet and the Psychodiagnostics (Psychodiagnostics of individuals considered to have learning difficulties and produced in certain circumstances), documents produced in different contexts and distant in time and space, the French royal prisions from the XVIII century and the schools/hospitals in Brazil in the XXI century. The theoretical works of Foucault (1926-1984) were used as a basis in this research, which allows us to comprehend that both documents are results of engendered tensions by power and counterpower means, whose social mechanisms mean to silent the singularities, justifying and defining evaluative practices that produce speeches presented in disciplinary and medic institutional practices and in this educational and hospital institutions’ quotidian, determining values and beliefs that are found in the historical relationship between language and power. As an analytical methodology the indicatorial paradigm purpose was adopted.

Historian has been preserving a historical unity and continuity as a truth. There is an assumption that history has a ‘constant’. This paper explains and proves otherwise. This writing understands history is in fact filled with various ruptures, differences, and deviations. This uncertainty has taken place when ‘language’ becomes a focus of the study of history. In his L’Archeologie du savoir (1969), Michel Foucault (1926-1984) rejected the preconception of history as unity and continuity. He believed the history as a journey with various ruptures, differences, and irregularities that reveal uncertainty. This reversal has taken place when language as the focus’ study in the history of knowledge. Foucault has called this method as the Archaeology of Knowledge. This is the question which this paper is going to respond: “How does Michel Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, the analytical philosophy of language, elucidate the diversity within Marshall G.S. Hodgson’s history of Islam?” These three below mentioned questions respectively reflect a three-fold dimension of the diversity in Foucault’s thoughts as explained in his L’Archeologie du savoir (poststructuralism-structuralism, postmodernism, and philosophy of history). First, how does Hodgson, as a structuralist, write the history of Islam by way of developing system of discourses to reveal meaning; at the same time, as a poststructuralist, he reveals incoherence of discourses and its plurality of meanings? Second, how do we understand that the social structure in the history cannot be simply detached from the chains of power as a constitutive dimension of discourse? Third, how do we comprehend, that in every stages of history, they have its distinctive episteme and diversity of thoughts that support the formation of discourses? This research is essentially to explain the three perspectives of Foucault’s philosophy. At the same time, the three approaches in Hodgson’s writing on the history of Islam are also being explored. Both points of convergence and of divergence have become the whole study of this paper.

A presença da temática ambiental em cursos de formação de professores assume grande importância na atualidade sendo, inclusive, recomendada por alguns instrumentos normativos brasileiros, como a Política Nacional de Educação Ambiental e as Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais para a Educação Ambiental. Nesse sentido, o objetivo principal deste trabalho é o de compreender como as recomendações sobre a inserção da Educação Ambiental (EA) na formação inicial de professores estabelecidas pela legislação brasileira materializam-se nos Projetos Pedagógicos de dois cursos de Licenciatura em Física oferecidos por duas Instituições de Ensino Superior públicas localizadas no estado de São Paulo. O material selecionado foi analisado segundo a perspectiva de Michel Foucault (1926-1984), através da mobilização dos conceitos de formação discursiva, poder e sujeito. Foi possível constatar que esses documentos se apropriam do discurso que trata da presença da EA na formação inicial dos docentes, entretanto a mesma é implementada de maneiras bastante distintas nesses dois cursos. Embora a formação discursiva sobre a EA defenda que a temática ambiental deva estar presente na formação de professores, é possível constatar algumas resistências às diretrizes oficiais que apresentam tais recomendações e que pode ser decorrente da relação de poder estabelecida entre os instrumentos normativos e os Projetos Pedagógicos analisados.

As sociedades humanas relacionam-se a partir de intensas relações de poder, gerando conflitos políticos, econômicos e sócio ambientais. Conflitos são travados em torno da lei, das normas e da lucratividade. A visão de poder advinda de Foucault confronta a visão convencional de que o poder reside no Estado e é operacionalizado pelas suas instituições, entre elas o Direito. No Brasil, a tutela ambiental é uma área relativamente nova, que tem seu marco histórico na Política Nacional do Meio Ambiente (PNMA). Nesse contexto, o problema posto em destaque no artigo é: como as relações de poder convalidam decisões e posicionamentos em assuntos que envolvem a vida e o meio ambiente? Sob quais motivações as relações de poder tornam permissíveis a reincidência de eventos como recentemente ocorreu em Mariana (2015) e Brumadinho (2019) no Estado de Minas Gerais? Utilizou-se dos recursos da pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. O objetivo geral consiste em compreender as relações de poder que convalidam decisões e posicionamentos em assuntos que envolvem a vida e o meio ambiente. Sob esse prisma, fundamentou-se nas ideias e investigações de Michel Foucault (1926 - 1984). Contudo, foi na década de 1970, mediante as publicações realizadas sobre o poder nas relações sociais que o autor se destacou como um dos filósofos mais renomados do panorama cultural, na contemporaneidade. Conclui-se que é a partir da compreensão das relações de poder que talvez poder-se-á constituir uma perspectiva de desenvolvimento em que meio ambiente e vida possa se apresentar integradas e indissolúveis e sua multiplicidade de manifestação e, sobretudo em sua preservação. Palavras-Chave: Relações de poder. Meio ambiente. Desenvolvimento. Vida.

Ethnicity Chinese is group society nomads who almost occupy all over Indonesian territory arrived in remote areas even though even ethnicity this is almost too occupy all countries in the world. Existence of ethnicity Chinese in Aru has a long history and very interesting for examined. The Problem in research this is: how history society Chinese in the District The Aru Islands with use Method historical research. Historian England, Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943), gave three understanding about history, namely: (1) all history is history thinking, (2) knowledge history is enforcement back thought in mind historians whose history is being studied , and (3) knowledge history is a business inviting back thoughts of the past are wrapped up in context thoughts today are with contradict it, limit it from different fields from field them (Collingwood 2004: 134-139). It seems Collinwood is more emphasis on history thoughts and how the historian uses his mind to understand various things that are in event history. Way of thinking this is also dominant in thought the history of Michel Foucault (1926-1984) who tended to the history of ideas or thought (Foucault 2002). He admitted that history Indeed is ' cheap ' fields to anyone who wants to learn it, but on him also there space astray for those who aren't able to dive in room knowledge history in a manner deep particularly related with network knowledge unvisible. Research results showing that: Arrival ethnicity Chinese in Aru are caused because of reason economy because the difficulty life economy in China are urging the community to do migrant Exit from China. Aru with various results earth especially results in the sea that is pearls, Lola, sea cucumbers, and fish and bird paradise make Pull the power itself alone for migrants including ethnicity Chinese. Social adaptation conducted by ethnicity Chinese to the Aru community is very binding life social The Aru community own because ethnicity Chinese in life daily not create differently or distance between they are.

Purpose In order to explore the impact of the recent wave of a technological revolution on global culture and society, the purpose of this paper is to re-read the two most outstanding dystopian novels of the mid-twentieth century. George Orwell and Aldous Huxley observe and anticipate technological development in relation to questions of human nature and culture, individual identity and close relationships, matters of care, privacy and private life. The totalitarian regimes both authors experienced in their time have disappeared, yet today the two fields of high technology that fueled their fantasy are reaching levels of development to surpass Orwell’s and Huxley’s daunting visions. Design/methodology/approach This paper approaches the recent innovations in the information and communication technology as well as the upsurge of life sciences and bio-technology from a philosophical perspective, considering their impact on the social structure (division of labor, distribution of wealth) as well as on the symbolic order of advanced industrial societies (the sign and the body, life and death). Findings Taking up Michel Foucault’s distinction between ancient sovereign rule and modern biopolitics, the author suggests discerning a third stage of domination: bio economics plus culture industries. In contrast to the two previous forms of domination, this new regime does not endeavor to suppress but to foster and unleash life. Therefore, it instigates less resistance and opposition but meets with more approval and compliance. Domination in this neoliberal-libertarian guise may prove not less dangerous than the former totalitarian variant. It forces the author to re-think ways of resistance and critique. Originality/value This paper makes a theoretical contribution to the analysis of care, society and democracy.

e4488149This paper discusses the role of the Universities in defense of life, democracy and rule of the law, and science as a generator of spaces of resistance in day-to-day and as powerful tool for unmasking of authoritarianism. In this context, it presents the results of the research on the role of perpetrators of human rights violations during Brazilian military dictatorship. The investigation was carried out at the Federal University of Paraíba, by the Interdisciplinary Network for the Study of Violence–RIEV, with the participation of the University of València, in Spain. For this study, 31 Federal Public Prosecution Service’ criminal prosecutions filed between 2012 and 2018 were selected. It sought the concepts that emerge from the data that help to understand how the process of violations of human rights occurs. The Straussian Grounded Theory was the methodology used in this study. The analysis had three stages: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. From the analyzed data, three relevant conceptual categories emerged to support human rights education: banality of evil/cruelty, discipline of the body and suffering. The study contributes to actions to incorporate into the school curriculum the comprehension that human dignity should constitute the basic value of the democratic rule of law. It allows the recognition that the human being must be the center and the end of law and education. In this context, the educational process must contribute to the protection of the dignity of the human being.ResumoO presente artigo trata sobre o papel das universidades na defesa da vida, da democracia e do estado de direito, e o papel da ciência como geradora de espaços de resistência no cotidiano bem como poderosa ferramenta no desmascaramento do autoritarismo. Nesse contexto, apresenta os resultados da pesquisa sobre a atuação dos perpetradores de violações aos direitos humanos durante a ditadura militar brasileira. A investigação foi realizada pela Rede Interdisciplinar de Estudos da Violência–RIEV, na Universidade Federal da Paraíba, com participação da Universidade de València, na Espanha. Para a análise, foram selecionadas 31 ações penais ajuizadas pelo Ministério Público Federal entre os anos de 2012 e 2018. O objetivo foi averiguar os conceitos que emergem dos dados e que ajudam a compreender o processo de violações aos direitos humanos naquele período. A metodologia do estudo atendeu aos três estágios preconizados pela Teoria Fundamentada Straussiana: a codificação aberta, a codificação axial e a codificação seletiva. Dos dados analisados emergiram três categorias conceituais relevantes para fundamentar a educação para os direitos humanos: banalidade do mal/crueldade, disciplina dos corpos e sofrimento. O estudo vem contribuir para ações de incorporação no currículo escolar do entendimento de que a dignidade humana deve se constituir como valor básico do Estado Democrático de Direito. Permite o reconhecimento de que o ser humano deva ser o centro e o fim do direito e da educação. Neste sentido, o processo educativo deve contribuir para a proteção da dignidade da pessoa humana.ResumenEste artículo aborda el papel de las universidades en la defensa de la vida, la democracia y el estado de derecho, y de la ciencia como generador de espacios de resistencia en la vida cotidiana, así como una herramienta poderosa para desenmascarar el autoritarismo. En este contexto, presenta los resultados de la investigación sobre el desempeño de los autores de violaciones de derechos humanos en el contexto de la dictadura militar brasileña. La investigación fue realizada por la Red Interdisciplinaria para el Estudio de la Violencia - RIEV, en la Universidad Federal de Paraíba con la participación de la Universidad de València, en España. Fueron seleccionados 31 acciones penales presentadas por el Ministerio Público Federal entre 2012 y 2018. El objetivo era investigar los conceptos que emergen de los datos y que ayudan a comprender el proceso de violaciones de derechos humanos. La metodología utilizó las tres etapas recomendadas por la Teoría Fundamentada Straussiana: codificación abierta, codificación axial y codificación selectiva. Tres categorías conceptuales relevantes surgieron para apoyar la educación en derechos humanos: banalidad del mal/crueldad, disciplina de los cuerpos y sufrimiento. El estudio contribuye a las acciones para incorporar al currículo escolar la comprensión de que la dignidad humana debe constituirse como un valor básico del Estado de derecho democrático. Permite el reconocimiento de que el ser humano debe ser el centro y el fin de la ley y la educación. En este sentido, el proceso educativo debe contribuir a la protección de la dignidad de la persona humana.Palavras-chave: Direitos humanos. Ditadura. Dignidade humana.Keywords: Dictatorship. Human dignity. Human rights.Palabras claves: Derechos humanos. Dictadura. Dignidad humana.ReferencesAGAMBEN, Giorgio. Estado de exceção. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2004.ALENCAR, H. M; LA TAILLE, Y. Humilhação: O desrespeito no rebaixamento moral. Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, Rio de Janeiro, v. 59, n. 2, p. 217-231, 2007. Disponível em: http://pepsic.bvsalud.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1809-52672007000200011. Acesso em: 25 jul. 2019.ALVES, Maria Helena. Estado e oposição no Brasil: 1964 a 1984. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1989.ANDRADE, Marcelo. A banalidade do mal e as possibilidades da educação moral: contribuições arendtianas. Revista Brasileira de Educação, Rio de Janeiro, vol.15, n.43, pp.109-125, 2010. Disponível em: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbedu/v15n43/a08v15n43.pdf. Acesso em: 15 jul. 2019.ARENDT, Hannah. Eichmann em Jerusalém: um relato sobre a banalidade do mal. São Paulo: Vozes, 1999.ARENDT, Hannah. A vida do espírito: o pensar, o querer, o julgar. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 2000.BANDEIRA-DE-MELLO, Rodrigo; CUNHA, Cristiano Jose? Castro de Almeida. Operacionalizando o me?todo da Grounded Theory nas pesquisas em estrate?gia: te?cnicas e procedimentos de ana?lise com apoio do software Atlas/TI. In: ENCONTRO DE ESTUDOS EM ESTRATÉGIA DA ANPAD, 1., 2003, Curitiba. Anais [...]. Curitiba: Anpad, 2003.BERNSTEIN, J. M. Torture and dignity: An essay on moral injury. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.BRASIL. Lei nº 12.527, de 18 de novembro de 2011. Regula o acesso a informações previsto no inciso XXXIII do art. 5o , no inciso II do § 3o do art. 37 e no § 2o do art. 216 da Constituição Federal; altera a Lei no 8.112, de 11 de dezembro de 1990; revoga a Lei no 11.111, de 5 de maio de 2005, e dispositivos da Lei no 8.159, de 8 de janeiro de 1991; e dá outras providências. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República. [2019]. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/lei/l12527.htm. Acesso em: 25 jul. 2019.BRENNAND, Edna Gusmão de Góes; DUTRA, Delamar Volpato. The taint of torture and the brazilian legal system. 2019, no prelo.COELHO, Myrna. Tortura e suplício, ditadura e violência. Lutas Sociais, São Paulo, vol.18 n.32, p.148-162, jan./jun. 2014. Disponível em: http://www4.pucsp.br/neils/revista/vol.32/myrna_coelho.pdf. Acesso em: 20 maio. 2019.FERNANDES, Eugénia M. MAIA, Ângela Gorunded Theory. In: FERNANDES, Eugénia M.; ALMEIDA Leandro S. Métodos e técnicas de avaliação: contributos para a prática e investigação psicológicas. Braga: Universidade do Minho, 2001.FOUCAULT, Michel. Vigiar e punir. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1999.FOUCAULT, Michel. Microfísica do poder. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2000.FREIRE, P. Educação como prática da liberdade. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982.FREIRE, P. Política e educação. São Paulo: Cortez, 1993.FREIRE, Paulo; FAUNDEZ, Antonio. Por uma pedagogia da pergunta. 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2002.GOFFMAN, Erving. 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O presente artigo objetiva estabelecer uma breve análise da interpretação e apropriação do pensamento kantiano na filosofia desenvolvida por Michel Foucault (1926-1984) em suas obras As palavras e as coisas (1966) e O governo de si e dos outros, sendo este último resultado de um curso no Collége de France proferido entre os anos de 1982 e 1983.

O objetivo do presente trabalho é investigar a teoria de Michel Foucault (1926-1984), principalmente as descritas nas obras “Vigiar e Punir” e “Microfísica do Poder”, no que se referem a práticas de subjetivação no contexto escolar, ou seja, a forma como a escola tem fabricado sujeitos constitui o principal foco dessa investigação.

Antes de partir a Polonia, en septiembre de 1982, Michel Foucault recomienda en su testamento que no se realicen publicaciones póstumas de sus obras. En 2018, la editorial Gallimard incumple el deseo del filósofo al publicar Las confesiones de la carne, el último volumen de Historia de la sexualidad. Su edición ha corrido por cuenta de Frédéric Gros, reconocido también por algunas de las ediciones de los cursos del Collège de France.

Analytic concepts in middle Foucault. This article investigates prominent analytic concepts in the philosophical historiographies of Michel Foucault (1926–1984), with specific regards to the work done in the middle phase of his career. These concepts accentuate the relation between history, power and contingency within the context of social inquiry. The author qualifies a particular order in the isolation of these concepts from the middle part of Foucault’s oeuvre: the notion of present history is introduced as the central concept in Foucault’s analyses from this period. It is argued that the notion of present history sustains Foucault’s other unique historiographical and socio-diagnostic tools from the particular period, namely archaeology, genealogy, discourse and power analysis. The article contributes to Foucaultian scholarship by periodising these concepts within the larger oeuvre, without subordinating Foucault to the parameters of his own ‘method’.

Neste estudo investigamos a recepção do filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984) na Psicologia Social brasileira a partir da análise dos usos do autor nas publicações da Revista Psicologia & Sociedade (1986-2017), da Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Social (ABRAPSO). O corpo documental desta pesquisa histórica foi composto de 90 artigos que citaram nominalmente o autor. Caracterizou-se a produção levantada quanto ao ano de publicação, distribuição geográfica, vinculações institucionais das autorias, temas e delineamentos dos estudos. Foram encontradas citações do filósofo durante todo o recorte temporal estabelecido, sendo a primeira em 1986, e o ano com maior frequência, 2012. Os trabalhos ligam-se majoritariamente a Instituições de Ensino Superior Públicas brasileiras, especialmente das regiões Sudeste e Sul (74,4%). Dos 90 estudos, 54 foram teóricos, e 36, empíricos. Versaram sobre Reflexões conceituais e epistemológicas, Políticas Públicas, Reflexões sobre a Psicologia, Subjetivação, Gênero/Sexualidade/Feminismo, Infância/Adolescência/Juventude, Arte-Política e Outros.

Introduction In the following self-reflexive (examining my own experiences) piece I discuss the methodology of my PhD thesis which, completed in 2014 (Johnson On a Tightrope), focused on how women negotiate, reject and embody the expectations associated with contemporary pregnancy and mothering. In this qualitative research project I examined the types of pregnancy and parenting practices (defined as those practices undertaken to manage and maximise the success of women’s pregnancies and parenting) women engage in with reference to contemporary sources of information. Central to this, I studied the changing nature of pregnancy and mothering practices in the context of increasing digitalisation, with a particular focus on whether and how technologies enable new spaces for experiential learning and health responsibilisation. This also allowed me to query how various discourses work to inform particular ideas of ‘good’ or ‘appropriate’ mothering behaviours and mothering ideologies, and the expert patient ideal (Johnson Maternal Devices). An examination of the different resources and technologies women draw on during their transition to first-time motherhood reveals how dominant discourses are resisted, negotiated or differentially embodied by women facing first-time pregnancy and motherhood. Since the time I began my research, there has been an explosion of applications (apps) into the market. Pregnancy and mothering have been ‘appified’. Apps offer a unique way to order, engage with and reshape our bodies and biology today. They reflect wider cultural and social changes in the understanding of our identity, our ‘lifestyle’ and our body. In my study I drew on characterisations from participants in attempting to understand the affordances of apps and the role they may play during both pregnancy and new motherhood. I found that apps format motherhood and pregnancy in new ways, instituting new rules into new devices and offering templates which actively shape meanings and practices. They provide new ways to imagine or create foetal/child identity, to monitor child activity from a distance, to gather and interpret data and the enactment of “digital” helicopter parenting (Johnson Maternal Devices). Apps also represent a ‘tidbitisation’ of information which is delivered directly into the user’s intimate sphere, sometimes ‘pushed’ into this intimate sphere, no matter where they are. This ‘device-ification’ of mothering purports to turn it into an administrative and calculable activity, valuing data over subjective experiences and changing the meaning of what it is to mother and be a mother. Apps also represent the contemporary intersection between social media, medical advice, expectations of self-management and notions of convenience. They also creates new social relations and valuing practices, such as ‘likeability’ on Facebook, which have the potential to alter our understandings of health and identity. Increasing numbers of health initiatives are adopting apps in their promotional marketing campaigns and the appification of health means that medical knowledge is being increasingly incorporated into new sorts of social interactions. Ongoing research must consider the multiplicity of women’s engagement with these apps across the transition to first-time motherhood and for parents who are trying to manage child health. It would be productive to direct focus onto the lived experiences associated with apps rather than lauding or criticising the content of apps. Background The initial question that motivated my research was: ‘How do women draw on, weave together, and reject aspects of the dominant advice which configures contemporary perceptions of maternal subjectivity, encompassing specifically the transition to first-time motherhood?’ I was interested in what women in the transition to first-time motherhood experienced and how they reflected on and interpreted these experiences. The subjective accounts of women tell a particular story, so, rather than administering a survey to a large group of women I focused on in-depth, semi-structured but flexible interviews as a way of discovering participant experiences as expressed in their own words. Having only a small number of interview participants meant that I was able to analyse my data closely in a way that would be difficult with a larger sample. In total, I conducted twenty-two interviews with twelve women during January and September, 2012. This included two interviews with ten participants and one interview with the remaining two participants. The first interview was conducted during the third trimester of pregnancy, ranging from 32 to 38 weeks. The second interview was undertaken postnatally when the babies ranged from 3 to 7 months of age. For participant demographic information, please refer to earlier publications (Johnson Maternal Devices; Intimate Mothering Publics). Interviewing late in pregnancy and early in new motherhood provided a realistic sense of the changes, both positive and negative, which occur during this transition as well as the – at times – deep rift between experience and expectation. The time between interviews was important as it allowed women time to adjust somewhat to life as a new mum, allowed time for reflection on both the pregnancy and the early months of mothering. The interviews were conversational and relaxed in nature and allowed to flow in the direction the participant chose to take. The women were generous in sharing intimate details of their experiences from conception through to motherhood. Their responses revealed different ways of being pregnant, being supported and responsibilised during pregnancy, and the different ways women cope with stress, anxiety and more. The stories also demonstrate the amount of work, thought and often deliberate self-transformation which occurs throughout pregnancy, and as a new mother. I believe my personal biography influenced the data that I collected during the interviews. My age and sex advantaged my position as an interviewer. Being a relatively young female researcher it was easy to develop rapport with the participants. In addition, being a woman likely increased my access, as a researcher, to the intimate experiences women shared throughout the interviews, especially considering the gendered and personal nature of the research. It was also apparent that my absence of first-hand experience of pregnancy and mothering enhanced the depth of interview data, encouraging participants to provide access to details and feelings that they may have believed were unnecessary to discuss had I also been a mother. Rebecca Horn discusses a similar experience in her research with prison inmates and police staff, which she describes as being due to her projected image as an “innocent abroad” (96). It also meant that participants were more likely to share details because my lack of experience meant that I was not in a position to judge these experiences against my own. Throughout the interviews, the participants often wanted to know more about me, asking me questions like: How old are you? Have you ever been pregnant? Do you have a partner? Does doing this research turn you off having children? Does doing this research make you want to have children? What do you plan to do after you’ve finished your thesis? Similar to other researchers who discuss their interview experiences in self-reflexive pieces Edwards, Finch and Oakley, I found that by sharing some of my own personal experiences I was able to establish trust and develop rapport with the participants. Like Kasper I worked with the assumption that each interview is a collaborative and consensual enterprise among women. I focused on earning trust, displaying sensitivity and fairness, and showing support. The participants expressed genuine interest in my research and the findings it was generating, with most women keen to read any published findings from the research. Many participants asked to have a copy of their interview transcripts for posterity or to reflect on with friends or in future pregnancies. ‘Getting Personal’ Now that I am contemplating the extension of my research into the future I must think about how my position as a researcher has changed. As one of my key interests is the ways in which digital technologies impact on parenting I have to ask myself whether I will use this broad range of technologies myself, as a parent. If I do use these technologies, will I insert myself into my research asking questions about my own user experiences and considering whether my partner uses these technologies in a different way to myself? If so, how, and what are the implications of this? I also need to consider my child amongst this, as both a parent and a researcher. Am I comfortable with my child having a digital life from a young age? I have already contemplated this question and made the conscious decision not to discuss or mention my pregnancy on social media, Facebook in particular. This question will again be important when my partner and I make decisions around the different ways we choose to announce the birth of our first child. These questions will continue to be important to me as a parent in an increasingly digitalised world. Until I become a mother, (some time in the next five weeks) I believe I cannot answer these questions. Rather, this article functions as a sounding board, allowing me to begin contemplating these questions in my future dual role as a mother and a researcher. Becoming a mother will change my position as a researcher in other important ways. I will no longer be the inexperienced, childless researcher. I will continue to treat my participants as partners in my research but being a mother myself, intersubjectivity, “the acknowledgment of the reciprocal sharing of knowledge and experience between the researcher and the researched” (Shields and Dervin 67), will become all the more essential to my approach. In this way I would hope to continue to de-emphasise the conventional hierarchies and dichotomies of research by focusing on the dialectical relationship between myself and my research ‘partners’. It will be imperative that I not only listen to these women without judgement but that I also share the intricacies of my research project and my own experiences as a maternal subject. These women are the experts of their own lives (Kasper) and I am sure this research would benefit from their involvement from an early phase where they would be invited to share in the design of research questions and the collection and interpretation of results. This is particularly important when designing research on new technologies where the only experiences I can currently draw from are my own and perhaps those of friends, family and colleagues. Digital research methodologies are still in their infancy, as this special issue attests, and although research into the use of apps is growing, there continues to be little research into the user experiences of apps. Apps as Tools of Convenience? As noted above, apps create a “tidbitisation” of information (Johnson Maternal Devices), where information is convenient and accessible in small ‘tidbits’ that anyone can access anywhere, anytime on their smartphone. This is something I have already utilised during my pregnancy (checking symptoms, reading about baby’s development) and I am sure this will be useful for me as a new mum. I have also been using my smartphone for other baby-related resources such as gathering lists of lullabies and nursery rhymes. These few examples indicate that smartphones do offer a great number of conveniences to new parents. But, they could also appear worrisome – raising questions around smartphones as distractions from parenting or relying on smartphones to track health conditions or baby habits, and perhaps even the deferral of responsibility, for example, busy parents using apps to entertain children. At this stage we actually know very little about the user experience of apps for mothers and new parents and new research in this area needs to ask questions such as: Who uses apps and why? What are users paying attention to and what is ignored or ‘switched off’? Do push notifications actually work? Do they create a new form of responsibilisation and if so, what are the repercussions of this, particularly if these apps are directed towards women as new parents, rather than men? This last question is particularly important for a scholar such as myself in the field of Gender and Cultural Studies where questions of gender and gendering are often central to our research. I have found that, as apps continue to be developed at an alarming rate, those specific to parenting are, more often than not targeted to women rather than men. Those that are targeted to men are often patronising and poorly executed, lacking detailed information and emphasising gendered stereotypes (for examples, see Johnson Maternal Devices). This is important to note because I found in my study that app use constitutes part of the intimate relationship of parents-to-be and new parents. Male partners rarely read guidebooks or significant detail from other information sources and so apps played a role in their day-to-day gathering of knowledge, usually via their partner. Rather than reading a chapter of a book or googling a pregnancy symptom, quiet time chatting on the couch after work often included the sharing of information from apps or regular email updates on a variety of topics. Men used the same apps as women but this was usually on their partner’s phone, rather than their own. This raises another important question. How do we research indirect use of apps? Is this even possible? The obvious way to answer this question would be through the use of qualitative interviews. This is made difficult through the mere fact that we first must know who uses these apps indirectly before we recruit them into our research. Researching Digital Technologies through Discourse Analysis In my PhD the use of smartphones and apps only emerged as a theme of interest late into the research project. The constant mention of various apps during the interviews prompted me to examine a number of key pregnancy and parenting apps in terms of the discourses they mobilise and their functionality (Johnson Maternal Devices). As Dorothy Smith attests, we live in a textually mediated world. Pregnancy and parenting books, magazines, technologies such as apps and other forms of popular advice represent a mediated version of motherhood, parenthood and fatherhood. If these texts can influence and be influenced by patterns of parenting discourse then critical discourse analysis can contribute to an understanding of the ways in which mothering can be influenced or constructed by popular media and discourse. Thus, in my PhD research I applied discourse analysis to the study of apps. Discourse analysis examines how language constructs social phenomena and investigates the ways in which it produces certain social realities and expectations (Sunderland). Discourse analysis is valuable because of the questions it enables us to ask about the constructed nature of our experiences and the texts that we are exposed to. Smartphone apps, social media and the Internet are growing resources for women in the transition to first-time motherhood. These technologies require further research as they represent a particular way for women to engage with the neoliberal project of responsibilisation. Targeting first-time mothers and parents research allows access to users of digital technologies who most likely have a vested interest (i.e. the health and development of their children) in understanding the way new technologies are increasingly intervening in our everyday lives. Maternal subjects are likely to view such technologies as a means to monitor her pregnancies and her children’s health and development. A central aim of my research is to render visible the enduring nature of ideologies and expectations of motherhood – which include the ways in which women as mothers are responsibilised – and the ways in which different variants of mothering are inserted in new ways into tools of self-help, social media and new ‘pushy’ technologies (apps). This will reveal how discourse is constituted by mothers and how mothering discourse can work to constitute particular maternal practices and beliefs or expectations. Thus I argue that discourse analysis is central to the research of pregnancy/parenting apps. My research demonstrates how women draw on new technologies in rebellious, ironic or affirmative ways to enact different technologies of the self (Foucault). The texts can be viewed as disciplinary in a Foucauldian sense, and by analysing these different forms of advice it is possible to provide an ongoing demonstration of the difficulty of complying with the various demands of motherhood. Women’s interactions with a range of parenting discourses and attempts to create their own version of motherhood can be seen to constitute one component of the work of motherhood and the ways women practice and enact motherhood (this is discussed in detail in an article currently under review). Although researching the potential affordances of apps is important this research must be connected to user experience. In other words, are apps used in the ways we think they are? In order to move forward and ask questions such as: “Are women responsibilised and their conduct shaped in a new way via their smartphones in what I have characterised ‘push responsibilisation’?” we must move beyond discourse analysis and ask questions that focus on the user experience of apps. It would be useful to draw on existing research in other fields, which have started to develop a range of ethnographic methods and tools for research into computer-user interactions, applications and social media including Tinder, Grindr and Instagram. Other questions I wish to include in a future empirical study include: Who adopts these apps and why? Are there variations in the ways different generational users adopt apps? Who rejects these apps and why? Are push notifications ignored, considered obtrusive or do they prompt specific practices or actions? How are apps used? How do apps maintain already existing gender inequalities in parenting? In asking these questions I believe we could also begin to interrogate a much broader question, that is: “What can the use of devices during this particular ‘life stage’ tell us more broadly about mapping, tracking and quantifying the self?” This brings me again to the central question in this piece: How do we do this research? In this article I have not attempted to answer this question but rather to provoke discussion and encourage debate. In particular, I would like to consider new research methodologies which have the potential to extend our research capabilities and those whom we are able to involve in our research. An example would be conducting research online through pre-existing discussion forums. I have attended numerous academic events in the past two years where academics have started to ponder these questions more generally but my hope is that this article can act as encouragement for further debate. References Edwards, Rosalind. “Connecting Method and Epistimology: A White Woman Interviewing Black Women.” Women's Studies International Forum 13 (1990): 477-490. Finch, Janet. “It’s great to have someone to talk to”: The Ethics and Politics of Interviewing Women. Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice. Eds. Colin Bell and Helen Roberts. London: Routledge, 1984. Foucault, Michel. "Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault." Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Eds. Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998. Horn, Rebecca. “Reflexivity in Placement: Women Interviewing Women.” Feminism & Psychology 5 (1995): 94-98. Johnson, Sophia. “On a Tightrope? Technologies of Motherhood in Neoliberal Society.” PhD Thesis. Sydney: Department of Gender and Cultural Studies, University of Sydney, 2014. Johnson, Sophia. “‘Maternal Devices’, Social Media and the Self-Management of Pregnancy, Mothering and Child Health”. Societies 4.2 (2014): 330-350. Johnson, Sophia. “‘Intimate Mothering Publics’: Comparing Face-To-Face Support Groups and Internet Use for Women Seeking Information and Advice in the Transition to First-Time Motherhood.” Culture, Health and Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention and Care 17.2 (2015): 237-251. Kasper, Anne. “A Feminist, Qualitative Methodology: A Study of Women with Breast Cancer.” Qualitative Sociology 17.3 (1994): 263-281. Oakley, Ann. “Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms.” Doing Feminist Research. Ed. Helen Roberts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. Shields, Vickie Rutledge, and Brenda Dervin. “Sense-Making in Feminist Social Science Research: A Call to Enlarge the Methodological Options of Feminist Studies.” Women's Studies International Forum 16.1 (1993): 65-81. Smith, Dorothy. The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology. Boston: Northern University Press, 1987. Sunderland, J. “'Parenting' or 'Mothering'? The Case of Modern Childcare Magazines.” Discourse & Society 17.4 (2006): 503-528.

Literary history can be viewed alternately in a perspective of continuities or discontinuities. In the former perspective, what I perversely call postmodernism is simply an extension of modernism [which is], as everyone knows, a development of symbolism, which … is itself a specialisation of romanticismand who is there to say that the romantic concept of man does not find its origin in the great European Enlightenment? Etc. In the latter perspective, however, continuities [which are] maintained on a certain level of narrative abstraction (i.e., history [or aesthetic description]) are resisted in the interests of the quiddity and discreteness of art, the space that each work or action creates around itself. – Ihab Hassan Ihab Hassan’s words, published in 1975, continue to resonate today. How should we approach art? Can an artwork ever really fully be described by its critical review, or does its description only lead to an ever multiplying succession of terms? Michel Foucault spoke of the construction of modern sexuality as being seen as the hidden, irresolvable “truth” of our subjectivity, as that secret which we must constantly speak about, and hence as an “incitement to discourse” (Foucault, History of Sexuality). Since the Romantic period, the appreciation of aesthetics has been tied to the subjectivity of the individual and to the degree an art work appeals to the individual’s sense of self: to one’s personal refinement, emotions and so on. Art might be considered part of the truth of our subjectivity which we seem to be endlessly talking about – without, however, actually ever resolving the issue of what a great art work really is (anymore than we have resolved the issue of what natural sexuality is). It is not my aim to explicate the relationship between art and sex but to re-inject a strategic understanding of discourse, as Foucault understood it, back into commonplace, contemporary aesthetic criticism. The problems in rendering into words subjective, emotional experiences and formal aesthetic criteria continue to dog criticism today. The chief hindrances to contemporary criticism remain such institutional factors as the economic function of newspapers. Given their primary function as tools for the selling of advertising space, newspapers are inherently unsuited to sustaining detailed, informed dialogue on any topic – be it international politics or aesthetics. As it is, reviews remain short, quickly written pieces squeezed into already overloaded arts pages. This does not prevent skilled, caring writers and their editorial supporters from ensuring that fine reviews are published. In the meantime, we muddle through as best we can. I argue that criticism, like art, should operate self-consciously as an incitement to discourse, to engagement, and so to further discussion, poetry, et cetera. The possibility of an endless recession of theoretical terms and subjective responses should not dissuade us. Rather, one should provisionally accept the instrumentality of aesthetic discourse provided one is able always to bear in mind the nominalism which is required to prevent the description of art from becoming an instrument of repression. This is to say, aesthetic criticism is clearly authored in order to demonstrate something: to argue a point, to make a fruitful comparison, and so on. This does not mean that criticism should be composed so as to dictate aesthetic taste to the reader. Instead, it should act as an invitation to further responses – much as the art work itself does. Foucault has described discourse – language, terminologies, metaphorical conceits and those logical and poetic structures which underpin them – as a form of technology (Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and History of Sexuality). Different discursive forces arise in response to different cultural needs and contexts, including, indeed, those formulated not only by artists, but also by reviewers. As Hassan intimates, what is or is not “postmodernism”, for example, depends less on the art work itself – it is less a matter of an art work’s specific “quiddity” and its internal qualities – but is, rather, fundamentally dependent upon what one is trying to say about the piece. If one is trying to describe something novel in a work, something which relates it to a series of new or unusual forms which have become dominant within society since World War Two, then the term “postmodernism” most usefully applies. This, then, would entail breaking down the “the space that each work … creates around itself” in order to emphasise horizontal “continuities”. If, on the other hand, the critic wishes to describe the work from the perspective of historical developments, so as to trace the common features of various art works across a genealogical pattern running from Romanticism to the present day, one must de-emphasise the quiddity of the work in favour of vertical continuities. In both cases, however, the identification of common themes across various art works so as to aid in the description of wider historical or aesthetic conditions requires a certain “abstraction” of the qualities of the aesthetic works in question. The “postmodernism”, or any other quality, of a single art work thus remains in the eye of the beholder. No art work is definitively “postmodern” as such. It is only “postmodern” inasmuch as this description aids one in understanding a certain aspect of the piece and its relationship to other objects of analysis. In short, the more either an art work or its critical review elides full descriptive explication, the more useful reflections which might be voiced in its wake. What then is the instrumental purpose of the arts review as a genre of writing? For liberal humanist critics such as Matthew Arnold, F.R. Leavis and Harold Bloom, the role of the critic is straight forward and authoritative. Great art is said to be imbued with the spirit of humanity; with the very essence of our common subjectivity itself. Critics in this mode seek the truth of art and once it has been found, they generally construct it as unified, cohesive and of great value to all of humanity. The authors of the various avant-garde manifestoes which arose in Europe from the fin de siècle period onwards significantly complicated this ideal of universal value by arguing that such aesthetic values were necessarily abstract and so were not immediately visible within the content of the work per se. Such values were rather often present in the art work’s form and expression. Surrealism, Futurism, Supremacism, the Bauhaus and the other movements were founded upon the contention that these avant-garde art works revealed fundamental truths about the essence of human subjectivity: the imperious power of the dream at the heart of our emotional and psychic life, the geometric principles of colour and shape which provide the language for all experience of the sublime, and so on. The critic was still obliged to identify greatness and to isolate and disseminate those pieces of art which revealed the hidden truth of our shared human experience. Few influential art movements did not, in fact, have a chief theoretician to promote their ideals to the world, be it Ezra Pound and Leavis as the explicators of the works of T.S. Eliot, Martin Esslin for Beckett, or the artist her or himself, such as choreographers Martha Graham or Merce Cunningham, both of whom described in considerable detail their own methodologies to various scribes. The great challenge presented in the writings of Foucault, Derrida, Hassan and others, however, is to abandon such a sense of universal aesthetic and philosophical value. Like their fellow travellers within the New Left and soixante huit-ièmes (the agitators and cultural critics of 1968 Paris), these critics contend that the idea of a universal human subjectivity is problematic at best, if not a discursive fiction, which has been used to justify repression, colonialism, the unequal institutional hierarchies of bourgeois democratic systems, and so on. Art does not therefore speak of universal human truths. It is rather – like aesthetic criticism itself – a discursive product whose value should be considered instrumentally. The kind of a critical relationship which I am proposing here might provisionally be classified as discursive or archaeological criticism (in the Foucauldian sense of tracing discursive relationships and their distribution within any given cross-section or strata of cultural life). The role of the critic in such a situation is not one of acknowledging great art. Rather, the critic’s function becomes highly strategic, with interpretations and opinions regarding art works acting as invitations to engagement, consideration and, hence, also to rejection. From the point of view of the audience, too, the critic’s role is one of utility. If a critical description prompts useful, interesting or pleasurable reflections in the reader, then the review has been effective. If it has not, it has no role to play. The response to criticism thus becomes as subjective as the response to the art work itself. Similarly, just as Marcel Duchamp’s act of inverting a urinal and calling it art showed that anyone could be an artist provided they adopted a suitably creative vision of the objects which surrounded them, so anyone and everyone is a legitimate critic of any art work addressed to him or her as an audience. The institutional power accorded to critics by merit of the publications to which they are attached should not obfuscate the fact that anyone has the moral right to venture a critical judgement. It is not actually logically possible to be “right” or “wrong” in attributing qualities to an art work (although I have had artists assert the contrary to me). I like noise art, for example, and find much to stimulate my intellect and my affect in the chaotic feedback characteristic of the work of Merzbow and others. Many others however simply find such sounds to constitute unpleasant noise. Neither commentator is “right”. Both views co-exist. What is important is how these ideas are expressed, what propositions are marshalled to support either position, and how internally cohesive are the arguments supplied by supporters of either proposition. The merit of any particular critical intervention is therefore strictly formal or expressive, lying in its rhetorical construction, rather than in the subjective content of the criticism itself, per se. Clearly, such discursive criticism is of little value in describing works devised according to either an unequivocally liberal humanist or modernist avant-garde perspective. Aesthetic criticism authored in this spirit will not identify the universal, timeless truths of the work, nor will it act as an authoritative barometer of aesthetic value. By the same token though, a recognition of pluralism and instrumentality does not necessarily entail the rejection of categories of value altogether. Such a technique of aesthetic analysis functions primarily in the realm of superficial discursive qualities and formal features, rather than subterranean essences. It is in this sense both anti-Romantic and anti-Platonic. Discursive analysis has its own categories of truth and evaluation. Similarities between works, influences amongst artists and generic or affective precedents become the primary objects of analysis. Such a form of criticism is, in this sense, directly in accord with a similarly self-reflexive, historicised approach to art making itself. Where artists are consciously seeking to engage with their predecessors or peers, to find ways of situating their own work through the development of ideas visible in other cultural objects and historic aesthetic works, then the creation of art becomes itself a form of practical criticism or praxis. The distinction between criticism and its object is, therefore, one of formal expression, not one of nature or essence. Both practices engage with similar materials through a process of reflection (Marshall, “Vertigo”). Having described in philosophical and critical terms what constitutes an unfettered, democratic and strategic model of discursive criticism, it is perhaps useful to close with a more pragmatic description of how I myself attempt to proceed in authoring such criticism and, so, offer at least one possible (and, by definition, subjective) model for discursive criticism. Given that discursive analysis itself developed out of linguistic theory and Saussure’s discussion of the structural nature of signification, it is no surprise that the primary methodology underlying discursive analysis remains that of semiotics: namely how systems of representation and meaning mutually reinforce and support each other, and how they fail to do so. As a critic viewing an art work, it is, therefore, always my first goal to attempt to identify what it is that the artist appears to be trying to do in mounting a production. Is the art work intended as a cultural critique, a political protest, an avant-garde statement, a work of pure escapism, or some other kind of project – and hence one which can be judged according to the generic forms and values associated with such a style in comparison with those by other artists who work in this field? Having determined or intuited this, several related but nominally distinct critical reflections follow. Firstly, how effectively is this intent underpinning the art work achieved, how internally consistent are the tools, forms and themes utilised within the production, and do the affective and historic resonances evoked by the materials employed therein cohere into a logical (or a deliberately fragmented) whole? Secondly, how valid or aesthetically interesting is such a project in the first place, irrespective of whether it was successfully achieved or not? In short, how does the artist’s work compare with its own apparent generic rules, precedents and peers, and is the idea behind the work a contextually valid one or not? The questions of value which inevitably come into these judgements must be weighed according to explicit arguments regarding context, history and genre. It is the discursive transparency of the critique which enables readers to mentally contest the author. Implicitly transcendental models of universal emotional or aesthetic responses should not be invoked. Works of art should, therefore, be judged according to their own manifest terms, and, so, according to the values which appear to govern the relationships which organise materials within the art work. They should also, however, be viewed from a position definitively outside the work, placing the overall concept and its implicit, underlying theses within the context of other precedents, cultural values, political considerations and so on. In other words, one should attempt to heed Hassan’s caution that all art works may be seen both from the perspective of historico-genealogical continuities, as well as according to their own unique, self-defining characteristics and intentions. At the same time, the critical framework of the review itself – while remaining potentially dense and complex – should be as apparent to the reader as possible. The kind of criticism which I author is, therefore, based on a combination of art-historical, generic and socio-cultural comparisons. Critics are clearly able to elaborate more parallels between various artistic and cultural activities than many of their peers in the audience simply because it is the profession of the former to be as familiar with as wide a range of art-historical, cultural and political materials as is possible. This does not, however, make the opinions of the critic “correct”, it merely makes them more potentially dense. Other audiences nevertheless make their own connections, while spectators remain free to state that the particular parallels identified by the critic were not, to their minds, as significant as the critic would contend. The quantity of knowledge from which the critic can select does not verify the accuracy of his or her observations. It rather enables the potential richness of the description. In short, it is high time critics gave up all pretensions to closing off discourse by describing aesthetic works. On the contrary, arts reviewing, like arts production itself, should be seen as an invitation to further discourse, as a gift offered to those who might want it, rather than a Leavisite or Bloom-esque bludgeon to instruct the insensitive masses as to what is supposed to subjectively enlighten and uplift them. It is this sense of engagement – between critic, artist and audience – which provides the truly poetic quality to arts criticism, allowing readers to think creatively in their own right through their own interaction with a collaborative process of rumination on aesthetics and culture. In this way, artists, audiences and critics come to occupy the same terrain, exchanging views and constructing a community of shared ideas, debate and ever-multiplying discursive forms. Ideally, written criticism would come to occupy the same level of authority as an argument between an audience member and a critic at the bar following the staging of a production. I admit myself that even my best written compositions rarely achieve the level of playful interaction which such an environment often provokes. I nevertheless continue to strive for such a form of discursive exchange and bibulous poetry. References Apollonio, Umbro, ed. Futurist Manifestos. London: Thames and Hudson, 1973. Arnold, Matthew. Essays in Criticism. London: Macmillan, 1903-27, published as 2 series. Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Trans. by Annette Lavers. London: Vintage, 1993. Bloom, Harold. Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human. New York: Riverhead, 1998. Benjamin, Walter. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Trans. by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Harcourt, 1978. Breton, André. Manifestoes of Surrealism. Trans. by Richard Seaver and Helen Lane. Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1972. Eliot, T.S. Collected Poems 1909-1962. London: Faber, 1963. Esslin, Martin. Theatre of the Absurd. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972. ———. The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction. Trans. by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin, 1990. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 1992. Graham, Martha. Blood Memory. New York: Doubleday, 1991. Hassan, Ihab. “Joyce, Beckett and the Postmodern Imagination.” Triquarterly 32.4 (1975): 192ff. Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Dominant of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review 146 (1984): 53-92. Leavis, F.R. F.R. Leavis: Essays and Documents. Eds. Ian MacKillop and Richard Storer. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995. Malevich, Kazimir. In Penny Guggenheim, ed. Art of This Century – Drawings – Photographs – Sculpture – Collages. New York: Art Aid, 1942. Marshall, Jonathan. “Documents in Australian Postmodern Dance: Two Interviews with Lucy Guerin,” in Adrian Kiernander, ed. Dance and Physical Theatre, special edition of Australasian Drama Studies 41 (October 2002): 102-33. ———. “Operatic Tradition and Ambivalence in Chamber Made Opera’s Recital (Chesworth, Horton, Noonan),” in Keith Gallasch and Laura Ginters, eds. Music Theatre in Australia, special edition of Australasian Drama Studies 45 (October 2004): 72-96. ———. “Vertigo: Between the Word and the Act,” Independent Performance Forums, series of essays commissioned by Not Yet It’s Difficult theatre company and published in RealTime Australia 35 (2000): 10. Merzbow. Venereology. Audio recording. USA: Relapse, 1994. Richards, Alison, Geoffrey Milne, et al., eds. Pearls before Swine: Australian Theatre Criticism, special edition of Meajin 53.3 (Spring 1994). Tzara, Tristan. Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries. Trans. by Barbara Wright. London: Calder, 1992. Vaughan, David. Merce Cunningham: Fifty Years. Ed. Melissa Harris. New York: Aperture, 1997. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Marshall, Jonathan. "Inciting Reflection: A Short Manifesto for and Introduction to the Discursive Reviewing of the Arts." M/C Journal 8.5 (2005). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0510/08-marshall.php>. APA Style Marshall, J. (Oct. 2005) "Inciting Reflection: A Short Manifesto for and Introduction to the Discursive Reviewing of the Arts," M/C Journal, 8(5). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0510/08-marshall.php>.

In 1991 the Michigan Womyn's Music Festival evicted two female identified transsexual attendees on the grounds that they violated its women only policy of admittance. The Festival, established in 1976 and now the largest of its kind, turned into a "microcosm of the conflicts that have plagued the women's movement" (Rubin 18) and revived widespread debate about the place of trans and non-standard gender performances in feminist activism. A pro-trans event, aptly named Camp Trans, was held outside the Festival's gates with the aim of inciting greater interest in the area. The Festival's founder and on going organiser, Lisa Vogel, responded with a statement in 2001 claiming the "intention is for the Festival to be for womyn-born womyn, meaning people who were born and have lived their entire life experience as female" (Vogel 2000). This resulted in the exclusion of not only trans individuals, but also a plethora of non-conventional gender identities. Bitter debate ensued, revealing the Festival's role not just in appealing to a defined, recognisable demographic, but in constructing and maintaining an entire category of identity. My initial encounters with the Festival occurred through independent media and the internet. It become particularly widely debated after artists from the Queer orientated Mr Lady record label (most famously Le Tigre, fronted by riot grrl icon Kathleen Hanna) confirmed that they would perform at the event, despite knowledge of the anti-trans policy. Perhaps the most poignant reflection came from Ciara Xyerra's 2001 zine A Renegade's Handbook To Love And Sabotage. She comments that the Festival's intent was to provide "not only just a 'safe space' for women, but specifically for 'womyn born womyn.'" […] this essentialist logic is […] flawed in that it assumes every "womyn born womyn" was socialized in exactly the same way, that differences regarding race, class, ability, personal history, have no bearing on how a woman perceives herself as a woman […](69). Certainly the revised womyn born womyn label is a problematic way of dealing with the situation. The standard woman is assumed not to encounter trans issues, at least not in a way that impacts on her sense of gendered self. This issue provokes comparisons to the race debates that wreaked havoc through US feminism in early eighties. The sentiments of the Camp Trans protest echo Audre Lorde's 1984 criticism that: As white women ignore their built-in privilege of whiteness and define women in terms of their experience alone, then women of Color become 'other', the outsider whose experience is too alien to comprehend (632). In retrospect what remains most striking about the race debates is how incredibly poorly they were handled. The period is marked by a tendency towards splinter and separatist groups, evident in the writing of people like bell hooks and Mary Daly. Communication between various factions collapsed amid accusations of racism and ignorance of the wider struggle, leaving ruptures still visible today. (Gubar 884-890) The emphasis has shifted from presumed racial background to presumed biological characteristics, but at its core this is the same argument about which performances of self are given legitimacy, and which are passed off as outside the interests of the feminist community. Indeed the Festival's anti-trans policy can also be traced back to the early 1980's, stemming from clashes between separatists and post-operative transsexuals entering feminist activism. In both instances there has been an assumption that the majority of members within the community experience the world from a common perspective, a collective sense of self at the core of the movement, outlining its wider agenda. I am reminded of Gayatri Spivak's comment that "We take the explanations we produce to be the grounds of our action; they are endowed with coherence in terms of our explanation of self" (In Other Worlds 104). Conflict arises when internal factions find their concerns being overlooked, and begin questioning exactly whose experience is taken as the model for the collective self. There is a tendency towards viewing this as a threat to the movement's solidarity. In an effort to maintain wider group cohesion, divergent voices are often dealt with by claiming they arise from entirely different strains of selfhood. New identities, or at the least hyphenated subcategories, proliferate under "the essentialist's claim that there must be an ultimate (that is, comprehensive), complete, consistent, coherent set of types" (Spinosa and Dreyfus 72). These redefinitions explain and dispel difference without actually addressing it. It would be naive to assume this sort of essentialism exists only for the Festival and older activist methodology. While Queer theory has certainly given us new tools for understanding the issues, its practical application does not necessarily avoid "knitting out more fashionably an otherwise reconstructed […] essentialism" (Jagose). As people like Martha Nussbaum and Benita Parry have argued, if somewhat problematically, there is a fine line between fluidity and dissolution. Activist and liberal scepticism towards deconstructive methodology contains an at least reasonably justified trepidation towards tinkering with political communities which have proved historically successful. The unfortunate revival of the 'old school' activism versus 'new school' theory attitude, itself founded on an essentialist belief in a single, correct ideological stance, has further complicated matters. Festival attendee Janel Smith, writing for one of the bastions of 'old school' activism, Off Our Backs, voiced activist scepticism when commenting that post structuralism is "an entire movement and theory […] designed to debunk these 'myths' about gender and racial identity." She continues: We often make sense of other people by categorizing them into labels and boxes that we ourselves feel comfortable with. Dominant discourse tends to dismiss this process as inherently negative, one that limits people and their understanding of self and projected identity (17). The criticism of dominant academic discourse is worth consideration. If it "is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak" (Foucault 130), we need to be acutely aware of the way we act within culture, and wary of any movement which claims to fully recognise and transcend its boundaries. Our treatment of identity needs to "avoid the mistake of slipping between 'no absolute truth' and 'absolutely no truth,'" as Felicity Newman, Tracey Summerfield and Reece Plunkett suggest. From the alternate perspective, Aviva Rubin argues "our activism is characterized by seemingly incompatible inclinations to generalize and to particularize" (17). She writes that the Festival's attempt to develop a "theoretical 'she'" with which we "identify sameness – she shares our politics, our goals, our place" is fundamentally flawed as "the notion collapses when confronted with the differences we've deliberately ignored" (8). This leaves the situation double bound. A standard sense of gendered self provides unity and a workable common agenda, but comes into conflict with the identities it has excluded from its definition. The unified self combats repression, but, as Judith Butler so aptly puts it, "exclusion operates prior to repression" (71). However there are certainly areas of common ground. Rubin's "plea for grey", or an area "between absolutes," (20) is remarkably similar to Smith's endeavour to exist "somewhere in-between butch and femme" (14). Yet, for the Festival, that difference was enough to cause a gap between those who found it "an atmosphere of unparalleled safety" (Smith 13) and the pro-trans attendees who felt they needed "an escort to get out safely after darkness fell" (Wilchins 2000). As these relative similarities exist, it is disappointing to see that the arising differences have met with such aggressively negative reactions. Given the unlikeliness of everyone agreeing on a definitive understanding in the near future, it would seem beneficial to shift the focus away from searches for correct identities and ideologies, and develop new approaches to the debates themselves. I am again reminded of a comment from Gayatri Spivak, this time from her 1992 essay "More on Power/Knowledge". She comments that "if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by arrangement of those lines" (151). This is as true for our concepts of self as it is for any other issue. If we cannot reach outside of the structures of culture to find more universally true categories, or expect an ideological stance to present entirely new and more correct understandings, how we handle the arising debate is of major importance. Homi Bhabha's comment that "our political references and priorities […] are not there in some primordial, naturalistic sense" (26) does not necessarily render them null and void. There is a difference between needing to debate an identity or ideology, and needing to discard or reinvent it. Instead of looking for a true model of self or a correct ideology, the problem becomes looking at the cultural structure we have, trying to "recognise it as best one can and, through one's necessarily inadequate interpretation, to work to change it" (Spivak 1988 120). From this perspective the conflict that emerges from the Festival is as important as the possibilities for final resolution. Rather than treating differences as immediate problems and being "shocked, disappointed and instantly sidetracked into seeking resolution" (Rubin 20), it seems possible to consider the debate important in its own right. In practice this would mean keeping the lines of communication between the various factions open, and treating debate as an integral and on going process, rather than an unwelcome confrontation to be settled as quickly and quietly as possible. The commitment of the Camp Trans protesters to "workshops to educate festival goers" (Wilchins 2000), and their modest success, indicates that maintaining ongoing debate is a workable and productive approach. On the other hand Vogel's unwillingness to talk to the Camp Trans group is perhaps as open to criticism as her definitions of gender identity. Surely if a definitive concept of self cannot be settled upon easily, the lines of communication between Camp Trans and the Festival can at least be expected to keep the search from stagnating. The role the Festival has served as "a locus of political and cultural debate" (Delany) combined with its relatively successful negotiations of class and race issues indicates that it can play this role successfully. Although the womyn born womyn policy might not have changed, it is difficult to imagine many other platforms on which trans related debates could occur on such a large scale. In light of this it does not seem unrealistic to think of the debate as beneficial in ensuring continued rethinking of the issues, and not just as part of some potential revision or creation of identities which will hopefully be completed some time in the future. References Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. 1994 London: Routledge. 2000. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1999. Delany, Anngel. "Michigan Womyn's Music Festival celebrates 25 years of controversy." Gay.Com (2002) May 10th, 2002. http://content.gay.com/people/women_spac... Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A Sheridan Smith. Ed. R.D Laing, London: Routledge, 2000. Gubar, Susan. "What Ails Feminist Criticism?" Critical Inquiry 24.4 (1998): 878-903. Jagose, Annamarie. "Queer Theory." Australian Humanities Review 4 (1996) http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archiv... (28-6-02). Lorde, Audre. "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference". Literary Theory: An Anthology. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. 4th Ed. Malden: Blackwell, 1998: 630-636. Newman, Felicity, Summerfield, Tracy and Plunkett, Reece. "Three Cultures from the 'Inside': or, A Jew, a Lawyer and a Dyke Go Into This Bar…" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.2 (2000). http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/count.... (28-5-02) Nussbaum, Martha. "The Professor of Parody: The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler." The New Republic 22 Feb. 1999: 38-45. Parry, Benita. "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse." Oxford Literary Review 9 (1987) 27-58. Rubin, Aviva. "The Search for Grey: an agree-to-disagree." Canadian Dimensions 31.5 (1997) 17-21. Smith, Janel. "Identity Crisis: Fuches Rise up and Unite." Off Our Backs 30.9 (2000): 13-20. Spinosa, Charles and Hubert Dreyfus. "Two Kinds of Antiessentialism and Their Consequences." Critical Inquiry 22.4 (1996) 735-764. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravority. In Other Worlds. London: Routledge, 1988. ---, "More On Power/Knowledge." The Spivak Reader. Ed. Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean. New York: Routledge, 1996: 141-174. Vogel, Lisa. "Official Statement of Policy by MWMF." (2000).http://www.camptrans.com/press/2000_mwmf... (30-6-2002). Wilchins, Riki Ann. Interview with In Your Face. (2000) http://www.camptrans.com/stories/intervi... (30-6-02). Xyerra, Ciara. A Renegades Handbook to Love and Sabotage 4. Madford: Independently Published, 2001. Links http://www.camptrans.com/ http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/country.html http://www.camptrans.com/stories/interview.html http://www.camptrans.com/press/2000_mwmf.html http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archive/Issue-Dec-1996/jagose.html http://content.gay.com/people/women_space/michigan_000807.html Citation reference for this article Substitute your date of access for Dn Month Year etc... MLA Style Ware, Ianto. "Conflicting Concepts of Self and The Michigan Womyn's Music Festival" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5.5 (2002). [your date of access] < http://www.media-culture.org.au/mc/0210/Ware.html &gt. Chicago Style Ware, Ianto, "Conflicting Concepts of Self and The Michigan Womyn's Music Festival" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5, no. 5 (2002), < http://www.media-culture.org.au/mc/0210/Ware.html &gt ([your date of access]). APA Style Ware, Ianto. (2002) Conflicting Concepts of Self and The Michigan Womyn's Music Festival. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5(5). < http://www.media-culture.org.au/mc/0210/Ware.html &gt ([your date of access]).