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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Foundationalism

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Academic literature on the topic 'Foundationalism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 June 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Foundationalism"

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Grube, Dirk-Martin. "Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism." Religious Studies 31, no. 1 (1995): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023283.

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In this article, I argue that foundationalist reconstructions of religious experience lose on all counts: First, philosophical defences of foundationalism are untenable. Second, the theological benefits that can be reaped from foundationalism come at too high a price. I show that both William Alston's and Alvin Plantinga's foundationalism leads to sceptical conclusions. Third, I argue that the epistemic implications of foundationalist reconstructions of religious experience are incompatible with Christian ontology. Criticizing the account Plantinga develops in his books on warrant, I suggest that it is preferrable to reconstruct religious experience in antifoundationalist, i.e., coherentist, terms and develop the model of a mobile for these purposes.

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Tyson, David. "Check Your Presuppositions! A New Kind of Foundationalism in Objectivism." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 23, no. 1-2 (2023): 154–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.23.1-2.0154.

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ABSTRACT Ayn Rand’s Objectivism holds a foundationalist view of knowledge—that knowledge is hierarchical, with the less basic supported by inference from the more basic, which is known directly. But two very different forms of foundationalism (deductive and presuppositional) are observable in Objectivism, and vestiges of deductivism, which Rand explicitly rejected, can be found in attempts to systematize her philosophy. This article attempts to resolve conflicts between the two approaches. It endorses presuppositional foundationalism and suggests that Rand’s view be modified accordingly.

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FAIRLAMB, HORACE. "Sanctifying evidentialism." Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2009): 61–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990187.

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AbstractIn contemporary epistemology of religion, evidentialism has been included in a wider critique of traditional foundationalist theories of rational belief. To show the irrelevance of evidentialism, some critics have offered alternatives to the foundationalist approach, prominent among which is Alvin Plantinga's ‘warrant as proper function’. But the connection between evidentialism and foundationalism has been exaggerated, and criticisms of traditional foundationalism do not discredit evidentialism in principle. Furthermore, appeals to warranted belief imply that the heart of evidentialism – the proportioning of belief to rational grounds – has not been discredited but assimilated to the reliabilist view of knowledge by expanding the concept of evidence to include religious experience. In the end, the warrant concept extends the reach of evidentialism, thereby enhancing rather than diminishing its relevance for rational belief.

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Turri, John. "Foundationalism for Modest Infi nitists." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (2010): 275–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2010.0006.

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We find two main contemporary arguments for the infinitist theory of epistemic justification (‘infinitism’ for short): the regress argument (Klein 1999, 2005) and the features argument (Fantl 2003). I've addressed the former elsewhere (Turri 2009a). Here I address the latter.Jeremy Fantl argues that infinitism outshines foundationalism because infinitism alone can explain two of epistemic justification's crucial features, namely, that it comes in degrees and can be complete. This paper demonstrates foundationalism's ample resources for explaining both features.Section II clarifies the debate's key terms. Section III recounts how infinitism explains the two crucial features. Section IV presents Fantl's argument that foundationalism cannot explain the two crucial features. Section V explains how foundationalism can explain the two crucial features. Section VI sums up.

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Stump, Eleonore. "Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 17 (1991): 125–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717265.

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Aquinas is sometimes taken to hold a foundationalist theory of knowledge. So, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff says, “Foundationalism has been the reigning theory of theories in the West since the high Middle Ages. It can be traced back as far as Aristotle, and since the Middle Ages vast amounts of philosophical thought have been devoted to elaborating and defending it‥ ‥ Aquinas offers one classic version of foundationalism.” And Alvin Plantinga says, “we can get a better understanding of Aquinas … if we see [him] as accepting some version of classical foundationalism. This is a picture or total way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief, rationality, and allied topics. This picture has been enormously popular in Western thought; and despite a substantial opposing ground-swell, I think it remains the dominant way of thinking about these topics.”

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CURNUTT, JORDAN. "Huang on Wittgenstein on religious epistemology." Religious Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 81–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412597004216.

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Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a ‘reflective equilibrium’ with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different ‘forms of life’. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the evidence indicates that Wittgenstein's view of religious beliefs is a form of foundationalism, not coherentism.

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Oberle, Thomas. "Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Dialogue 61, no. 3 (2022): 421–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221732200018x.

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AbstractThere is a ubiquitous claim in the grounding literature that metaphysical foundationalism violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in virtue of positing a level of ungrounded facts. I argue that foundationalists can accept the PSR if they are willing to replace fundamentality as independence with completeness and deny that ground is a strict partial order. The upshot is that the PSR can be compatible with both metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism, and so presupposing this fixed explanatory demand need not beg the question in favour of either view.

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Decosimo, David. "THE NEW GENEALOGY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM." Journal of Law and Religion 33, no. 1 (2018): 3–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2018.11.

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AbstractThis article pursues an immanent critique of a scholarly movement and mood that I call “the new genealogy of religious freedom” and sketches an alternative proposal. The new genealogy of religious freedom claims that religious freedom is incoherent, systemically biased, oppressive, ideological—and necessarily so. Its critique deploys a methodology inherited from Nietzsche and targets a vision of religious freedom associated with “foundationalists” like Kant and Rawls. This article calls both the methodology and the vision into question. The version of genealogy that this movement promotes proves self-destructive and incoherent, veering toward nihilism and unable to account for its own status ascritique. Its attack on foundationalist religious freedom is effective, but it presupposes—and targets—conceptions of freedom, neutrality, and power that we need not endorse. For foundationalists and genealogists alike, these assumptions define religious freedom. This article rejects those assumptions and that vision of religious freedom. It sketches a pragmatist, dialectical vision of religious freedom rooted in alternate conceptions of power, freedom, and neutrality and a corresponding strategy for legally defining “religion,” inheriting the strengths of genealogy and foundationalism while avoiding their weaknesses.

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Vaassen, Bram M. K. "BASIC BELIEFS AND THE PERCEPTUAL LEARNING PROBLEM: A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE FOR MODERATE FOUNDATIONALISM." Episteme 13, no. 1 (2016): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.58.

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AbstractIn recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, the moderate foundationalist will have to characterize the ‘expertise’ of the expert observer in such a way that it cannot be had by novice observers and that it bestows justification on expert basic beliefs independently of any other justification had by the expert. I will argue that the accounts of expert basic beliefs currently present in the literature fail to meet this challenge, as they either result in a too liberal ascription of justification or fail to draw a clear distinction between expert basic beliefs and other spontaneously formed beliefs. Nevertheless, some guidelines for a future solution will be provided.

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Watson, P. J., Benjamin S. Reagan, Zhuo Job Chen, and Ronald J. Morris. "Xenophilia and the Religious Openness Hypothesis: Love of the “Stranger” within Religious Fundamentalist and Biblical Foundationalist Ideological Surrounds." Journal of Psychology and Theology 47, no. 4 (2018): 243–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807184.

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While research documents conservative religious tendencies towards a fear (“phobia”) of the stranger (“xeno”), this investigation sought to evaluate possible additional potentials for a love (“philia”) of the stranger (“xeno”). Procedures explored a preliminary measure of religious xenophilia that defined xenophilic love and xenophilic grace factors in a sample of 279 American Christian university undergraduates. Xenophilic correlations with religious fundamentalism, biblical foundationalism, social dominance orientation, religious schema, and other religious and psychological constructs uncovered conservative religious potentials for social openness. Partial correlations controlling for biblical foundationalism described a more psychologically closed and less xenophilic religious fundamentalist ideological surround, whereas partial correlations controlling for religious fundamentalism revealed a more psychological open and xenophilic biblical foundationalist surround. These data supported the Religious Openness Hypothesis by confirming the potentials of conservative religious commitments for social as well as for psychological openness.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Foundationalism"

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Wellon, Christopher. "Forgetting foundationalism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ34240.pdf.

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Trifiro, Fabrizio. "Anti-foundationalism and liberalism." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.405898.

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HARRINGTON, FRED. "BONJOUR'S RECONSIDERATION OF FOUNDATIONALISM." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1028837654.

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Harrington, Fred J. "Bonjour's reconsideration of foundationalism." Cincinnati, Ohio : University of Cincinnati, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=ucin1028837654.

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Kharitonova, Natalia. "Incarnation as a challenge to foundationalism." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.

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Cobb, Ryan Daniel. "Dissolving some dilemmas for acquaintance foundationalism." Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/2057.

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This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as well as dilemmas proposed by Jack Lyons and Michael Bergmann targeting internalism. Acquaintance foundationalism is what I will call any theory of justification that is internalist in what may justify us, foundationalist in the structure of justification, and relies on the concept of acquaintance in justifying our basic beliefs. Internalism requires that what justifies us improves the belief from the perspective of the believing subject. Foundationalism states that the justification for all beliefs depends ultimately on basic beliefs. Finally, acquaintance is a relation between a person and other things such that these other things are before the “mind’s eye” of the subject. The general idea behind each of these dilemmas, so I will argue, is to claim that acquaintance foundationalism cannot provide epistemic reasons for basic beliefs, where epistemic reason means something that contributes to justification from the subject’s perspective. Each dilemma will ask whether the alleged justifier has some feature x. However, each dilemma contends that, whether the alleged has the feature x or not, it cannot serve as an epistemic reason. For example, BonJour will ask whether our allegedly basic beliefs are cognitive or not. He argues that if they are cognitive, they need justification (and so cannot be basic), but if they are not cognitive, they cannot provide justification. Thus, no allegedly basic belief can serve as an epistemic reason. I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars’s famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour’s later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons’s dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist’s (including the acquaintance foundationalist’s) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons’s dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons’s version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism.

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Tomiak, Andrew Z. "Foundationalism and the rationality of the sciences." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304665.

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McGuinness, Barbara Lynne. "Anti-foundationalism and justification in political philosophy." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358160.

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Fairley, Ciara. "Foundationalism and the idea of the empirical." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2007. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445437/.

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This thesis is about foundationalism in epistemology. It distinguishes between different forms of foundationalism and defends one particular version of this doctrine. Chapter 1 gives an account of the motivations for foundationalism, including the so-called epistemic regress argument. It criticizes recent accounts of the core doctrines of foundationalism, such as those of Michael Williams and Ernest Sosa, and proposes a different account according to which foundationalism is the view that (a) some of our beliefs must be non-inferentially justified, (b) perception is a source of non-inferential justification, and (c) perception is a basic source of such justification. Chapter 2 gives an account of traditional foundationalism and tries to identify both what is right with it and what is wrong with it. It argues that the basic insight of traditional foundationalism can be detached from some of the other doctrines with which it was associated by the traditional foundationalists. That insight concerns the role of perceptual awareness or acquaintance as a regress-terminating source of epistemic justification. Chapter 3 exploits this idea in defending a more modest form of foundationalism according to which ordinary perceptual beliefs may be foundational. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on two influential arguments against the view that ordinary beliefs about the world around us can be non- inferentially justified by perception. The first argument trades on the alleged fallibility of perceptual justification, the second on its defeasibility. It is shown that neither argument poses a genuine threat to the more modest version of foundationalism that I defend. Chapter 5 compares perception with other sources of non-inferential justification such as memory and testimony. It defends the view that perception is a privileged source of non- inferential justification, even if it isn't the only source of such justification. It also contrasts foundationalism with traditional forms of externalism such as reliabilism and explains why the latter should not be counted as a form of foundationalism.

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Byun, Soo Young. "Bonjour's Positions on Empirical Knowledge: From Coherentism to Foundationalism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/6.

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Lawrence Bonjour supported coherentism in the early period, but turns to foundationalism in the later period. In this paper I shall focus on two sides in relation to his epistemology. To understand his early and later positions, first, I shall explain his coherentism and foundationalism. Second, I shall consider what objections have been raised to each position. Thus we can evaluate why Bonjour abandoned his coherentism and why his foundationalism succeeds as a plausible theory for empirical justification.

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Books on the topic "Foundationalism"

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Z, Phillips D. Faith after foundationalism. Routlege, 1988.

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Couvalis, George. Feyerabend's critique of foundationalism. Avebury, 1989.

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1954-, DePaul Michael R., ed. Resurrecting old-fashioned foundationalism. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

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Crook, Stephen. Modernist radicalism and its aftermath: Foundationalism and anti-foundationalism in radical social theory. Routledge, 1991.

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1951-, Bhat Parameshwar R., ed. Psychoanalysis as a human science: Beyond foundationalism. Sage Publications, 1995.

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Strumia, Alberto. Il problema dei fondamenti: Un'avventurosa navigazione dagli insiemi agli enti passando per Gödel e Tommaso d'Aquino. Cantagalli, 2009.

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Strumia, Alberto. Il problema dei fondamenti: Da Aristotele a Tommaso d'Aquino all'ontologia formale. Cantagalli, 2007.

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Tollefsen, Olaf. Foundationalism defended: Essays on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Cambridge Press, 1995.

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Cruickshank, Justin. Realism and sociology: Anti-foundationalism, ontology, and social research. Routledge, 2003.

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Cruickshank, Justin. Anti-foundationalism and social ontology: Towards a realist sociology. typescript, 2000.

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Book chapters on the topic "Foundationalism"

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Fumerton, Richard. "Foundationalism and Non-Foundationalism." In Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_688-1.

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Brogaard, Berit. "Foundationalism." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-24.

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McAllister, Blake. "Foundationalism Defended." In Seemings and the Foundations of Justification. Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003281108-6.

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Knowles, Jonathan. "Anti-foundationalism." In Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_5.

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Barber, Benjamin R. "Foundationalism and Democracy." In Politisches Denken Jahrbuch 1993. J.B. Metzler, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-03503-5_4.

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Bland, Steven. "Foundationalism and Coherentism." In Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_4.

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Drummond, John J. "Husserl and Foundationalism." In Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Springer Netherlands, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7_10.

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Hersch, Charles. "Non-Metaphysical Foundationalism." In Creating Democracy. Routledge, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003584377-9.

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Flatscher, Matthias. "Phenomenology and Post-Foundationalism." In The Routledge Handbook of Political Phenomenology. Routledge, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003197430-36.

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Tho, Tzuchien. "Mechanical Philosophy: Reductionism and Foundationalism." In Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_142-1.

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