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Journal articles on the topic 'Foundationalism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 June 2025

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1

Grube, Dirk-Martin. "Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism." Religious Studies 31, no. 1 (1995): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023283.

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In this article, I argue that foundationalist reconstructions of religious experience lose on all counts: First, philosophical defences of foundationalism are untenable. Second, the theological benefits that can be reaped from foundationalism come at too high a price. I show that both William Alston's and Alvin Plantinga's foundationalism leads to sceptical conclusions. Third, I argue that the epistemic implications of foundationalist reconstructions of religious experience are incompatible with Christian ontology. Criticizing the account Plantinga develops in his books on warrant, I suggest that it is preferrable to reconstruct religious experience in antifoundationalist, i.e., coherentist, terms and develop the model of a mobile for these purposes.

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2

Tyson, David. "Check Your Presuppositions! A New Kind of Foundationalism in Objectivism." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 23, no. 1-2 (2023): 154–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.23.1-2.0154.

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ABSTRACT Ayn Rand’s Objectivism holds a foundationalist view of knowledge—that knowledge is hierarchical, with the less basic supported by inference from the more basic, which is known directly. But two very different forms of foundationalism (deductive and presuppositional) are observable in Objectivism, and vestiges of deductivism, which Rand explicitly rejected, can be found in attempts to systematize her philosophy. This article attempts to resolve conflicts between the two approaches. It endorses presuppositional foundationalism and suggests that Rand’s view be modified accordingly.

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3

FAIRLAMB, HORACE. "Sanctifying evidentialism." Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2009): 61–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990187.

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AbstractIn contemporary epistemology of religion, evidentialism has been included in a wider critique of traditional foundationalist theories of rational belief. To show the irrelevance of evidentialism, some critics have offered alternatives to the foundationalist approach, prominent among which is Alvin Plantinga's ‘warrant as proper function’. But the connection between evidentialism and foundationalism has been exaggerated, and criticisms of traditional foundationalism do not discredit evidentialism in principle. Furthermore, appeals to warranted belief imply that the heart of evidentialism – the proportioning of belief to rational grounds – has not been discredited but assimilated to the reliabilist view of knowledge by expanding the concept of evidence to include religious experience. In the end, the warrant concept extends the reach of evidentialism, thereby enhancing rather than diminishing its relevance for rational belief.

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4

Turri, John. "Foundationalism for Modest Infi nitists." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (2010): 275–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2010.0006.

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We find two main contemporary arguments for the infinitist theory of epistemic justification (‘infinitism’ for short): the regress argument (Klein 1999, 2005) and the features argument (Fantl 2003). I've addressed the former elsewhere (Turri 2009a). Here I address the latter.Jeremy Fantl argues that infinitism outshines foundationalism because infinitism alone can explain two of epistemic justification's crucial features, namely, that it comes in degrees and can be complete. This paper demonstrates foundationalism's ample resources for explaining both features.Section II clarifies the debate's key terms. Section III recounts how infinitism explains the two crucial features. Section IV presents Fantl's argument that foundationalism cannot explain the two crucial features. Section V explains how foundationalism can explain the two crucial features. Section VI sums up.

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5

Stump, Eleonore. "Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 17 (1991): 125–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717265.

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Aquinas is sometimes taken to hold a foundationalist theory of knowledge. So, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff says, “Foundationalism has been the reigning theory of theories in the West since the high Middle Ages. It can be traced back as far as Aristotle, and since the Middle Ages vast amounts of philosophical thought have been devoted to elaborating and defending it‥ ‥ Aquinas offers one classic version of foundationalism.” And Alvin Plantinga says, “we can get a better understanding of Aquinas … if we see [him] as accepting some version of classical foundationalism. This is a picture or total way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief, rationality, and allied topics. This picture has been enormously popular in Western thought; and despite a substantial opposing ground-swell, I think it remains the dominant way of thinking about these topics.”

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CURNUTT, JORDAN. "Huang on Wittgenstein on religious epistemology." Religious Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 81–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412597004216.

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Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a ‘reflective equilibrium’ with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different ‘forms of life’. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the evidence indicates that Wittgenstein's view of religious beliefs is a form of foundationalism, not coherentism.

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7

Oberle, Thomas. "Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Dialogue 61, no. 3 (2022): 421–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221732200018x.

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AbstractThere is a ubiquitous claim in the grounding literature that metaphysical foundationalism violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in virtue of positing a level of ungrounded facts. I argue that foundationalists can accept the PSR if they are willing to replace fundamentality as independence with completeness and deny that ground is a strict partial order. The upshot is that the PSR can be compatible with both metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism, and so presupposing this fixed explanatory demand need not beg the question in favour of either view.

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8

Decosimo, David. "THE NEW GENEALOGY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM." Journal of Law and Religion 33, no. 1 (2018): 3–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2018.11.

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AbstractThis article pursues an immanent critique of a scholarly movement and mood that I call “the new genealogy of religious freedom” and sketches an alternative proposal. The new genealogy of religious freedom claims that religious freedom is incoherent, systemically biased, oppressive, ideological—and necessarily so. Its critique deploys a methodology inherited from Nietzsche and targets a vision of religious freedom associated with “foundationalists” like Kant and Rawls. This article calls both the methodology and the vision into question. The version of genealogy that this movement promotes proves self-destructive and incoherent, veering toward nihilism and unable to account for its own status ascritique. Its attack on foundationalist religious freedom is effective, but it presupposes—and targets—conceptions of freedom, neutrality, and power that we need not endorse. For foundationalists and genealogists alike, these assumptions define religious freedom. This article rejects those assumptions and that vision of religious freedom. It sketches a pragmatist, dialectical vision of religious freedom rooted in alternate conceptions of power, freedom, and neutrality and a corresponding strategy for legally defining “religion,” inheriting the strengths of genealogy and foundationalism while avoiding their weaknesses.

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Vaassen, Bram M. K. "BASIC BELIEFS AND THE PERCEPTUAL LEARNING PROBLEM: A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE FOR MODERATE FOUNDATIONALISM." Episteme 13, no. 1 (2016): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.58.

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AbstractIn recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, the moderate foundationalist will have to characterize the ‘expertise’ of the expert observer in such a way that it cannot be had by novice observers and that it bestows justification on expert basic beliefs independently of any other justification had by the expert. I will argue that the accounts of expert basic beliefs currently present in the literature fail to meet this challenge, as they either result in a too liberal ascription of justification or fail to draw a clear distinction between expert basic beliefs and other spontaneously formed beliefs. Nevertheless, some guidelines for a future solution will be provided.

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Watson, P. J., Benjamin S. Reagan, Zhuo Job Chen, and Ronald J. Morris. "Xenophilia and the Religious Openness Hypothesis: Love of the “Stranger” within Religious Fundamentalist and Biblical Foundationalist Ideological Surrounds." Journal of Psychology and Theology 47, no. 4 (2018): 243–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807184.

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While research documents conservative religious tendencies towards a fear (“phobia”) of the stranger (“xeno”), this investigation sought to evaluate possible additional potentials for a love (“philia”) of the stranger (“xeno”). Procedures explored a preliminary measure of religious xenophilia that defined xenophilic love and xenophilic grace factors in a sample of 279 American Christian university undergraduates. Xenophilic correlations with religious fundamentalism, biblical foundationalism, social dominance orientation, religious schema, and other religious and psychological constructs uncovered conservative religious potentials for social openness. Partial correlations controlling for biblical foundationalism described a more psychologically closed and less xenophilic religious fundamentalist ideological surround, whereas partial correlations controlling for religious fundamentalism revealed a more psychological open and xenophilic biblical foundationalist surround. These data supported the Religious Openness Hypothesis by confirming the potentials of conservative religious commitments for social as well as for psychological openness.

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Dempster, Wesley C. "The Foundations of Knowledge in Aristotle and Epicurus." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 1, no. 1 (2019): 20–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.1.1.20-25.

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As early proponents of foundationalism, Aristotle and Epicurus share the view that all knowledge rests on indubitable foundations. For Aristotle, these foundations are intellectual first principles. But for Epicurus, sense perception is basic. If certainty is the criterion of knowledge, then, despite their different approaches, neither philosopher succeeds in providing a mechanism sufficient to certify knowledge claims. For the foundationalist wishing to avoid nihilism, therefore, Aristotle’s and Epicurus’ failures are instructive.

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12

Berdaus, Svetlana V. "Moderate Foundationalism in Husserl's Phenomenology." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 472 (2021): 17–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/472/2.

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The article deals with the problem of knowledge justification in Husserl's phenomenology. The author of the article shows that, in the matter of justification of knowledge, Husserl's phenomenology does not fully meet the requirements of either foundationalism or coherentism. The fundamentalist way of reasoning assumes the presence of basic beliefs, from which all inference beliefs are derived. One of the most paradigmatic examples of foundationalism is the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum”, and it is this kind of justification that is present in phenomenology. However, the Cartesian method of justification is accepted by Husserl in a truncated form: the ego is the source of apodictic evidence, but it cannot guarantee the adequacy of subsequent conclusions. In this regard, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that Husserl is a moderate foundationalist in the matter of knowledge justification. In search of an explanatory principle for such a position, a hypothesis is expressed about the asymmetry between epistemological and ontological approaches to the interpretation of the ego's experience in Husserl's phenomenology. A non-epistemic understanding of the ego's experience presupposes the recognition of the obviousness of the existence of the ego as a thinking instance, while an epistemic understanding concerns all peripheral superstructures of the ego, which, in fact, are inferential knowledge from the basic belief given by the formulation cogito ergo sum. The presence of these restrictions forced Dagfinn Follesdahl to qualify Husserl's phenomenology as a kind of coherentism. The author of the article objects to this, believing that phenomenology cannot be considered either as a form of coherentism or as a form of (strong) foundationalism. Based on William Alston's thesis on the combination of epistemic and non-epistemic beliefs in a rethought type of foundationalism and on the works of LLaurence BonJour, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that Husserl's phenomenology should be understood as moderate foundationalism. The specificity of phenomenology -its appeal to the experience of the transcendental ego - leads to the fact that the pre-predicative structures of consciousness become the criterion of validity as such. Thus, moderate foundationalism in phenomenology boils down to the fact that Husserl recognized the undoubted evidence of the non-epistemic experience of the ego experience and, on the other hand, saw the possibility of correcting epistemic beliefs that do not affect the fundamental nature of the non-derivative basis.

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13

Grigg, Richard. "The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God." Religious Studies 26, no. 3 (1990): 389–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020540.

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The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.

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14

Duran, Jane. "Naturalized Foundationalism." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 32, no. 94 (2000): 29–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2000.839.

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15

Zuppolini, Breno Andrade. "Aristotle’s Foundationalism." Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia 44 (April 5, 2017): 187. http://dx.doi.org/10.15210/dissertatio.v44i0.9366.

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Para Aristóteles, conhecimento demonstrativo é o resultado do que ele denomina 'aprendizado intelectual', processo em que o conhecimento da conclusão depende de um conhecimento prévio das premissas. Dado que demonstrações são, em última instância, baseadas em princípios indemonstráveis (cujo conhecimento é denominado 'νοῦς'), Aristóteles é frequentemente retratado como promovendo uma doutrina fundacionista. Sem contestar a nomenclatura, tentarei mostrar que o 'fundacionismo' de Aristóteles não deve ser entendido como uma teoria racionalista da justificação epistêmica, como se os primeiros princípios da ciência pudessem ser conhecidos enquanto tais independentemente de suas conexões explanatórias com proposições demonstráveis. Argumentarei que conhecer os primeiros princípios enquanto tais envolve conhecê-los como explicações de outras proposições científicas. Explicarei, então, de que modo conhecimento noético e conhecimento demonstrativo são, em certo sentido, estados cognitivos interdependentes – ainda que o conceito de νοῦς se mantenha distinto de (e, nas palavras de Aristóteles, mais 'preciso' do que) conhecimento demonstrativo.

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16

Miller, Hugh T. "Doubting Foundationalism." Administration & Society 34, no. 3 (2002): 335–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009539902400387227.

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17

Bohn, Einar Duenger. "Divine Foundationalism." Philosophy Compass 13, no. 10 (2018): e12524. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12524.

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18

McIntosh, Ian. "Beyond Foundationalism." Theology 104, no. 822 (2001): 454–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040571x0110400624.

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19

Wilson, Jeffrey R. "Tragic Foundationalism." Mosaic: an interdisciplinary critical journal 52, no. 4 (2019): 91–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mos.2019.0040.

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20

Brandt, Richard B. "Foundationalism for Moral Theory." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 51–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717432.

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It seems to be generally agreed that a foundationalist view of any area of justified beliefs is the affirmation that there are some (basic) beliefs which are to some degree credible for a person independently of reflection on logical relations to any others of his beliefs, and that any other beliefs of his are justified because of appropriate logical relations to these basic beliefs — thus contrary to the coherentist thesis that beliefs can only be justified by appeal to their relation to other beliefs of a person, independently of whether these other beliefs are themselves independently credible. Thus, for the area of moral beliefs, foundationalism is the view that there is at least a subset of a person's moral beliefs which are either justified independently of logical relations to any other beliefs, or are justified by their logical relations to some other beliefs, either independently credible moral beliefs, or independently credible non-moral ones.I am here restricting ‘ethical’ beliefs to moral beliefs, as distinct from beliefs that something is a good thing or intrinsically good or good for a person.

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21

Paździora, Michał. "Antyautorytarna edukacja prawnicza." Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 43, no. 4 (2021): 375–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.43.4.29.

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The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the main assumptions of foundationalism and, using selected examples from general reflection on law, reconstruct related strategies of justifying claims. Then, I discuss the anti-foundationalist method of justifying the universalism of human rights. Referring to the arguments of Hannah Arendt and Alessandro Ferrara, I give the example of the Holocaust as the so-called point of no return, whose exemplary validity justifies the idea of human rights without the need to refer to substantive human dignity. In the second part of the article, I use the anti-foundationalist argument to build a conception of anti-authoritarian legal education. The proposed concept of education based on a collaborative, democratic, nonhierarchical, and pluralistic discussion of historical examples should complement traditional legal education.

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22

Coitinho Silveira, Denis. "Uma Justificação Coerentista dos Direitos Humanos em Rawls." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 18, no. 36 (2010): 109–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2010183626.

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The aim of this paper is to identify how the ethical-political foundation of human rights in John Rawls’s theory of justice makes use of a coherentist model of moral justification in which cognitivism, liberalism, pluralism, non-foundationalism, and mitigated intuititionism stand out, leading to a pragmatic model of foundation with public justification in The Law of Peoples (LP). The main idea is to think about the reasonableness of the universal defence of human rights as primary goods with the aspects foliows: its political nature, not metaphysical; its theoretical coherentist model, non-foundationalist; its pragmatic function and its public justification.

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23

Ambrus, Gergely. "Chisholm, Wittgenstein, and Haller on the Meaning of “I” and on Knowledge De Se." Grazer Philosophische Studien 101, no. 3 (2025): 408–31. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000230.

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Abstract In this article, I discuss Rudolf Haller’s views on the meaning of “I”, and knowledge de se. Haller’s conception was informed and inspired to a large extent by Chisholm and Wittgenstein. This is problematic since, it seems, they held contrary views regarding the meaning of “I”, self-identification, and knowledge of one’s own experiences. To overcome this problem, I put forth a “praxeological foundationalist” suggestion that may enable one to reconcile Chisholmian foundationalism with Wittgenstein’s constraint that knowledge requires the possibility of error, in a Hallerian spirit, drawing on Wittgenstein’s last views on certainty and self-knowledge.

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24

Jacobson, Stephen. "Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and Cartesian Epistemology." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (1992): 133–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717274.

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In his influential paper ‘Two Types of Foundationalism,’ (TTF) William Alston distinguishes two important conceptions of foundationalism: ‘simple foundationalism’ (SF) and ‘iterative foundationalism’ (IF). SF is the view that there are immediately justified beliefs of some kind or other. IF is the stronger view that certain epistemic propositions are immediately justified. Alston favors a reliability account of immediate justification of the kind defended by externalists such as Armstrong, Dretske, and Goldman. Alston rejects IF by appeal to what he calls the ‘second level argument.’ He claims, further, that since IF is essential to the Cartesian project of reconstructing knowledge, the Cartesian project must be abandoned.

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25

Neta, Ram. "Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?" Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 125 (2010): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.872.

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Internalist foundationalism was popular through much of the history of Western epistemology, but has been subjected to intense critical scrutiny in the last century. Ernest Sosa’s new book presents some novel and seemingly powerful arguments against internalist foundationalism. After laying out these arguments, I attempt to rebut them. I argue that Sosa does not, after all, give us good reason for abandoning internalist foundationalism.

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Rappaport, Steven. "Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism." Dialogue 28, no. 3 (1989): 433–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730001595x.

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Empirical foundationalism affirms that some empirical beliefs a person holds (at a time) have a degree of justification or warrant that does not derive from their being inferable from other empirical beliefs the person holds. Such beliefs are basic for the person (at the time). In his recent book Laurence Bonjour claims that foundationalism faces the following problem:The basic problem confronting empirical foundationalism … is how the basic or foundational empirical beliefs to which it appeals are themselves justified or warranted or in some way given positive epistemic standing, while still preserving their status as basic. This problem amounts to a dilemma: if there is no justification, basic beliefs are rendered epistemically arbitrary, thereby fatally impugning the very claim of foundationalism to constitute a theory of epistemic justification; while a justification which appeals to further premises of some sort threatens to begin anew the regress of justification which it is the whole point of foundationalism to avoid.

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27

Wolterstorff, Nicholas, and D. Z. Phillips. "Faith After Foundationalism." Philosophical Review 101, no. 2 (1992): 452. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185572.

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Levin, Richard, and Barbara Hodgdon. "Intentions, Foundationalism, Symmetry." PMLA 109, no. 1 (1994): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/463016.

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29

Vogel, Jonathan. "Skepticism and Foundationalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 11–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1997_23.

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30

Kellenberger, J. "Faith After Foundationalism." Faith and Philosophy 7, no. 3 (1990): 351–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19907331.

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31

Pecchioni, Frank. "FOUNDATIONALISM AND SEMANTICS." Southwest Philosophy Review 5, no. 2 (1989): 69–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview19895225.

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32

Ray, Rickey J. "Faith After Foundationalism." International Studies in Philosophy 23, no. 3 (1991): 139–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1991233117.

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Hart, Hendrik. "Faith After Foundationalism." International Studies in Philosophy 31, no. 4 (1999): 123–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199931486.

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Feldman, Richard, and Richard Foley. "Foley's Subjective Foundationalism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 1 (1989): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108116.

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35

Brueckner, Anthony, and Michael Williams. "Skepticism and Foundationalism." Noûs 28, no. 4 (1994): 533. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215480.

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노호진. "Causal Anti-Foundationalism." 철학사상 ll, no. 39 (2011): 199–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..39.201102.007.

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37

Meynell, Hugo. "BonJour on Foundationalism." New Blackfriars 71, no. 841 (1990): 391–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1990.tb01432.x.

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38

Johnsen, Bredo C. "Kekes on foundationalism." Philosophia 16, no. 2 (1986): 203–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380266.

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39

Dascal, Marcelo. "Pragmatics and foundationalism." Journal of Pragmatics 17, no. 5-6 (1992): 455–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(92)90064-i.

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40

MARTIN, JAMES A. "IS FOUNDATIONALISM INDEFINABLE?" Metaphilosophy 19, no. 2 (1988): 128–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00708.x.

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41

HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL. "FOUNDATIONALISM AND ARBITRARINESS." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, no. 1 (2005): 18–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00212.x.

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42

Ommen, Thomas B. "Theology and foundationalism." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 16, no. 2 (1987): 159–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842988701600203.

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43

Stewart, T. Wesley, and D. Z. Phillips. "Faith after Foundationalism." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 29, no. 1 (1990): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1387048.

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44

Crișan, Anton. "Schlick and Sellars on Observational Knowledge." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 65, no. 3 (2020): 163–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.3.09.

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"The aim of the present paper is to provide a comparative account of the manner in which Moritz Schlick and Wilfrid Sellars treat certain aspects surrounding the topic of observational knowledge. By considering Sellars’s allusions to Schlick’s epistemological undertaking within the context of his rejection of givenness, I evaluate the extent to which Schlick can be characterized as a traditional foundationalist. By emphasizing that this is not the case and that Schlick adheres to a non-standard version of epistemological foundationalism, I shed some light on those theoretical elements that allow for a convergence of opinions between the two authors to transpire. Keywords: Schlick, Sellars, confirmations, the Given, observation reports "

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45

Tucker, Chris. "Hermeneutics as a … Foundationalism?" Dialogue 45, no. 4 (2006): 627–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300001219.

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ABSTRACTIt is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once the positions are stated in this way, their putative incompatibility vanishes. Also, to inspire further research I include an appendix which contains an unfinished prototype of a hermeneutic foundationalism.

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Westmoreland, Peter. "Moral Laws of the Heart." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2020): 207–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche20201026175.

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Tensions between sentiments and reason are a well-known feature of Rousseau’s moral theory. To explain these tensions, this paper appeals to Rousseau’s moral foundationalism. In this foundationalism, I argue, feeling and reason operate jointly to establish the content and normativity of moral law. This joint operation is not always smooth, and additionally there is much leeway in this theory, which explains the theory’s ability to accommodate various interpretations and emphases as well as its struggle to delimit specific moral laws, choices, and actions. The most important element of this foundationalism is conscience, which does the work of voicing moral laws with content and normativity grounded in moral sentiments.

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Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and E. J. Coffman. "Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 4 (2006): 535–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0003.

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A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person's belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Traditional Foundationalism says that, first, if a human being has a nonbasic belief, then, at bottom, it owes its justification to at least one basic belief, and second, there are basic beliefs. Call the second thesis Minimal Foundationalism. In this essay, we assess three arguments against Minimal Foundationalism which we find in recent work of Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.

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McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. "Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation." Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2000_13.

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Guarino, Thomas. "Foundationalism and Contemporary Theology." Philosophy and Theology 3, no. 3 (1989): 241–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtheol1989332.

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Barnes, Gordon. "Resurrecting Old–Fashioned Foundationalism." Philosophical Books 44, no. 1 (2003): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0149.00281.

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