Relevant bibliographies by topics / Founder-CEO

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Founder-CEO'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Wang, Qian, Xiaojie Pei, and Huigang Liang. "Founder CEO, CEO Characteristics, and Firm Innovation Efficiency: An Empirical Study of China’s GEM-Listed Companies." Sustainability 14, no. 14 (2022): 8250. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14148250.

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While it is widely known that founder Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) can influence firm innovation, few studies have comprehensively examined how the founder CEO affects the firm’s innovation input, innovation output, and input-to-output conversion rate, and how these effects depend on the founder CEO’s demographic, cognitive, and corporate positional characteristics. We analyze the nine-year panel data of China’s Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)-listed companies to empirically study the relationship between founder CEO (vs. non-founder CEO), CEO characteristics, and firm innovation efficiency. Our analysis produces four major findings. First, founder CEO firms have a lower innovation input and higher innovation output than non-founder CEO firms. Second, compared with male founder CEOs, female founder CEOs can further reduce innovation input without sacrificing innovation output. Third, founder CEOs with a higher education level can also further reduce innovation input without sacrificing innovation output. Finally, compared with founder CEOs that are not the chairman of the board, the founder CEOs that take dual positions (CEO and chairman) allocate higher innovation input, but the innovation output does not increase. These findings have implications for both research and practice in helping firms achieve sustainable development.
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Shabbir, Aiza, and Shazia Kousar. "Impact of founder CEO and CEO ownership on entrepreneurial orientation, moderating role of CEO narcissism." Asia Pacific Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 13, no. 2 (2019): 153–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/apjie-10-2018-0057.

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Purpose This study aims to explore the moderating impact of narcissism overload on the relation between founder CEO and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in registered private schools of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected through a stratified random sampling method with the help of previously validated questionnaires. A sample of 121 replies was gathered for analysis. SPSS has been used to find the results. Findings Results depict that CEO narcissism moderates the relation between founder CEO and EO and does not moderate the relationship between and CEO ownership and EO. Originality/value Many studies focused on the founder personality characteristics (such as generalized self-efficacy or locus of control) are not directly observed, but rather inferred their effect indirectly. The study contributes to examine how the founder CEO variable interacts with CEO personality to influence EO. This study will propose a practical approach to investigate whether and how the narcissism constructs moderate the founder CEO–EO relationship. Direct association between stock ownership and EO will also be examined.
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Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger. "Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, no. 2 (2009): 439–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109009090139.

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AbstractEleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.
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Leone, Andrew J., and Michelle Liu. "Accounting Irregularities and Executive Turnover in Founder-Managed Firms." Accounting Review 85, no. 1 (2010): 287–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.1.287.

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ABSTRACT: This study tests the hypothesis that founder CEOs are less likely to be fired than non-founder CEOs when accounting irregularities are disclosed. We also examine whether CFOs are more likely to shoulder the blame when the CEO is a founder. Using a sample of 96 newly public firms with accounting irregularities, and a control sample of similar newly public firms, we document that the probability of CEO (CFO) turnover in the wake of an accounting irregularity is lower (higher) when the firm's CEO is also a founder. The difference in CEO turnover rates is dramatic, with nonfounder CEOs turning over at a rate of 49 percent, as compared to only 29 percent for founder CEOs. Our overall findings are consistent with the notion that the board's response to irregularities differs when the CEO is a founder.
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Hsieh, Chialing, Vivek Pandey, and Hongxia Wang. "Executive compensation of immigrant-founder firms in the USA." International Journal of Managerial Finance 15, no. 4 (2019): 546–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-09-2017-0197.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms. Design/methodology/approach Univariate and multi-variate tests are implemented. CEO compensation is designed as a function of the origin of a firm’s founder (immigrant or native), executive characteristics and firm characteristics with firm and year fixed effect regressions. CEO compensation is measured with cash pay, equity-based pay and total compensation. Findings CEOs of immigrant-founder firms receive higher equity-based compensation and higher total pay than CEOs of non-immigrant-founder firms and the levels of their equity-based and total compensation are contingent upon their stock ownership. CEOs in high-growth immigrant-founder firms receive higher stock-based pay than their counterparts in non-immigrant-founder firms. Immigrant-founder family firms compensate their CEOs with higher equity-based pay than immigrant-founder non-family firms. Practical implications The paper provides some explanations on the success of immigrant-founder firms. CEO compensation designs in immigrant-founder firms can be adopted in other firms. Social implications The paper provides some rationale for immigration legislation to encourage the talented to come to the USA and start their business in the USA. Originality/value This paper is the first to study executive compensation practice in immigrant-founder firms. The findings provide some practical and policy implications on immigration reform.
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Magdalena, Renna, and Yanuar Dananjaya. "CEO Capability and CEO Arrogance." International Journal of Scientific Research and Management 9, no. 07 (2021): 2319–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v9i07.em06.

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This study aims to see the effect of the CEO Capabilities and CEO Arrogance to fraudulent financial statements indication. The study used a sample of all manufacturing companies from 2017 to 2019. In accordance with the sample selection, there are 162 manufacturing companies that meet the sample criteria. In this study using multiple linear regression test. This study uses secondary data for the 2017-2019 annual report.
 Based on the results that have been tested, CEO capability as a respected party (CEO Age), CEO capability as the person who knows the most about the company (CEO Tenure) and CEO arrogance as a person who has political connections (CEO Political Connection) have an influence on the indication of fraudulent financial statements. Furthermore, the hypothesis of CEO Capability in Accounting/finance knowledge (CEO Education), CEO arrogance in the form of narcissism (CEO PIC) and CEO arrogance as company founder (Founder CEO) have no influence on indications of fraudulent financial statements.
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Sutrisno, Paulina, Sidharta Utama, Ancella Anitawati Hermawan, and Eliza Fatima. "Founder and Descendant vs. Professional CEO: Does CEO Overconfidence Affect Tax Avoidance in the Indonesia Case?" Economies 10, no. 12 (2022): 327. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies10120327.

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This study aims to test whether the founder or descendants of CEOs have differences from professional CEOs in influencing the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance. Overconfident CEOs have strong incentives to avoid taxes. However, the role of the founder or descendant CEOs is expected to mitigate the relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and tax avoidance. This study used a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012–2019 and tested random effect panel data. The results of this study show that CEO-led companies that are overconfident are more driven to tax avoidance. Meanwhile, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance is not influenced by the presence of a descendant, founder, or professional CEO. Indonesia as one of the countries that adheres to a two tier governance system, the founder or descendant CEO is not the only significant actor in the company but based on the upper echelon theory that role of the entire company management team that influences the company’s policy strategy. This study provides implications for developing the literature regarding the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance. However, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance is not influenced by the presence of the founder, descendant, or professional CEO. Likewise, this research is useful for investors, creditors, and regulators in paying attention to the characteristics of the CEO in making decisions.
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Lee, Joon Mahn, Dalee Yoon, and Steven Boivie. "Founder CEO Succession: The Role of CEO Organizational Identification." Academy of Management Journal 63, no. 1 (2020): 224–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.0091.

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Sudana, I. Made, and Elka Dwiputri. "Karakteristik CEO Dan Kinerja Perusahaan Non-Keuangan Yang Teraftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia." Jurnal Manajemen dan Bisnis Indonesia 5, no. 3 (2018): 299–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.31843/jmbi.v5i3.169.

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The purpose from this research is to test the effect from CEO characteristics towards firm performance. CEO characteristics was proxied with founder CEO, ownership, tenure, and education. Firm performance was proxied with Tobin’s Q. The sample from this research are every non-financial firm that have been listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2010 – 2015 period. The method from this research is purposive sampling with analysis technique model multiple linier regression. The result from this research showed that founder CEO, CEO ownership, CEO tenure have a positive significant effect towards firm’s performance or Tobin’s Q.
 
 Keywords : CEO Characteristics, Firm Performance
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Shekshnia, Stanislav. "Founder-CEO succession: the Russian paradox." European J. of International Management 2, no. 1 (2008): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ejim.2008.016927.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Almeida, Ana Margarida Martins de. "When do startups hire a CEO?" Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/13235.

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Mestrado em Finanças<br>Este estudo avalia os fatores que levam um fundador a contratar um Director Geral (Gestor Profissional) para a sua empresa. A literatura anterior tem vindo a estudar os Directores Gerais e as startups separadamente, sendo o tema de estudo ignorado. Pretendemos contribuir para a literatura ao pesquisar em que momento as startups decidem contratar um Gestor Profissional e as transformações que daí ocorrerão. A revisão da literatura refere: se as startups contratam ou não um Gestor Profissional, quais os determinantes para o contratar e, por fim, quais as características de um Gestor Profissional. Para esclarecer esta investigação, utilizamos dados recolhidos através de uma entrevista semi-estruturada e complementa-mo-la com fontes secundárias. A nossa amostra inclui startups incubadas na região de Lisboa, que contrataram um Gestor Profissional ou que permaneceram com os fundadores iniciais no papel de CEO (Gestor Fundador). A nossa principal conclusão indica que o Gestor Fundador tem habilidades de liderança incomparáveis e ao ser crucial na vida de uma startup, a longo prazo, as empresas geralmente permanecem com estes no papel de Director Geral.<br>This study evaluates the factors that drive a founder to hire a Chief Executive Officer (Professional CEO) for its start-up. Previous literature have studied CEOs and start-ups, separately, being the study topic itself ignored. We aim to contribute to the literature by researching in which moment the startups decide to hire a Professional CEO and the transformations that from there will occur. The literature review refers to: startups hire or not a Professional-CEO, which are the determinants to hire him/her and finally, which are the characteristics of a Professional-CEO. To enlighten this investigation, we use data collected through a semi-structured interview and complement it with secondary sources. Our sample includes startups incubated in the region of Lisbon, which hired a Professional CEO or remained with the initial founders in the role of CEO (Founder-CEO). Our major findings indicate that as Founder-CEO have unmatched leadership skills and are crucial in the life of a startup, in the long-term, the ventures usually remain with them in the role of Chief Executive Officers.<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Fernandes, Junior Matheus. "O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras." Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, 2010. http://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/handle/tede/757.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Fernandes Junior.pdf: 862744 bytes, checksum: 7ae0f1de3ba158af12066864631a3dad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-10<br>Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa<br>Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration.<br>As estruturas de controle e administração familiares são apontadas, por um lado, como eficientes e benéficas ao desempenho das empresas pelo seu potencial de redução de conflitos entre acionistas e administradores, menor miopia administrativa, reduzida assimetria de informação e possível influência social e política das famílias, entre outros fatores. Por outro, são apontadas como estruturas prejudiciais ao desempenho, por serem fonte de conflitos entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários, estarem sujeitas ao nepotismo e particularismo, pela inibição de takeovers, por estenderem os conflitos familiares à empresa e assim por diante. As conclusões sobre a correlação (positiva, negativa ou inexistente) destes fatores com o desempenho das empresas seguem dúbias. Este trabalho investigou esta questão, trazendo duas contribuições principais: o estudo da relação entre controle familiar ou individual, famílias fundadoras e administração do fundador no contexto nacional e o uso de um índice específico para a medida da governança corporativa como variável de controle, o qual usualmente é tratado pela literatura estrangeira através de proxies. Na análise empírica foi investigado o desempenho das 230 empresas mais líquidas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, nos anos de 2006, 2007 e 2008 frente ao controle familiar, ao controle da família fundadora da empresa e ao fato do cargo de CEO ser ocupado pela pessoa que fundou a firma, comparandoas aos grupos de controle não familiares ou não geridos pelo fundador. Modelos econométricos indicaram que, sob o ponto de vista de mercado, não há evidências claras de diferenças de desempenho entre empresas cujo controle é familiar ou individual e das famílias fundadoras e as empresas em geral. Já as empresas administradas pelo fundador (CEO fundador) apresentaram desempenho de mercado (Valor de Mercado sobre o Valor Contábil e Q de Tobin) superior às demais. Por outro lado, o desempenho operacional, medido por critérios contábeis, foi menor para o controle familiar, da família fundadora e para a administração do CEO fundador, comparado às empresas em geral. Os resultados referentes ao desempenho operacional diferem dos obtidos em estudos realizados nos Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental que apontam relações positivas entre o desempenho de mercado e operacional - e o controle e administração familiares.
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Madeira, João Pedro Gil Ferreira. "Do founder-CEO firms outperform the market?" Master's thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/32370.

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Estudos recentes relatam diferenças na performance de empresas com base no status do respetivo CEO. Este estudo examina empiricamente o desempenho das empresas cujo CEO é fundador. Utilizo uma amostra de 96 empresas americanas públicas cujo CEO é fundador ou cofundador para estimar os coeficientes das variáveis explicativas de Fama e French (1992) SMB, HML, WML, RMW e CMA usando o estimador de mínimos quadrados. Os resultados obtidos são emocionantes e esclarecedores. Ambas os portfólios produzem resultados robustos e com significância estatística global. Os portfólios value-weighted e eqaual-weighted obtêm retornos que variam de 1.51% a 2.01%. Isto sugere que existe um nexo de causalidade entre a existência de retornos anormais positivos e a performance de empresas cujo CEO é fundador e é de grande importância para os profissionais que trabalham no setor financeiro.<br>Research has been conducted that finds differences in firm performance according to the CEO status. This dissertation empirically examines founder-CEO firm’s performance. I use a sample of 96 listed US companies that are either founder or co-founder run to regress Fama and French’s (1992) independent variables SMB, HML, WML, RMW and CMA on equal-weighted and value-weighted excess returns using the OLS regression model. The results obtained are exciting and clarifying. Both portfolios produce very robust results and global statistical significance throughout. I find that the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios earn abnormal monthly returns ranging from 1.51% to 2.01%. This finding suggests there is a causal link between the existence of positive abnormal returns and founder-CEO firms and is of high importance for practitioners working in the finance industry.
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Delfino, Cinzia Laura. "CEO overconfidence and leverage ratio: evidence from the founder members of Mila." Master's thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/16782.

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The study investigates the impact of the managerial overconfidence bias on the capital structure of a sample of 78 firms from Chile, Peru and Colombia, during the years 1996-2014. We infer that there is a positive relation between the leverage ratio and a) the overconfidence; b) the experience and c) the male gender of the executive. Overconfidence is measured according to the status of the CEO (entrepreneur or not-entrepreneur) and the hypotheses are tested through dynamic panel data model. The empirical results show a highly significant positive correlation between overconfidence and leverage ratio and between gender and leverage ratio while, in contrast, the relation between experience and leverage ratio is negative.
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Arcand, Jean-Philippe. "Institutional and strategic implications of founder-ceo transitions in firms issuing initial public offerings." Thesis, 2004. http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/7869/1/MQ90994.pdf.

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Some of the most highly recognized CEOs were the entrepreneurial creators of their firms. These CEOs distinguished themselves, not only by starting their firms, but also by successfully managing them for long periods of time after they issued initial public offerings (IPOs) and became public. Considering such successes, it seems reasonable to ask the following question: Why do founders have a bad reputation among Venture Capitalists and Investment Bankers? Tashakori (1980) notes that Venture Capitalists realize that they put pressure on founders to leave their CEO positions. However, empirical research supporting the replacement of the Founder is limited. In this research, I examine the effect of replacing the founder with a professional CEO in firms that are issuing an initial public offering on a US stock exchange between 1996 and 2000. It is found that replacing the founder-CEO by a professional results in an increase of, on average, $12 million in the valuation of the issue. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Hearn, Bruce, and I. Filatotchev. "Founder retention as CEO at IPO in emerging economies: The role of private equity owners and national institutions." 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/18031.

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Yes<br>We integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emerging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels of private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources.
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Kulchina, Elena. "Three Essays on Foreign Entrepreneurs." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/34774.

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My dissertation focuses on foreign entrepreneurs—individuals who establish firms outside of their native countries. Despite the prevalence of foreign entrepreneurs, their strategic choices have received little attention in the research literature. For example, when starting a firm, an entrepreneur must decide whether to manage the business personally or hire a local manager, yet we know little about how this choice affects firm performance. To examine this issue, in the first study I use a novel dataset of foreign entrepreneurial firms in Russia and a visa policy change as an instrument for the owner-manager choice. Contrary to the expectation that foreign entrepreneurs would underperform local managers due to the liability of foreignness, I find that foreign owner-managers can benefit their firms: Exogenous assignment of a local manager in place of a foreign owner-manager reduces profits. Foreign owner-managers benefit their firms by hiring cheap native-country labor as well as through reduced agency costs. The second study examines how private benefits of occupying a managerial position affect an entrepreneur’s choice between owner-management and hiring an agent. I show that foreign entrepreneurs with a strong desire to reside in a host country are more likely to become owner-managers. These results are consistent with the idea that entrepreneurs expecting to gain private benefits from managing their firms are more likely to become owner-managers. Moreover, I demonstrate that entrepreneurs are willing to substitute the non-pecuniary benefits associated with relocation for firm profit. These findings add to a growing literature exploring the role of personal preferences in entrepreneurs’ strategic decisions, such as location choice and ownership structure. The third study examines the impact of media coverage on the location choices of foreign firms. Publicly available media information has largely been ignored by the location literature, perhaps because its impact on location choice is expected to be trivial. This study challenges this assumption: Using a new instrument for media coverage (a major anniversary of a city’s establishment date), I show that extensive foreign media coverage of a city increases the number of foreign entrants. Moreover, this effect is strongest for socially and geographically distant firms and entrepreneurs.
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Books on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Jack Ma: Founder and CEO of the Alibaba Group. Homa & Sekey Books, 2014.

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Stand for the best: What I learned after leaving my job as CEO of H&R Block to become a teacher and founder of an inner city charter school. Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, 2008.

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Swanson, Robert A. Co-founder, CEO, and chairman of Genentech, Inc., 1976-1996. 2001.

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R, Jasmine, Zayn M, Maria L, and Kamaldeep Singh. Marketing : Return on Investment: Written by Kamaldeep Singh; CEO and Founder of Zhoustify. Independently Published, 2020.

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Hughes, Sally Smith, and Robert A. Swanson. Co-founder, CEO, and Chairman of Genentech, Inc., 1976-1996: Oral History Transcript / 200. Franklin Classics, 2018.

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Hughes, Sally Smith, and Robert a. Swanson. Co-Founder, Ceo, and Chairman of Genentech, Inc., 1976-1996: Oral History Transcript / 200. Franklin Classics Trade Press, 2018.

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Hughes, Sally Smith, and Robert A. Swanson. Co-founder, CEO, and Chairman of Genentech, Inc., 1976-1996: Oral History Transcript / 200. Franklin Classics, 2018.

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Hughes, Sally Smith, and Robert a. Swanson. Co-Founder, Ceo, and Chairman of Genentech, Inc., 1976-1996: Oral History Transcript / 200. Franklin Classics Trade Press, 2018.

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Randolph, Marc. That Will Never Work: The Birth of Netflix by the First CEO and Co-Founder Marc Randolph. Octopus Publishing Group, 2021.

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Pirates, Category. Living Your Category POV: Why Founder/CEO-Problem Fit Defines Whether You Are a Missionary or a Mercenary. Category Pirates, 2022.

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Book chapters on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Chitpol Mungprom: CEO and Founder, Zanroo." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_11.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Akiko Naka: CEO and Founder, Wantedly." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_14.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Winston Damarillo: CEO and Founder, GlueCode." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_18.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Shing Chow: Founder and CEO, Lalamove." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_2.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Mark Sears: CEO and Founder, CloudFactory." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_21.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Achmad Zaky: Founder and CEO, Bukalapak." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_9.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Mohan Belani: Co-founder and CEO, e27." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_12.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Ron Hose: Co-founder and CEO, Coins.ph." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_15.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Chih-Han Yu: CEO Co-founder, Appier." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_17.

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Ferraz, Ezra, and Gracy Fernandez. "Maria Ressa: Co-founder and CEO, Rappler." In Asian Founders at Work. Apress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5162-1_20.

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Conference papers on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Moelmann, Connor, Phillip Davis, Josh Getz, et al. "A Walker With Integrated Toilet Seat and Stroller Capabilities for the Disabled." In ASME 2013 Summer Bioengineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/sbc2013-14763.

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Abstract:
With the baby boomers reaching retirement, we anticipate a large increase in demand of health care products for the elderly. As people age, bones become fragile and balance becomes impaired, which puts older people at increased danger with longer recovery times. Dick Sarns, the sponsor of this project and co-founder and CEO of NuStep, a rehabilitation equipment manufacturer, wanted to create a walker for his wife, Norma Sarns, who suffers from multiple sclerosis.
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Reports on the topic "Founder-CEO"

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Dr. Jay Stewart ‘Meeting the needs of gender diverse children and young people with mental health difficulties’. ACAMH, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.13056/acamh.4101.

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