Academic literature on the topic 'Founder Shareholding'
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Journal articles on the topic "Founder Shareholding"
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Almasadeh, Ahmed Mahmoud. "The Legal Status of the Founders in the Public Shareholding Company under Incorporation in Jordan." Journal of Law and Sustainable Development 11, no. 12 (2023): e2388. http://dx.doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i12.2388.
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Objective: the objective of this study first is Public shareholding companies are considered the most important engine of economic activity in the country, as they were established to undertake major economic projects, whether commercial or industrial. Therefore, the establishment of a joint-stock company requires carrying out legal procedures by people called the founders.
 
 Method: In this study, we follow the comparative analytical descriptive approach, as well as looking at some jurisprudential opinions. The study was divided into the concept of the founder in the public shareholding companies and the conditions that must be met in the founder, the first topic, and the actions issued by the founders in the company under incorporation in the second topic.
 
 Result: This study aimed to explain the role of the founders during the establishment procedures period, and the extent to which it is permissible to exploit the subject of the activity for which the company was established for during the establishment stage, and the extent of the disposition of the actions carried out by it. During the incorporation period, to the founding person or to the company.
 
 Conclusion: After this detailed presentation of the legal position of the founder in the company under incorporation in the joint-stock company, it can be said that the credit for the emergence of this type of company belongs to the founders, as he is the owner of the idea in establishing this company, and his willingness to carry out all the actions and legal procedures necessary to establish this company.
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Gamra, Atika Ben, and Dorra Ellouze. "Family Ownership and Accrual-Based Earnings Management: Evidence from Tunisia." Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance 17, no. 1 (2021): 93–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.21315/aamjaf2021.17.1.4.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of family shareholding and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on earnings management. We use panel data for a sample of 37 Tunisian non-financial listed firms over the period 2007–2017. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance in family firms by testing the effect of the presence of a family or a founder CEO on earnings management in Tunisia. Our results show that the family ownership and the presence of a family CEO (either founder or not) are positively and significantly associated with earnings management practices. These findings suggest that families’ dominance with a significant equity stake and a CEO position under control leads to an entrenchment effect resulting in poor earnings reporting quality.
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Bessolitsyn, Alexander. "A.A. Khanzhonkov as a Pioneer of the National Film Industry." Journal of Economic History and History of Economics 22, no. 1 (2021): 98–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2308-2488.2021.22(1).98-120.
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The article provides an analysis on the activity of the first shareholding company in the Russian film industry. The analysis is based on archival documents from the Russian State Archive and the State Achieve of the Republic of Crimea, as well as on published sources, available literature and Khanzhonkov’s own memoirs. The main focus of the text is on managing mechanism of the shareholding company, special attention is paid to the key directions and peculiarities of its activity in the film market of the early 20th century. It was revealed that the production process of documentary and educational films released by the film factory was rather innovative. The research defined the main stakeholders and equity holders, besides it described the life path of the founder of the Shareholding Company at different stages of his life including the Soviet period. One of the conclusions made in the research was the equity-mutual type of the Shareholding Company, when shares were issued and distributed only among the people closest to the equity holders, their relatives and family members and were not presented to the market for general public. This approach provided the management body with complete control over the enterprise, but at the same time the approach limited its development since there were no external investments. As the Board Chairman and Managing Director A. Khanzhonkov sought alternative opportunities to win the national film market without attracting additional outside sources of funding. The key condition for implementing the chosen strategy was the search for opportunities to improve the quality of released film products.
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Kwiatkowska, Magdalena. "Polska księgarnia w Petersburgu. Przyczynek do opisu polskiego ruchu wydawniczego na przełomie XIX i XX wieku." Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Librorum, no. 18 (January 1, 2014): 71–89. https://doi.org/10.18778/0860-7435.18.04.
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The article concerns Polish Bookstore in Petersburg, existing in years 1879/1880-1918/1920. Within 40 years of bookselling and publishing the company changed hands and name several times. The publishing house was founded in 1879 in Warsaw by printer and publisher Gratian Unger (1853-1911) who remained its owner until 1883. In the years 1883-1886 it was owned by writer and journalist Henry Gliński, followed by Erasmus Piltz, co-founder and editor of the St. Petersburg magazine „Kraj” (1882-1909). In 1893 the company was taken over by Kazimierz Grendyszyński and in 1903 – by Polska Spółka Udziałowa [Polish Shareholding Company], on behalf of which the company was managed by Ferdynand M. Heidenreich (d. 1922). This article aims to organize the fractional information available in historical sources and publications of a biographical character. Based on bibliographic sources an attempt has been made to describe the publishing repertoire of Polish Bookshop in St. Petersburg up to year 1903 and the attitude of the Russian censorship towards it.
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Bun, Kwan Man. "Managing Market, Hierarchy, and Network: The Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd., 1917–1937." Enterprise & Society 6, no. 3 (2005): 395–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1467222700014609.
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As China underwent industrialization during the Republican period, how did companies deal with the problems of expansion, competition, and relationship with the state? Using the concept of network capitalism, this article demythologizes the “enigma” of Chinese network by analyzing the experience of the Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd. Fan Xudong, the company’s founder, deftly managed his network portfolio for information and other resources. Kith and kin as shareholders, interlocking directorates, and cross-shareholding, as well as hierarchical management and cartels, were utilized to raise capital and manage local markets. Market, hierarchy, and network thus constitute three complementary organization principles in explaining Jiuda’s success.
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H.R., Ganesha, and S. Aithal P. "Extending the Concept of Delayed Gratification to Retail Start-ups in India: An Imperative Strategy for the Success, Long-Term Sustainability, and Protection of Founding Members' Majority Shareholding." International Journal of Management, Technology, and Social Sciences (IJMTS) 5, no. 2 (2020): 252–65. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4216311.
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By definition, the key objective of an organized investor is to commit capital with an expectation of financial returns within a specified period. This definition neither explicitly nor implicitly indicates the moral ways through which such financial returns are to be expected. Thus, the founding members of any Retail start-ups in India need to be cognizant of the fact that the key objectives of external organized investors are contrary to the founding members’ objectives of building a successful firm. This study demonstrates that the founding members of Retail start-ups in India knowingly or unknowingly distance themselves from understanding such objectives of investors, they are constantly reaching out to fund their start-ups. We have noticed that the most important aspects that have given the highest attention by the founding members (implicitly influenced by organized investors’ ideology) and have a greater significance in the failure to protect the majority shareholding in the firm revolve around (i) Quick reward; (ii) Short-term reward; (iii) Immediate reward; (iv) Impulsivity and rapid decision-making for the reward; (v) A desire for prodigious financial returns. And the only strategy that has a significant association and determination in getting rid of such aspects is the concept of Delayed Gratification (DG) i.e., ‘a person’s ability to resist either a smaller or immediate reward to receive either a larger or more enduring reward later’. This study indicates that even after ten years of operation, the founding members with high levels of DG were able to retain more than 65% of their original shareholding with a relatively better financial performance of their firm whereas, founders with lower levels of DG were able to retain less than 5% and founders with no DG are no more holding any shareholding of the startup they founded. Besides finding evidence of the DG strategy’s role for the founding members, our results are also consistent with the arguments, suggestions, and recommendations of Cognitive, Biological, Psychodynamic, Social, Behavioral, and Developmental psychologists. However, our findings are contrary to Evolutionary theorists.
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Huang, Lianfan, and Hong Xie. "Research on the Factors Influencing the Quality of Family Business Information Disclosure From the Perspective of Social Emotional Wealth Theory." SHS Web of Conferences 148 (2022): 02009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202214802009.
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Based on the theory of social emotional wealth, social emotional wealth is divided into two types: constraint type and extension type. Using the data of family businesses from 2015 to 2020, empirical research is conducted on the impact of two types of social emotional wealth on the quality of information disclosure, It also examines the moderating effect of institutional investor ownership and analyst concern on the relationship between emotional wealth and information disclosure quality in a constrained society, as well as the moderating effect of parental founder status and second generation experience length on the relationship between emotional wealth and information disclosure quality in an extended society. The findings are as follows: (1) Constrained social emotional wealth negatively affects the quality of information disclosure of family businesses; (2) Extended social emotional wealth has a positive impact on the quality of family business information disclosure; (3) The higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the weaker the relationship between the constrained social emotional wealth and the quality of family business information disclosure; (4) Analysts focus on the relationship between the negative impact of social emotional wealth and corporate information disclosure; (5) The paternal founder status can positively affect the relationship between the extended social emotional wealth and the quality of information disclosure of family businesses. (6) The second generation experience did not positively affect the relationship between extended social emotional wealth and family business information disclosure.
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Koji, Kojima, Bishnu Kumar Adhikary, and Le Tram. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Comparative Analysis between Listed Family and Non-Family Firms in Japan." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 13, no. 9 (2020): 215. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm13090215.
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This study aims to explore the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of publicly listed family and non-family firms in the Japanese manufacturing industry. The study obtains data from Bloomberg over the period 2014–2018 and covers 1412 firms comprising of 861 non-family and 551 family firms. Our results show that family firms outperform non-family counterparts in terms of return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q when a univariate analysis is invoked. On multivariate analysis, family firms show superior performance to non-family firms with Tobin’s Q. However, family ownership negates firm performance when ROA is taken into account. Regarding the impact of governance elements on Tobin’s Q, institutional shareholding appears to be a significant and positive factor for promoting the performance of both family and non-family firms. Furthermore, board size encourages the performance of non-family firms, while such influence is not observed for family firms. In terms of ROA, foreign ownership inspires the performance of both family and non-family firms. Moreover, government ownership stimulates the performance of family firms, while board independence significantly negates the same. Besides, we find that the performance of family firms run by the founder’s descendants is superior to that of family firms run by the founder. These findings have critical policy implications for family firms in Japan.
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Lau, James, and Joern H. Block. "Corporate payout policy in founder and family firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 3 (2014): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i3p7.
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This paper investigates the tax and agency explanations of corporate payout policy by investigating the likelihood, the level and the method of payout in founder and family firms. Controlling founders and families are both subject to the tax disadvantage of dividends arising from their substantial shareholdings, but family firms are arguably subject to more severe agency conflicts than founder firms due to their susceptibility to wasteful expenditure and the adverse effects of intra-family conflicts. Results indicate that founder firms on average are less likely and pay a lower level of dividends than family firms. Moreover, founder firms prefer share repurchase over dividends as the main method of payout whereas family firms prefer dividends over share repurchase. Overall, our findings are consistent with the agency explanation of corporate payout policy.
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Naib, Sudhir, and Swati Singh. "Mindtree: hostile takeover bid by Larsen and Toubro." Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies 9, no. 3 (2019): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eemcs-08-2019-0223.
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Learning outcomes The case explores information technology (IT) company Mindtree’s journey of 20 years from the time it was founded in 1999 to be different from others, and how it became a target for acquisition by an Indian diversified conglomerate in 2019. It offers insights into developing organizational culture and values in an organization, threats faced by a company when promoters dilute their shareholding, and the strategies followed by the acquirer and the target firm. It also deals with the challenges in the acquisition of a knowledge service digital firm. After working through the case and assignment questions, students will be able to: identify the circumstances under which a company can become a target for hostile takeover; describe motivations of the acquirer firm in an acquisition; distinguish between acquisition and hostile takeover, and discuss salient features of Securities and Exchange Board of India (substantial acquisition of shares and takeover) regulations, 2011; list the defenses a target firm can adopt to ward off hostile acquirer; explore strategies followed by acquirer and target firms; analyze important ingredients of organization culture, and importance of cultural congruence in an acquisition; and discuss challenges faced by an acquirer in India, namely, legal, retention of clients and key people in the target firm particularly in hostile environment. Case overview/synopsis The case explores how ten IT professionals founded mid-tier IT services company Mindtree in 1999 in Bengaluru, India (home to Infosys and Wipro) to be different from others – by inserting themselves at a higher level in the value chain, being philanthropic as a part of broader business strategy to attract a certain kind of employee and customer. It developed a culture of equality, consideration and respect. Its attrition rate of 12 to 13 per cent was significantly lower than the Industries. Mindtree crossed annual revenue of US$1bn for FY 2019 and was growing at twice the industry’s growth rate. The most attractive part was that its proportion of revenue from digital services was about 50 per cent as compared to 25-35 per cent of other services vendors. With time, the share of promoters/founders declined and increased one investor’s shareholding of V. G. Siddhartha and his related entities. In early March 2019, the promoters’ stake was 13.32 per cent while Siddhartha had 20.32 per cent. Larsen and Toubro (L&T) one of India’s conglomerate entered into a share purchase agreement on March 18, 2019 with Siddhartha to acquire his 20.32 per cent stake. Immediately, L&T asked its broker to purchase up to 15 per cent of share capital of Mindtree at a price not exceeding INR 980 per share (each share of face value INR 10). This would trigger an open offer by L&T to purchase additional 31 per cent shares of Mindtree. The action of hostile takeover bid by L&T evoked emotional criticism from Mindtree founders. Mindtree efforts to defend itself could not materialize. L&T’s stake crossed 26 per cent on May 16, 2019. After Indian regulator SEBI’s approval, L&T’s open offer to buy shares from Mindtree shareholders commenced on June 17, 2019. The case examines motivation of the acquirer firm particularly when it is a conglomerate, and how a well-performing company became a target for hostile takeover. It looks at vulnerabilities of a target firm, and defensive steps a firm can take to fence itself against such takeover. The case also explores how organizational culture is built in a people-oriented business, namely, digital services, and what role it plays in a merger of two firms. Complexity academic level The case is suited for postgraduate students of management, as well as those undergoing executive courses in management. Supplementary materials Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes. Subject code CSS 11: Strategy.
Book chapters on the topic "Founder Shareholding"
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Zhang, Pengfei, and Yibing Tang. "Research on the Impact of Management’s Shareholding on Cash Holding Behavior of Manufacturing Companies." In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/faia220391.
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Taking manufacturing companies of listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as samples, a fixed effect model is constructed to explore the mechanism of management’s shareholding and corporate cash holding behavior. The results show that management’s shareholding significantly improves the value of cash holding and reduces the cash holding level. Financing constraint negatively moderates the influence of management’s shareholding and corporate cash holding behavior. From the perspective of the life cycle, it is found that: for the growing, mature, and recession companies, the effect of management shareholding on cash holding value and cash holding level shows a strong trend first and then a weak trend.
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Nandi, Devanjali, and Arindam Das. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance." In Handbook of Research on Globalization, Investment, and Growth-Implications of Confidence and Governance. IGI Global, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8274-0.ch013.
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Ownership structure is considered to be of prime importance in corporate governance of a firm. The ownership structure significantly varies across the nations. The main focus of this chapter is twofold: firstly to see the impact of ownership structure on performance of the firm and secondly to investigate the relationship between stock market performance and ownership structure during the crisis period. Panel data analysis of CNX 200 companies has been done for the time period of 2006-2013.The study also takes into account the relationship between crisis period stock return and ownership structure. The results of this study reveal a positive relationship of promoter's shareholding with performance while a negative relationship of performance is found with the non-promoters shareholding. The regression of stock price performance on ownership variable gives a significant negative relationship during the crisis period.
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Ghosh, Sohini, and Sraboni Dutta. "M&A Deals and Corporate Governance Framework." In Foreign Direct Investments. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2448-0.ch070.
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The escalating importance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has coincided with concerns about corporate governance issues. This article investigates how corporate governance mechanisms along with firm-specific control variables impact performance during M&A deals occurring between 2000-2012 in acquiring Indian telecom companies. In this research, firm performance has been measured via accounting based, market based and qualitative performance dimensions, represented by Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), Tobin's Q and Human Capital Return on Investment (HCROI) respectively. Panel data regression techniques was employed for the analysis. The learning from this study reveals that board size and firm size have significant positive relationships with ROCE and HCROI. Chairperson-CEO duality also has positive significant association with ROCE. Shareholding percentage of institutional investors was found to have a significant negative relationship with HCROI. Board independence, firm size and market share significantly affect Tobin's Q.
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Aybars, Aslı, and Levent Ataünal. "Earnings Management and Institutional Ownership in Turkey." In Advances in Finance, Accounting, and Economics. IGI Global, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-6114-9.ch010.
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Earnings management is an important factor that considerably affects the reporting quality of firms and conceivably results in suboptimal investor decisions. The presence of active institutional investors among the equity holders is generally accepted as an external control mechanism that moderates earnings management problems. This chapter aimed to evaluate the role of institutional investors on earnings management with a data of firms listed on Borsa Istanbul between 2005 and 2011. The study found a significant and negative relation between institutional ownership level and managerial discretion exercised in opportunistic management of accruals and confirmed the substantial role played by institutional investors in monitoring and disciplining corporate managers. In other words, the managers' tendency for earnings management practices is observed to be mitigated by institutional shareholdings.
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Whitley, Richard. "Enterprise Change and Continuity in a Transforming Society: The Case of Hungary." In Divergent Capitalisms. Oxford University PressOxford, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198293965.003.0009.
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Abstract In this chapter I present some evidence about how leading Hungarian enterprises and their managers responded to the institutional and economic changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s that broadly confirms the analysis in Chapter 8. In addition to the limited and incremental nature of many changes to enterprises ‘ structures and strategies in the early 1990s, the effects of changes in ownership were more varied and less sharp than many anticipated. Where privatization did result in significant changes in control and behaviour, typically when foreign firms bought a dominant shareholding, these took some time to be implemented. Additionally, many of the enterprises in severe financial difficulties that remained in state hands had restructured their activities quite substantially by 1996. Changing ownership per se, then, was not a prerequisite for reducing the labour force, disposing of business units, or reorganizing the managerial hierarchy. However, substantial investment in new technologies and products overwhelmingly occurred in those SOEs taken over by foreign firms, as was found in numerous case studies elsewhere (Carlin et al. 1995).
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Fruin, W. Mark. "Learning to Work Together: Adaptation and the Japanese Firm." In Beyond The Firm. Oxford University PressOxford, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198290605.003.0012.
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Abstract After we enter the world, we adapt to it. Indeed, after creation, adaptation is the most basic fact of life for organizations no less than individuals. As soon as organizations are founded and for as long as they exist, they adapt and continue to adapt. Given this imperative, it is also evident that organizational learning is the primary means whereby both large and small adaptation, planned and unplanned change, take place in firms. Yet, in spite of the significance of adaptation and learning, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to these concepts in most theories of the firm. This oversight may be particularly unfortunate with respect to studies of the Japanese firm. The large Japanese firm, with its personnel policies favouring long-term employment and seniority-weighted remuneration, its patterns of stable shareholding and relational contracting, and its operational interdependency with groups of related firms, subsidiaries, and affiliates, as discussed throughout this volume as corporate clusters and groups, may be among the best examples of the need to ‘adapt or fail ‘. All of these organizational features tend to shield Japanese firms from market forces, especially in factor markets but also in product markets, and to reinforce emphases on adaptation and learning, so much so that many scholars have argued for a distinctive pattern of corporate organization in late-industrializing Japan based on these features (Levine and Kawada
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Sheard, Paul. "Japanese Corporate Boards and the Role of Bank Directors." In Networks, Markets, And The Pacific Rim. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195117202.003.0010.
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Abstract Banks occupy an important place in the loose networks of large firms that characterize the Japanese brand of capitalism. Most listed firms in Japan have an identifiable connection to one of the ten or so major commercial banks. Many firms are affiliated with one of the six bank-centered groupings, most clearly the case when they belong to the group presidents’ club. Keizai Chosa Kyokai (1993) identified 635 (60 percent) of the 1,053 first-section-listed firms in 1991 as being affiliated with one of the six bank-centered groups and 140 (13 percent) as being affiliated with one of the nine other city or long-term credit banks. Only 93 firms (9 percent) were found not to be affiliated with a bank or parent company. President club membership is much more exclusive: In 1991, only 175 (8 percent) of the 2,086 listed firms belonged to one of the six clubs (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1991). Even if the affiliation is not this clear-cut, most firms have a “main bank” relationship (as do group-affiliated ones), meaning that the bank maintains the leading position in loan shares and other banking business with the firm and that the bank and firm maintain a significant interlocking shareholding relationship.
Conference papers on the topic "Founder Shareholding"
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Barbosa, Carlos Magno G., Lucas Gabriel da S. Felix, Carolina R. Xavier, and Vinícius da F. Vieira. "Investigação da relação entre empresas através da análise topológica de uma rede na Bolsa de Valores do Brasil." In Symposium on Knowledge Discovery, Mining and Learning. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação - SBC, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/kdmile.2018.27380.
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B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão) is the official stock exchange in Brazil and plays a key role in the world financial market. Stock exchange allows people and companies to relate through the shareholding and the purchase and sale of shares. The study of the relationship between people and companies can reveal valuable information about the operation of the stock exchange and, consequently, the financial market as a whole. In this work, the relations in B3 are modeled through a network, in which the vertices represent companies and people and the edges represent shareholdings. From the built network, several analyzes are performed with the objective of understanding and characterizing the patterns found in relationships. Investigation on the topology of the network is performed under different perspectives, such as the centrality of the vertices, organization of vertices in communities, the robustness and the diffusion of influence.