Journal articles on the topic 'Franco-Russian Alliance. France-Foreign economic relations Russia'

The subject of this research consists in determination of legal component of creation and functionality of the technological strategic alliances, taking into account Russian experience and the experience of other countries. The article reveals that the agreement-based strategic alliances are assigned the key position, as such structures ensure sustainable and effective development of technological sector of the economy of each country. Based on the analysis of international and Russian experience, systematic review and author’s conclusions are presented the peculiarities of creation of such structures. The author analyzes the possible forms of establishment of strategic alliance with participation of the Russian companies. The creation of such treaty-based unions may become an instrument for stemming the operational risks for particular participants, since the reduction in transaction costs and influence of synergism of the business approximate an organization to achieving strategic goals. It is underlined that there is currently a number of objective obstacles in establishment of the long-term partnership relations between the Russian and foreign subjects and creation of transnational associations.

The current state of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China is described by many international relations experts as the best in history. After taking the president office by Donald Trump, the bilateral relations between America and abovementioned powers are cooling down. Current foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation focuses on holding a common position in the international political arena, which is in fact an attempt to counterweight political influence of the US administration and their allies. The dimension of the strategic partnership between China and Russia is also determining the mutual economic dependence, which is now crucial for both powers to build a strong position on the international forum. In addition, Russia is one of the crucial partners for the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by many recognized as the Chinese attempt to break the American economic domination. The collisional course of the American foreign policy towards Russia and China forces the latter to look for Central and Eastern European allies as well as to gain influence in the region of Central Asia which is leading to a constant increase in tensions between China and Russia.

In the international framework India is finding a larger position for itself. This hope is focused on the belief that India is a prosperous democracy with substantial human and material resources; it is an increasingly strong economic power; it has a proven record as a responsible and law-abiding regime, and as a member of the non-aligned party it has consistently shared the interests of the developing nations. Indian foreign policy makers argue that India wants to re-invent itself at this point of 'take-off' as a great force. India needs new alliance for the proposed new position, including the dominant superpower, the United States of America (US). The US has said it would turn India into a great force. This essay attempts to examine the old pattern of relations with Russia that India had enjoyed. There's an Indo-US triangular alliance taking its place. How is this current type of strategic partnership distinct from that of the Indo Soviet/ Russian alliance? However, both countries' natural desire to strive towards multi polarity in world politics has helped restore the relationship, particularly over the past decade. Remarkably, ties with the US no longer stand in the way of stronger relations between India and Russia. The turbulent security climate marked by what is frequently assumed to be the state-sponsored insurgency invulnerable Asian areas, the war in Afghanistan, and the political turmoil in both Afghanistan and Central Asian countries has paved the way for a strategic alliance between India and Russia.

This article is devoted to the description and analysis of the Russian foreign policy as it has evolved from a more pro-Western line after 1991-1992 to a more balanced and nationalistic version by the mid-1990s. In addition, as a part of this article certain projections are made for the future of Russian relations with the West. The author argues that in many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia during the early 1990s was continuation of the Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking.’ Gorbachev had hoped to put the Soviet Union on the path of partnership with the Western alliance through clearing away the military and political baggage of Stalinism-Brezhnevism. This strategy enjoyed full support of the pro-western democratic movement headed by Yeltsin. The Russian democrats saw Western nations as their chief ideological and political allies, and a possible source of economic aid and a model for Russia’s economic development. However, over time, a number of internal and external factors started to influence the original Yeltsin’s strategy. Internally, the failure of ‘shock therapy’ led to the weakening of democrats and strengthening of the communists and nationalists. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s foreign policy became the target of intense criticism. Moreover, as a result of the internal and external influences and specifically the national debates, Russia’s foreign policy was gradually modified. Russia again puts an emphasis on security, and on the strength of its armed forces, and forging strategic partnerships in various parts of the world. In addition, nationalism would be expressed through the protection of the Russian diaspora, the glorification of Russia’s imperial past, and the scaling down the policy of repentance for the misdeeds of the Communist regime. Russia’s great power ambitions could be observed through Russia’s attempt to play pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, and a desire to show the Russian flag across the world. Moreover, ideology does not influence Kremlin’s relations with other states anymore, instead economic interests encourage Moscow to restore cooperation with many Third World nations. It can be expected that Russia will continue to compete for predominance with the West in the post-soviet republics and in the field of security and at the same time Russia will promote its partnership with China and other non-Western actors. However, despite these shifts, a multidirectional strategy will likely be preserved.

The article is devoted to the Russian-Greek ecclesiastical and political relations before and during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s. After the start of the Greek uprising in 1821, Russia took an ambivalent position: as a patron of all orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, it sought to support the Greeks, but Russia also had to recognize the Greek revolution as an illegitimate rebellion. As a member of the Holy Alliance of European Powers Russia had no other choice but to adhere to the principles of legitimism. Russia had both political and economic interests in the region. After the Greek uprising, main powers in the Western Europe had no doubt that Russia would support the rebels. Nevertheless, Russia regarded the Greek rebellion as another European revolution. After a successful war of independence, Russia established its diplomatic mission in the Greek capital. The first ambassador was P.I. Rickman, who arrived with aim to provide political relations with this new Balkan state. If political support of the rebellion could find no understanding in the conservative European circles, the aid of the Orthodox Balkan Church was implied by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774. Special attention in this support, provided by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Greek monasteries, was paid to the Athos monasteries. This support was designed by a special document. It was adopted in 1735 under the Empress Anna Ivanovna and was subject to execution in subsequent years. The Archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has kept lists of all Orthodox monasteries on the territory of the Ottoman Empire that enjoyed material support from the Russian church; a significant part of this list are the Orthodox churches of Greece.

RETRACTEDIn this article the writer analyses the development peculiarities of the Tajik-Russian geopolitical relations during the establishment of Tajikistan foreign policy up to the commencement of multi-vector «open doors» policy in 2003-2004. Since the establishment of peace and stability in Tajikistan beginning from the year of 2000 the socio-economic development issues have been set as prior actions. To boost the economy, attraction of foreign investments, creation of new jobs and improvement of life standard of population were the issues to address. Political leaders of Tajikistan had no right to waste time making no headway. The country inevitably faced the issue of diversification of interstate and foreign economic relations, including outside the CIS. The article highlights that the foreign «open door» policy declared at the turn of2002-2003 implied mandatory modernization of the Tajik-Russian cooperation through strengthening its economic and human dimensions, adjusting the strategic partnership and alliance between the two states to the new global political realities. As to the geopolitical and military-political priorities, which Tajikistan had firmly adhered throughout the entire 1990th since its Independence, they actually remained unchanged even after 2002. The author points out the long-term Russian presence in the form of a large scale military base and military infrastructure on the territory of Tajikistan. The Republic is one of the most consistent, active and disciplined members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. During the first decade of the XXI century the political leaders of Tajikistan had been receiving offers from foreign non CIS countries with regard to deployment of military facilities on a fee basis on the territory of Tajikistan which were not even considered by the Government. Thus, the multi-vector foreign policy of «open doors» has been reflected in diversification of the international relations of Tajikistan, in demonopolization of trade and economic priorities, in attraction of foreign investments and military-technical assistance from the third countries (other than CIS and CSTO countries) but completely preserving the geopolitical and military-political priorities established until 2002.

The essence of integration transformations taking place recently in Eurasia where the leading role belongs to Russia as a regional power. A peculiar result was the creation of the post-Soviet reintegration Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in January 2015 This alliance is another integration project in Russia, designed to finally consolidate its influence in Eurasia, and in the long run turn into a powerful center of political and economic influence multipolar world. Create EEU were in during acceleration transformation of the world order growth in the context contradictions between the major geopolitical players. The final shift towards Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic structures has caused a crisis in its relations with Russia, which led to the annexation of the Crimea and escalated into armed confrontation with Russia supported puppet republics of the DPR and the LPR. Support local armed conflict and the deployment of a hybrid war was the reaction of the foreign Kyiv choices that ultimately negated Ukraine’s participation in the Eurasian integration structures. Aggravation Ukrainian crisis caused cautious traditional participants Eurasian integration – Belarus and Kazakhstan, which are increasingly trying to pursue an independent geopolitical game in its relations with the EU and China, which does not enhance EEU. The cooling of relations with Russia its allies traditional, multiplied by the loss of the prospects of Ukraine to EEU significantly weakens the new Eurasian organization and makes its future uncertain.

With Australia and Russia increasingly seeing their future in the Asia-Pacific, neither can reach its full economic potential except under the guidance of Beijing’s control of ports on its “Maritime Silk Road.” Cold War clichés of the “Yankee lapdog” and the big bad “Russian bear” continue to dominate how Canberra and Moscow view each other. Yet when it comes to the future of Australia-Russia-China relations, one must look beyond Moscow, Beijing, and Canberra, but rather at Vladivostok and Darwin, symbols of an as-yet unrealized goal to shift emphasis onto each country’s sparsely-populated regions bordering the Asia-Pacific. With the dawning of the “Asian Century,” how does the United States change the geopolitical dynamics of the region, and how do China, Russia, and Australia react to “America’s Pacific Century”? Rather than a capitulation to America’s aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific, China and Russia have consolidated the integration of their economies and militaries to counter such penetration. This emerging rivalry creates a challenge for Australia to balance its military alliance with the United States and its economic reliance on China. The necessity of finetuning this balance should be Canberra’s primary foreign policy issue.

Relations between Russia and Turkey have gone through five centuries at different stages, sometimes in difficult wars and conflicts, sometimes in harmony and good relations. However, conditions changed in the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was weakened and disintegrated. Russia played an important role in cutting down parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in reducing the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, which was considered a great nation for centuries. At the end of the First World War, after the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Russian troops withdrew from the war fronts. The Bolshevik government exposed the secret clauses of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, with the Quadruple Alliance, led by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire, like its German ally, took advantage of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the war fronts. In contrast to the agreement, attacks were launched on the Caucasus regions controlled by Russian Russia. However, following the emergence of the Turkish National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal and the signing of the Sevre Treaty and there were changes in the war fronts, as in the political arena. Russia, which became Soviet Russia at that time, found a new friend and ally, which had common interests with Soviet Russia, against the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. Both countries have benefited from this friendship and alliance. But at a time when the Kurds, especially in the Ottoman Kurdistan, had a chance to move towards achieving their goals and national rights, and at least making some progress in accordance with the provisions of the Sovereign Convention on the Rights of the Kurds. As the first country to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Turkey with the help of the Kemalist Movement in various ways, Russia, as well as economic, industrial and mining assistance, became a great supporter of Turkey in international and diplomatic forums. All this, along with many other factors, helped the Republic of Turkey stand on its own feet. When the revolutions and movements against the injustice and tyranny of the Turks occurred in Northern Kurdistan in the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet Russia sided with all possible means, military and political, as well as the Turkish Republic. Which brutally suppressed these uprisings and every move of a Kurdish nationalist nature.

In the first decade of the 21st century, Moscow and Beijing made two strategic decisions to expand and deepen bilateral economic relations. The first one was to endorse diversified energy partnership. The second was centered on cross-border area and has been offered in the program of regional cooperation between Russian and Chinese border regions. However, basic methodological illogicality between estimations and expectations in Russia–China economic relations has smashed the good intentions of both sides. Recommendations for the governments to develop economic relations were theoretically correct, but mostly generalized and abstract in nature. Subsequently, these relations had not found a stable ground and were undermined by numerous internal and outside factors, positive and negative. A narrow range of trade articles made Russian–Chinese exchange dependent on the demand and prices for these goods, and small mutual investments slightly influenced an economic exchange between two countries. In spite of a number of decisions related to cross-border and inter-regional relations accepted at the top level, these relations are still the weakest link in bilateral ties. Mutual investments and modern forms of economic cooperation did not flourish along the border also. Moreover, economic troubles in Russia of 2014–2016 have hampered the cross-border relations seriously, while Heilongjiang Province being the intermediary between many Chinese territories and Russia has become the biggest loser on the Chinese side. In spite of all problems in economic cooperation between Russia and China, today, China is the no. 1 trade partner of Russia and Russia is the no. 1 supplier of oil to China. Their energy alliance has strengthened both countries’ statuses in their economic interaction: the position of raw material supplier for Russia and the exporter of manufactured goods to Russia for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Western sanctions amplified the Chinese high-tech goods export to Russia; China’s share in Pacific Russia’s foreign trade increased from 29.2% in 2014 to 33.4% in 2017 and the peoples’ mood in this region moved in favor of China. However, by the end of second decade of the 21st century, Russia’s and China’s favorable “economic complementarities” and geographic proximity happened to remain a virtual product of academic’s intellectual exercises and have not transformed into the genuine economic cooperation. This is because, on the one hand, the philosophy, political and cultural infrastructures of Russia–China economic relations did not change much since 1990s, and, on the other hand, of some domestic and international factors that prevented this transformation.

Introduction. The article is devoted to the features and historical evolution of the SovietChinese (later Russian-Chinese) relations from the moment of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the present. The analysis of the complex of factors that determined the complex dynamics of the relations between the two countries was carried out by the author of the article. It is shown that the SovietChinese (later – Russian-Chinese) relations developed from close alliance to alienation and confrontation – with reaching a level of strategic partnership in the second decade of the 21st century. Methods and materials. The authors seek a combination of general theoretical and special methods, focusing on the historical, sociocultural and political analysis. They are based on the analysis of periodicals, as well as using books, articles and materials of researchers on the problems of the political development of China and the USSR (Russia) and on the transformation of the nature of their bilateral relations. The author analyzes the current situation in the relations between the two countries, according to which the nature of the development of the general situation in international relations and the objective foreign policy interests of China and Russia encourage them to build and deepen bilateral partnership. Results. According to the author, many of the reasons that gave rise to a conflict of interests and confrontation between the two countries in previous years are exhausted today. At the same time, the joint participation of China and Russia in the formation and adoption of a new, more equitable and sustainable world order, in the settlement of conflicts and crises, in the arrangement of the Greater Eurasia space seems to the author justified and promising. Among the factors defining the nature of the Sino-Soviet relations the author identifies the relationship between the leaders of the two countries, the difference of geopolitical concepts and approaches, ideological disputes and differences in the views on strategy and prospects of the communist movement, the logic of the socio-political and socio-economic development in the context of modernization. The changing and contradictory correlation of these factors determined the development of the Soviet-Chinese (later Russian-Chinese) relations from a close alliance to mutual distancing and confrontation – with the subsequent entry into strategic partnership.

The importance of Korean Peninsula in Russian foreign strategy is based on the need to preserve peace and stability in the Russia's Far East "soft underbelly" and to be a part of international efforts to solve the Korean problem, as well as to promote regional economic cooperation. In 1990-s Russia's position on the peninsula weakened, mainly because of the rupture of ties with North Korea, while relations with South Korea were reactive in nature. Rebalancing relations with the two Koreas in 2000-s increased Russia's involvement into Korean settlement, including the 6- party format. Russia/s relations with North Korea are now based on good neighborhood principle, however, they are far from idyllic as Russia disapproves of Pyongyang's behavior, especially its nuclear and missile activities. However to influence the situation more Russia should deepen its ties with the current Pyongyang leadership regardless of how irritating its behavior might be. Relations with the ROK are aimed at becoming strategic, but in reality are limited due to ROK's alliance with the USA. However South Korea has become the third most important economic partner in Asia. Russia is especially interested in three- party projects, such as Trans-Korean railroad (linked to Transsiberan transit way), gas pipeline and electricity grid. However implementation of these project is negatively influenced by the tensions in Korean peninsula. It can be solved only by multilateral efforts for comprehensive solution combining security guarantees for North Korea and its abandonment of nuclear option.

Diplomatic ties between Africa and the Russian Federation dates back to Africa’s dark decades of collective struggle for continental decolonization and severance in relations with its European colonizers. There is a vestige of historical evidence to support the claim that Russia had contributed immensely to this struggle in the early 1950s. Historically, the Russian Revolution of 1917 set the stage for the strenuous global struggle against colonialism and imperialism. This revolution, subsequently, inspired leaders of the nationalist movements on the African continent like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, among others to champion the fight for the liberation of Africa. Between 1945 and 1991, international politics was in a hegemonic geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective global allies. This power struggle polarized the world into the contrasting ideologies of Capitalism and Socialism. Some African nationalists situated the crusade for self-rule within the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR on 26 December 1991 and the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 heralded a new era in global politics. This paper is on the assumption that three decades into the demise of the Soviet Union, it is now time to reflect on the influence of Russia in international politics, with particular focus on Moscow’s foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. This rethinking is crucial because of the criticism that Russia’s renewed interest in Africa is a grand strategy to dominate affairs of the continent, rather than a search for new opportunities for economic cooperation and geopolitical alliances.

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU’s resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the “coronabonds” – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal “Northern” and economically modest “Southern” groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left “frugal” group by agreeing to allocate money to support the “South” without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the “Southern” coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the “South” states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the “frugals” put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission’s project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the “South” states had to persuade both the “frugal” and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission’s plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

Introduction. Nowadays, the steadily growing relationship with the People’s Republic of China is one of the priority directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. According to the author of the present paper, new opportunities for active constructive interaction between the countries are provided with the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR or BRI) adopted by China for the purpose of combination of efforts of the states for stable development of economy in the Eurasian space and peaceful co-existence of the people on the basis of the principles of openness, inclusivity of different civilizations, tolerance, safety, mutual benefit and training.The aimof the paper is to discuss the status and prospects of the RussianChinese cooperation in the humanitarian field and search for new narrative for development cooperation.Methodology and research methods. The research was performed with a support on philosophical and general scientific methods: comparative, structurally functional and system types of analysis, synthesis, generalization, and forecasting.Results and scientific novelty. The Russian-Chinese recent cooperation was considered. Special attention was given to education communication strategy as one of the reliable and checked channels of establishment and consolidation of international economic relations. The educational component of humanitarian interaction enables to provide effective tools for adjustment and support for the international dialogue and has an extensive range of opportunities for harmonization of cultural, social and even political standards.It is emphasized that further strengthening of the productive bilateral interaction of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation is prevented by its developed model which is under construction and functions mainly at the level of public authorities. In spite of the fact that the relations between two countries are on the rise, the potential of the existing model has become exhausted, and it is therefore necessary to search for other ways of future joint collaborative work. Strengthening of partnership requires the transition to multilateral cooperation with other states and mutual participation of Russia and China in the course of overcoming the social and economic imbalance in the zone of their shared interests – the territory of the revived Silk Road. The third countries located along its southern transit corridor, unlike the states of the northern direction, are characterized by the backwardness of economics, high unemployment rate, lack of the fair system of upward mobility, poverty and ignorance of the population, thus promoting the spread of religious extremism and escalation of international conflicts. The author proposed to involve the humanitarian sphere as the mechanism of the start of transcontinental infrastructure projects in order to normalize the social and economic situation in these regions, to overcome socio-cultural barriers and to achieve integration of economics of various states for the sake of their steady growth and effectivization. The coordinated actions of China, Russia and EU countries for the promotion and maintenance of modern models of education can become a decisive factor to stabilize and implement the One Belt and One Road Initiative in problematic regions. In the author’s view, partner States should focus on actions for modernization of national education systems and dissemination of scientific worldview, e.g. in the regions of the Northern Silk Road. Otherwise, the South will remain the centre of regularly military conflicts and terrorism financing, whereas the Russian and Chinese companies will continue to spend considerable personnel and financial resources for the safety of the ongoing joint projects.Practical significance. Materials of the research can be useful as a guide to reconsider the objectives of the Russian-Chinese alliance in the humanitarian sphere and generate new ideas on development and ways of implementation of the international educational programs.

The 19 August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow and the subsequent collapse of the economy of the former Soviet Union has had its effects on Middle East studies. The seizure of Communist party property and bank accounts and the dispute between the Russian federal government and what remained of the centralized Soviet state structure still headed by President Gorbachev placed such distinguished centers for Middle East research as the Institutes for Oriental Studies in Moscow and St. Petersburg in serious financial jeopardy. Even before the coup attempt and the dissolution of the Communist party, continued full state funding was uncertain and the institutes were scrambling to establish joint publishing agreements with Western academic presses to ensure some infusion of hard currency against the plunging value of the ruble. Individual researchers began looking for translation work or other lucrative forms of moonlighting to supplement their insufficient salaries. And, of course, the content of Middle East studies has undergone a radical transformation. For the social scientists, such notions as “imperialism,” “socialist orientation,” and “international solidarity” have been swiftly abandoned and replaced with what experts now call “the new pragmatism,” which seeks to steer foreign policy away from engaged ideological alliances in the Middle East and towards bettering those state-to-state relations in the region that serve Russian national and economic interests.

The article examines the seventy-year history of the diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China, which went through two large 30-year cycles of its development, associated with the names of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the leaders of the country of the first and second generation, and Xi Jinping, which has been conducting its foreign policy since 2013. The diplomacy of Mao Zedong is characterized by such features as a strong ideological component and a strategy for joining alliances. Deng Xiaoping’s diplomacy is distinguished by its economic orientation and the strategy of not join¬ing alliances. Xi Jinping is actively conducting “great power diplomacy” and the “belt and path” geo-economic project in the context of the formation of new structures of the system of international relations with its predominant influence. The article also explores the independent variables of China’s diplomacy. The first is the conceptualization of all diplomatic activity in the form of strategies: short-term (about 10 years) and long-term (about 30 years), with two to three years of settlement between them. Another one that has had a significant impact on the diplomacy of China over the past 40 years is its conditionality in relations with the United States, its main global partner and geopolitical competitor, to whom, due to the trade war, it has lost all strategic trust. Another feature of China’s modern diplomacy is its global nature, network-centricity, coverage of the entire world political space and a clear desire to change its status in global governance from adopting norms and rules (norm-taker) to their creation (norm-maker). Great attention is paid to the analysis of modern forms of China’s diplomacy. The article presents a Chinese view of the history and modern diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China, reflected in Chinese academic discourse, party documents and speeches of the country’s leaders. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the framework of the scientific project of Russian Foundation for Basic Research – Chinese Academy of Social Sciences No. 20-514-930003 “Russia and China in the global political space: harmonization of national interests in global governance”.

The article discusses the dynamics of the US military presence in Germany through the evolution of American foreign policy. The article presents data on the quantitative presence of the American army in Germany and assesses the impact of various incentives to change the size of the American contingent and their comparison. The presence of the US armed forces in Germany is one of the most striking examples of the long-term deployment of foreign troops on the territory of a major power. In terms of the duration and size of the contingent, it is comparable only to the deployment of American troops in Japan. In both countries, foreign troops played an occupying role after the end of World War II. In the future, the American contingent remained in them already as an ally. At the same time, in the case of Germany, the presence of foreign military personnel was combined with the creation of an efficient and relatively large army. For a long time, Tokyo was limited only by compact self-defense forces. The presence of independent capabilities to ensure security is often a prerequisite for pursuing an independent policy and encourages the refusal to deploy a contingent of another state on its territory. It is all the more surprising that in the FRG the question of the withdrawal of US forces was never seriously raised. On the contrary, the German leadership has repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of reducing the American presence. In this it was very different from the Japanese establishment, in which the expediency of maintaining allied relations with the United States was sometimes critically assessed. The authors conclude that ensuring the loyalty of the German leadership was not associated with the size of Washington’s military presence on the territory of Germany. The buildup of the American contingent in the Federal Republic of Germany was influenced by fears around external threats, the correlation of conventional and nuclear deterrence in the US strategy and the desire to reduce military costs. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 17-78-20170 “Typology of Modern Military-Political Alliances and Model of Russia’s Relations with Allies”).

The scientific interest of the development of the theory and practice of cooperation of Central European countries of the Visegrád Group in the context of modern European integration processes is important for developing and implementing the strategy of foreign and domestic policy in European countries and Ukraine at the modern stage. At the beginning of the XXI century, under the changes in the geopolitical situation on the European continent, the countries of Central Europe (full members of the European Union) build a new operating system of international relations and accordingly continue to delegate some of their powers to suprastate institutions of the EU. The purpose of this scientific study is to determine paradigmatic aspects of European integration processes, modern threats arising in the EU, prospects for the interaction of EU countries, and to form a new format of cooperation of Ukraine and countries of the Visegrád Group. The aim of the creation of the alliance of the Visegrád Group (1991) was the desire to contribute to the construction of European security architecture and economic cooperation through the effective cooperation within European institutions. The whole activity of the Visegrád Group is aimed at strengthening stability in the Central European region. Risks in the economic sphere and strengthening of Euroscepticism are considered traditional for the EU functioning. In view of signing the Rome Declaration in 2017, the EU threats and challenges for the short-term (2018–2020) include: hybrid consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, European migrant crisis, a series of terrorist acts in European cities, unpredictable policy of the newly elected US president D. Trump in relation to the European security system, strengthening the position of far-left and far-right political forces in European states, Brexit and its consequences, in particular, risk of domino effect in other member countries of the Union. Therefore, we consider it appropriate to carry out system analysis of key relevant challenges and threats to the EU for 2018–2020 and to consider interconditionality and interdependence of problems that may affect the EU future. Given the defined trends, development and economic stability of each state are strategically important, however, special attention in this context should be paid to the analysis of the development of large countries of the European Union, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. V4 countries are characterized by sustainable economic growth. If to analyse the Visegrád Four as a single national state, then the Visegrád Group is the fifth largest economy in Europe and the 12th in the world. The authors consider it too simplistic to define the essence of the Visegrád alliance only as a consolidation of the efforts of Central European countries for the sake of “returning to Europe” through Euro-Atlantic integration. In the modern dimension of events, the interaction format V4 + Ukraine is much more complex and more promising than it appears. Since joining NATO and the European Union in 1999 and 2004 by the Visegrád Group (i.e. Central European countries) geopolitically changes the status of the Central European Region, transforms bilateral and multilateral relations of Central European countries – full members of the EU with Ukraine. Moreover, this changes the system of relations within the Visegrád Four, as well as with other member states of the European Union.

Тhe article deals with the results of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. The analysis of these largest wars in the history of Russian-European relations is carried out, their comparison is made, their nature, character and driving forces are revealed. On the basis of this, it is concluded that both sides have not made the proper conclusions: Europe — in terms of the expediency and consequences of an attack on Russia, thereby violating the will of the iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck: "Make alliances with anyone, start any wars, but never touch the Russians." Russia — timely opening and preparation for the upcoming tests in relations with Europe. Against the background of more than 200 years of history, the current state of relations between Russia and Europe, which has reached a low level, is considered. Although the leading European states, Germany and France, have not stopped political contacts with Russia, but the content of these contacts has become significantly poorer, the format has narrowed, and the tone has sharpened. In the military sphere, Europe in the Russian direction follows in principle the same course as the United States. Within the framework of NATO, European countries, led by the United States, have taken a number of steps that have restored, so far at a symbolic level, the military confrontation with Russia in eastern Europe. Moscow, for its part, has stepped up its own military activities near its western borders. As a result, Europe has ceased to be the island of security that it remained for the previous quarter of a century. This does not mean, of course, that relations between Russia and European countries are ending. In fact, Russia's practical needs require easing tensions with Europe as its largest trade and economic partner. With this in mind, Moscow has achieved some success in replacing the almost non-existentties with Brussels with meaningful bilateral relations with some EU countries. Despite the fact that the European Union's foreign policy apparatus is unable to form a unified geopolitical, economic and cultural front against Moscow, there is every reason to believe that the Kremlin intends to be guided by this strategy of bilateral relations in the coming years.

Problem setting. The issue of Ukrainian relations with the four state members of the Visegrad Group is important from the very beginning of the establishment of the Visegrad Group as Ukraine is interested in raising the question of its support in the integration into the NATO and EU. The Visegrad Group has the experience of supporting its members in such integration. In addition, Ukraine is concerned about the resolution of its defence problems. Takin into consideration the war conflict of Ukraine with the Russian Federation that started in 2014, issues of cooperation in the military field turned out to be of top priority in relations with the state members of the Visegrad Group. Recent research and publications analysis. Issues of cooperation of Ukraine with the four state members of the Visegrad Group, in particular as a means for the European integration, have been studied by O. Andriychuk, Ye. Kish, M. Lendiel, A. Kudriachenko, S. Mitriaeva and H. Perepelytsia. Challenges and opportunities in collaboration of the Visegrad Group countries with Ukraine in the field of defence and security have been analysed in research works of V. Andreiko, H. Mysak and O. Kaplynskyi. Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. In spite of numerous studies of the above-mentioned authors, military cooperation between Ukraine and the state members of the Visegrad Group is understudied. Issues of working together with individual state members of the Visegrad Group in the military field need to be addressed deeper. Especially, it is important to outline military cooperation with the Republic of Poland in light of understanding the threats posed by the Russian Federation to Eastern-European countries. Paper main body. The Visegrad Group (Visegrad Four or V4) is a union of the four countries – Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia, founded 25 years ago on 15 February 1991, composed at that time of the three states: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The union was formed as a result of the reaction of countries of the former Communist Bloc to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that created economic and security problems for the states, which they tried to solve partially by the enforcement of regional cooperation. According to the instruments of incorporation, the V4 Group is headed by one of the state members based on annual rotation, with a Summit of Heads of Governments held at the end. The countries head the organization for one year by turn. The main priorities of heading include expansion of the EU to the Western Balkans and eastern policy of the EU, cooperation in the field of defence, etc. Ukraine is one of the key partners of the V4 Group, aiming primarily at establishing a comprehensive dialogue and elaborating a joint position on the whole range of topical issues of international partnership and political situation, including in the region of the East Central Europe. In the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, the V4 Group was headed by the Czech Republic. Taking into consideration significant changes in the security environment, the program of Czech heading was targeted at the expansion of cooperation in the following areas: – internal unity (joint political approach and solutions: there were more than 10 statements approved by the V4 Group at the level of Heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs since the escalation of the situation in Ukraine regarding the support of Ukraine and preservation of its territorial integrity); – defence and security cooperation (implementation of common projects both within the V4 Group and the European Union), and others. Polish heading provided for coordination of the position of the state members of the V4 Group concerning Ukraine and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and evaluation of the previous activities of the V4 Group towards the support of Ukraine. The Republic of Poland makes every effort to strengthen relations with Ukraine aimed at minimizing political threats and enforcing Polish defence. In the area of military cooperation, Ukraine and the Republic of Poland achieved substantial success in formation of the regulatory and legal framework of cooperation and initiation of primary directions of collaboration – from participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, joint military trainings, sharing experiences, improvement of professional skills of officers, education of mobile and tank forces to formation of a Polish-Ukrainian unit. Support of the idea of creation of a common security (defence) space from the Baltic States to the Back Sea must become a prioritized direction in cooperation between Ukraine and the Visegrad Group. Intensification of mutual efforts in the mentioned area will contribute to restraining the unhidden full-scale military aggression of Russia and serve as a factor of holding the Russian Federation from new re-division of the spheres of influence and territories. Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Therefore, Ukraine has a great potential for the expansion of cooperation with the countries of the V4 Group in the military field, in particular with Poland and Czech Republic. Planning of and participation in the activities within the regional military collaboration of the Visegrad Group with Ukraine gradually turn into an efficient ground for the achievement of the main strategic objective of our country – full integration into the European Atlantic security space and joining the political and military alliance NATO. Further studies will provide an insight into the possibilities for enhancement of cooperation of Ukraine with the individual state members of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) in the military field and development of comprehensive measures to mitigate the destructive policy of Hungary towards Ukraine.

IntroductionIn this article, I set out to accomplish two tasks. The first is to map coffee and cafés in Mainland China in different historical periods. The second is to focus on coffee and cafés in the socio-cultural milieu of contemporary China in order to understand the symbolic value of the emerging coffee/café-scape. Cafés, rather than coffee, are at the centre of this current trend in contemporary Chinese cities. With instant coffee dominating as a drink, the Chinese have developed a cultural and social demand for cafés, but have not yet developed coffee palates. Historical Coffee Map In 1901, coffee was served in a restaurant in the city of Tianjin. This restaurant, named Kiessling, was run by a German chef, a former solider who came to China with the eight-nation alliance. At that time, coffee was reserved mostly for foreign politicians and military officials as well as wealthy businessmen—very few ordinary Chinese drank it. (For more history of Kiessling, including pictures and videos, see Kiessling). Another group of coffee consumers were from the cultural elites—the young revolutionary intellectuals and writers with overseas experience. It was almost a fashion among the literary elite to spend time in cafés. However, this was negatively judged as “Western” and “bourgeois.” For example, in 1932, Lu Xun, one of the most important twentieth century Chinese writers, commented on the café fashion during 1920s (133-36), and listed the reasons why he would not visit one. He did not drink coffee because it was “foreigners’ food”, and he was too busy writing for the kind of leisure enjoyed in cafés. Moreover, he did not, he wrote, have the nerve to go to a café, and particularly not the Revolutionary Café that was popular among cultural celebrities at that time. He claimed that the “paradise” of the café was for genius, and for handsome revolutionary writers (who he described as having red lips and white teeth, whereas his teeth were yellow). His final complaint was that even if he went to the Revolutionary Café, he would hesitate going in (Lu Xun 133-36). From Lu Xun’s list, we can recognise his nationalism and resistance to what were identified as Western foods and lifestyles. It is easy to also feel his dissatisfaction with those dilettante revolutionary intellectuals who spent time in cafés, talking and enjoying Western food, rather than working. In contrast to Lu Xun’s resistance to coffee and café culture, another well-known writer, Zhang Ailing, frequented cafés when she lived in Shanghai from the 1920s to 1950s. She wrote about the smell of cakes and bread sold in Kiessling’s branch store located right next to her parents’ house (Yuyue). Born into a wealthy family, exposed to Western culture and food at a very young age, Zhang Ailing liked to spend her social and writing time in cafés, ordering her favourite cakes, hot chocolate, and coffee. When she left Shanghai and immigrated to the USA, coffee was an important part of her writing life: the smell and taste reminding her of old friends and Shanghai (Chunzi). However, during Zhang’s time, it was still a privileged and elite practice to patronise a café when these were located in foreign settlements with foreign chefs, and served mainly foreigners, wealthy businessmen, and cultural celebrities. After 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China, until the late 1970s, there were no coffee shops in Mainland China. It was only when Deng Xiaoping suggested neo-liberalism as a so-called “reform-and-open-up” economic policy that foreign commerce and products were again seen in China. In 1988, ten years after the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s policy, the Nestlé coffee company made the first inroads into the mainland market, featuring homegrown coffee beans in Yunnan province (China Beverage News; Dong; ITC). Nestlé’s bottled instant coffee found its way into the Chinese market, avoiding a direct challenge to the tea culture. Nestlé packaged its coffee to resemble health food products and marketed it as a holiday gift suitable for friends and relatives. As a symbol of modernity and “the West”, coffee-as-gift meshed with the traditional Chinese cultural custom that values gift giving. It also satisfied a collective desire for foreign products (and contact with foreign cultures) during the economic reform era. Even today, with its competitively low price, instant coffee dominates coffee consumption at home, in the workplace, and on Chinese airlines. While Nestlé aimed their product at native Chinese consumers, the multinational companies who later entered China’s coffee market, such as Sara Lee, mainly targeted international hotels such as IHG, Marriott, and Hyatt. The multinationals also favoured coffee shops like Kommune in Shanghai that offered more sophisticated kinds of coffee to foreign consumers and China’s upper class (Byers). If Nestlé introduced coffee to ordinary Chinese families, it was Starbucks who introduced the coffee-based “third space” to urban life in contemporary China on a signficant scale. Differing from the cafés before 1949, Starbucks stores are accessible to ordinary Chinese citizens. The first in Mainland China opened in Beijing’s China World Trade Center in January 1999, targeting mainly white-collar workers and foreigners. Starbucks coffee shops provide a space for informal business meetings, chatting with friends, and relaxing and, with its 500th store opened in 2011, dominate the field in China. Starbucks are located mainly in the central business districts and airports, and the company plans to have 1,500 sites by 2015 (Starbucks). Despite this massive presence, Starbucks constitutes only part of the café-scape in contemporary Chinese cities. There are two other kinds of cafés. One type is usually located in universities or residential areas and is frequented mainly by students or locals working in cultural professions. A representative of this kind is Sculpting in Time Café. In November 1997, two years before the opening of the first Starbucks in Beijing, two newlywed college graduates opened the first small Sculpting in Time Café near Beijing University’s East Gate. This has been expanded into a chain, and boasts 18 branches on the Mainland. (For more about its history, see Sculpting in Time Café). Interestingly, both Starbucks and Sculpting in Time Café acquired their names from literature, Starbucks from Moby Dick, and Sculpting in Time from the Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky’s film diary of the same name. For Chinese students of literature and the arts, drinking coffee is less about acquiring more energy to accomplish their work, and more about entering a sensual world, where the aroma of coffee mixes with the sounds from the coffee machine and music, as well as the lighting of the space. More importantly, cafés with this ambience become, in themselves, cultural sites associated with literature, films, and music. Owners of this kind of café are often lovers of foreign literatures, films, and cultures, and their cafés host various cultural events, including forums, book clubs, movie screenings, and music clubs. Generally speaking, coffee served in this kind of café is simpler than in the kind discussed below. This third type of café includes those located in tourist and entertainment sites such as art districts, bar areas, and historical sites, and which are frequented by foreign and native tourists, artists and other cultural workers. If Starbucks cultivates a fast-paced business/professional atmosphere, and Sculpting in Time Cafés an artsy and literary atmosphere, this third kind of café is more like an upscale “bar” with trained baristas serving complicated coffees and emphasising their flavour. These coffee shops are more expensive than the other kinds, with an average price three times that of Starbucks. Currently, cafés of this type are found only in “first-tier” cities and usually located in art districts and tourist areas—such as Beijing’s 798 Art District and Nanluo Guxiang, Shanghai’s Tai Kang Road (a.k.a. “the art street”), and Hangzhou’s Westlake area. While Nestlé and Starbucks use coffee beans grown in Yunnan provinces, these “art cafés” are more inclined to use imported coffee beans from suppliers like Sara Lee. Coffee and Cafés in Contemporary China After just ten years, there are hundreds of cafés in Chinese cities. Why has there been such a demand for coffee or, more accurately, cafés, in such a short period of time? The first reason is the lack of “third space” environments in Mainland China. Before cafés appeared in the late 1990s, stores like KFC (which opened its first store in 1987) and McDonald’s (with its first store opened in 1990) filled this role for urban residents, providing locations where customers could experience Western food, meet friends, work, or read. In fact, KFC and McDonald’s were once very popular with college students looking for a place to study. Both stores had relatively clean food environments and good lighting. They also had air conditioning in the summer and heating in the winter, which are not provided in most Chinese university dormitories. However, since neither chain was set up to be a café and customers occupying seats for long periods while ordering minimal amounts of food or drink affected profits, staff members began to indirectly ask customers to leave after dining. At the same time, as more people were able to afford to eat at KFC and McDonald’s, their fast foods were also becoming more and more popular, especially among young people. As a consequence, both types of chain restaurant were becoming noisy and crowded and, thus, no longer ideal for reading, studying, or meeting with friends. Although tea has been a traditional drink in Chinese culture, traditional teahouses were expensive places more suitable for business meetings or for the cultural or intellectual elite. Since almost every family owns a tea set and can readily purchase tea, friends and family would usually make and consume tea at home. In recent years, however, new kinds of teahouses have emerged, similar in style to cafés, targeting the younger generation with more affordable prices and a wider range of choices, so the lack of a “third space” does not fully explain the café boom. Another factor affecting the popularity of cafés has been the development and uptake of Internet technology, including the increasing use of laptops and wireless Internet in recent years. The Internet has been available in China since the late 1990s, while computers and then laptops entered ordinary Chinese homes in the early twenty-first century. The IT industry has created not only a new field of research and production, but has also fostered new professions and demands. Particularly, in recent years in Mainland China, a new socially acceptable profession—freelancing in such areas as graphic design, photography, writing, film, music, and the fashion industry—has emerged. Most freelancers’ work is computer- and Internet-based. Cafés provide suitable working space, with wireless service, and the bonus of coffee that is, first of all, somatically stimulating. In addition, the emergence of the creative and cultural industries (which are supported by the Chinese government) has created work for these freelancers and, arguably, an increasing demand for café-based third spaces where such people can meet, talk and work. Furthermore, the flourishing of cafés in first-tier cities is part of the “aesthetic economy” (Lloyd 24) that caters to the making and selling of lifestyle experience. Alongside foreign restaurants, bars, galleries, and design firms, cafés contribute to city branding, and link a city to the global urban network. Cafés, like restaurants, galleries and bars, provide a space for the flow of global commodities, as well as for the human flow of tourists, travelling artists, freelancers, and cultural specialists. Finally, cafés provide a type of service that contributes to friendly owner/waiter-customer relations. During the planned-economy era, most stores and hotels in China were State-owned, staff salaries were not related to individual performance, and indifferent (and even unfriendly) service was common. During the economic reform era, privately owned stores and shops began to replace State-owned ones. At the same time, a large number of people from the countryside flowed into the cities seeking opportunities. Most had little if any professional training and so could only find work in factories or in the service industry. However, most café employees are urban, with better educational backgrounds, and many were already familiar with coffee culture. In addition, café owners, particularly those of places like Sculpting in Time Cafe, often invest in creating a positive, community atmosphere, learning about their customers and sharing personal experiences with their regular clients. This leads to my next point—the generation of the 1980s’ need for a social community. Cafés’ Symbolic Value—Community A demand for a sense of community among the generation of the 1980s is a unique socio-cultural phenomenon in China, which paradoxically co-exists with their desire for individualism. Mao Zedong started the “One Child Policy” in 1979 to slow the rapid population growth in China, and the generations born under this policy are often called “the lonely generations,” with both parents working full-time. At the same time, they are “the generation of me,” labelled as spoiled, self-centred, and obsessed with consumption (de Kloet; Liu; Rofel; Wang). The individuals of this generation, now aged in their 20s and 30s, constitute the primary consumers of coffee in China. Whereas individualism is an important value to them, a sense of community is also desirable in order to compensate for their lack of siblings. Furthermore, the 1980s’ generation has also benefitted from the university expansion policy implemented in 1999. Since then, China has witnessed a surge of university students and graduates who not only received scientific and other course-based knowledge, but also had a better chance to be exposed to foreign cultures through their books, music, and movies. With this interesting tension between individualism and collectivism, the atmosphere provided by cafés has fostered a series of curious temporary communities built on cultural and culinary taste. Interestingly, it has become an aspiration of many young college students and graduates to open a community-space style café in a city. One of the best examples is the new Henduoren’s (Many People’s) Café. This was a project initiated by Wen Erniu, a recent college graduate who wanted to open a café in Beijing but did not have sufficient funds to do so. She posted a message on the Internet, asking people to invest a minimum of US$316 to open a café with her. With 78 investors, the café opened in September 2011 in Beijing (see pictures of Henduoren’s Café). In an interview with the China Daily, Wen Erniu stated that, “To open a cafe was a dream of mine, but I could not afford it […] We thought opening a cafe might be many people’s dream […] and we could get together via the Internet to make it come true” (quoted in Liu 2011). Conclusion: Café Culture and (Instant) Coffee in China There is a Chinese saying that, if you hate someone—just persuade him or her to open a coffee shop. Since cafés provide spaces where one can spend a relatively long time for little financial outlay, owners have to increase prices to cover their expenses. This can result in fewer customers. In retaliation, cafés—particularly those with cultural and literary ambience—host cultural events to attract people, and/or they offer food and wine along with coffee. The high prices, however, remain. In fact, the average price of coffee in China is often higher than in Europe and North America. For example, a medium Starbucks’ caffè latte in China averaged around US$4.40 in 2010, according to the price list of a Starbucks outlet in Shanghai—and the prices has recently increased again (Xinhua 2012). This partially explains why instant coffee is still so popular in China. A bag of instant Nestlé coffee cost only some US$0.25 in a Beijing supermarket in 2010, and requires only hot water, which is accessible free almost everywhere in China, in any restaurant, office building, or household. As an habitual, addictive treat, however, coffee has not yet become a customary, let alone necessary, drink for most Chinese. Moreover, while many, especially those of the older generations, could discern the quality and varieties of tea, very few can judge the quality of the coffee served in cafés. As a result, few Mainland Chinese coffee consumers have a purely somatic demand for coffee—craving its smell or taste—and the highly sweetened and creamed instant coffee offered by companies like Nestlé or Maxwell has largely shaped the current Chinese palate for coffee. Ben Highmore has proposed that “food spaces (shops, restaurants and so on) can be seen, for some social agents, as a potential space where new ‘not-me’ worlds are encountered” (396) He continues to expand that “how these potential spaces are negotiated—the various affective registers of experience (joy, aggression, fear)—reflect the multicultural shapes of a culture (its racism, its openness, its acceptance of difference)” (396). Cafés in contemporary China provide spaces where one encounters and constructs new “not-me” worlds, and more importantly, new “with-me” worlds. While café-going communicates an appreciation and desire for new lifestyles and new selves, it can be hoped that in the near future, coffee will also be appreciated for its smell, taste, and other benefits. Of course, it is also necessary that future Chinese coffee consumers also recognise the rich and complex cultural, political, and social issues behind the coffee economy in the era of globalisation. References Byers, Paul [former Managing Director, Sara Lee’s Asia Pacific]. Pers. comm. Apr. 2012. China Beverage News. “Nestlé Acquires 70% Stake in Chinese Mineral Water Producer.” (2010). 31 Mar. 2012 ‹http://chinabevnews.wordpress.com/2010/02/21/nestle-acquires-70-stake-in-chinese-mineral-water-producer›. Chunzi. 张爱玲地图[The Map of Eileen Chang]. 汉语大词典出版 [Hanyu Dacidian Chubanshe], 2003. de Kloet, Jeroen. China with a Cut: Globalization, Urban Youth and Popular Music. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2010. Dong, Jonathan. “A Caffeinated Timeline: Developing Yunnan’s Coffee Cultivation.” China Brief (2011): 24-26. Highmore, Ben. “Alimentary Agents: Food, Cultural Theory and Multiculturalism.” Journal of Intercultural Studies, 29.4 (2008): 381-98. ITC (International Trade Center). The Coffee Sector in China: An Overview of Production, Trade And Consumption, 2010. Liu, Kang. Globalization and Cultural Trends in China. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004. Liu, Zhihu. “From Virtual to Reality.” China Daily (Dec. 2011) 31 Mar. 2012 ‹http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/life/2011-12/26/content_14326490.htm›. Lloyd, Richard. Neobohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City. London: Routledge, 2006. Lu, Xun. “Geming Kafei Guan [Revolutionary Café]”. San Xian Ji. Taibei Shi: Feng Yun Shi Dai Chu Ban Gong Si: Fa Xing Suo Xue Wen Hua Gong Si, Mingguo 78 (1989): 133-36. Rofel, Lisa. Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture. Durham and London: Duke UP, 2007: 1-30. “Starbucks Celebrates Its 500th Store Opening in Mainland China.” Starbucks Newsroom (Oct. 2011) 31 Mar. 2012. ‹http://news.starbucks.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=580›. Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: U of California P, 1996. Xinhua. “Starbucks Raises Coffee Prices in China Stores.” Xinhua News (Jan. 2012). 31 Mar. 2012 ‹http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/31/c_131384671.htm›. Yuyue. Ed. “On the History of the Western-Style Restaurants: Aileen Chang A Frequent Customer of Kiessling.” China.com.cn (2010). 31 Mar. 2012 ‹http://www.china.com.cn/culture/txt/2010-01/30/content_19334964.htm›.