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Journal articles on the topic 'Frankfurt cases'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Funkhouser, Eric. "Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 3 (September 2009): 341–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0053.

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For nearly forty years now, Frankfurt cases have served as one of the major contributors to the compatibilist's cause with respect to moral responsibility. These cases typically involve a causally preempted condition that is supposed to guarantee a choice without causing it. This has had the effect of softening up some to the idea that determinism does not exclude moral responsibility simply in virtue of guaranteeing a unique future. I believe that these traditional Frankfurt cases adequately support this cause. But I also believe that the traditional versions of Frankfurt cases suffer from some rhetorical defects.My strategy is as follows. First, I want to respond to a dilemma that has been raised by some libertarians against arguments utilizing Frankfurt cases. This dilemma has the effect of raising a question-begging charge against such arguments. Part of my response is to draw attention to the relevant principle that I think Frankfurt cases should really target, a principle slightly different from Harry Frankfurt's original Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Second, I elaborate and defend the claim that traditional Frankfurt cases involve causal preemption.

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2

Palmer, David. "Deterministic Frankfurt cases." Synthese 191, no. 16 (June 15, 2014): 3847–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0500-8.

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3

Mele, Alfred R., and David Robb. "Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases." Philosophical Review 107, no. 1 (January 1998): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998316.

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4

Allen, Robert. "Re-examining Frankfurt Cases." Southern Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 3 (September 1999): 363–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00872.x.

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5

Lockie, Robert. "Three Recent Frankfurt Cases." Philosophia 42, no. 4 (May 27, 2014): 1005–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9530-1.

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6

Palmer, David. "Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases." Philosophical Studies 153, no. 2 (December 9, 2009): 261–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9489-0.

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7

Cova, Florian. "Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 3 (August 22, 2013): 505–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9456-x.

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8

Ahmed, Arif. "Frankfurt cases and the Newcomb Problem." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 11 (November 13, 2019): 3391–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01375-0.

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Abstract A standard argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem is ‘Why Ain’cha Rich?’, which emphasizes that one-boxers typically make a million dollars compared to the thousand dollars that two-boxers can expect. A standard reply is the ‘opportunity defence’: the two-boxers who made a thousand never had an opportunity to make more. The paper argues that the opportunity defence is unavailable to anyone who grants that in another case—a Frankfurt case—the agent is deprived of opportunities in the way that advocates of Frankfurt cases typically claim.

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9

Miller, Jason S., and Adam Feltz. "Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases." Consciousness and Cognition 20, no. 2 (June 2011): 401–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.015.

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10

HAJI, ISHTIYAQUE, and MICHAEL MCKENNA. "DISENABLING LEVY'S FRANKFURT-STYLE ENABLING CASES." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 3 (August 4, 2011): 400–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x.

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11

Cohen, Yishai. "Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases." Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (February 17, 2016): 89–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.198.

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12

Ribeiro, Leonardo de Mello. "Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 48, no. 142 (October 31, 2016): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.235.

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According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agentis morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.

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13

Krag, Erik. "A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases." Southwest Philosophy Review 33, no. 1 (2017): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201733115.

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14

Swenson, Philip. "The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions." Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 264 (January 11, 2016): 579–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv127.

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15

Janzen, Greg. "Frankfurt Cases, Alternate Possibilities, and Prior Signs." Erkenntnis 78, no. 5 (July 24, 2012): 1037–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9386-3.

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16

Palmer, David. "The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases." Erkenntnis 78, no. 5 (September 2, 2012): 1011–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9396-1.

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17

Harrison, Gerald K. "Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities." Philosophical Studies 130, no. 2 (August 2006): 399–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5753-5.

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18

Capes, Justin A., and Philip Swenson. "Frankfurt cases: the fine-grained response revisited." Philosophical Studies 174, no. 4 (July 11, 2016): 967–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0726-z.

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19

Moya Espí, Carlos J. "Blockage Cases: No Case against PAP." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 35, no. 104 (January 8, 2003): 109–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1022.

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According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples ("Frankfurt cases") in which a counterfactual, and unactivated, device ensures that the agent will decide and do what she actually decides and does on her own, if she shows some sign that she is going to decide and do something else. Problems with these cases have led some thinkers to design examples in which the counterfactual factor is replaced by a device that actually blocks alternative possibilities. I argue that, even if these cases did not illicitly assume determinism, they are not successful against PAP anyway, for they violate a plausible condition on moral responsibility that Fischer has called "reasons-responsiveness".

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20

Carson, Thomas L. "Frankfurt and Cohen on bullshit, bullshiting, deception, lying, and concern with the truth of what one says." New Theoretical Insights into Untruthfulness 23, no. 1 (September 26, 2016): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.1.03car.

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This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit: 1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others. 2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”). 3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says. I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.

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21

Harrison, Gerald. "Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge." Facta Philosophica 7, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 273–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/93520_273.

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22

Fischer, J. M. "The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories." Philosophical Review 119, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 315–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2010-002.

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23

Levy, Neil. "Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases are Still Broken." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 3 (September 4, 2013): 523–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9459-7.

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24

Robinson, Michael. "The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases." Philosophical Studies 169, no. 3 (August 20, 2013): 429–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0190-y.

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25

Sartorio, Carolina. "Actual Causes and Free Will." Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 147–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0002.

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Abstract In this paper I reexamine the debate between two contrasting conceptions of free will: the classical model, which understands freedom in terms of alternative possibilities, and a more recent family of views that focus only on actual causes, and that were inspired by Frankfurt’s famous attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. I offer a novel argument in support of the actual-causes model, one that bypasses the popular debate about Frankfurt-style cases.

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26

Robinson, Michael. "ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM." Social Philosophy and Policy 36, no. 01 (2019): 211–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052519000244.

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Abstract:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.

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27

Mishura, Aleksandr. "Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases." Axiomathes 27, no. 4 (October 24, 2016): 393–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-016-9318-y.

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28

Moya, Carlos J. "Doing One’s Best, Alternative Possibilities, and Blameworthiness." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 46, no. 136 (December 7, 2014): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2014.612.

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My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent and famous Frankfurt case, Derk Pereboom’s “Tax Evasion”. After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue that they don’t succeed. I conclude by pointing out that my criticism of Pereboom’s example suggests a general strategy against other actual or possible Frankfurt cases.

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29

Repko Waller, Robyn. "A Case for Classical Compatibilism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 97, no. 4 (November 24, 2020): 575–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000124.

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Abstract In this article the author makes the case for a hybrid sourcehood–leeway compatibilist account of free will. To do so, she draws upon Lehrer’s writing on free will, including his preference-based compatibilist account and Frankfurt-style cases from the perspective of the cognizant agent. The author explores what distinguishes kinds of intentional influence in manipulation cases and applies this distinction to a new perspectival variant of Frankfurt cases, those from the perspective of the counterfactual intervenor. She argues that it matters what kind of intentional influence is at issue in the counterfactual intervention and, further, that our judgments about desert of praise (and blame) are affected by occupying the POV of the counterfactual intervenor. The author concludes that such attention to perspectival variants of Frankfurt cases supports the view that compatibilist sourcehood accounts of moral responsibility require an additional compatibilist could-have-done-otherwise condition to capture a more robust sense of moral responsibility.

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30

Huoranszki, Ferenc. "Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination." Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 193–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0004.

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Abstract This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.

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31

Sartorio, Carolina. "Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View." Criminal Law and Philosophy 10, no. 4 (November 11, 2014): 875–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9355-9.

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32

Woodward, P. A. "Frankfurt-Type Cases and the Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility." Journal of Value Inquiry 41, no. 2-4 (December 2007): 325–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-007-9089-1.

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33

Moya, Carlos J. "On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 43, no. 128 (December 13, 2011): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.803.

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According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions.

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34

Rojek, Krzysztof. "Counterfactual Intervention as a Theoretical and Practical Risk to Freedom. A Critical Analysis of the Frankfurt Cases." Kultura i Wartości 16 (March 21, 2016): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2015.16.23.

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35

McCormick, Kelly. "Comments on Erik Krag’s “A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases”." Southwest Philosophy Review 33, no. 2 (2017): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201733236.

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36

Cova, Florian, and Hichem Naar. "Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?" Philosophical Explorations 19, no. 3 (August 15, 2016): 290–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1173223.

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37

Rychter, Pablo. "Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?" Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0001.

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Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

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38

Moya, Carlos J. "Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”." Philosophia 44, no. 2 (March 19, 2016): 585–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9701-3.

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39

Shabo, Seth. "Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise." Acta Analytica 31, no. 1 (August 13, 2015): 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0266-8.

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40

Sales, Maurício M., John C. Small, and Harry G. Poulos. "Compensated piled rafts in clayey soils: behaviour, measurements, and predictions." Canadian Geotechnical Journal 47, no. 3 (March 2010): 327–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/t09-106.

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This paper presents a method of analysis of the behaviour of piled rafts in clayey soils, in which a deep excavation was necessary for buildings with two or more basements. In these cases, the piled raft foundations are called a “compensated piled raft.” The soil stresses reduce due to excavation, and the reloading of the soil should be taken into account for this kind of foundation. Many important factors that are required to achieve a satisfactory comparison of “measurement versus prediction” are pointed out, and they are grouped in a proposed simplified method of analysing compensated piled rafts using numerical tools that can consider the raft–soil–pile interaction. Finally, two well-known cases of compensated piled rafts (Hyde Park Barracks in London and the Messeturm building in Frankfurt) and a newer building (the Skyper Tower, Frankfurt) are analyzed using the presented approach and the computed and measured time–settlement behaviours are compared.

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41

Hart, Matthew J. "A Modest Classical Compatibilism." Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 265–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0007.

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Abstract The advent of Frankfurt-style counterexamples in the early 1970s posed a problem not merely for incompatibilists, but for compatibilists also. At that time compatibilists too were concerned to hold that the presence of alternative possibilities was necessary for moral responsibility. Such a classical compatibilism, I argue in this paper, should not have been left behind. I propose that we can use a Kratzer-style semantics of ‘can’ to model ‘could have done otherwise’ statements in such a way that the truth of such expressions is both (i) evidently consistent with determinism, and (ii) clearly such that Frankfurt-style counterexamples do not count as cases where the agent could not have done otherwise.

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42

Porotto, Alessandro. "Utopia and vision. Learning from Vienna and Frankfurt." Joelho Revista de Cultura Arquitectonica, no. 7 (December 25, 2016): 84–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/1647-8681_7_7.

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The article identifies and observes critically two emblematic cases of modern utopia of 1920s: Das rote Wien and Das neue Frankfurt. These two architectural experiences correspond to two alternative but complementary spatial and social models, the courtyard block (Hof) and the settlement (Siedlung). Through the historical distance today we can observe in critical way these experiences, analyzing the effects of utopian character within the contemporary city.Referring to the theoretical concepts of “utopia” and “realism” by Tafuri, the analysis tries to show the spatial elements that characterize these examples. The comparative approach highlights that today their solutions produce spatial quality at the urban and housing scale. In this way, Höfe and Siedlungen represent a “vision”.The actuality of utopia of social housing in Vienna and Frankfurt is the starting point to reflect to the contemporary architecture and collective living.

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43

Freyenhagen, Fabian. "Acting Irrespective of Hope." Kantian Review 25, no. 4 (December 2020): 605–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415420000357.

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AbstractMust we ascribe hope for better times to those who (take themselves to) act morally? Kant and later theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition thought we must. In this article, I disclose that it is possible – and ethical – to refrain from ascribing hope in all such cases. I draw on two key examples of acting irrespective of hope: one from a recent political context and one from the life of Jean Améry. I also suggest that, once we see that it is possible to make sense of (what I call) ‘merely expressive acts’, we can also see that the early Frankfurt School was not guilty of a performative contradiction in seeking to enlighten Enlightenment about its (self-)destructive tendencies, while rejecting the (providential) idea of progress.

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44

Oh, Heechul. "Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology, the Epistemic Dependence of Knowledge and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases." CHUL HAK SA SANG : Journal of Philosophical Ideas 71 (February 28, 2019): 139–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss.71.201902.006.

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45

Cova, Florian. "Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: a Reply to Swenson." Acta Analytica 32, no. 4 (February 2, 2017): 427–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0316-5.

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46

Hunt, David, and Seth Shabo. "Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy." Philosophical Studies 164, no. 3 (March 2, 2012): 599–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9874-y.

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47

Pundik, Amit. "Coercion and Volition in Law and Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 31, no. 1 (February 2018): 107–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2018.5.

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AbstractThis paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.

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48

Fremder, Wolfgang. "Medical Services during Disasters at Frankfurt Airport." Journal of the World Association for Emergency and Disaster Medicine 1, no. 2 (1985): 134–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x00065262.

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The airport clinic at Flughafen Frankfurt Main AG (FAG) is a 24 hour manned casualty ward. It employs three surgeons and approximately 40 paramedics. This clinic is supported by external physicians during the night and weekends that guarantees, on a 24 hour basis, a minimum of one physician and four paramedics available for immediate response.In addition, the airport operator provides an industrial medical service which employs (during normal working hours) six physicians and approximately 10 paramedics.Finally, there is support from the clinic of the US Rhein Main Air Base, at the military part of the airport, which employs approximately 12 physicians and flight surgeons, 10 dentists and another 100 paramedics. The emergency staff of the clinic of the US Rhein Main Air Base is also manned on a 24 hour basis. The airport clinic and the clinic of the US Forces and their respective fire departments collaborate together in cases of emergency or disaster.For immediate medical care the airport clinic has available an emergency surgery unit, one emergency surgery ambulance vehicle, and three ambulances with first-aid equipment. In addition, the airport clinic provides two trucks with medical equipment for 100 severely injured persons and two inflatable air-conditioned emergency tents.Comparable medical equipment is also available at the clinic of the US Rhein Main Air Base, according to US military standards. The US Rhein Main Air Base also operates three DC-9 Nightingale medical aircraft which are responsible for all types of emergencies in the area of the US Forces in Europe.

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49

Jun, Nam-Il. "A Comparison of Opening the Housing Block in the Cases of the “New Frankfurt” Project." Journal of the Korean Housing Association 30, no. 5 (October 25, 2019): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.6107/jkha.2019.30.5.019.

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50

Kittle, Simon. "Robustness and Up-to-us-ness." Disputatio 9, no. 44 (May 1, 2017): 35–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2017-0026.

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Abstract Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases.

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