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Journal articles on the topic 'Free will and determinism Molinism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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1

Keathley, Kenneth D. "Molinist Gunslingers Redux: A Friendly Response to Greg Welty." Perichoresis 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 31–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/perc-2018-0009.

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Abstract Philosopher Greg Welty contributed a chapter entitled ‘Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin’, to a book devoted to answering the charge that Calvinism makes God the author of sin (Calvinism and the Problem of Evil). Welty argues that Molinism has the same problems as Calvinism concerning God’s relationship to sin, regardless of what view of human freedom Molinism may affirm. The Molinist believes that God generally uses his knowledge of the possible choices of libertarianly free creatures in order to accomplish his will. (This knowledge is typically categorized as residing within God’s middle knowledge.) But affirming libertarian freedom for humans, he argues, does not help in dealing with the question of God’s relationship to evil. Therefore, Molinism is no better than Calvinism, at least concerning this issue. In response to Welty, (1) I agree with him that Molinism does not have a moral advantage over what he calls ‘mysterian, apophatic’ Calvinism, but Molinists don’t claim that it does, and (2) I argue that, contra Welty, Molinism indeed does have a moral advantage over the Calvinist versions that do employ causal determinism. Welty does not take ‘intentions’ into consideration in his argument, and this is a serious flaw. In the libertarian model of Molinism, intent originates in the doer of evil. However, in the compatibilist model of causal determinism, ultimately God implants intent. Thus, adherents of causal determinism have difficulty not laying responsibility at the feet of God.

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2

Stratton, Tim, and Jacobus Erasmus. "Mere Molinism: A Defense of Two Essential Pillars." Perichoresis 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/perc-2018-0008.

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Abstract Molinism is founded on two ‘pillars’, namely, the view that human beings possess libertarian free will and the view that God has middle knowledge. Both these pillars stand in contrast to naturalistic determinism and divine determinism. In this article, however, the authors offer philosophical and theological grounds in favor of libertarian free will and middle knowledge.

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3

OPPY, GRAHAM, and MARK SAWARD. "Molinism and divine prophecy of free actions." Religious Studies 50, no. 2 (October 17, 2013): 235–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441251300036x.

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AbstractAmong challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.

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4

Bhat, Abdur Rashid. "Free Will and Determinism." Journal of Islamic Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2006): 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/islamicphil2006215.

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5

FREMLIN, J. H. "Free will and determinism." Nature 319, no. 6052 (January 1986): 352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/319352a0.

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6

ROBINSON, JOSEPH D. "Free will and determinism." Nature 319, no. 6052 (January 1986): 352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/319352c0.

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7

PERSZYK, KENNETH J. "Stump's theodicy of redemptive suffering and Molinism." Religious Studies 35, no. 2 (June 1999): 191–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412599004795.

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Eleonore Stump develops and defends a theodicy of redemptive suffering. In particular, God's permission of suffering (at least some classes, if not instances, of serious undeserved, involuntary suffering due to natural or free causes) is justified just in case it benefits those who suffer, it is the best possible means in the circumstances for their benefit, and God knows this is the case. The main aim of this paper is to show that for Stump's theodicy to have a good chance of working, it is reasonable to think that it requires the Molinist claim that God has middle knowledge.

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8

Cain, James. "Free Will, Resiliency and Flip-flopping." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20193519.

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Many philosophers accept with certainty that we are morally responsible but take it to be an open question whether determinism holds. They treat determinism as epistemically compatible with responsibility. Should one who accepts this form of epistemic compatibilism also hold that determinism is metaphysically compatible with responsibility—that it is metaphysically possible for determinism and responsibility to coexist? John Martin Fischer gives two arguments that appear to favor an affirmative answer to this question. He argues that accounts of responsibility, such as his, that are neutral with respect to whether responsible actions are determined have a “resiliency” that counts in their favor. Furthermore, he criticizes libertarians who argue on a priori grounds that determinism cannot coexist with responsibility and who admit that they would retract their argument if determinism were shown to hold; this “metaphysical fl ip-flopping” is said to render their positions implausible. I assess the merits of these arguments.

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9

KyungsukChoi. "Free Will and Neural Determinism." Korean Journal of Medical Ethics 16, no. 2 (August 2013): 249–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.35301/ksme.2013.16.2.249.

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10

Cobb, Jeffrey. "DETERMINISM, AFFIRMATION, AND FREE CHOICE." Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (March 1986): 9–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb00433.x.

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11

Haynes, Sandra D., Don Rojas, and Wayne Viney. "Free Will, Determinism, and Punishment." Psychological Reports 93, no. 3_suppl (December 2003): 1013–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2003.93.3f.1013.

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Determinists were compared with weak, moderate, and strong libertarians with respect to philosophy of punishment. Data provided support for the contention that determinists are less punitive than libertarians.

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12

HAYNES, SANDRA D. "FREE WILL, DETERMINISM, AND PUNISHMENT." Psychological Reports 93, no. 8 (2003): 1013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.93.8.1013-1021.

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13

HAYNES, SANDRA D. "FREE WILL, DETERMINISM, AND PUNISHMENT." Psychological Reports 93, no. 7 (2003): 1013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.93.7.1013-1021.

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14

Rossi, Ernest Lawrence. "Chaos, determinism, and free will." Psychological Perspectives 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00332928908407754.

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15

Lycan, William G. "Free Will and the Burden of Proof." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 (September 2003): 107–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008298.

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Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism.(1) Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism.(2) The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori.(3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defence of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyse such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into eventcausation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven't done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it's a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I'm afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)(4) Free will is not impugned by quantum indeterminism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. To reconcile free will with quantum indeterminism takes work, but the work comes under the heading of metaphysical business-as-usual; to reconcile free will with determinism requires a conceptual breakthrough.And listen to Laura Waddell Ekstrom on the burden of proof.

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16

Sennett, James F. "The Free Will Defense and Determinism." Faith and Philosophy 8, no. 3 (1991): 340–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19918325.

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17

Junseong Park S.J. "Problems of Free Will and Determinism." Theology and Philosophy ll, no. 26 (May 2015): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.16936/theoph..26.201505.141.

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18

Ferraiolo, Bill. "Free Will, Determinism, and Stoic Counsel." Ars Disputandi 6, no. 1 (January 2006): 204–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819927.

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19

LICHTENBERG, JAMES W. "Free Will and Determinism: A Story." Journal of Counseling & Development 63, no. 9 (May 1985): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.1985.tb00688.x.

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20

Zanetti, Luca. "Determinism and Judgment." European journal of analytic philosophy 15, no. 2 (December 12, 2019): 33–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.2.

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In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and commitments.

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21

Nichols, Shaun. "Folk Intuitions on Free Will." Journal of Cognition and Culture 6, no. 1-2 (2006): 57–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853706776931385.

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AbstractThis paper relies on experimental methods to explore the psychological underpinnings of folk intuitions about free will and responsibility. In different conditions, people give conflicting responses about agency and responsibility. In some contexts, people treat agency as indeterminist; in other contexts, they treat agency as determinist. Furthermore, in some contexts people treat responsibility as incompatible with determinism, and in other contexts people treat responsibility as compatible with determinism. The paper considers possible accounts of the psychological mechanisms that underlie these conflicting responses.

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22

BERNSTEIN, SARA, and JESSICA WILSON. "Free Will and Mental Quausation." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 2 (2016): 310–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.7.

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ABSTRACT:The questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are clearly connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-à-vis other events. Nonetheless, the free will and mental causation debates have proceeded largely independently of each other. Here we aim to make progress in determining the mutual bearing of these debates. We first argue that the problems of free will and of mental causation can be seen as special cases of a more general problem of mental ‘quausation’, concerning whether and how mental events of a given type can be efficacious qua the types they are—qualitative, intentional, freely deliberative—given reasons to think such events are causally irrelevant. We go on to identify parallels between hard determinism and eliminativist physicalism and between soft determinism and nonreductive physicalism, and we use these parallels to identify a new argument against hard determinism and to reveal and motivate a common strategy underlying apparently diverse soft determinist accounts.

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23

Pearce, Kenneth L. "Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?" Faith and Philosophy 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 158–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.2.

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Can I be free to perform an action if God has decided to ensure that I do not choose that action? I show that Molinists and simple foreknowledge theorists are committed to answering in the affirmative. This is problematic for their status as theological incompatibilists. I suggest that strategies for preserving their theological incompatibilism in light of this result should be based on sourcehood. However, the path is not easy here either, since Leibniz has shown how theological determinists can offer an extremely robust form of sourcehood. Proponents of these views must identify a valuable form of sourcehood their theories allow that Leibniz’s theory doesn’t.

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24

Syrov, Vasily N. "Historical Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 57 (October 1, 2020): 108–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/57/11.

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25

Wilkinson, Stephen, and Ted Honderich. "How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem." Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 179 (April 1995): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220430.

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26

Murray, Andrew. "Book Review: Free Will, Predestination and Determinism." Pacifica: Australasian Theological Studies 22, no. 3 (October 2009): 358–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1030570x0902200314.

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27

Arseculeratne, SN. "The problem of free-will versus determinism." Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences 31, no. 1-2 (April 26, 2013): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.4038/sljss.v31i1-2.5459.

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28

Ellis, Albert. "Free Will and Determinism: A Second Stay." Journal of Counseling & Development 64, no. 4 (December 1985): 286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.1985.tb01106.x.

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29

Kirsch, Irving, and Michael E. Hyland. "Methodological determinism and the free will hypothesis." Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 4, no. 3 (September 2017): 321–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000135.

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30

Mackie, Penelope. "Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 265–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000140.

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AbstractMany contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility.

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31

Bishop, Robert C. "Free will in absentia: Dennett on free will and determinism." Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 2 (2003): 168–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0091233.

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32

Bernier, Paul. "Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy." Buddhist Studies Review 36, no. 2 (March 19, 2020): 191–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsr.36779.

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Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

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33

Wolt, Daniel. "Kant on Free Will and Theoretical Rationality." Ideas y Valores 67, no. 166 (January 4, 2018): 181–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n166.62775.

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The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism (§3). However, I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events (§4).

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34

Collier, William G., and Xinyan Shi. "Mindfulness, Meditation, and Belief in Free Will/Determinism." Psychological Reports 123, no. 5 (December 8, 2019): 1724–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294119892884.

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Two experiments investigated the influence of mindfulness, meditation, and type of induction (free will, determinism, or neutral) on affect and beliefs in free will/determinism. In Experiment 1, it was found that high mindful participants reported experiencing more positive affect and less negative affect than low mindful participants. In the determinism induction condition in Experiment 2, high mindful participants scored higher on free will beliefs after they meditated, whereas low mindful participants scored lower on free will beliefs after they meditated. So it would seem that mindfulness can have differential effects for high and low mindful individuals. It was also found that high mindful participants (depending on the task and induction condition) sometimes had longer reaction times than low mindful participants. This could be an indication of high mindful participants having a higher decision boundary for some tasks or simply an indication that high mindful participants enjoyed some tasks more than others (i.e., processing fluency). In addition, the internal consistency of the questionnaires was compared to the internal consistency found for those questionnaires in previous research.

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35

Kenny, Hamill. "Free Will, Determinism, and The Names of Places." Names 33, no. 1-2 (June 1985): 68–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/nam.1985.33.1-2.68.

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36

Strawson, Galen. "Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism." Inquiry 32, no. 1 (January 1989): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602175.

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37

Johannsen, Kyle. "Free Will and Determinism: Political, Not Just Metaphysical." AJOB Neuroscience 4, no. 4 (October 2013): 65–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2013.827281.

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38

Elzein, Nadine, and Tuomas K. Pernu. "Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock." Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 219–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0005.

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Abstract Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.

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39

Feldman, Gilad, and Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar. "Laypersons’ Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism." Social Psychological and Personality Science 9, no. 5 (July 25, 2017): 539–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550617713254.

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We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants’ free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

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40

Wassermann, Gerhard D. "Morality and Determinism." Philosophy 63, no. 244 (April 1988): 211–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043370.

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This paper is intended as a contribution to a recent vigorous debate in The Times, between the distinguished journalist Bernard Levin, the eminent Oxford economist Wilfred Beckerman and the Archbishop of York, John Habgood, among others. The debate concerns morality, ‘free will’ and determinism. As a former German (now British) Jew, who lost close relatives at Auschwitz (e.g. my mother's sister) and who suffered personally severely in my youth under daily virulent Nazi persecution (even from schoolmasters who earlier professed to be ‘good democrats’ but were vicious antisemites), I obviously cannot remain strictly detached and neutral. Yet, I shall attempt to retain as much neutrality as possible, since I think that the main rivals in this debate have all some very relevant, interesting and valid things to say. Let me also state other, probably very relevant, biases. I am an ardent Zionist (and have been so since the experiences of my youth). In addition, I am a diehard mechanistic materialist as regards basic philosophy, although I am tolerant of other people's religious feelings, because I realize that my materialism is as metaphysical as their religious views. With this as background let me return to the technical issues. Obviously, in a philosophical journal one can write at a level above that of The Times, where there is, perhaps, insufficient room to debate philosophical, biological, physical and other niceties in some depth.

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41

Voak, N. "English Molinism in the Late 1590S: Richard Hooker on Free Will, Predestination, and Divine Foreknowledge." Journal of Theological Studies 60, no. 1 (November 12, 2008): 130–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jts/fln148.

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42

ROGERS, KATHERIN A. "Christ's freedom: Anselm vs Molina." Religious Studies 52, no. 4 (July 14, 2016): 497–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412516000093.

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AbstractBoth Molinism and Anselmianism attempt to preserve libertarian freedom for created agents as well as robust divine sovereignty. The two issues intersect in addressing the puzzle of Christ's freedom: If God is necessarily good, how can God Incarnate be free? Anselm answers: while human agents need options for our choices to be up to us, Christ inevitably chooses rightly with perfect freedom. I defend Anselm's answer against a general criticism and then argue that Anselm's position is preferable to the Molinist solution which has recently been championed by Thomas P. Flint.

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43

Ristic, Sava. "Descartes and the formulations of free will." Theoria, Beograd 59, no. 2 (2016): 87–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1602081r.

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Based on certain places in Descartes? writings, regarding the notion of ?free will?, it seems that Descartes may be interpreted as both a compatibilist and libertarian. Firstly, we claim that it is impossible to describe Descartes as a compatibilist, and the consequence of that proposition is that that it is impossible for him to be both a compatibilist and libertarian. By referring to Meditations, Passions of the Soul, Principles and Letters, we will show that Descartes is not a compatibilist, rather that he is a libertarian, since he places free will in an incompatible relation with determinism by allowing free will not to be restrained by anything, which leaves the ?alternative possibilities? open. Afterwards we will respond to possible objections, out of which the main one will be related to determinism.

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44

JUDISCH, NEAL. "Theological determinism and the problem of evil." Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2, 2008): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412508009384.

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AbstractI argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the free-will defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.

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45

Goto, Takayuki, Yuya Ishibashi, Shogo Kajimura, Ryunosuke Oka, and Takashi Kusumi. "Development of free will and determinism scale in Japanese." Japanese journal of psychology 86, no. 1 (2015): 32–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/jjpsy.86.13233.

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46

Fonda, A. Granville. "No Need to Deify: How Determinism Generates Free Will." International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society 3, no. 4 (2014): 35–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/2154-8633/cgp/v03i04/51072.

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47

List, Christian. "Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise." Noûs 48, no. 1 (April 18, 2013): 156–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12019.

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48

Holton, Richard. "Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will." Inquiry 52, no. 4 (August 3, 2009): 412–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740903087383.

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49

Ratheal, Juli D'Ann, and Duffy Wilks. "Perceptions of Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility Reexamined." Journal of Professional Counseling: Practice, Theory & Research 34, no. 1-2 (March 2006): 88–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15566382.2006.12033826.

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50

Ogletree. "MISCONSTRUING AGENCY: ISSUES RELATED TO FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM." Journal of Social Sciences 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.3844/jssp.2014.1.6.

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