Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Free will and determinism / Dissertations / Theses

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Free will and determinism.

Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Free will and determinism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 July 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Free will and determinism.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Arthurs, Frank. "Free will, determinism, and moral responsibility." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2014. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/6857/.

Full text

Abstract:

The first half of this thesis is a survey of the PSR, followed by consideration of arguments for and against the principle. This survey spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, and gives the reader a sense of the ways in which the PSR has been used both implicitly and explicitly throughout the history of philosophy. I argue that, while none of the arguments either for or against the PSR provide conclusive evidence of its truth or falsity, we should adopt a presumption in its favour. The best hope the PSR sceptic has of demonstrating the PSR’s falsity would be to find empirical evidence of something non-deterministic, since the PSR entails determinism. The theory of libertarianism is considered as just such a counterexample; but I argue the evidence for libertarianism is flimsy, and so the presumption in favour of the PSR remains. The second half starts from the premise that the PSR—and hence also determinism—is true, and goes on to examine what implications this has for our moral responsibility practices. We examine incompatibilist arguments by van Inwagen and Galen Strawson, both of which appeal to the origination condition. I contend that these arguments are compelling precisely because the origination condition to which they appeal is compelling. This leaves us with a dilemma: it seems like we can either accept these incompatibilist arguments, which would require us to abandon our moral responsibility practices; or we could save our moral responsibility practices by adopting some form of compatibilism, but at the cost of denying the intuitively appealing origination condition. In fact, to avoid the costs of each horn of this dilemma, we can seek to create a ‘mixed view’ instead. We consider Vargas’s revisionism, Double’s free will subjectivism, and Smilansky’s illusionism and fundamental dualism, which help to shape the mixed view I argue for here: a consequentialist compatibilist theory of moral responsibility. This theory allows us to acknowledge the impossibility of true desert without dispensing with our responsibility practices.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Cole, Ryan L. "Free will a compatibilist account /." Pullman, Wash. : Washington State University, 2008. http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Thesis/Fall2008/r_cole_112408.pdf.

Full text

Abstract:

Thesis (M.A. in philosophy)--Washington State University, December 2008.<br>Title from PDF title page (viewed on Dec. 23, 2008). "Department of Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-39).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Bobzien, Susanne. "Determinism and free will in Stoic philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334904.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Whitney, Eoin. "Compatibilism of Causal Determinism and Free Will." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1017.

Full text

Abstract:

An argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and free will. Draws on recently conducted philosophical experimentation related to intuition and development of the intuition of agent-causal accounts of free will in children. Argues that regardless of the intuition held, the manner in which people arise to these intuitions shows that the working definition of free will is different than people posit. Lays groundwork for why the working definition of free will is compatible with causal determinism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Laird, Kirstie. "Free will and mental causation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365538.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Wilson, David Thomas. "The nature of free will." Thesis, Electronic version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/385.

Full text

Abstract:

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University (Division of Society, Culture, Media & Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy), 2006.<br>Bibliography: p. 218-228.<br>Free will and nature -- Metaphysical free will -- Incompatibilism -- Causal closure of the physical domain -- Free will and physics -- Free will within nature.<br>There is more than one problem of free will. Many philosophers approach the free will question seeking a foundation for systems of ethics or a justification for societal practices of praise and blame. ... Rather, I address the metaphysical question of how to accommodate free will within the natural world. I conclude that the natural world is not identical with the physical world and that it must contain entities or influences that are not physical in any current sense of that word.<br>Mode of access: World Wide Web.<br>x, 228 p

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Inglis, Kelly. "Conscious will : illusion or reality? /." Thesis, View the Table of Contents & Abstract, 2006. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B35881549.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Perez, Edward Mario. "The philosophical problem of free will." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1999. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Wilson, Kenneth Mitchell. "Augustine's conversion from traditional free choice to "non-free free will" : a comprehensive methodology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:823cd43d-04f5-4c5d-ab0a-43be52ca1077.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis will explore whether Augustine of Hippo altered his theological views and what influences might have precipitated the alleged modifications. Augustine’s early "De libero arbitrio" argued for an individual’s ability to respond freely to God while his later anti-Pelagian writings rejected any human ability to believe until God infuses grace creating belief as his gift. Does his theology exhibit continuity or discontinuity? Four commonplace assertions within Augustinian studies are questioned in this thesis: 1.) Augustine changed his theology in AD 396; 2.) while he was writing the letter to Bishop Simplicianus (Simpl.); 3.) with his transition occurring through reading scripture (Rom.7, 9;1 Cor.15); 4.) which he developed through merely modifying prevalent doctrines. No scholarly work has researched Augustine’s entire corpus from AD 386–430 specifically analyzing his theology in the five final doctrines of: 1.) God giving initial faith as a gift, 2.) inherited damnable reatus from Adam, 3.) the gift of perseverance, 4.) unilateral pre-determination of persons’s eternal destinies independently of foreknowledge, and 5.) God’s neither desiring nor providing for the salvation of all persons. Only a comprehensive methodological approach—reading systematically, chronologically, and comprehensively through his entire corpus—can legitimately demonstrate changes. Did a Patristic consensus exist regarding post-Adamic free choice? What was Augustine’s contribution to this theology? To what degree did the combination of Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism contribute to his liberum arbitrium captivatum? Chapters include an introduction followed by chapters on free choice versus determinism in the: 1.) ancient philosophical-religious world, 2.) Christian authors AD 95–215, 3.) Christian authors AD 216–430, 4.) Augustine’s works AD 386–395, 5.) Augustine’s works AD 396–411, 6.) Augustine’s works AD 412–426, 7.) Augustine’s works AD 427–430, 8.) sermons and epistles, 9.) Augustine’s exegesis of scripture, and 10.) conclusion. Conclusions will be established via extensive primary quotations and references with supporting secondary sources.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Choi, Jung K. "Balthazar Hubmaier's understanding of free will." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p001-1199.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Donnelly, Matthew P. "A critical evaluation of freewill theism." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1998. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Kelland, Lindsay-Ann. "Determinism and reactive attitudes: reflections on our alleged unrenounceable commitments." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843.

Full text

Abstract:

There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Shaw, Elizabeth. "Free will, punishment and criminal responsibility." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9590.

Full text

Abstract:

Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and most legal systems incorporate retributive elements. It is probably also the dominant theory of punishment among contemporary philosophers of criminal justice. However, retributivism relies on conceptions of free will and responsibility that have, for millennia, fundamentally divided those who have thought seriously about the subject. Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, I argue, is in accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt standard. In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis considers what methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In particular, it attempts to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of free will or retributive desert, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of dealing with criminal offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of modifying their behaviour through neurological interventions). The final part of this thesis also gives an overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal law of taking doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe treatment that offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of liberty, stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether our current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what goals and values should guide attempts at reforming the system.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Bishop, Robert Charles. "Chaotic dynamics, indeterminacy and free will /." Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Harris, Ashley K. "Effects of Free Will, Determinism, and Conscientiousness on Academic Cheating." Marietta College / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=marietta1471523673.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Kelsey, E. Benjamin. "Freedom and forfeiture responding to Galen Strawson's basic argument /." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08152008-154026/.

Full text

Abstract:

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.<br>Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, committee chair; Sebastian Rand, Timothy O'Keefe, committee members. Electronic text (58 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

DeLong, Edwin R. "Arminianism, verbal inspiration, and the loss of libertarian freedom does obtaining a verbally inspired and inerrant scripture entail a loss of libertarian freedom? /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1995. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Nicholls, Jason A. "Omniscience in the divine openness a critical analysis of present knowledge in God /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1997. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Stojanovich, Mladen. "Death, free will and sin in the Orthodox perspective." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 1992. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p015-0240.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Davis, Paul. "The cheap tricks of compatibilism and why the problem of free will won't go away." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/18821.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Bawulski, Shawn J. "Grace and free will libertarianism, the Arminian soteriological framework, and freely chosen faith /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p006-1578.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Cagatay, Hasan. "Free Will And Determinism: Are They Even Relevant To Each Other?" Phd thesis, METU, 2012. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12614162/index.pdf.

Full text

Abstract:

Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism / indeterminism and the problem of free will. The belief that there exists such a significant relation is supported by our intuitions<br>however, in this thesis, I defend just the opposite view: free will has no significant dependence on the deterministic or indeterministic character of causal relations. In the same way, I propose that the question, whether or not determinism is true, cannot be answered based on observations about the problem of free will. I believe that the genuine question whose answer would illuminate the darkness surrounding free will is whether or not will supervenes on anything other than itself. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not we are free, the question we should ask is &ldquo<br>Does will supervene upon something other than itself?&rdquo<br>Moreover, I defend the position that no matter whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, if physicalism is true, i.e. if properties of free will supervene upon physical properties, then we cannot enjoy genuine freedom. The position of the thesis has some important ethical implications: If we cannot be genuinely free, we cannot be genuinely responsible for our actions either. This implies that retributive and admirative desires towards other persons are rationally untenable. I defend the view that only practical attitudes like reinforcement and punishment or isolation and inclusion are rationally tenable.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Chan, Hoi-yee, and 陳凱宜. "Free will and experimental philosophy : when an old debate meets a new movement." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/207187.

Full text

Abstract:

Consider this scenario: A terrorist just bombed the subway in London, which resulted in the casualties of numerous innocent people. His act can be considered well-planned for he fully knew what consequences his act would bring. If determinism is true, is it possible that the terrorist in question bombed the subway out of free will? An incompatibilist would respond to this question with a resounding “no”. A compatibilist, on the other hand, would answer yes, as long as the terrorist possessed certain psychological characteristics, causal histories, etc. This underlies the basis of disputes between the compatibilists and incompatibilists, who appear to hold opposite views on whether it is possible for someone to act out of free will if determinism is true. However, as I shall discuss in Chapter One, this disagreement is partly a verbal one that stems from the diverse meanings of the term “free will”. This thesis aims to transcend the verbal disagreement and explore where the deeper, more substantial disagreements may lie between compatibilists and incompatibilists. One possible sphere where substantial disagreements between compatibilists and incompatibilists may lie is the content of the ordinary concept of free will, or that of the strongest sense of control condition necessary for securing the ordinary concept of moral responsibility. On this view, the metaphysical question and the conceptual question about free will are inseparable; in order to find out the metaphysical satisfaction conditions of free will, one must first identify the conceptual satisfaction conditions of free will. Further, the latter is reflected in everyday free will/ moral responsibility ascriptions about hypothetical or real scenarios. In Chapter Two, I analyze how the recent experimental philosophy movement bears on this issue. By examining the findings of some current experimental philosophy studies, I argue that neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism can sufficiently capture the ordinary concept of free will or moral responsibility. In the light of my discussions in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Three why each of the various traditional accounts of free will (including compatibilism, libertarianism and hard incompatibilism) cannot independently provide an adequate “package deal” of solutions for the problem of free will. Near the end of the chapter, I propose a pluralistic, agnostic account of free will as an alternative solution. Despite its great instrumental value, experimental philosophy is not widely recognized as a philosophically significant methodology. Hence, Chapter Four is devoted to discussing the actual and potential values of experimental philosophy in the light of its contribution to the free will debate. I conclude that the encounter between the free will debate and the experimental philosophy movement is a fruitful one; the former proves the value of the latter by receiving helpful insights from it.<br>published_or_final_version<br>Philosophy<br>Master<br>Master of Philosophy

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Leach, Trenton Douglas. "On Alvin Plantinga's Molinist account of the compatability [sic] of divine foreknowledge and human freedom." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2005. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Skepple, Roger Whitfield Fitzgerald. "Of God, angels and men freedom of the will, a moral paradigm /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1991. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Greer, Sacha. "Cogs in a Cosmic Machine: A Defense of Free Will Skepticism and its Ethical Implications." Scholar Commons, 2015. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5487.

Full text

Abstract:

Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions, followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom's optimism that a global acceptance of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than those which perpetuate the illusion of free will. Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary. Some object to free will skepticism not because they found something inherently wrong with the logic of the position but because of practical concerns. Their arguments against free will skepticism assert that if such a view is accepted, society will unravel, interpersonal relationships will become compromised, personal identity will be undermined, and life would lose all meaning. However, largely inspired by Derk Pereboom's book "Living without Free Will," I will show why such misgivings are unfounded. Pereboom offers good reasons to believe that not only would society, relationships, identity, and meaning remain intact, but also that society would enjoy practical advantages by accepting free will skepticism. Furthermore, a society based on the belief in free will perpetrates grave injustices on its citizens, and beliefs in desert and blame fuel destructive reactive attitudes inimical to flourishing interpersonal relationships. The social advantages of accepting free will skepticism involve sweeping reforms necessitated by its acceptance. I discuss two such reforms pertaining to the institutions of punishment and parenthood. If those who commit immoral or illegal acts are not to blame for their transgressions, then our current system of punishment is unfair and unjust. There are alternative ways to cultivate a safe society without subjecting wrongdoers to desert-based penalties. Using an alternative model of justice, one that tailors a punitive response to the specific risks and needs of each perpetrator, would be far more effective than mere incarceration. Furthermore, since the root cause of criminality can, in many cases, be traced to childhood abuse or neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent parents are not raising children. Therefore, I advocate a licensing program for parents for the benefit of both future children, and for the safety of society. Building on the arguments of notable free will skeptics, I conclude that free will skepticism is the most scientifically defensible position, that the objections to it are unfounded, and that the benefits of accepting it surpass those of alternative positions. While a discussion of all ethical and practical implications would surpass the space allowed here, I hope that my limited discussion inspires more research and challenges the many misconceptions surrounding free will skepticism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Mobbs, Dean. "Free will versus determinism : how 'reflective' and 'reflexive' systems modulate affective behavior." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.497962.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Ferreira, Maria Andreia. "Livre - ArbÃtrio: um debate filosÃfico e neurocientÃfico." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2016. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=18304.

Full text

Abstract:

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior<br>Sabemos que o problema do livre-arbÃtrio Ã tratado, pelo menos, desde Epiteto. A liberdade de escolha que âjulgamosâ possuir Ã algo que supomos ser inerente Ã natureza humana. AlÃm disso, parece que sÃ poderemos ser pessoalmente responsÃveis por nossos atos se os realizarmos livremente. Acreditamos que ser responsÃveis por nossas aÃÃes e escolhas Ã o que nos torna diferentes dos outros animais. No entanto, apesar de todas essas nossas intuiÃÃes, nÃo sÃ algumas correntes filosÃficas defendem que nÃo somos livres, mas tambÃm a ciÃncia parece nos dizer que somos sistemas ou mÃquinas determinÃsticas. Os resultados de vÃrios experimentos neurocientÃficos tÃm sugerido que nÃo escolhemos conscientemente fazer o que fazemos. E, posto que a noÃÃo de livre-arbÃtrio tem como prÃ-requisito bÃsico a noÃÃo de consciÃncia, entÃo parece que hÃ um conflito entre nossas intuiÃÃes cotidianas e as conclusÃes cientÃficas e filosÃficas. O objetivo central desta dissertaÃÃo serÃ, nÃo somente analisar a coerÃncia conceitual das diversas teses sobre o livre-arbÃtrio que surgiram na GrÃcia clÃssica e nos estudos neurocientÃficos atuais, mas tambÃm mostrar que as explicaÃÃes que tentam conectar os fenÃmenos subjetivos e objetivos relativos ao problema nos levaram, ao menos, atÃ o presente momento, a uma lacuna explicativa. Isto Ã, uma lacuna na explicaÃÃo sobre como podemos conectar nossas intuiÃÃes subjetivas sobre como somos os autores de nossas aÃÃes e as explicaÃÃes objetivas sobre como nosso corpo executa tais aÃÃes.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Pillai, Jessica D. "God's change of mind." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2004. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Harrison, David J. "Connectionism, folk psychology and cognitive architecture." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.322924.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Kaiserman, Alexander. "Cause and context." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a887f7cc-64df-40b5-8587-0eb89bfa5fd5.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis comprises an introduction and six papers on causation, freedom and responsibility. Though mostly self-standing, the papers are unified by two common goals - to recognise and analyse the role of context in the semantics of causal claims and ascriptions of freedom; and to put metaphysical approaches to causation into closer contact with actual causal reasoning in science and the law. Chapter One defends a contextualist semantics of causal language that combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. Chapter Two extends this approach to ascriptions of freedom, by combining Kratzer's account with the principle that an agent acts freely only if she could have acted otherwise. Chapter Three explores a neglected view which combines David Lewis's counterfactual account of causation with his counterpart-theoretic approach to de re modality. Chapter Four proposes an amendment to the interventionist account of causation in response to a worry raised by John Campbell about causation in psychology. Chapter Five motivates the idea that causation is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees, and defends a novel account of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. Chapter Six then argues, from a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's losses only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant's harm.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Nordstrom, Samuel C. "Manipulation That Matters: The Manipulation Debate Considered." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1273.

Full text

Abstract:

In this paper I examine the contemporary debate over Derk Pereboom’s Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. After considering the argument in its entirety, I entertain a Hard-Line compatibilist reply given by Michael McKenna, based on an improved reworking of Pereboom’s cases. In evaluating McKenna’s reply I begin with several objections raised by Ishiyaque Haji and Stephan Cuypers before arguing that the reworking of cases is unsuccessful due to a lack of freedom-undermining manipulation. I redefine the conditions for what satisfies as freedom-undermining manipulation based on a revised understanding of the process whereby agents come to evaluate their desires independently. In conclusion, I maintain that Pereboom’s argument succeeds only insofar as it satisfies an evaluative account of manipulation. However, upon doing so, Pereboom’s strategy of accounting for all desired CAS conditions fails, given that authentic evaluation cannot be manipulatively accounted for. As a result, the Manipulation Argument fails to prove the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Evans, Blake W. S. "Determined Freedom: On Moral Responsibility Between Chance and Necessitation." Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1619724559950428.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Ghisleri, Luca. "Inizio e scelta il problema della libertà nel pensiero di Luigi Pareyson /." Torino : Trauben : Centro studi filosofico-religiosi Luigi Pareyson, 2003. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/54987376.html.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Kupcu, Yoldas Aybuke. "In Search Of Free Will." Master's thesis, METU, 2010. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/12611721/index.pdf.

Full text

Abstract:

Free will is a paramount concept that is central to our everyday lives, society and moral judgements. In this thesis, I search for the conditions under which free will can exist. This is done in relation to two topics: determinism and agency. Finally, I also explore the relation between free will and several social and philosophical concepts, and discuss briefly what would be the case if there were no free will.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Pigden, John. "Human free will and post-Holocaust theology : a critical appraisal of the way human free will is employed as a theodicy in post-Holocaust theology." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683352.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Fisk, Philip J. "The integral relation of impeccability and freedom to the projects of Cyril of Alexandria, John Calvin, Petrus van Mastricht, and Jonathan Edwards." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p036-0399.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Burke, Catherine Margaret. "The possibility of free will: John Duns Scotus and William James on the will." Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3895.

Full text

Abstract:

The two questions that motivate the present inquiry are: is it possible that human beings will freely, and what does free will make possible? John Duns Scotus and William James are two defenders of the possibility of free will, although each has a very different notion of the will. First, I present the accounts of the will articulated by Duns Scotus and James, with attention to the context in which the accounts were developed and the reasons each philosopher gives for the possibility of free will. Next, I briefly consider the picture of human action each account of the will makes possible. Then, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Finally, in response to a weakness of both accounts, I argue that in order to widen the possibilities of human moral agency, it is necessary to reflect not only on our strengths but also on our physical and moral frailty.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Carlson, Allison Doreen, and University of Lethbridge Faculty of Education. "Free will in the educational theory of Jacques Maritain." Thesis, Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Faculty of Education, 1991, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10133/47.

Full text

Abstract:

In Jacques Maritain's text The Education of Man (1962) a Christian perspective affirming the individual's free will is presented. This study examines the validity of Maritain's argument and speculates upon some consequences for public schooling. The conclusions of the study are as follows: First. Maritain's exposition of the existence of absolute free will is unconvincing as it is not successfully reconciled with his religious world view. Second. if Maritain's views may be assumed to complement the religous educational and institutional objectives of Alberta's Catholic schools, the potential for conflict between these views and the 'secular' (i.e. the common goals, contents and processes of all public and separte schools) objectives of Catholic schools exists.<br>vi, 81 leaves ; 28 cm.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Rydberg, Andreas. "Viljebegreppet och psykologin : En studie av psykologins framväxt som vetenskap i Sverige genom en analys av viljebegreppets betydelseförändring." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of History of Science and Ideas, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-103264.

Full text

Abstract:

<p>The aim of this study is to elucidate the process in which psychology was separated from philosophy and established itself as a distinct academic discipline in Sweden. I argue that the concept of <em>will</em>, as well as the concepts of <em>thinking </em>and <em>emotion</em>, have a lot to tell us about the rise of academic psychology in Sweden. This is done through an analysis of psychology textbooks, encyclopaedia-articles and academic texts on the themes <em>will </em>and <em>psychology</em>, from around 1800 till 1950.</p><p>Prior to the establishment of the first chair of psychology in Uppsala 1948, the discipline was above all a part of the philosophical discipline. For psychology to become a science of its own, it was crucial to obtain a position among the empirical sciences. It thus had to distance itself from philosophy, and in particular from metaphysics. In that respect the concept of will, thinking and emotion posed a problem. On the one hand, these concepts seamed necessary for a science of the psyche but on the other, they were traditionally associated with philosophy and especially with metaphysics.</p><p>From around 1900, the concept of will underwent an empirisation process in which it distanced itself from the metaphysical content of meaning. The idea of thinking, emotion and will as <em>faculties </em>was criticised and replaced by a way of speaking of them in terms of single <em>acts</em>, able to be analysed in a more empirical manner. This change was in accordance with the new demand on empiricism. Within psychology, however, practicians of the trade still spoke in terms of will, thinking and emotion, as well as of classical philosophical problems such as that of the <em>free will</em>, albeit in a more empirical manner.</p><p>A second, more profound change, occurred in the 1940s when the concepts of thinking, emotion and will, as well as the problem of the free will were sorted out from the psychological discourse. In light of their long time as an integral part of the psychological discourse it was a significant change that the human psyche was no longer to be discussed in terms of will, thinking and emotion. The most likely explanation of this change is that the institutional split between psychology and philosophy after 1948 also signified a separation between philosophical and empirical-psychological questions. After 1948 it was possible to pursue scientific studies in psychology without any knowledge of philosophy and hence, without an urge to pose philosophical questions.</p>

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Heckel, Matthew C. ""His spear through my side into Luther" Calvin's relationship to Luther's doctrine of the will /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online. Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2005. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Kristjansson, Kristjan. "Freedom as a moral concept." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2814.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a 'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes (to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate, in the given context, to ask A for a justification of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept. Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars, for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom; nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy. Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-, not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct, values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions of method. It is argued that the widely held essential contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical, and that it is methodologically possible to construct an authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and critical but non-relative.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Ju, Kang Hyo. "The extent of the atonement in the thought of John Davenant (1572-1641) in the context of the early modern era." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2018. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=237075.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis is a study on the theology of an Anglican bishop, John Davenant (1572-1641), in the context of the early modern era. In particular it focuses on his understanding of the extent and intent of the atoning death of Christ. Davenant played an important role in the development of early orthodox Reformed theology, especially on this controversial doctrine. Some scholars have claimed that Davenant's position was a forerunner of Amyraldianism in the seventeenth century. Others have argued that his view was different from Amyraldianism. However, no scholar has substantiated the latter argument based on Davenant's extensive writings as to how far Davenant's view on the extent of the atonement was distinct from the position of John Cameron, the Father of Amyraldianism. The contention of this thesis is that Davenant's views of predestination, the atonement and free-will were the main factors that affected his twofoldintention view, and they differed from the positions of John Cameron. The exposition of those doctrines by John Davenant both in his various writings and in his testimony at the Synod of Dort serve as the object of the investigation. Cameron's writings are also selectively investigated and his views on those doctrines are compared with Davenant's positions. The Canons of Dort are analysed in order to examine whether Davenant's doctrinal position is situated within the confessional orthodoxy in the early seventeenth century. Davenant's position on the universal aspect of the atonement was based on the universal proclamation of the Gospel. Davenant stressed the immutability of God's will for the elect. Cameron's view on the universal aspect of the atonement depended on the divine will for the salvation of every individual which could be frustrated due to human free choice. Since the decree of sending Christ preceded the decree of election according to Cameron's view on the order of the divine decrees, Cameron's view was different from Davenant's. Cameron held to a distinction between moral and physical ability and intellectual persuasion of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind. These things were not shared by Davenant. The conclusion arrived at is that Davenant's twofold-intention view was distinct from Cameron's hypothetical universalism. Thus this study substantiates the claim that Davenant was not a forerunner of Amyraldianism and his view was situated within the boundary of confessional orthodoxy codified in the Canons of Dort.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Preciado, Michael Patrick. "The compatibility of guidance control and reformed theology." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2017. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=235593.

Full text

Abstract:

In this thesis, I ask whether reformed theology is compatible with guidance control. I conclude that they are compatible. The main areas of compatibility are fourfold. First, both deny the sourcehood condition. Second, both deny the alternative possibilities condition. Third, both are types of reasons-responsive theories. Finally, both have a similar subjectivist condition. This conclusion implies that the resources of guidance control can be constructively used, developed and applied by reformed theologians and philosophers. Guidance control can be applied to the debates on free will and moral responsibility as well as to ethics and other related fields.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Headley, Alrick George. "The nature of the will in the writings of Arminius and Calvin a comparative study /." Portland, Or. : Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2004. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Campos, Heber Carlos de. "The Arminian libertarian doctrines of freedom and responsibility evaluated according to biblical-reformed doctrine of sin." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1992. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Giese, Stephen D. "An examination of Jonathan Edwards' analysis of the Arminian objections to moral necessity." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1995. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Speratos, Jason G. "God's omnipotence in freewill and process theism." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1997. http://www.tren.com.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Hartman, Robert James. "The role of volition within a broadly-Swinburnian epistemology of faith." Deerfield, IL : Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2986/tren.006-1619.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Robson, David. "A study in metaphysics for free will : using models of causality, determinism and supervenience in the search for free will." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2014. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/48781/.

Full text

Abstract:

We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality is defined on a temporal sequence of δ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose ‘immanence' - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions. We then argue these beings can exercise free will only when selecting between choices inhering within immanent relata. A being is responsible for its selections if and only if it is constituted of a temporally evolving deterministic substructure. Our proposal is novel: it avoids injecting indeterminism into the decision process. Topological models for property supervenience are developed and used to reconstruct standard definitions from the literature. These are then used to demonstrate considerations of supervenience do not affect our arguments. We have demonstrated that a model of the exercise of free will involving both genuine choices and responsibility is possible but can only operate within a non-deterministic universe possessing specific traits.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!