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Journal articles on the topic 'Free Will and Moral Responsibility'

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Published: 3 June 2025

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Hartman, Robert J. "Against luck-free moral responsibility." Philosophical Studies 173, no. 10 (2016): 2845–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0640-4.

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Árnason, G. "NEUROSCIENCE, FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY." Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 15, no. 2 (2011): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.3176/tr.2011.2.03.

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3

Tait, Gordon. "Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD." International Journal of Inclusive Education 7, no. 4 (2003): 429–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1360311032000122483.

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4

Špirková, Sára. "Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms." Ethics & Bioethics 13, no. 1-2 (2023): 83–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2023-0006.

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Abstract Some determinist approaches to free will opine that the human brain is subordinate to physical laws not fully under our control. This results in a weakening of the concept of the personal autonomy and moral responsibility of humans. Were we to acknowledge this assumption, we might consider automatic machines unable to influence the thoughts and intentions from which our actions take root. The key issue lies in the fact that an individual does not consciously engage in particular actions (automatisms), which challenges the concept of free will in an individual’s complex behaviour. Desp

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5

Linden, David E. J. "Moral psychology, vol. 4: free will and moral responsibility." Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 20, no. 5 (2015): 469–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2015.1073470.

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6

Vicens, Leigh C. "Agentive Phenomenology and Moral Responsibility Agnosticism." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 181–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201935119.

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Most incompatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility require, for a person to count as morally responsible for an action, that specific events leading up to the action be undetermined. One might think, then, that incompatibilists should remain agnostic about whether anyone is ever free or morally responsible, since whether there are such undetermined events would seem to be an empirical question unsettled by scientific research. Yet, a number of incompatibilists have suggested that the phenomenological character of our experiences already gives us good reason to believe that muc

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Meynen, G. "FC31-05 - Mental disorder and moral responsibility." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (2011): 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)73696-3.

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IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and ass

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8

Jin, Yingxian. "The Conflict of Free Will and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 8 (February 7, 2023): 1139–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v8i.4440.

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the motivations of human moral behaviors are still driven by free will under the influence of society. The paper will discuss how free will affects morality through ideas about morality and free will gained from psychologists and philosophers. In addition to some arguments concerning the existence of free will, this article will look at the conflicts between moral responsibilities and free will. Individuals must abide by its moral laws, which occasionally go against free will, in order to exist. The essay will also contrast several instances of m

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ÁRNASON, GARDAR. "Neuroimaging, Uncertainty, and the Problem of Dispositions." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19, no. 2 (2010): 188–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180109990454.

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Brain research in neuroscience and related fields is changing our understanding of the brain and its relation to the mind and to human behavior, giving a new impetus to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. The reactions have covered the entire range, from claims to the effect that neuroscientific research is showing that our folk–psychological understanding of conscious free will and moral responsibility is deeply mistaken to claims to the effect that neuroscientific research is irrelevant to moral issues of free will and responsibility. In any case, neuroscience is posing some s

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10

King, Matt, and Peter Carruthers. "Moral Responsibility and Consciousness." Journal of Moral Philosophy 9, no. 2 (2012): 200–228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552412x625682.

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Our goal in this paper is to raise a general question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. The evidence from cognitive science suggests that there are no conscious mental states playing the right causal roles to count as decisions, judgments, or evaluations. We propose that all theorists should determine whether their theories (or the examples that motivate them) could survive the discovery that there are no conscious states of these kinds. Since we take it that theories of moral responsibility should

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11

McKenna, Michael, and Brandon Warmke. "Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?" Journal of Moral Philosophy 14, no. 6 (2017): 698–733. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810068.

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The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise to questions regarding free will and moral responsibility. There is cause for concern that a ran

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12

Vargas, Manuel. "Taking the Highway on Skepticism, Luck, and the Value of Responsibility." Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2009): 249–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409x402386.

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AbstractI consider some themes and issues arising in recent work on moral responsibility, focusing on three recent books—Carlos Moya's Moral Responsibility, Al Mele's Free Will and Luck, and John Martin Fischer's My Way. I argue that these texts collectively suggest some difficulties with the way in which many issues are currently framed in the free will debates, including disputes about what constitutes compatibilism and incompatibilism and the relevance of intuitions and ordinary language for describing the metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility. I also argue that each of the acco

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13

Mele, Alfred R. "Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck." Social Philosophy and Policy 16, no. 2 (1999): 274–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002478.

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My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic (or “deterministic,” for short). That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free will and moral responsibility are compat

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14

Alaoui, Ali. "The Problem of Free Will and Moral Responsibility." Questions: Philosophy for Young People 19 (2019): 21–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/questions20191919.

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15

Anckarsäter, Henrik. "Has biology disproved free will and moral responsibility?" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 28 (2010): E114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1006466107.

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16

Shepherd, Joshua. "Scientific Challenges to Free Will and Moral Responsibility." Philosophy Compass 10, no. 3 (2015): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12200.

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17

Levy, Neil, and Michael McKenna. "Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility." Philosophy Compass 4, no. 1 (2009): 96–133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00197.x.

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18

Nelkin, Dana Kay. "Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices." Journal of Ethics 23, no. 3 (2019): 265–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-019-09294-2.

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19

Bartel, Christopher. "Free will and moral responsibility in video games." Ethics and Information Technology 17, no. 4 (2015): 285–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9383-8.

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20

Clarke, Randolph. "Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility." Philosophical Studies 66, no. 1 (1992): 53–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00668395.

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21

Feltz, Adam, and Florian Cova. "Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis." Consciousness and Cognition 30 (November 2014): 234–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.012.

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22

Simkulet, William. "Shaky Ground." De Ethica 1, no. 3 (2014): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.14135.

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The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everythin

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23

Angelo Corlett, J. "Free Will and Responsibility." Grazer Philosophische Studien 97, no. 4 (2020): 559–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000123.

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Abstract Professor Keith Lehrer has recently argued for what this author shall refer to as his “preference compatibilism,” according to which, among other things, knowledge of S’s preferences is what a counterfactual intervener uses to decide when S will depart from the counterfactual intervener’s plan. Lehrer assumes, among other things, Harry G. Frankfurt’s notion of “effective wants,” which are what Lehrer calls “preferences that reveal themselves in choice given the opportunity to act” (Lehrer 2016, 36). While the author here generally concurs with Lehrer’s preference compatibilism, he sha

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24

Prašević, Nedžib. "Causal determinism and moral responsibility." Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini 54, no. 4 (2024): 297–315. https://doi.org/10.5937/zrffp54-54830.

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In the debate between incompatibilists and compatibilists regarding the relationship between causal determinism, moral responsibility, and free will, causal determinism is identified as a potential basis for an excusing argument against moral responsibility. If this were valid, incompatibilists would have a powerful argument for their position, thereby shifting the burden of proof onto the opposing side. However, Strawson and Frankfurt, through their analysis of the role of excuses, have argued why causal determinism cannot serve as an exculpatory basis for responsibility. In this paper, by an

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25

Smilansky, Saul. "Free Will Denialism as a Dangerous Gamble." Diametros 21, no. 79 (2024): 119–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.33392/diam.1943.

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Denialism concerning free will and moral responsibility combines, in its minimal form, the rejection of libertarian free will and the rejection of compatibilism. I will address the more ambitiously “happy” or “optimistic” version of denialism, which also claims that we are better off without belief in free will and moral responsibility, and ought to try to radically reform our moral, social and personal lives without such beliefs. I argue that such denialism involves, for various reasons, a dangerous gamble, which it would be morally irresponsible to follow. I conclude by reflecting upon the i

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26

Costa, Daniel de Vasconcelos. "The limits of the neuroscience of moral responsibility." ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2021): 5–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e79816.

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The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger becau

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27

De Caro, Mario, and Massimo Marraffa. "Free Will and Retribution Today." ETHICS IN PROGRESS 5, no. 2 (2014): 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/eip.2014.2.2.

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The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: (i) that such findings would cause the collapse of all punitive practices; (ii) that

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28

Maciel, Robert. "Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility." European Legacy 20, no. 3 (2015): 306–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2014.999531.

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29

Waller, Bruce N. "Empirical Free Will and the Ethics of Moral Responsibility." Journal of Value Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2003): 533–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:inqu.0000019055.85061.98.

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30

Ratheal, Juli D'Ann, and Duffy Wilks. "Perceptions of Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility Reexamined." Journal of Professional Counseling: Practice, Theory & Research 34, no. 1-2 (2006): 88–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15566382.2006.12033826.

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31

Rowe, William L. "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of “OOMPH”." Journal of Ethics 10, no. 3 (2006): 295–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-5779-8.

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32

Bray, Amanda. "Moral Responsibility and Borderline Personality Disorder." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 37, no. 3 (2003): 270–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1614.2003.01177.x.

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Objective: To examine the concepts of free will and moral responsibility in a psychiatric context, and to consider whether those with borderline personality disorder (BPD) may be considered responsible for their actions. Method: A wide, but necessarily incomplete, range of literature was reviewed in the fields of psychiatry and philosophy. I offer a set of criteria for responsible action and examine some features of BPD in the light of these criteria. Results: Impulsivity, acting out and the less severe forms of dissociation do not vitiate responsibility. Severe dissociative and psychotic symp

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33

O.V., Sapenok, and Dobryakova N.A. "MORAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL ACTIVITY: PROBLEMS OF FREEDOM OF MORAL CHOICE, RESPONSIBILITY, DUTY." Natural resources of the Earth and environmental protection 2, no. 2 (2021): 54–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.26787/nydha-2713-203x-2021-2-2-54-57.

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Annotation: The article is devoted to the moral problems of modern medicine caused by the "challenge" to all mankind by the coronavirus pandemic, when the problems of duty, freedom of moral choice and responsibility have become particularly relevant. The authors believe that the medical ethos as a set of moral principles of the medical community as a whole is determined by the requirements of duty as the realization of the doctor's responsibility for his free choice. In this regard, the standards of the medical community are coordinated with moral ideals, which requires subordination of subjec

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34

Lenart, Bartlomiej Andrzej. "Dignity, free will, emergence, and illusion." Philosophical Readings 15, no. 1 (2023): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8283266.

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This paper argues that although emergentism does not appear to provide the libertarian with the tools she requires for metaphysical freedom, this does not actually matter for the grounding of a robust notion of moral responsibility. Moreover, illusionism about metaphysical freedom offers some consolation to those who see metaphysical freedom as a source of human dignity and value. This paper argues that emergentism, even in its weak form, when buttressed by both philosophical and psychological considerations regarding the illusory nature of the phenomenal experience of metaphysical freedom, as

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35

Majeed, H. M. "Reincarnation, Predestination and Moral Responsibility: Critical Issues in Akan Philosophy." Thought and Practice 7, no. 2 (2016): 105–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/tp.v7i2.6.

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African scholars such as Bolaji Idowu and John Mbiti have argued that belief in reincarnation is alien to African thought. However, this article argues that an adequate understanding of the Ghanaian Akan culture points to the presence of reincarnation in Akan, and for that matter African, philosophy. Nevertheless, unlike in Indian philosophy, for instance, where reincarnation depends on the quality of an individual’s moral life and is a means of ensuring moral responsibility, in Akan philosophy reincarnation is not dependent on moral considerations. Yet there is the idea of moral responsibilit

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36

Rychter, Pablo. "Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?" Disputatio 9, no. 45 (2017): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0001.

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Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate

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37

Hunt, David P. "Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 2 (2014): 39–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i2.176.

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38

NAHMIAS, EDDY, D. JUSTIN COATES, and TREVOR KVARAN. "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2007): 214–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x.

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39

Mele, Alfred. "Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?" Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 3 (2014): 297–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.940061.

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40

Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner. "Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility." Philosophical Psychology 18, no. 5 (2005): 561–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500264180.

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41

Tognazzini, Neal A. "Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 4 (2012): 809–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2012.714390.

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42

Shepherd, Joshua. "Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously." Philosophical Psychology 28, no. 7 (2014): 929–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.962018.

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43

Mele, Alfred R. "Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories." Midwest Studies In Philosophy 43, no. 1 (2019): 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misp.12105.

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44

Hartman, Robert J. "Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck." Erkenntnis 85, no. 6 (2018): 1417–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0084-7.

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Abstract Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and those earlier directly free actions formed him into the kind of person who must refra

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45

Peric, Marko. "Is regulative control a necessary condition for moral responsibility?" Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 1 (2014): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1401047p.

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Libertarianist concept of free will is based on the principle of alternate possibilities - standpoint which presupposes that an agent has moral responsibility only if, in the given circumstances, he could have done otherwise. The author of this paper tries to review this key principle of libertarianism, and to determine whether the access to alternate possibilities represents necessary or sufficient cause for the assessment of moral responsibility, or neither of that. Finally, based on the consideration of famous Frankfurt?s and Austin-style examples, in this paper is defended a sort of compat

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46

Camargo, Ricardo. "Freedom, with or beyond moral responsibility?: the Frankfurt challenge." Signos Filosoficos 25, no. 49 (2023): 90–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24275/sfilo.v25n49.04.

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One of the most recurrent debates facing epistemology today is that of the possibility of imputing moral responsibility within a deterministic context that denies freedom of will (free will). In contemporary analytical philosophy, this challenge has been met with relative success by the theoretical approach of Harry Frankfurt. In this article, this perspective will be revisited in contrast to the positions that both Aristotle and late Stoicism hold in relation to the question of freedom of will and consequent moral responsibility. An intersection with this will allow us to build an updated cri

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ELGAT, GUY. "Is Punishment Morally Justified? Developing Nietzsche's Critique of Compatibilism in The Wanderer and His Shadow, Section 23." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 3 (2016): 420–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.20.

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ABSTRACT:Nietzsche is mostly known for denying moral responsibility on account of lack of libertarian free will, thus betraying an incompatibilist approach to moral responsibility. In this paper, however, I focus on a different, less familiar argument by Nietzsche, one that I interpret as a critique of a compatibilist conception of moral responsibility. The critique shows why punishment and our moral sanctions in general are morally unjustified by the compatibilist's own lights. In addition, I articulate what I call Nietzsche's explanatory challenge, which challenges the compatibilist to expla

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48

Volkova, Vlada A. "The Problems of Free Will and Moral Responsibility in Buddhist Ethics." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2024): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2024-28-1-109-119.

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At the end of the 20th century, a discipline of Buddhist ethics was formed in English-speaking countries, within the framework of which a community of closely interacting researchers is engaged in the comprehension and systematization of ethical positions within Buddhism, often resorting to the use of analytical philosophy tools. One of the directions within the discipline of Buddhist ethics is an attempt to embed the ethical content of Buddhism in a contemporary Western European philosophical context and to put before it questions characteristic of Western philosophy, for example, the questio

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Chitov, Alexandre. "Moral Truth and Criminology: Back to Its Classical Roots." Russian Journal of Criminology 15, no. 1 (2021): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2021.15(1).6-14.

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This paper argues for the relevance of classical criminology for addressing contemporary problems of the criminal justice system. Despite many fundamental differences in political and cultural contexts, the central themes of classical criminology continue to be relevant for our time. One such theme is the criticism of criminal law for imposing very harsh penalties. Penalties become cruel if they produce fear rather than moral responsibility. Criminal laws based on fear rather than conscience and reason are the expressions of political tyranny. The importance of developing moral responsibility

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50

Farano, Alessia. "Legal Responsibility between Morality and Mind." Rechtsphilosophie 11, no. 1 (2025): 21–32. https://doi.org/10.5771/2364-1355-2025-1-21.

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The challenge that legal responsibility currently faces in the face of neuroscientific findings has often been framed in the context of the free will debate. Free will has been seen as the philosophical basis of both moral and legal responsibility. Against this view, I will argue that legal responsibility depends more on practical reason, by considering a line of scholarship that focuses primarily on the conditions that excuse action before the law. This idea will be tested by examining some recent legal cases in which neuroscientific expertise has been used.

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