Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'French Revolutionary War'

Throughout the age of sail, with the exception of finance, there was no aspect of naval warfare that exhibited as much difficulty and anguish as manning the fleet. Finding the necessary skilled seamen to man warships was the alpha and omega of problems for the Royal Navy, as in wartime it was the first to appear with mobilisation and the last to be overcome. Manning the Royal Navy was an increasing problem throughout the eighteenth century as the Navy and British sea trade continuously expanded. This resulted in a desperate struggle for the scarce resource of skilled manpower, made most evident during the initial mobilisation from peacetime to wartime footing. There is no doubt that the Royal Navy depended on able seamen as if they were the very lifeblood of the ships on which they served. In manning its fleets the Royal Navy had to also consider the merchant marine, which depended upon skilled mariners and supplied the British Isles with food, stores, and the economic income generated by sea trade. The task of manning the fleets proved extremely difficult and was only accomplished under great stress as both the Royal Navy and the merchant marine struggled to obtain the services of vitally important skilled mariners. Therefore the fruits of the Royal Navy’s avid search for seamen during the French Revolutionary Wars must be viewed in light of its success in dominating the oceans of the world. This research proves that the Admiralty of the British Royal Navy was as concerned and as cautious in manning warships as they were in fighting them. It also shows that much of what history has said about naval manning has been based on conjecture rather than fact. This research utilizes statistics to reanalyze naval manning and provide a basis for future research.

In 1793, the British government embarked on a war against Revolutionary France that few expected would last twenty-five years and engulf all of Europe. Radical French policies provided an opportunity for William Pitt, the British prime minister, to endeavor to cobble a European alliance, including a number of Mediterranean states. These efforts never progressed beyond theory and negotiations because of conflicted policy and tension between the British diplomatic corps and Royal Navy over the strategic goals in the region. With diplomats focused on coalition building and military commanders focused on national objectives, British efforts never congealed into a unified effort to defeat Revolutionary France.

Historian David Bell recently suggested that scholars reconsider the impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) upon modern culture, naming them the first "total war" in modern history. My thesis explores the significance of the wars specifically in the British mourning culture of the period by studying the war literature of four women writers: Anna Letitia Barbauld, Amelia Opie, Jane Austen, and Felicia Hemans. This paper further asks how these authors contributed to the development of a national consciousness studied by Georg Lukács, Benedict Anderson, and others. I argue that women had a representative experience of non-combatants' struggle to mourn war deaths occurring in relatively foreign lands and circumstances. Women writers recorded and contributed to this representative experience that aided the development of a national consciousness in its strong sense of shared anxieties and grief for soldiers. Excluded physically and experientially, women would have had an especially difficult time attempting to mourn combatant deaths while struggling to imagine the places and manners in which those deaths occurred, especially when no physical bodies came home to "testify" of their loved ones' experiences. Women writers' literary portraits of imagined women mourning those whose bodies never came home provide interesting insights into the strategies employed during the grieving process and ultimately demonstrate their contribution to a collective British consciousness based on mourning. The questions I explore in the first section of this thesis circle around the idea of women as writers and mourners: What were writers saying about war, death, and mourning? What common themes begin to appear in the women's Romantic war literature? And, perhaps most importantly, how did such mourning literature affect the growing sense of nationality coming out of this period? In the second section, I consider more precisely how these literary contributions affected mourning culture when no bodies were present for burial and advanced the development of a national consciousness that recognized the wars' "nobodies." How did women's experiences of being left behind and marginalized in the war efforts prepare them to conceptualize destructive mass deaths abroad, and, conceptualizing them, to mourn them?

The responses of British people to the French Revolution have recently received considerable scholarly interest. Their views on the ensuing wars have been much less well covered, however, and this thesis seeks to provide a wide-ranging examination of these. Using government and parliamentary papers, pamphlet literature, printed ephemera, printed and manuscript letters, novels, poetry, newspapers, periodicals and graphic satires, the thesis considers the attitudes of various groups of people to the conflict. It attempts to highlight the debate in England and Scotland provoked by the war, both as distinct from the polemic on the French Revolution itself and, more substantially, as the sequel to the Revolution debate, though integrally linked to it. This debate concerned the grounds, aims, nature and conduct of the war, the issues surrounding negotiations for peace with France, and especially the effects of the conflict on British society. Groups of people across the whole political spectrum took part in the controversy. Edmund Burke's views were crucial to its development, and the thesis begins with a discussion of his analysis. Succeeding chapters examine the attitudes of various political groups. The second chapter studies the opinions of members of the government (particularly those of Pitt, Grenville and Dundas) and of George III. This is followed by a chapter on the war-time activities and attitudes of loyalists inside and outside Parliament and of the 'war crusaders' (those conservatives who sympathised with Burke's interpretation of events, such as the government pamphleteer John Bowles). The next two chapters consider the opposition to the war: the Foxite Whigs in Parliament and their supporters, and radical politicians and 'Friends of Peace' out-of-doors. Each of these four chapters is to some extent organised around a coherent and unified view of the war, but the thesis attempts to show the dialogue within each group as well as their disagreements with other groups.

The British and French armies that existed in the period between the fall of the Bastille and the Battle of Waterloo have been subject to any number of popular caricatures, myths, and misunderstandings. One such common stereotype is that the British army in the period was little more than an Old Regime army that somehow managed to win battles in the face of a French army that after centuries of aristocratic sclerosis and decades of revolutionary turmoil had mutated into an all-conquering juggernaut led by one of the universally recognized military geniuses of all human history; Napoleon Bonaparte. The image of the British soldier is of the downtrodden redcoat, whose life was one long story of alcoholism, hard fighting, and brutal corporal punishment at the hands of uncaring and brutal officers. The French soldier, in sharp contrast, is a bright-eyed young conscript, eager for victory and glory in the service of his country, of the ideals of the revolution, and of his seemingly-unbeatable Emperor. This thesis intends to examine the issues of military identity, that is to say how the soldiers truly saw themselves, and of military organization, specifically why armies organized and conducted themselves in the ways that they did. In so doing this thesis aims to challenge popular misconceptions, and to show that despite differences in ideology and ethos, the French and British armies actually came to adhere to a broadly similar ideal of military professionalism.

The North African Barbary States are usually dismissed as an unimportant, though bothersome, pirate base of little consequence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This thesis challenges that idea by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of Barbary's role in trade and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, especially as it affected Britain and how the British were able to carry out their military and political goals in the Mediterranean. The study is based on the correspondence between the British government and its military leaders in the region, the correspondence and reports generated by British consuls working in Barbary, import/export records, and a database tracking British shipping to and from North Africa during the conflict. To the British, Barbary was not an irritation but an asset. Britain was able to manage Barbary's trade and foreign policy over the course of the twenty-three-year conflict. This was accomplished in two key ways: as a source of supplies for British forces and through the diplomatic role provided by Britain's extensive consul network. Though the North African states were neutral for the majority of both wars, Britain worked strenuously to maintain and increase its trade and diplomacy with Barbary for the benefit of the British armed forces. British trade with Barbary, supported by the British-Barbary diplomatic relationship, directly contributed to British successes in the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsula.

This thesis analyses civil-military relations in North-East England during an extended eighteenth century that begins with the Glorious Revolution and ends with the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars. The study will focus on the relationship that developed between soldiers and civilians by analysing a number of themes including recruiting, billeting and garrisoning, the maintenance of public order and the role of soldiers in local crime. By looking at this type of daily interaction it is possible to gain an understanding of how the actions of the army, and the reactions of society, affected civil-military relations. Through this process the study attempts to discover whether the army was prone to lewd and violent behaviour that terrorised local communities and consequently resulted in poor relations with the civilian population. This thesis argues that despite the relative unpopularity of the army, and its occasional involvement in criminal activity and violence against civilian society, civil-military relations in the region were never overwhelmingly frictional or confrontational. The main sources of tension actually arose out of the burden placed on the civilian population by their financial, logistical and constitutional commitments to the army. At the same time the army's role in opposing civil unrest, and enforcing local and central government policy, undermined its relationship with local communities.

History
Ph.D.
This dissertation explores the influence of late eighteenth-century British imperial and global paradigms of thought on the formation of British policy and strategy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It argues that British imperial interests exerted a consistent influence on British strategic decision making through the personal advocacy of political leaders, institutional memory within the British government, and in the form of a traditional strain of a widely-embraced British imperial-maritime ideology that became more vehement as the conflict progressed. The work can be broken into two basic sections. The first section focuses on the formation of strategy within the British government of William Pitt the Younger during the French Revolutionary Wars from the declaration of war in February 1793 until early 1801. During this phase of the Anglo-French conflict, British ministers struggled to come to terms with the nature of the threat posed by revolutionary ideology in France, and lacked strategic consistency due to acute cabinet-level debates over continental versus imperial strategies. The latter half of the work assesses Britain’s response to the challenges presented by Napoleonic France. Beginning with the debates surrounding Anglo-French peace negotiations in late 1801, the British increasingly came to define Napoleonic France as a regime harboring imperial aspirations that represented an explicit threat to British imperial interests. By defining the Napoleonic regime as an aspirational imperial power, British opponents of the Peace of Amiens provided the intellectual framework for the hegemonic struggle between land and sea powers that would define the Anglo-French struggle until its conclusion in June 1815. While Britain ultimately proved successful in defeating France in Europe, the expanse of the conflict also exposed the strengths and weaknesses of British force projection outside of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Temple University--Theses

This study demonstrates how royal portraiture functioned during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars as a vehicle for visualizing and processing the contemporary political upheavals. It does so by considering a notion of the 'sovereignty of the portrait', that is, the semiotic integrity (or precisely the lack thereof) and the material territory of royal portraiture at this historical juncture. Working from an assumption that the precariousness of sovereignty which delineated the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars goes hand in hand with the precariousness of representation during the same period, it reframes prevailing readings of royal portraiture in the aftermath of the French Revolution by approaching the genre less as one defined by the oneway propagation of a message, and more as a highly unstable intermedial network of representation. This theoretical undertaking is refracted through the figure of Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples (1752-1814), close sister and foil to Queen Marie- Antoinette of France, and who, as de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Naples, physically survived revolution but was twice dethroned and thrice exiled. A diverse ecology of royal portraiture revolving around Maria Carolina is presented across five case studies. Close attention to the materiality of a hyperrealistic wax bust of Maria Carolina reveals how portraiture absorbed the trauma of the French Revolution; Maria Carolina’s correspondence in invisible ink is used as a tool to read a highly distinctive visual language of 'hidden' silhouettes of sovereigns and to explore the in/visibility of exile; a novel reading of Antonio Canova's work for the Neapolitan Bourbons through the lens of contemporary caricature problematizes the binary between ancien régime and parvenue monarchy; and a unique miniature of Maria Carolina offers itself as a material metaphor for post-revolutionary sovereignty. Finally, Maria Carolina’s death mask testifies to how Maria Carolina herself became a relic of the ancien régime.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This thesis examines the role of national defence in British parliamentary politics between 1794 and 1812. It suggests that previous analyses of the late eighteenth-century political milieu insufficiently explore the impact of war on the structure of the state. Work by J.E. Cookson, Linda Colley, J.C.D. Clark, and Paul Langford depicts a decentralised state that had little direct involvement in developing a popular “British” patriotism. Here I argue that the threat of a potential French invasion during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France provoked a drive for centralisation. Nearly all the defence measures enacted during the period gave the government a much greater degree of control over British manpower and resources. The readiness of successive governments to involve large sections of the nation in the war effort through military service, financial contributions, and appeals to the British “spirit”, resulted in a much more inclusive sense of citizenship in which questions of national participation and political franchise were unlinked. National identity was also affected, and the focus on military defence of the British Isles influenced political attitudes towards the regular army. By 1810, however, the nation was disillusioned by the lengthy struggle with France. The result of lingering political weakness was that attention shifted from national defence onto domestic corruption and venality. The aftermath of the Irish Act of Union, too, demonstrated the limits of attempts to centralise the policy of the whole United Kingdom. Significantly, however, the debates over the relationship between the centre and the localities in the 1830s and 1840s, and the response to a new French invasion threat in the 1850s and 1860s, revived themes addressed during the 1790s and 1800s. The political reaction to the invasion threats between 1794 and 1812 ultimately had more in common with a Victorian state bureaucracy than an eighteenth-century ancien régime.

Pierre-Louis Prieur, dit Prieur de la Marne (1756-1827) fut un acteur majeur de la Révolution française, dont la carrière politique embrasse toute sa phase jusnaturaliste, de 1789 à l’an III (1795). Constituant, Conventionnel, membre du « grand » Comité de salut public, plusieurs fois représentant en mission, l’un des derniers Montagnards, Prieur par son parcours aux éléments exceptionnels ou typiques offre une entrée dans le projet politique à la fois collectif et protéiforme de la Montagne. Cette thèse cherche ainsi à dégager les spécificités de la défense et de la mise en œuvre chez Prieur d’un programme républicain, démocratique et jusnaturaliste au cours de son mandat à la Convention nationale, tant parmi ses collègues que sur le terrain, lors de ses nombreuses missions. Il s’agit d’interroger à travers Prieur le rapport entre action individuelle et collective ainsi que la tension permanente entre principes et pratiques, surtout dans un contexte de guerre étrangère et civile. L’étude du cas de Prieur permet de mieux comprendre la politique montagnarde dans ses limites mais aussi dans ses possibilités et ses réalisations concrètes
Pierre-Louis Prieur, known as Prieur of the Marne (1756-1827) was a major actor in the French Revolution, whose political career spanned the entirety of its natural rights phrase, from 1789 to the Year III (1795). A member of the Constituent Assembly, of the Convention, of the “great” Committee of Public Safety; several times a representative on mission; one of the last Montagnards, Prieur, through his trajectory with its aspects at once exceptional and typical, provides an entry into the political project of the Mountain, which was both collective and protean. This thesis therefore seeks to uncover the specificities of Prieur’s defense and implementation of a republican, democratic and natural rights program over the course of his mandate in the National Convention, both among his colleagues and on the ground, during his numerous missions. Through Prieur, it interrogates the relationship between individual and collective action, as well as the permanent tension between principles and practices, particularly in a context of foreign and civil war. Studying the example of Prieur allows for a better comprehension of Montagnard politics, in their limitations but also their possibilities and concrete achievements

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’augmentation du nombre de guerres irrégulières place les armées modernes dans une situation délicate. Pour pouvoir relever ce nouveau défi, ces organisations militaires, avant tout destinées à mener des guerres interétatiques, se doivent d’innover. Plusieurs cas historiques montrent comment, face à de nouvelles formes de conflit, certaines armées se sont lancées dans un processus d’innovation. Le cas de l’armée française en Algérie en est un. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment l’innovation a émergé lors du conflit, et comment elle s’est diffusée au sein de l’organisation militaire. Un survol de la stratégie française en Algérie va permettre de dégager trois principales innovations : La mise en place de la doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, la création des Sections Administratives Spécialisées et l’approche de David Galula. L’étude de ses trois cas nous montre que, durant la Guerre d’Algérie, l’innovation provenait principalement des militaires, plus précisément du sommet de la hiérarchie. Cependant, certains exemples d’innovation par le bas existent. Dans ces cas-là, la diffusion se fera via la doctrine informelle. L’exemple de Galula nous prouve néanmoins qu’une innovation se diffuse beaucoup plus difficilement lorsqu’elle émane des hommes de terrain.
During the last decades, the increasing number of irregular wars brought the modern armies into a delicate situation. In order to overcome this new challenge, these military organizations primarily designed for interstate wars had to innovate. Many historical cases show how certain armies have launched into innovation processes because of new forms of conflict. The case of the French army in Algeria is a good example. The main goal of this paper is to understand how innovation has emerged during the conflict, and how it has diffused within the military organization. A glance at the French strategy in Algeria will allow us to highlight three main innovations: the development of the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine, the creation of “Sections Administratives Specialisées, and the David Galula approach. The analysis of these three study cases shows that innovation came mainly from militaries during the Algerian war, particularly those on top of the hierarchy. However, certain examples of bottom-up innovations do exist. In these cases, diffusion will take place via the informal doctrine. Nevertheless, the Galula example demonstrates that an innovation will diffuse with more difficulty when it comes from people on the ground.