Relevant bibliographies by topics / Future contingents (Logic)

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Future contingents (Logic)'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 4 March 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Future contingents (Logic).'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Future contingents (Logic)"

1

Akama, Seiki, Yasunori Nagata, and Chikatoshi Yamada. "Three-Valued Temporal Logic Q t and Future Contingents." Studia Logica 88, no. 2 (February 28, 2008): 215–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9102-0.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Akama, Seiki, Tetsuya Murai, and Yasuo Kudo. "Partial and paraconsistent approaches to future contingents in tense logic." Synthese 193, no. 11 (September 16, 2015): 3639–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0905-z.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Schoubye, Anders J., and Brian Rabern. "Against the Russellian Open Future." Mind 126, no. 504 (January 23, 2017): 1217–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv189.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form ‘will()’, that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd’s analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further controversial semantical or metaphysical complication. In this paper, we will show that this quasi-Russellian analysis of ‘will’ both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. In particular, we show that the standard arguments for Russell's treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form ‘will()’.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Todd, Patrick. "The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution." Synthese 197, no. 11 (October 9, 2018): 5051–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01959-z.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Various philosophers have long since been attracted to the doctrine that future contingent propositions systematically fail to be true—what is sometimes called the doctrine of the open future. However, open futurists have always struggled to articulate how their view interacts with standard principles of classical logic—most notably, with the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). For consider the following two claims: (a) Trump will be impeached tomorrow; (b) Trump will not be impeached tomorrow. According to the kind of open futurist at issue, both of these claims may well fail to be true. According to many, however, the disjunction of these claims can be represented as p ∨ ~p—that is, as an instance of LEM. In this essay, however, I wish to defend the view that the disjunction these claims cannot be represented as an instance of p ∨ ~p. And this is for the following reason: the latter claim is not, in fact, the strict negation of the former. More particularly, there is an important semantic distinction between the strict negation of the first claim [~(Trump will be impeached tomorrow)] and the latter claim (Trump will not be impeached tomorrow). However, the viability of this approach has been denied by Thomason (Theoria 36:264–281, 1970), and more recently by MacFarlane (Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) and Cariani and Santorio (Mind 127:129–165. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzw004, 2017), the latter of whom call the denial of the given semantic distinction “scopelessness”. According to these authors, that is, will is “scopeless” with respect to negation; whereas there is perhaps a syntactic distinction between ‘~Will p’ and ‘Will ~p’, there is no corresponding semantic distinction. And if this is so, the approach in question fails. In this paper, then, I criticize the claim that will is “scopeless” with respect to negation. I argue that will is a so-called “neg-raising” predicate—and that, in this light, we can see that the requisite scope distinctions aren’t missing, but are simply being masked. The result: a under-appreciated solution to the problem of future contingents that sees (a) and (b) as contraries, not contradictories.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Malone-France, Derek. "Between Hartshorne and Molina: A Whiteheadian Conception of Divine Foreknowledge." Process Studies 39, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 129–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/44799098.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract The doctrine of inerrant divine "middle knowledge" of future contingent events, first developed by the sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, has resurfaced as a prominent position within contemporary debates over divine foreknowledge, creaturely freedom, and the ontological status of possibilities. As yet, the only substantive response to the new Molinism from a process perspectiv has come in a brief section on "Hartshorne and the Challenge of Molinism," in an essay on Hartshorne’s view of "The Logic of Future Contingents" by George W. Shields and Donald W. Viney, in Shields’ edited anthology Process and Analysis. Shields and Viney offer an insightful critique of Molinism. However, their use of Hartshorne’s understanding of possibility presents problems for those, like me, who prefer Whitehead’s more robustly realist notion of eternal objects. Here, I defend Whitehead’s Platonism from the main lines of criticism leveled against it by Hartshorne, while demonstrating that a "thick" conception of the objective content of the possible within the context of the divine understanding need not cross over into a deterministic conception of God’s foreknowledge, à la Molina.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bărbat, Boldur E. "DOMINO: Trivalent Logic Semantics in Bivalent Syntax Clothes." International Journal of Computers Communications & Control 2, no. 4 (April 1, 2007): 303. http://dx.doi.org/10.15837/ijccc.2007.3.2362.

Full text
Abstract:
The paper describes a rather general software mechanism developed primarily for decision making in dynamic and uncertain environments (typical application: managing overbooking). DOMINO (Decision-Oriented Mechanism for "IF" as Non-deterministic Operator) is meant to deal with undecidability due to any kind of future contingents. Its description here is self-contained but, since a validation is underway within a much broader undertaking involving agent-oriented software, to impair redundancy, several aspects explained in very recent papers are here abridged. In essence, DOMINO acts as an "IF" with enhanced semantics: it can answer "YES", "NO" or "UNDECIDABLE in the time span given" (it renders control to an exception handler). Despite its trivalent logic semantics, it respects the rigours of structural programming and the syntax of bivalent logic (it is programmed in plain C++ to be applicable to legacy systems too). As for most novel approaches, expectations are high, involving a less algorithmic, less probabilistic, less difficult to understand method to treat undecidability in dynamic and uncertain environments, where postponing decisions means keeping open alternatives (to react better to rapid environment changes).
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Feldhay, Rivka. "Knowledge and Salvation in Jesuit Culture." Science in Context 1, no. 2 (September 1987): 195–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269889700000363.

Full text
Abstract:
The ArgumentIn this paper, I argue that the most significant contribution of the Jesuits to early modern science (via Galileo) consists in the introduction of a new “image of knowledge.”In contradistinction to traditional Scholasticism, this image of knowledge allows for the possibility of a science (i. e. certain knowledge) of hypothetical entities.This problem became crucial in two specific areas. In astronomy, knowledge of mathematical entities of unclear ontological status (like epicycles and eccentrics) was nevertheless proclaimed certain. In theology, God's knowledge of the future acts of man, logically considered as future contingents, was also proclaimed certain. In both cases the concept of certain knowledge of hypothetical entities was problematic and challenged a central premise of the accepted canons of logic, i.e., that the objects of true knowledge (“scientia”) must be real objects.The main argument of this paper is that the practical orientation of the Jesuit cultural milieu enabled Jesuit scientists and theologians to ignore accepted logical considerations and to modify traditional Thomist images of knowledge. Nevertheless, this modification was not so radical as to change the contemporary organization of knowledge. This was due to the peculiar status of the Jesuits within the church establishment, which exposed them to harsh criticism and created a deep need for legitimation. Thus, the limitations of Jesuit scientific culture are accounted for in institutional, rather than in logical terms.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Morris-Reich, Amos. "Georg Simmel’s Logic of the Future: ‘The Stranger’, Zionism, and ‘Bounded Contingency’." Theory, Culture & Society 36, no. 5 (April 10, 2019): 71–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276419839117.

Full text
Abstract:
For reasons that have more to do with the historiographical traditions of modern Jewish history and the history of critical thought than history itself, Georg Simmel – of Jewish descent – is rarely discussed within the frame of modern Jewish history. Bringing the two together as a theoretical contribution to Simmel studies and modern Jewish history alike, this article explores Simmel’s logic of contingency in the context of modern Jewish history. Which forms and types could Jews realistically seek to fulfill from the perspective of Simmel’s thought? Which could they hope to escape and what could they expect from the future? The author suggests that in answering these questions we disclose a peculiar notion of ‘bounded contingency’ embedded in Simmel’s positing of a non-binary, ‘gray area’ between the necessary and the impossible. This hypothesis is tested in several distinct contexts: a letter on Zionism from around 1900; an odd passage on love in the excursus on ‘The Stranger’ (1908); and a letter on individuals of Jewish background in German academia (1906). Simmel’s coherency lies in the ‘realist’ approach he adopts to reality as the domain of the contingently possible. When applied to Jewish history in general and Zionism in particular, this notion not only explains why Zionism is unfeasible but also demystifies its emergence as an attempt to escape the status of stranger in Europe. It also evinces why this Jewish national enterprise inevitably carried within it the seeds of the problem it sought to solve.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Øhrstrøm, Peter, and David Jakobsen. "William of Ockham on Future Contingency." KronoScope 18, no. 2 (September 18, 2018): 138–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685241-12341413.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractIn his philosophy, William of Ockham (1285-1347) offered an important and detailed response to the classical argument from the truth of a statement regarding the future to the necessity (unpreventability) of the statement. In this paper, Ockham’s solution and the possible formalisation of it are discussed in terms of modern tense and modal logic. In particular, the famous branching time formalisation suggested by A. N. Prior (1914-19) is discussed. Weaknesses and problems with this suggestion are pointed out, and an alternative formalisation of Ockham’s solution without the use of branching time is presented.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Fernandes, Aline, Martin Spring, and Monideepa Tarafdar. "Coordination in temporary organizations." International Journal of Operations & Production Management 38, no. 6 (June 4, 2018): 1340–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-02-2017-0097.

Full text
Abstract:
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore intra-firm coordination in temporary organizations (TOs). Specifically, it identifies and explains how operational coordination evolves over time in a particular TO: the 2016 Olympic Games Organizing Committee.Design/methodology/approachThis is an immersive case study based on qualitative analysis and longitudinal fieldwork, which allowed the observation of operational coordination in real time. The main sources of data are participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and internal documents of the TO.FindingsThe findings suggest that operational coordination in TOs dealing with multiple and decentralized operations takes place through the combination of both formal and informal coordination mechanisms. Further analysis indicates a contingency logic in using these mechanisms, shaped by the presence of specific coordination challenges in different phases of work. Three main aspects influencing coordination are explored. First, it is suggested that TOs are inherently “hybrid.” That is, they comprise enduring as well as temporary and centralized as well as decentralized elements. These elements change over time. Second, a formal transition phase is explored: “venueization” – a phase between planning and operation in which centralized structural elements and processes are translated to operational units. Third, since TOs present emergence and dynamism, and related challenges across various phases of work, coordination is arguably contingent on the phase of the project.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the findings are limited to a particular empirical context, this paper offers theoretically new insights concerning the hybrid nature of processes in TOs, the contingent use of complementary coordination mechanisms, and the importance of the venueization phase, and provides a basis for future research into operational coordination in TOs.Practical implicationsThe findings can help practitioners understand and identify the challenges embedded in temporary contexts and develop coordination strategies accordingly.Originality/valueThis study explains how operational coordination takes place in TOs enabled by formal and informal mechanisms, which are contingently combined over time through particular coordination strategies.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Future contingents (Logic)"

1

Oliveira, Carlos Eduardo de. "A realidade e seus signos: as proposições sobre o futuro contingente e a predestinação divina na lógica de Guilherme de Ockham." Universidade de São Paulo, 2006. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-08012008-100954/.

Full text
Abstract:
A \"Exposição de Guilherme de Ockham para o Perihermenias de Aristóteles (i.e., o Sobre a Interpretação)\" traz um problema para \"a verdade os teólogos\": de acordo com Aristóteles, a proposição hipotética que contém um par de contraditórias sobre a mesma coisa futura e contingente não é verdadeira nem falsa de modo determinado - uma vez que nenhuma de suas contraditórias é verdadeira ou falsa de modo determinado. Sendo assim, antes que aquilo que é enunciado aconteça, ninguém pode saber com certeza a verdade ou a falsidade de proposições sobre o futuro contingente. Os teólogos, entretanto, não podem admitir essa conclusão: a revelação nos diz que Deus sabe, com toda certeza e desde a eternidade, que parte da contradição será determinadamente verdadeira ou falsa. Para Ockham, a solução desse problema parece conter desde uma abordagem especial da formulação lógica desta questão até o reconhecimento de uma certa limitação do conhecimento humano. É a análise dessa solução o que pretendemos mostrar no trabalho que se segue.
The \"William of Ockham\'s Exposition on the \'Perihermenias\' of Aristotle (i.e., the Aristotelian De Interpretatione)\" brings a problem \"to the truth and to the theologians\": according to Aristotle, the hypothetical proposition which contains a pair of contradictories related to the same future contingent thing is neither determinately true nor determinately false - once none of their contradictories are neither determinately true nor determinately false. Therefore, before that thing happens, nobody can know with certainty the truth or the falsity of any proposition about future contingent things. Theologians, however, cannot accept this conclusion: the faith teaches that God knows, with certainty and from eternity, which part of that pair of contradictories is determinately true or determinately false. In Ockham\'s view, the solution of this argument seems to pass by a special approach of the logical view of this question and by the assumption of limits for the human knowledge. It\'s on the analysis of this solution that the present work is related.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Rossi, Niccolo' <1995&gt. "Trivalenza e futuri contingenti: Nell'opera di Jan Łukasiewicz e Arthur Prior." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/15457.

Full text
Abstract:
Aristotele in De Interpretatione IX si interroga sulla questione dei futuri contingenti. Egli credeva nell'indeterminatezza del futuro, contro il megarico Diodoro, che difendeva una posizione necessitarista. In una prima sezione, dopo aver introdotto tale dibattito, analizzeremo nel dettaglio l'opera di Jan Łukasiewicz, autore che si confronta direttamente con lo Stagirita. In primo luogo, tratteremo la sua logica trivalente, la quale nasce con lo scopo di trovare un valore di verità ulteriore rispetto al vero e al falso, così da giustificare l’indeterminatezza del futuro: il possibile. In un secondo momento, analizzeremo la sua logica modale, dove il possibile non è un valore di verità, ma un modo di darsi di alcune particolari proposizioni. Nella seconda sezione, analizzeremo l’opera di Arthur Prior, la quale si pone in continuità con quella del logico polacco. Egli è considerato l'inventore della logica temporale, che considera le proposizioni come dotate di un valore di verità variabile nel tempo. Approfondiremo alcuni dei sistemi formali elaborati dall’autore, costituiti in primo luogo per trattare gli enti contingenti e rifiutare la tesi diodorea. Nell’ultima sezione introdurremo alcune proposte contemporanee di logica temporale trivalente, enfatizzando così il fil rouge che lega le prime due sezioni. Nel corso di tutta la trattazione si presterà particolare attenzione al valore che il principio del terzo escluso assume nei vari autori di riferimento.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Future contingents (Logic)"

1

Temporal logic, omniscience, human freedom: Perspectives in analytic philosophy. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1991.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

N, Fotion, and Heller Jan Christian, eds. Contingent future persons: On the ethics of deciding who will live, or not, in the future. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Dvořák, Petr. Logika onticky neurčitých domén: Jsou logické pravdy nahodilé? Praha: Togga, spol. s r.o., 2016.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Craig, William Lane. Divine foreknowledge and human freedom: The coherence of theism : omniscience. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Thomas, Buckingham. Thomas Buckingham and The contingency of futures: The possibility of human freedom : a study and edition of Thomas Buckingham, "De contingentia futurorum et arbitrii libertate" : Question 1 of Ostensio meriti liberae actionis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Genest, Jean François. Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine. Paris: J. Vrin, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

-1358, Gregory of Rimini, ed. Necessità e contingenza in Gregorio da Rimini. Pisa: ETS, 2011.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Holkot, Robertus. Seeing the future clearly: Questions on future contingents. Edited by Streveler Paul A. 1943-, Tachau Katherine H, and Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. 1995.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

The quarrel over future contingents (Louvain, 1465-1475): Unpublished texts. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Walter Chatton on Future Contingents: Between Formalism and Ontology. BRILL, 2017.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Future contingents (Logic)"

1

Akama, Seiki, Kazumi Nakamatsu, and Jair Minoro Abe. "Some Three-Valued Temporal Logics for Future Contingents." In Studies in Computational Intelligence, 351–61. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00909-9_34.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Todd, Patrick, and Brian Rabern. "Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience." In The Open Future, 148–80. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192897916.003.0008.

Full text
Abstract:
Perhaps one of the chief objections to open future views is that they must deny a principle we may call “Retro-closure”: roughly, if something is the case, then it was the case that it would be the case. Certain theorists, however—supervaluationists and relativists—have attempted to maintain both the open future view, and Retro-closure. In this chapter, the author argues (with Brian Rabern) that this combination of views is untenable: we must take our pick between the open future and Retro-closure. They argue that this combination of views results either in an unacceptable form of changing the past, or instead implausibly rules out the (former) existence of an omniscient being. In the appendix to this chapter, Todd argues that we can plausibly do without the Retro-closure principle, and that the principle, while intuitive, is not nearly so obvious as many have seemed to suppose.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

"Ammonius on future contingent propositions." In Ancient Logic, Language, and Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Falcon and Pierdaniele Giaretta, 195–218. First [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Issues in ancient philosophy: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429273827-10.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

"Indeterminism and Future Contingency in non-Classical Logics." In Studies on the History of Logic, 383–96. De Gruyter, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110903829-028.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Gordon, Geoff. "The Time of Contingency in International Law." In Contingency in International Law, 162–74. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898036.003.0010.

Full text
Abstract:
The normative affirmation that international law could have been otherwise upholds material commitments to an actually-existing distribution of goods, which international law supports. To make this clear, this chapter begins by sketching a larger context by which the contingency of international law can be made legible. The larger context here pertains to a Western humanist tradition, following which international law relies on contingency to sustain a humanist fantasy of a temporal economic actor. The humanist fantasy includes an emancipatory pretension to political pre-eminence that is inscribed in its temporality, but at odds with its material, economic underpinnings. The pretension to pre-eminence corresponds historically with an ascendant normative regime that has succeeded as an economic programme but continuously failed as an emancipatory one. The frustrated emancipatory project is a complementary counterpart to the successful economic one. The former persists not despite but on the basis of failure and contradiction: in the face of historical failure, international law always already contains within itself the normative solution; its past failures are proof of future successes, a source of assurance and self-affirmation. When political ideals fail, specific temporal logics entangled with international law enable an affirmation of the subject who maintains those failed ideals, for no other reason than persisting as the same idealistic subject in the same material system that produced the failure. As a result, international legal practice redirects energy for social objectives into subjective self-affirmation, leaving other forces at work for political purposes.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Future contingents (Logic)' for particular source types:
Journal articles Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography