Journal articles on the topic 'Gamal Abdel Naser'

Some years ago, a colleague from another institution told me how much she was looking forward to screening Nasser 56 in her introductory Middle East history course. Students had just finished reading about the Nasser era, and the screening of Muhamad Fadel's stylish biopic starring the charismatic film star Ahmed Zaki would serve as an enjoyable way to round out the unit. I was surprised, not at my colleague's use of the film in her class, but at her timing. Released in 1996, Nasser 56 is very much the product of the Mubarak era. It offers rich opportunities to discuss the particular challenges Egypt faced in the 1990s and how this nostalgic look back at a triumphant moment in Gamal Abdel Nasser's (Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir's) presidency was marshalled to animate an economically and politically fraught period. Its celebration of ʿAbd al-Nasir as an effective and caring patriarch to the nation could be interpreted as an endorsement of Egypt's authoritarian political system. However, the film is less useful as an explication of ʿAbd al-Nasir as a political figure, or of 1950s Egypt.

Gamal Abdel Naser’s Regime and the Genesis of the First Wave of Liberalization in EgyptThe aim of this article is to analyse the origins of the first wave of economic liberalization in Egypt. This paper refers to the historical period preceding the fundamental change of economic policy initiated by Anwar as-Sadat in the 1970s, analysing the causes of delegitimation of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime (1952–1970). The author characterizes the mechanisms of consolidation of the authoritarian rule, describes the main pillars of power, and analyses Nasser’s economic reforms (statism and central planning), including their social consequences.

Este artigo explora a influência do líder egípcio Gamal Abdel Nasser na América Latina. Na década de 1950, uma geração de intelectuais e políticos latino-americanos viram, no sucesso do emergente nacionalismo árabe, simbolizado por Nasser, um exemplo a imitar. No Panamá, a nacionalização egípcia do Canal de Suez, em 1956, desencadeou nova onda de demandas contra o controle e a posse do canal interoceânico pelos Estados Unidos. Em toda a região, frente ao aparecimento de regimes reacionários, intelectuais de esquerda enfatizaram a necessidade de um Nasser latino-americano; um caudilho moderno, que emergiria do interior das Forças Armadas imbuído de potente nacionalismo sem concessões e compromisso inegociável com o progresso social.

Three years ago, the film Nasser 56 (1996), from Muhammad Fadil, a dramatic reenactment of the Suez crisis, set unprecedented attendance records in Egypt. Opening at the end of another disappointing year marked by a steady decline in studio film production and a dearth of high-quality offerings—and held back from public screening a full year by wavering government support—the film breathed new life into the movie industry and precipitated a national discussion about the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The film has come and gone from Cairo theaters (although screenings abroad continue), but Nasser 56 will remain a historic film. In dramatic fashion, it broke a long-accepted taboo against cinematic depiction of modern political leaders. It is also the first serious attempt at film biography by an Egyptian filmmaker in thirty years.

Abstract The article examines the impact of cultural structures on journalistic story telling. It argues that the mass media can be understood in neofunctionalist terms as a subsystem of civil society. Mass media discourses are therefore responsive to the cultural forms shaping civil discourse. At the core of American media discourse is a set of binary codes that specify civic virtues and vices. These codes provide the foundation from which more complex narrative forms are constructed in the American mass media. The proposed model of codes and narratives is briefly applied in a comparative analysis of American mass media interpretations of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 1956 Suez crisis, and Saddam Hussein and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. (Sociology)

The history of Egypt and Israel consists of four wars and hundreds of border incidents that have taken the lives of tens of thousands of people. It seems that only the rise to power of a leader in the stature of Anwar Sadat could put an end to this bloody circle, because the previous president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was not willing to hold any kind of political contact with Israel. But Nasser’s reign involved constant political contact between Egypt and Israel, most of whom remain confidential. This article attempts to examine whether any of these contacts were likely to succeed and yield a peace treaty between the two countries, an agreement that could have prevented three wars and saved the lives of so many people on both sides. It will do so by examining these contacts, their characteristics, and the reasons for their failure, while dividing them into three periods: the 1948 war to the 1956 war, the 1956 war to the 1967 war, and the 1967 war to the death of Nasser in 1970.

Drawing on documents and memoirs in Russian and Arabic, this article tells the unknown story of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the early phases of the Yemeni Civil War, a war that broke out while much of the world's attention was focused on the Cuban missile crisis and the war between India and Pakistan. Egypt's fateful decision to intervene in the conflict was dependent on substantial Soviet backing, which strengthened the relationship between the USSR and Gamal Abdel Nasser's government in Egypt. In response to a plea from Nasser, Nikita Khrushchev authorized the military transport branch of the Soviet Air Force to embark on a clandestine airlift operation ferrying Egyptian troops into Yemen to shore up the new government there.

In the late 1950s and the 1960s, an Egyptian welfare state was developed to provide the economic basis of a new social contract between the Nasser regime and its key class allies. Its main beneficiaries were the men and women of both the middle class and the labor aristocracy, who were to staff and run its expanding state sector. For Egyptian women, who were scorned by the pre-1952 states, the new welfare state offered explicit commitment to public equality for women. It contributed to the development of state feminism as a legal, economic, and ideological strategy to introduce changes to Egyptian society and its gender relations. In its own turn, state feminism contributed to the political legitimacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime and its progressive credentials.

Abstract In this article, I examine the politicization of natural resources like water and land, and the wider entanglement of environments and politics, in Egyptian cinematic imaginaries. I focus on Youssef Chahine’s film al-Ard (The land, 1969) and its politicization of agricultural land during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–1970) and the British colonial occupation of Egypt (1882–1956). Because histories of colonialism and nationalism in the Arab world are rooted in the economic and political exploitation of material resources (including land, water, and people), I draw on eco-criticism as a method of critical reading to analyze the film’s depictions of these configurations of political power and resource management. I argue that al-Ard roots its depiction of the resistance of the Egyptian peasantry (fellahin) in environmental terms, namely, restrictions to resource access and the affective relationships of the peasants to the land. By tracing these imbrications, I seek to relocate environmental concerns in scholarship on political resistance with reference to Nasser-era cinema.

This paper attempts to provide a conceptualization of Egypt’s current predicaments by process-tracing historical critical junctures and sequences of causal mechanisms that contributed to bringing about the January 2011 events. Focusing on the period between the July 1952 Revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the events of 2011, it traces the developments and changing political and strategic trajectories of the three presidents Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The case of Egypt is examined here as ‘an instance of a class of events’ focusing on phenomena related to the tracing of causal factors or critical junctures, and mechanisms leading to a particular outcome on 25 January 2011. It further links the uprising to that country’s 1979 ‘Peace Treaty’ with Israel. This treaty ‘de-securitized’ the latter, allowing it significant regional freedom of action. This had a causal effect on challenging Egypt’s identity-motivated action, contributing, in the process, to undermining its identity structure. An increasing awareness among many Egyptians of the link between the treaty and their identity formation is one of the main reasons for summoning the legacy of Nasser’s leadership as a source of ‘ontological security’.

This article shows that for two years prior to the June 1967 Six-Day Mideast War, Soviet-Egyptian relations had begun to fray because the Soviet Union wanted to loosen its ties with radical regimes in the Third World, including Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soviet leaders urged Nasser to reform the Egyptian economy, decrease Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, and allow the Soviet Navy unfettered access to Egyptian ports. But like numerous other small powers during the Cold War, Egypt was able to fend off the pressure of its superpower ally. In May 1967, when Egypt unilaterally decided to bring its forces into the Sinai, Soviet leaders were divided over how to respond to the crisis that engulfed the Middle East. In the end, the more cautious faction in Moscow prevailed, and the Soviet government continued to be wary of becoming embroiled in conflicts initiated by radical Third World regimes.

Can labor emigration form part of a state’s foreign policy goals? The relevant literature links emigration to states’ developmental needs, which does not explain why some states choose to economically subsidize their citizens’ emigration. This article explores for the first time the soft power importance of high-skilled emigration from authoritarian emigration states. It finds that the Egyptian state under Gamal Abdel Nasser employed labor emigration for two distinct purposes linked to broader soft power interests: first, as an instrument of cultural diplomacy to spread revolutionary ideals of Arab unity and anti-imperialism across the Middle East; second, as a tool for disseminating development aid, particularly in Yemen and sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on Arabic and non-Arabic primary sources, the article identifies the interplay between foreign policy and cross-border mobility, while also sketching an evolving research agenda on authoritarian emigration states’ policy-making.

Gamal Abdel Nasser established the praetorian regime in 1952. Nasser ruled Egypt with the ‘party-state’ system to maintain the ‘social contract’ between the state and the Egyptians. The government thrived on the patrimonial relationship and de-politicization of the population. The ‘Egyptian upheaval’ in 2011 sought the protection of individuals’ rights, equality, and freedom against the military-led praetorian regime. A short-democratic experiment led to the arrival of Islamist majority rule in Egypt under the leadership of President Mohammed Morsi. The liberal-secular oppositions and the military removed President Morsi because Islamists failed to achieve the protesters’ aspirations. Egyptians supported the military’s rule that led to the election of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi as President of Egypt. Fatah al-Sisi shifted the dynamics of government from ‘party-state’ to ‘ruler-arbiter’ praetorian rule that centralized the authority and power under his leadership through military domination to counter the Islamists and revolutionary aspirations. The research explains the causality behind the Egyptian military's intervention in politics, structuring of the praetorian regime in Egypt; the return of military praetorianism after the removal of President Hosni Mubarak; the rise of the Sisi as ‘ruler-arbiter’ and its implications on the democratization process. The paper’s method is explanatory to study the ‘structural’ (military) and ‘agential’ (Sisi’s rule) factors to determine the causes of establishing the praetorian ‘ruler-arbiter’ type Sisi’s regime. The approach to examine the ruler-arbiter phenomenon is the ‘actor-centric’ instead of the ‘mechanistic’ to understand the praetorian rule in Egypt. The research finds that the rise of the ‘ruler-arbiter’ regime under the leadership of the Sisi, caused by the military-established praetorian authority and President Sisi's choices and decisions, led to the failure of the democratization in Egypt.

The Egyptian artist Inji Efflatoun (1924-1989) is widely recognized as a major avant-garde figure in Egyptian modernist history as well as a feminist activist who petitioned for women’s suffrage, amendments to family law, and for worker’s rights. Perhaps most famously, she was among the first cohort of women to be arrested as a political prisoner; she served a four-year sentence under President Gamal Abdel Nasser for her work with the Egyptian Communist Party (1959-1963). Most scholarship on Efflatoun has followed the artist’s autobiographical narrative in treating the artist’s dual activities – political action and artistic practice – as essentially opposed. This essay proposes an adjustment to this frame, arguing instead for recognizing the artist’s theoretically-informed response to gendered somatophobia (fear of the body) as a central aspect of both commitments. The essay examines the darkness of Efflatoun’s early surrealist paintings as a pairing with the «white light» of her 1970s paintings, thereby revealing the artist’s ongoing inquiry into possibilities for kinship based on copresence rather than appearance.

Al-Azhar, traditionally Egypt's most respected and influential center for Islamic study, adopted an increasingly bold platform opposing Egyptian government policy throughout the mid-1990s. Al-Azhar defied government policy on a variety of sensitive issues, including population control, the practice of clitoridectomy, and censorship rights. Moreover, al-Azhar directly challenged the government in high-profile forums such as the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in September of 1994. This open opposition was remarkable in light of the tremendous capacity that the Egyptian government has shown in the past to manipulate and control al-Azhar. Over the past century, and particularly since the 1952 Free Officers' coup, the Egyptian government virtually incorporated al-Azhar as an arm of the state through purges and control over Azhar finances, and by gaining the power to appoint al-Azhar's key leadership. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak all benefited from this dominance over al-Azhar by securing fatwas legitimating their policies. Given this overwhelming leverage, what can explain al-Azhar's increased opposition to the government throughout the mid-1990s?

Over the past sixty years, contemporary Arab political history has witnessed two significant shifts, each of which has resulted in enormous social, economic, cultural, and ideological transformations. The experience of the Arab world is not unique; rather, it is part of the contemporary “world story” in general, and experience of “the societies of the South” in particular, despite the uniqueness of the Arab experience, in general, and the experience of individual country. This review reconstructs the Arab experience since the early 1950s and distinguishes two historical stages economically, politically, and ideologically. The first stage is the era of decolonization and the rise of Arab socialism (1952–70); the second stage is the era of globalization of colonialism or neoliberal capitalism (1980–2011), which in the opinion of the author is responsible for the unfolding of events in the Arab world since the end of 2010. The goal of this comparison is intended as political and historical criticism of the current Arab condition. Comparing and contrasting both stages, and reconsidering the model and experience presented by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, it is concluded that the Arab nation is facing the choice between two critical options: socialism or neoliberal barbarism.

Gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin yang didirikan di Mesir tahun 1928 oleh Hassan Al-Banna dipersepsikan oleh sebagian penulis barat sebagai gerakan yang mengusung politik fundamentalisme Islam, yaitu sebuah gerakan yang menegaskan kembali kewajiban mendirikan Negara Islam serta penolakan terhadap pengaruh budaya, politik, dan ekonomi barat. Ikhwanul Muslimin juga dinilai telah melakukan politisasi agama, sangat agresif terhadap non Islam sekaligus umat Islam yang mengadopsi gaya hidup barat., melakukan praktek kekerasan dalam melaksanakan tuuan-tujuan politiknya, mengkafirkan para penguasa, dan melakukan praktek dinas rahasia dalam mencapai tujuan-tujuan politiknya. Persepsi politik fundamentalisme Ikhwanul Muslimin semakin diperkuat lagi dengan sebuah tindakan nyata, yaitu aksi penggulingan terhadap kekuasaan Monarki Mesir Pro Inggris tahun 1952. Tak cukup sampai di situ, Ikhwanul Muslimin juga pernah mengirim relawan jihad ke bumi Palestina tahun 1947 untuk membantu perjuangan rakyat Palestina melawan zionisme Yahudi. Cap fundamentalisme juga sempat dialamatkan oleh rezim Gamal Abdul Nasser yang berkuasa saat itu sehingga ia memasukan Ikhwanul Muslimin sebagai organisasi terlarang, bahkan para pemimpinnya dipenjarakan, disiksa, dan dieskekusi mati.

Three decades later, the circumstances that led to the Arab–Israeli war of June 1967 bare again the subject of scholarly attention as the end of the Cold War and the release of official documents in the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and Israel have allowed surviving participants to compare notes and made possible the detailed reconstruction of decision-making in those states. Much of this historiography has focused on the critical two months immediately preceding the start of hostilities, giving rise to broad agreement that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser “stumbled into the crisis rather than provoking it deliberately,” through miscalculation and ill-advised brinkmanship. However, there is still no consensus regarding the relationship between Nasser's decisions in spring 1967 and his policy toward Israel in the preceding three years, partly because the dearth of official documents from the Egyptian side has made it difficult to substantiate his real intentions and “historicize” his crisis behavior. Most recent studies tend to skim over the earlier period, if they cover it at all, or now accept the view that Egyptian strategy before 1967 was essentially defensive, based on deterrence and containment, and that Nasser ultimately shifted course due to perceptions of threat that steadily heightened in the course of the previous three years due to the revival of the Arab “cold war,” fear of Israeli nuclear power, and deteriorating relations with the United States, all set against a background of the debilitating military entanglement in Yemen and economic malaise at home

The academic works on transition processes following the Arab revolts in the Middle East since the beginning of 2011 have so far mostly focused on the extraordinary character of the events which took place in Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi, etc. - attempting to explain the reasons for the in many ways surprising development in the region. This article analyses how strategic relations between the EU and Egypt are being challenged by constitutional changes in Egypt following the political development since early 2011. Initially the article describes European-Egyptian relations prior to the fall of President Hosni Mubarak by briefly going back to early contacts between the EEC and President Gamal Abdel Nasser and how more elaborate agreements developed up to recent times. Taking this historical point of departure the article characterizes the role of the EU in connection with the development since the start of the unrest in Egypt followed by an analysis of the European-Egyptian relationship over the last two years divided in three parts: Egypt and the ENP-UfM complex, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian political transformation process seen in a European perspective and finally the migration issue in the context of Egyptian-European relations. The article argues that the EU policies, which earlier have been dominated by a pragmatic approach towards the Mubarak regime, now have to be rethought considering an Egyptian polity, where the contours of a new constitutionalism are developing.

The main purpose of this article is to present the most important conditions and variables characterizing the role of the Middle East in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy in the 1970s, based on available literature and documentation. I also intend to analyze the conditions that contributed to intensifying Yugoslavia’s position in the region and led to a decrease in Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East in the second half of the decade. Firstly, I will describe Yugoslavia’s relations with the countries of the Middle East in 1970–1973, especially with Egypt, where Gamal Abdel Nasser, after his death, was succeeded by the country’s Vice President, Anwar Al-Sadat. It will also be important to shed light on the Yugoslav Government’s stance regarding the Middle East conflict from the point of view of the situation in Europe. Next, I will present the significance of the Yom Kippur War for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and its implications for Belgrade’s relations with Cairo and Tel-Aviv. Moreover, it will be extremely important to explain why Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East gradually diminished as of the middle of the decade. In addition, I will address the issue of Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito’s position toward the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fading of Yugoslavia’s interest in the region following Tito’s death and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the summary, I want to note that the period under analysis in Yugoslav-Middle Eastern relations was decisive for the country’s foreign policy and its internal situation, as Yugoslavia never again played a significant role in the Arab world.

Analisa Potensi Geografis Timur Tengah Menjadi Kekuatan Teritori Melalui Komik Digital Berlandaskan Paradigma Pedagogi Reflektif telah menjawab tantangan era Revolusi Industri 4.0 menjadi peluang. Tujuan penelitian ini ialah 1)menganalisis potensi geografis Timur Tengah menjadi kekuatan teritori ; 2)menguraikan komik digital berlandaskan paradigma pedagogi reflektif. Metode yang digunakan adalah penelitian kualitatif yang menggambarkan tentang kegiatan atau informasi tentang kondisi kelas yang sedang berlangsung. Data penelitian dikumpulkan melalui observasi dengan teknik cuplikan yang dikenal dengan purposive sampling. Sampel yang digunakan adalah salah satu informan untuk mendapatkan informasi mengenai media yang tepat. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa 1) Banyak pelopor nasionalisme Arab yang memiliki misi menyelamatkan bangsanya terbebas dari tradisi yang terlalu konservatif untuk tetap memajukan bangsa serta terbebas dari penetrasi asing diantaranya Sultan Abdul Hamid II(Turki), Al-Tahtawi (Mesir), Muhammad Rashid Rida (Syria), Mustafa Kemal Ataturkh (Turki), Gammal Abdul Nasser (Mesir). Selain gagasan para nasionalis wilayah lain yang merasakan pengaruh asing yang kuat langsung bereaksi dengan membuat ketetapan netralitas dengan tidak memihak blok manapun yang memiliki kepentingan. Namun, ada pengecualian untuk Arab Saudi dimana AS tetap bekerjasama dalam bidang ekonomi dan terbukti dengan adanya perusahaan asing ARAMCO (Arabia American Company Oil) dan ini dirasa lebih menguntukan dari pada menempatkan pangkalan militer asing.; 2) Frekuensi mahasiswa yang menguraikan analisa potensi geografis Timur Tengah menjadi kekuatan teritori melalui komik digital berlandaskan paradigma pedagogi reflektif ialah sebesar 30% atau sekitar 15 dari jumlah keseleuruhan mahasiswa 50, sedangkan topik lain (tokoh, konflik ideologi, konflik kepentingan barat, konflik perbatasan) mendapatkan porsi rata-rata seitar 10-20%.

Since the beginning of decolonization in Africa in the late 1950’s Arabcountries have found it necessary to re-establish links with Africa south ofthe Sahara. An Arab leader like Gamal Abdel Nasser argued in his Philosophyof the Revolution (1954) that Africa constitutes the second circle in Egypt’sthree concentric circles of identity. The other two were the Arab and theIslamic. Nasser’s preoccupation with what he and his fellow Arab nationalistscalled the “Israeli menace”, was another factor which drove him to seek alliesand friends in Africa. But Nasser was not the first Arab leader to establishclose relations with the Africans. The Magrebians and the Arabians to theeast also forged links with Africa in the years before the primacy of Europein African political life.The book under review is one of a series of studies that have come outin the last decade. What distinguishes this work from those before it is itsfocus and its authors. In the early 1970’s when the Afro-Arab caravan beganto move rapidly along the pathways of international politics, many Westernand Third World intellectuals and scholars began to examine the nature ofwhat was then believed by many as a new phenomenon in international politics.Africa and the Middle Eastern states coexisted in the Bandung Movement;they journeyed together to the United Nations General Assembly, but up untilthe mid-1970’s closer bonds, which resulted in the greater coordination ofpolicies on major international issues, did not develop. In fact prior to the1973 massive defection of African states from the Israeli camp, most of theindependent African states were locked in diplomatic and political embracewith the Jewish state. Indeed, Africa was unique in the sense that it was theonly part of the Afro-Asian world where the Israelis received warm welcome.Israeli leaders tried hard to win friends and influence people in Asia but withoutsuccess. It is indeed against this background that the present book can beadequately reviewed.The work consists of the proceedings of a major conference held in Amman,Jordan on 24-29 April, 1983. Organized by the Centre for Arab UnityStudies, it brought together some sixty participants. Though the conferenceitself was conducted in Arabic, many of the participants suggested that theproceedings be published in English and French. This book is the English ...

In June 1959, Emperor Haile Sellassie of Ethiopia paid a visit to President Gamel Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, during which the two leaders aired matters of acute strategic importance. Several issues, some touching the very heart of ancient Ethiopian–Egyptian relations, were in the stages of culmination. These included a bitter dispute over the Nile waters (some four-fifths of the water reaching Egypt originates in Ethiopia1), the emergence of an Arab-inspired Eritrean movement, Egyptian support of Somali irredentism, the Ethiopian alliance with Israel, the future of Pan-African diplomacy, and Soviet and American influences.2 Both leaders did their best to publicly ignore their conflicts. They were able to use a rich, though polarized, reservoir of mutual images in their speeches to emphasize the dimensions of old neighborliness and affinity.3 In a joint announcement issued during the farewell party of 28 June, they even underlined a common policy of non-alignment. Though they hinted at the issues mentioned earlier in all their public speeches, they refrained from referring to one culminating historical drama.4 On that very same day, in the main Coptic church of Cairo, the Egyptian Coptic Patriarch Kyrillos VI had ceremonially appointed the head of the Ethiopian church, Abuna Baselyos, as a patriarch in the presence of Haile Sellassie and Egyptian officials. In so doing, he declared the Orthodox Ethiopian church autocephalous, and for the first time since the early 4th century, the Ethiopian church had become independent of the Egyptian church.

The article analyzes the role of the Egyptian military-political elite on the eve of the Revolution of 1952, when the military came to power, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The study of the history and activities of the organization «Free Officers» is hardly possible without considering the evolution of the national-patriotic and political movements in the Egyptian army. During the second quarter of the 20 th century the Egyptian society experienced fairly turbulent and eventful political process that influenced the further development of the country. At present the study of role of army in liberation movement in the Middle East is extremely urgent since military structures have become the base of the state system of many Arabic countries. The army has sufficiently influenced to the political development of the states. In connection with the recent transformations in the Middle East, that witnessed crises of political systems and statehood, the consideration of military elites, their coming to power and impact on a political system is important for the study of the general issues of the Middle East.The author considers the factors which influenced the evolutionary transformation of the Egyptian military before and after the World War II, as well as the social origins of the officer corps. Moreover, the object of the study includes the entire period of the national liberation movement of the Egyptian people, when almost all segments of Egyptian society were involved in this struggle. An important aspect of this trend is that, in the run-up to the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the officers and the military elite became a more prepared and organized than other groups and was able to quickly and almost bloodlessly take power into their own hands.The article notes that it is impossible to solve urgent social problems and overcome economic backwardness without centralized strong leadership. While forming the Egyptian statehood and the Kingdom of Egypt, there were three centers of power – Wafd party led by Saad Zaghloul, the king and his supporters, as well as Great Britain, which retained control over Egypt. Given the absence of one center of power in the country, as well as the weakness and dependence of the existing ones, opposition movements with different views on the development of Egypt were created. The society of «Muslim Brotherhood» was one of them, eventually discrediting itself during its further development. «Free Officers» were able to establish themselves as a secret society, which ideologically did not belong to any political camp. Coherence, hierarchy and army solidarity became effective advantages in their struggle for power.

Gamal Abdel Nasser used his strong response to the 1956 Suez Canal crisis to elevate his political position within Egypt. However, Nasser and Egypt did not respond to European and Israeli aggression alone. World-wide political pressure caused the Suez Canal Crisis to serve as a turning point where French and British global dominance were surpassed by that of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, China also played a substantial role in aiding Egypt. In a recognition of Egypt’s analogical circumstances of ideological struggle versus imperial powers and out of a desire to establish stronger relations in the area, China used their state response to build stronger connections with both Nasser and Egypt. As a result of the Chinese response to the Suez Canal Crisis, the foundations were laid for more positive Chinese-Egyptian relations for the next several decades.

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir o papel funcional da política externa do não-alinhamento para as políticas de desenvolvimento econômico e militar de países periféricos durante a Guerra Fria. Para tanto, propõe-se um estudo de caso sobre a política externa do governo egípcio de Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970). Ao longo do texto, argumenta-se que a política externa “não alinhada” aos principais blocos da Guerra Fria representou um poderoso instrumento de barganha internacional por parte do governo egípcio entre os anos de 1955e de 1967. Para respaldar essa afirmação, o texto evidencia a relação existente entre, por um lado, as melhores condições externas para a viabilização dos programas internos de desenvolvimento e, por outro, as relações ambíguas cultivadas pelo governo Nasser com Estados Unidos e União Soviética. Tais relações, por sua vez, somente foram possíveis graças a um permanente jogo de compensações de ordem geopolítica que envolvia a capacidade do governo egípcio de intervir nos interesses regionais das duas superpotências.

This present work was carried out at the Energy Department of the Higher Institute of Technology of Mamou and at the Applied Energy Education and Research Laboratory of the Faculty of Sciences of the Gamal Abdel Nasser University of Conakry, Guinea. Given the solar energy potential available to the continent, Hybrid Photovoltaic Power Systems and Generating Sets could constitute a suitable technological solution for the supply of electrical energy in isolated sites. This study led to the following results: average unfavorable solar irradiation in June (4.16 kWh/m2.d); the building's electrical load balance is 254760 Wh/d; the sizing of the photovoltaic field (the type of panels chosen Cip-60-270, the peak power of the PV field 59435.420 Wp, the number of panels 220 including 2 in series and 110 in parallel); the C4000-48 type inverter-chargers, 62 in number to achieve a power of 40 nickel-cadmium 1.2 V type accumulators in series in 140 batteries connected in parallel, the voltage drop in the cables is between 0.01 and 0.02. The electrical diagram of the installation is done.

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkap kontestasi serta ideologi alternatif yang terdapat dalam novel Wanasitu Anni Imra’ah (WAI) karya Ihsan Abdul Qudus dengan menggunakan kerangka analisis Antonio Gramsci tentang sosiologi sastra. Gramsci melihat bahwa sastra merupakan situs konstetasi dan negosiasi ideologi. Pandangan tersebut berdasarkan pada gagasan bahwa sastra memiliki peran yang penting untuk mempertahankan atau melanggengkan tatanan sosial yang ada. Sebaliknya, sastra juga dapat berperan untuk meruntuhkan dominasi yang telah terbangun. Melalui karya sastra, pengarang berusaha memberikan alternatif ideologi yang dianggapnya sebagai solusi baik pada penguasa maupun kelompok subaltern. Dari hasil penelitian yang dilakukan, peneliti menemukan bahwa novel WAI hasil artikulasi berbagai macam ideologi pasca revolusi Mesir. Patriarki merupakan ideologi yang dipahami oleh kebanyakan masyarakat yang mana ideologi tersebut menjadi dasar dominasi laki-laki atas wanita. Disamping itu, banyak ideologi lain yang terdapat dalam novel WAI seperti islam, marxisme, hedonisme, kapitalisme, nasionalisme, dan kolonialisme. Kontestasi yang terjadi dalam novel WAI merupakan respon atas dominannya gerakan perempuan untuk mendapatkan posisi pada tingkat elit (kekuasaan). Hubungan antara ideologi dalam WAI, yaitu subordinatif, korelatif dan kontradiktif. Melalui novel WAI, pengarang berusaha menawarkan ideologi alternatif sebagai konter hegemoni terhadap dominasi patriarki yakni feminism eksistensialis. Ideologi tersebut ditawarkan oleh pengarang atas respon terhadap perubahan zaman dan pemerintahan pasca jatuhnya kekuasaan Gamal Abdul Nasser. Feminisme eksistensialis dianggap sebagai jembatan bagi perempuan untuk membangun hubungan-hubungan sosial serta kepemimpinan dalam masyarakat Mesir.

The article is based on the information of the author, who as officer of the 10th Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff spent two days in Egypt during the Six Day War between Israel and the Arab states. It briefly analyzes the history of Moscow’s relations with Cairo after the 1952 revolution, particularly in the military field, and notes that the Soviet military leadership overestimated the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, as the Arab Republic of Egypt was then called. Although by June 1967 the situation in the Middle East was rather tense, the war was not expected by Moscow on the day Israel attacked Egypt, and its quick success, especially the defeat of the Egyptian Air Force, was a shock to Cairo and Moscow. The article describes the situation in Cairo on June 9 and 10, the Egyptians’ reaction to the resignation of President Gamal Abdel Nasser; speaks of the negative attitude of the “Arab street” to the Russians, which arose in those days, primarily because of the false information of the Egyptian authorities, who argued that unlike the USSR, the United States and Great Britain took part in the war by bombing objects in Egypt.

Abstract Along with a moment of peace in the middle of the 20th century came large changes in the world order; namely the rise of newly independent nations and the formation of supranational organisations. The Middle East was the first region to establish an intergovernmental security network after 1945 when the Arab League was created. While the institution has had several opportunities to prove itself capable of uniting and pacifying a region often described to be “without regionalism,” it has rather served as a tool in the toolbox of Arab nationalist leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser to solidify their political legitimacy and maintain a strict policy of non-interference. The League’s failure to provide a place for mediation and resolution of regional conflicts further undermines its effectiveness. The Arab Spring that swept across the region beginning in 2009 brought optimistic projections for the League’s capacity to deal with the conflict, particularly following the League’s suspension of Syria following brutal repression of demonstrations in 2010. Is the failure of the League a product poor design at its offset or could it provide a hopeful forecast for increased regional cooperation and peacebuilding in the Middle East? Without bark and without bite, the latter will be difficult to achieve.

ABSTRACT This article examines the visual archive of the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. Better known as the Bandung Conference or simply Bandung, this diplomatic meeting hosted 29 delegations from countries in Africa and Asia to address questions of sovereignty and development facing the emergent postcolonial world. A number of well-known leaders attended, including Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Zhou Enlai of China, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Sukarno of the host country, Indonesia. Given its importance, the meeting was documented extensively by photojournalists. The argument of this article is that the visual archive that resulted has contributed to the enduring symbolism and mythology of Bandung as a moment of Third World solidarity. More specifically, the street photography style of many images - with leaders walking down the streets of Bandung surrounded by adoring crowds - depicted an informality and intimacy that conveyed an accessible, anti-hierarchical view of the leaders who were present. These qualities of conviviality and optimism can also be seen in images of conference dinners, airport arrivals, delegate speeches, and working groups. Drawing upon the critical work of scholars of southern Africa and Southeast Asia, this article summarily positions the concept of the 'decolonising camera' to describe both the act of documenting political decolonisation as well as the ways in which visual archives produced during decolonisation can contribute to new iconographies of the political, which are both factual and mythic at once.

After the founding of the Arab League in 1945, Arab nationalism became an important political stage that was clearly embodied when the Zionist entity avowed its so-called state in 1947, when Arab positions were united to confront the coming danger, but unfortunately the calamity occurred in .1948 From this standpoint, the Egyptian people began to feel the importance of Arabic unity, so the press got an important role in raising Arabic awareness. Al-Ahram newspaper was one of those newspapers, and some hints and implications appeared, but after the July Revolution of 1952, things changed and Egypt became an Arab republic and the leader Gamal Abdel Nasser appeared. Who sensed the danger of the increasing British influence on Egypt and its revolution. Al-Ahram newspaper tended to adopt new political, economic and social positions in the Arabic world after the nationalization of the Suez Canal and its clear preference towards deepening Arab nationalist thought . In this paper, the researcher dealt with the change in the discourse of Al-Ahram newspaper from general, literary or Egyptian to supportive, supportive and promoter of Arabic nationalist thought explicitly and clearly. It is divided into two dimensions. First; (The trend of Al-Ahram newspaper towards assuming the Egyptian national discourse before the tripartite violence against Egypt). Second; (The trend of Al-Ahram newspaper towards adopting the Egyptian national discourse during and after the tripartite violence on Egypt), with a conclusion and findings .

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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