Relevant bibliographies by topics / Gamer's dilemma

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Gamer's dilemma'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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BOURNE, CRAIG, and EMILY CADDICK BOURNE. "Players, Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77, no. 2 (March 2019): 133–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12634.

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Kas, Judith, David J. Hardisty, and Michel J. J. Handgraaf. "Steady steps versus sudden shifts: Cooperation in (a)symmetric linear and step-level social dilemmas." Judgment and Decision Making 16, no. 1 (January 2021): 142–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008342.

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AbstractAre groups of people better able to minimize a collective loss if there is a collective target that must be reached or if every small contribution helps? In this paper we investigate whether cooperation in social dilemmas can be increased by structuring the problem as a step-level social dilemma rather than a linear social dilemma and whether cooperation can be increased by manipulating endowment asymmetry between individuals. In two laboratory experiments using ‘Public Bad’ games, we found that that individuals defect less and are better able to minimize collective and personal costs in a step-level social dilemma than in a linear social dilemma. We found that the level of cooperation is not affected by an ambiguous threshold: even when participants cannot be sure about the optimal cooperation level, cooperation remains high in the step-level social dilemmas. We find mixed results for the effect of asymmetry on cooperation. These results imply that presenting social dilemmas as step-level games and reducing asymmetry can help solve environmental dilemmas in the long term.
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Naumov, Pavel, and Rui-Jie Yew. "Ethical Dilemmas in Strategic Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 13 (May 18, 2021): 11613–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i13.17381.

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An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a modality in strategic game settings with and without limit on sacrifice and for perfect and imperfect information games. The authors show that the dilemma modality cannot be defined through the earlier proposed blameworthiness modality. The main technical result is a sound and complete axiomatization of the properties of this modality with sacrifice in games with perfect information.
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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 8 (August 2020): 200891. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200891.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.
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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 10 (October 2018): 181085. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181085.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
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Haesevoets, Tessa, Chris Reinders Folmer, Dries H. Bostyn, and Alain Van Hiel. "Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation." European Journal of Personality 32, no. 4 (July 2018): 405–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2158.

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Mixed–motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non–cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed–motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed–motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one–shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed–motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology
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Rodenburg, Kathleen, Louise Hayes, Lianne Foti, and Ann Pegoraro. "Responsible Leadership in Sport: An Ethical Dilemma." Societies 11, no. 3 (July 23, 2021): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc11030085.

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Sports, apart from providing entertainment, can provide an escape from everyday troubles, a community to belong to, and an opportunity to connect to the wider world. As such, sports have contributed to the unification of people, the development of peace and tolerance, and the empowerment of women and young people globally. However, sports’ widespread popularity has also contributed to “big money” opportunities for sports organizations, sporting venues, athletes, and sponsors that have created an environment riddled with ethical dilemmas that make headlines, resulting in protests and violence, and often leave society more divided. A current ethical dilemma faced by agents associated with the Olympic games serves to demonstrate the magnitude and challenges related to resolving ethical dilemmas in the sport industry. A decision-making framework is applied to this current sport’s ethical dilemma, as an example of how better ethical decision making might be achieved.
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Bartel, Christopher. "Resolving the gamer’s dilemma." Ethics and Information Technology 14, no. 1 (September 23, 2011): 11–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9280-8.

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Luck, Morgan. "Can Young’s constructive ecumenical expressivism resolve the gamer’s dilemma?" Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 17, no. 1 (March 11, 2019): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jices-02-2018-0017.

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Purpose This paper aims to evaluate a potential resolution to the gamer’s dilemma that arises from Gary Young’s metaethical theory of constructive ecumenical expressivism (CEE). Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the gamer’s dilemma is reformulated as a paradox and the potential resolution is evaluated in light of this new formulation. Findings The author argues that this resolution does resolve the dilemma, but CEE itself has limited appeal. Originality/value This paper contributes to the growing scholarship dedicated to resolving the gamer’s dilemma.
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Kieslich, Pascal J., and Benjamin E. Hilbig. "Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics." Judgment and Decision Making 9, no. 6 (November 2014): 510–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006392.

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AbstractRecently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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Sohng, Elaine. "Real Intentions and Virtual Wrongs." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1547.

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In this thesis, I answer the gamer's dilemma or the inability to find a moral distinction between virtual pedophilia and virtual murder. I expand virtual pedophilia to virtual rape to address increasing rates of sexual harassment and assault in virtual reality. In this thesis, I 1) explain what occurs when one engages in virtual rape; 2) identify relevant moral differences between physical rape and virtual rape; 3) challenge the existing relationship between committing harm and wrong in the case of rape; and 4) argue that virtual rape is morally reprehensible due to the agent’s intention to utilize a person as a mere tool for pleasure.
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Robertson, Paul. "Police dilemmas of interpretation and action : the 'shoot/no-shoot dilemma'." Thesis, University of Abertay Dundee, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.650525.

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Van, der Merwe Martijn. "Non-cooperative games on networks." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/79930.

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Thesis (MSc)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: There are many examples of cooperation in action in society and in nature. In some cases cooperation leads to the increase of the overall welfare of those involved, and in other cases cooperation may be to the detriment of the larger society. The presence of cooperation seems natural if there is a direct bene t to individuals who choose to cooperate. However, in examples of cooperation this bene t is not always immediately obvious. The so called prisoner's dilemma is often used as an analogy to study cooperation and tease out the factors that lead to cooperation. In classical game theory, each player is assumed to be rational and hence typically seeks to select his strategy in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-o . In the case of the classical prisoner's dilemma, this causes both players to defect. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game and only bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated in rounds and players are a orded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Past studies have revealed that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner's dilemma is placed in an evolutionary context, where the evolutionary tness of a strategy is directly related to the pay-o achieved by the player adopting the strategy. One of the mechanisms that promote the persistence of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma is structured interaction between players. A mathematical framework for representing the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (ESPD) is developed in this thesis. The mathematical framework is used to undertake an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) towards investigating the dynamics of the ESPD with a path, cycle, plane grid or toroidal grid as underlying graph. The objective of this investigation is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation between players. The ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally di erent parameter regions; large values of the temptation-to-defect parameter are not capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while small values of this parameter allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. It is found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases if the underlying graph is a path or cycle. The state space of the ESPD with a plane or toroidal grid graph as underlying graph grows very quickly as a function of the graph order. The automorphism classes of game states are enumerated to determine exactly how fast the size of the state space of the game grows as a function of the order of the underlying graph. Finally, the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated for a grid graph as underlying graph (in cases where the state space is small enough) by means of constructing the corresponding state graphs of the ESPD.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Daar is baie voorbeelde van samewerking in the gemeenskap en in die natuur. In sommige gevalle lei samewerking tot 'n toename in die algehele welvaart van die betrokkenes, terwyl samewerking in ander gevalle tot nadeel van die bre er gemeenskap mag wees. Die voorkoms van samewerking blyk natuurlik te wees indien daar 'n direkte voordeel vir die individue is wat kies om saam te werk. In voorbeelde van samewerking is s o 'n voordeel egter nie altyd voor-diehand- liggend nie. Die sogenaamde prisoniersdilemma word dikwels as voorbeeld in die studie van samewerking gebruik om die faktore wat na samewerking lei, te ontbloot. In klassieke speleteorie word daar aangeneem dat elke speler rasioneel is en dus poog om sy spelstrategie op s o 'n manier te kies dat sy eie verwagte uitbetaling gemaksimeer word. In die geval van die klassieke prisoniersdilemma veroorsaak dit dat beide spelers mekaar verraai. In evolusion^ere speleteorie, daarenteen, word daar slegs aangeneem dat elke speler oor beperkte kennis van die spel en begrensde rasionaliteit beskik. Spele in evolusion^ere speleteorie word in rondtes herhaal en spelers word die geleentheid gebied om gedurende hierdie herhalingsproses aan te pas en te leer. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking 'n lewensvatbare strategie is indien die prisoniersdilemma in 'n evolusion^ere konteks gespeel word, waar die evolusion^ere ksheid van 'n strategie direk afhang van die uitbetaling van 'n speler wat die strategie volg. Een van die meganismes wat volhoubare samewerking in die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma voortbring, is gestruktureerde interaksie tussen spelers. 'n Wiskundige raamwerk word vir die voorstelling van die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma in hierdie tesis ontwikkel. Hierdie wiskundige raamwerk word gebruik om 'n analitiese studie (met ander woorde sonder die gebruik van simulasie) van die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad, siklus, rooster in die vlak, of rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek van stapel te stuur. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die waarskynlikheid vir die ontstaan van volhoubare samewerking tussen spelers te bepaal. Die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad of siklus as onderliggende gra ek het twee fundamenteel verskillende parametergebiede tot gevolg; groot waardes van die versoeking-om-te-verraai parameter lei nie tot volhoubare samewerking nie, terwyl volhoubare samewerking wel vir klein waardes van hierdie parameter moontlik is. Daar word gevind dat die kans vir volhoubare samewerking toeneem tot sekerheid namate die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die toestandsruimte van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek groei baie vinnig as 'n funksie van die orde van die gra ek. Die outomor smeklasse van die speltoestande word getel met die doel om te bepaal presies hoe vinnig die toestandsruimte van die spel as 'n funksie van die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek word laastens deur middel van konstruksies van die ooreenstemmende toestandsgra eke ondersoek (in gevalle waar die toestandsruimte klein genoeg is).
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Hanley, James E. "The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation /." view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Berger, Ulrich. "Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games." Elsevier, 2009. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5590/1/2009_BioSys.pdf.

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We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].
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Galbraith, Todd William. "Examining Friendship Dynamics in Social Anxiety with Iterated Games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/409829.

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Psychology
Ph.D.
Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to have higher levels of friendship impairment and greater difficulty establishing close relationships than persons without social anxiety. However, the mechanisms associated with such impairment have not been widely examined. Previous research suggests that deficiencies in prosocial behaviors (e.g., low warmth, limited self-disclosure, and constrained cooperation) during interpersonal exchanges may partially explain their difficulties developing close relationships. The present study aimed to examine the effect that rejection may have on prosocial behaviors, as well as other factors associated with developing and maintaining friendships, including trust, perceived likeability, closeness/connectedness, using an iterated, computerized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Participants with high (n = 56) and low (n = 35) social anxiety were asked to play the PD game with another participant (actually an experimental confederate) whom they met at the start of the study. Participants were led to believe that they were playing the PD game against the other participant but were actually playing against a computer that was programmed with a strategy meant to initially facilitate cooperation. Cooperation, or giving, in the PD game was measured primarily by the number of tokens that the participant shared with his/her partner. Additionally, participants were randomized to either rejection or non-rejection conditions. Partway through the study, those in the rejection condition were exposed to a programmed decrease in giving by their partner as well as an ambiguous in-person rejection (administered by the experimenter). Participants in the non-rejection condition were not exposed to either the programmed or in-person manipulations. Outcomes of interest included total giving during the PD game, constriction of giving, and the use of particular strategies following rejection in the PD game, as well as various measures of relationship quality collected at the end of each round of play. It was hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would exhibit less total giving and a constricted response to low partner giving and also be less likely to use prosocial strategies to encourage cooperation (i.e., a coaxing strategy) following rejection by the partner compared to those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Additionally, we anticipated that those with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would provide lower ratings of the following relationship quality domains following the rejection condition: trust, closeness/connectedness, and perceived likeability than those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Overall, results provided little support for these hypotheses. However, there were several significant main effects that highlighted differences among those with high and low social anxiety. For example, individuals with high social anxiety had greater ratings of the expectancy of future rejection and of the importance of their next turn for maintaining the quality of their relationship with their partner. Additionally, there was a trend level (p = .08) social anxiety group by rejection condition interaction on the participant’s trust of his/her partner, such that those with high social anxiety exhibited reductions in relationship trust following rejection whereas those with low social anxiety did not. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions of study are also explored.
Temple University--Theses
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De, Silva Hannelore, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen, and Karl Sigmund. "Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism." Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8.

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Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only. (authors' abstract)
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Sandbank, Daren. "ANALYTICAL SOLUTION, AGENT BEHAVIORAL TRANSITIONS AND CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURES IN N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194612.

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This dissertation presents the analytical solution, agent behavioral transitions and classification structures in N-person social dilemma games. The specific model in this research uses Pavlovian agents making decisions in a cellular automaton environment with linear payoff functions. This effort culminated in four papers being submitted to journals that publish in this field of study. The first paper demonstrates that the analytical solution to the N-person Prisoners' Dilemma game discussed in previous literature fails when the learning factors are unequal. The paper then derives a more general analytical solution that corrects this issue. The second paper analyzes agent behavior and transitions extending over all social games. Three plateaus are identified. It is found that the agents in each plateau have a significantly different behavior. The transitions between these plateaus are analyzed. Previous literature indicates that there are indeed transitions, but offers no explanations. The third paper presents under what conditions the analytical solution is applicable. The previous literature implies the analytical solution is always applicable in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. This paper thoroughly analyzes for which games the analytical solution actually works and concludes that it applies in the Chicken game with the parameter S slightly negative. The fourth paper views the N-Person Social Dilemma model from a new perspective based on dynamic system theory. Thirteen cases or games are identified. These cases plot the state transition formula, which is a quadratic curve with linear payoff functions, versus the 45 degree line. From case diagrams the solution structures are readily apparent without the use of simulation. Also, additional information concerning proper selection of parameter values is provided above the traditional approach. The case diagrams can be used by modelers to easily develop and validate models for specific applications. There is no previous literature viewing N-person social dilemma games from this system theoretical perspective.
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Sarangi, Sudipta. "Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556.

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This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers instances where the payoffs and the objectives may not be very clear to the players or the analyst. We develop a model for analyzing such games using a vector of reference utilities which are included in the definition of the game and assumed to be shared by all players. These are used to obtain the true utilities in the game. Conditions for the existence of equilibrium are identified by allowing players to have beliefs about the others. The solution concept is applied to the Traveler's Dilemma and a duopoly. In Chapter 3 a non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity by allowing for different failure probabilities. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and redundancy and provide an explicit characterization of star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We also explore the consequences of three alternative specifications which address criticisms of such communication networks. Chapter 4 examines noncooperative fuzzy games. Both in fuzzy noncooperative games and in abstract economies, players impose mutual restrictions on their available strategic choices. Here we combine these two theories: A player tries to minimize the restrictions he imposes on others, while respecting the restrictions imposed by others on him, but does not explicitly pursue any other objectives of his own. We establish existence of an equilibrium in this framework. In Chapter 5 normal form game is modeled using tools from fuzzy set theory. We extend the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. The formulation is preliminary
Ph. D.
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Levati, Maria Vittoria. "Individuals behaviour in social dilemma games and the role played by persuasion : theory and experiments." Thesis, University of York, 2000. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14042/.

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Books on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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Young, Garry. Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1.

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Kunreuther, Howard. Deterministic and stochastic prisoner's dilemma games: Experiments in interdependent security. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

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S, Weston Mark, ed. Playful parenting: Turning the dilemma of discipline into fun and games. Los Angeles: Tarcher/Putnam, 1993.

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Tazdaït, Tarik. Coopération et jeux non coopératifs: Dilemme du prisonnier, rationalité, équilibre. Paris: CNRS éditions, 2005.

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Brock, Thomas R. The Philippine Islands annexation debate: A re-creation of the nation's dilemma, debating whether or not to end its isolationist era. Carlsbad, CA: DBA Interact, 1992.

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Horowitz, Andrew W. Beyond indifferent players: On the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences. Antwerp, Belgium: Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, 2005.

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Guillén, Germán Vargas. La representación computacional de dilemas morales: Investigación fenomenológica de epistemología experimental. Bogotá: Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, 2004.

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Stewart, Ronnie. Black leadership conference: A re-creation of the leadership dilemma blacks faced following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. Carlsbad, CA: DBA Interact, 1992.

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The evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

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Young, Garry. Resolving the Gamer's Dilemma: Examining the Moral and Psychological Differences Between Virtual Murder and Virtual Paedophilia. Springer International Publishing AG, 2016.

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Book chapters on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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Xhignesse, Michel-Antoine. "The Gamer's Dilemma (Gaming Ethics)." In Aesthetics, 305–10. New York: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003368205-49.

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Young, Garry. "Introducing the Gamer’s Dilemma." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 1–15. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_1.

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Young, Garry. "Social Convention and the Likelihood of Harm: Luck’s Initial Attempts at Resolving the Dilemma." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 17–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_2.

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Young, Garry. "Motivation, Discrimination and Special Status: Luck’s Further Attempts at Resolving the Dilemma." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 41–60. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_3.

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Young, Garry. "Virtual Paedophilia as Child Pornography, and Harm Done to Women: Bartel’s Attempt at Resolving the Dilemma." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 61–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_4.

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Young, Garry. "Targeting Morally Irrelevant Characteristics and the Need for Context: Further Attempts at Resolving the Dilemma." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 83–103. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_5.

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Young, Garry. "A New Approach to Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma: Applying Constructive Ecumenical Expressivism." In Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma, 105–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1_6.

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Jirušek, Martin, Petra Kuchyňková, and Tomáš Vlček. "Business as Usual or Geopolitical Games? Russian Activities in Energy Sector of the Czech Republic." In Czech Security Dilemma, 117–49. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20546-1_5.

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Tanimoto, Jun. "Social Dilemma Analysis for Modeling Traffic Flow." In Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics, 105–54. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8_3.

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Berger, Ross. "Game Writer’s Dilemma: Context vs. Story." In Encyclopedia of Computer Graphics and Games, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08234-9_129-1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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Ashlock, Daniel, and Elizabeth Knowles. "Deck-based prisoner's dilemma." In 2012 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2012.6374133.

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Ashlock, Wendy, and Daniel Ashlock. "Shaped prisoner's dilemma automata." In 2014 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2014.6932869.

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Ashlock, Daniel, EunYoun Kim, and Amanda Saunders. "Prisoner’s Dilemma Agents with Phenotypic Plasticity." In 2019 IEEE Conference on Games (CoG). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2019.8848067.

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Hingston, Philip. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for species." In 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2009.5286498.

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Ashlock, Daniel A. "Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma on Graphs." In 2007 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2007.368078.

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Finzer, William. "The data science education dilemma." In Technology in Statistics Education: Virtualities and Realities. International Association for Statistical Education, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.52041/srap.12105.

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Abstract:
The need for people fluent in working with data is growing rapidly and enormously, but U.S. K–12 education does not provide meaningful learning experiences designed to develop understanding of data science concepts or a fluency with data science skills. Data science is inherently inter- disciplinary, so it makes sense to integrate it with existing content areas, but difficulties abound. Consideration of the work involved in doing data science and the habits of mind that lie behind it leads to a way of thinking about integrating data science with mathematics and science. Examples drawn from current activity development in the Data Games project shed some light on what technology-based, data-driven might be like. The project’s ongoing research on learners’ conceptions of organizing data and the relevance to data science education is explained.
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Ashlock, Daniel, Christopher Kuusela, and Nicholas Rogers. "Hormonal systems for prisoners dilemma agents." In 2011 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2011.6031990.

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Hsieh, Te-Yi, Bishakha Chaudhury, and Emily S. Cross. "Human-Robot Cooperation in Prisoner Dilemma Games." In HRI '20: ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3371382.3378309.

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Krebs, Jacqueline. "Moral Dilemmas in Serious Games." In 2013 International Conference on Advanced ICT. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icaicte.2013.46.

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"MONITORING INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH GAMES WITH SOCIAL DILEMMA." In International Conference on Evolutionary Computation Theory and Applications. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0003623400050012.

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Reports on the topic "Gamer's dilemma"

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Kunreuther, Howard, Gabriel Silvasi, Eric Bradlow, and Dylan Small. Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0341.

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