Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Gamer's dilemma'

In this thesis, I answer the gamer's dilemma or the inability to find a moral distinction between virtual pedophilia and virtual murder. I expand virtual pedophilia to virtual rape to address increasing rates of sexual harassment and assault in virtual reality. In this thesis, I 1) explain what occurs when one engages in virtual rape; 2) identify relevant moral differences between physical rape and virtual rape; 3) challenge the existing relationship between committing harm and wrong in the case of rape; and 4) argue that virtual rape is morally reprehensible due to the agent’s intention to utilize a person as a mere tool for pleasure.

Thesis (MSc)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: There are many examples of cooperation in action in society and in nature. In some cases cooperation leads to the increase of the overall welfare of those involved, and in other cases cooperation may be to the detriment of the larger society. The presence of cooperation seems natural if there is a direct bene t to individuals who choose to cooperate. However, in examples of cooperation this bene t is not always immediately obvious. The so called prisoner's dilemma is often used as an analogy to study cooperation and tease out the factors that lead to cooperation. In classical game theory, each player is assumed to be rational and hence typically seeks to select his strategy in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-o . In the case of the classical prisoner's dilemma, this causes both players to defect. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game and only bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated in rounds and players are a orded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Past studies have revealed that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner's dilemma is placed in an evolutionary context, where the evolutionary tness of a strategy is directly related to the pay-o achieved by the player adopting the strategy. One of the mechanisms that promote the persistence of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma is structured interaction between players. A mathematical framework for representing the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (ESPD) is developed in this thesis. The mathematical framework is used to undertake an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) towards investigating the dynamics of the ESPD with a path, cycle, plane grid or toroidal grid as underlying graph. The objective of this investigation is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation between players. The ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally di erent parameter regions; large values of the temptation-to-defect parameter are not capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while small values of this parameter allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. It is found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases if the underlying graph is a path or cycle. The state space of the ESPD with a plane or toroidal grid graph as underlying graph grows very quickly as a function of the graph order. The automorphism classes of game states are enumerated to determine exactly how fast the size of the state space of the game grows as a function of the order of the underlying graph. Finally, the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated for a grid graph as underlying graph (in cases where the state space is small enough) by means of constructing the corresponding state graphs of the ESPD.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Daar is baie voorbeelde van samewerking in the gemeenskap en in die natuur. In sommige gevalle lei samewerking tot 'n toename in die algehele welvaart van die betrokkenes, terwyl samewerking in ander gevalle tot nadeel van die bre er gemeenskap mag wees. Die voorkoms van samewerking blyk natuurlik te wees indien daar 'n direkte voordeel vir die individue is wat kies om saam te werk. In voorbeelde van samewerking is s o 'n voordeel egter nie altyd voor-diehand- liggend nie. Die sogenaamde prisoniersdilemma word dikwels as voorbeeld in die studie van samewerking gebruik om die faktore wat na samewerking lei, te ontbloot. In klassieke speleteorie word daar aangeneem dat elke speler rasioneel is en dus poog om sy spelstrategie op s o 'n manier te kies dat sy eie verwagte uitbetaling gemaksimeer word. In die geval van die klassieke prisoniersdilemma veroorsaak dit dat beide spelers mekaar verraai. In evolusion^ere speleteorie, daarenteen, word daar slegs aangeneem dat elke speler oor beperkte kennis van die spel en begrensde rasionaliteit beskik. Spele in evolusion^ere speleteorie word in rondtes herhaal en spelers word die geleentheid gebied om gedurende hierdie herhalingsproses aan te pas en te leer. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking 'n lewensvatbare strategie is indien die prisoniersdilemma in 'n evolusion^ere konteks gespeel word, waar die evolusion^ere ksheid van 'n strategie direk afhang van die uitbetaling van 'n speler wat die strategie volg. Een van die meganismes wat volhoubare samewerking in die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma voortbring, is gestruktureerde interaksie tussen spelers. 'n Wiskundige raamwerk word vir die voorstelling van die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma in hierdie tesis ontwikkel. Hierdie wiskundige raamwerk word gebruik om 'n analitiese studie (met ander woorde sonder die gebruik van simulasie) van die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad, siklus, rooster in die vlak, of rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek van stapel te stuur. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die waarskynlikheid vir die ontstaan van volhoubare samewerking tussen spelers te bepaal. Die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad of siklus as onderliggende gra ek het twee fundamenteel verskillende parametergebiede tot gevolg; groot waardes van die versoeking-om-te-verraai parameter lei nie tot volhoubare samewerking nie, terwyl volhoubare samewerking wel vir klein waardes van hierdie parameter moontlik is. Daar word gevind dat die kans vir volhoubare samewerking toeneem tot sekerheid namate die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die toestandsruimte van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek groei baie vinnig as 'n funksie van die orde van die gra ek. Die outomor smeklasse van die speltoestande word getel met die doel om te bepaal presies hoe vinnig die toestandsruimte van die spel as 'n funksie van die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek word laastens deur middel van konstruksies van die ooreenstemmende toestandsgra eke ondersoek (in gevalle waar die toestandsruimte klein genoeg is).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].

Psychology
Ph.D.
Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to have higher levels of friendship impairment and greater difficulty establishing close relationships than persons without social anxiety. However, the mechanisms associated with such impairment have not been widely examined. Previous research suggests that deficiencies in prosocial behaviors (e.g., low warmth, limited self-disclosure, and constrained cooperation) during interpersonal exchanges may partially explain their difficulties developing close relationships. The present study aimed to examine the effect that rejection may have on prosocial behaviors, as well as other factors associated with developing and maintaining friendships, including trust, perceived likeability, closeness/connectedness, using an iterated, computerized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Participants with high (n = 56) and low (n = 35) social anxiety were asked to play the PD game with another participant (actually an experimental confederate) whom they met at the start of the study. Participants were led to believe that they were playing the PD game against the other participant but were actually playing against a computer that was programmed with a strategy meant to initially facilitate cooperation. Cooperation, or giving, in the PD game was measured primarily by the number of tokens that the participant shared with his/her partner. Additionally, participants were randomized to either rejection or non-rejection conditions. Partway through the study, those in the rejection condition were exposed to a programmed decrease in giving by their partner as well as an ambiguous in-person rejection (administered by the experimenter). Participants in the non-rejection condition were not exposed to either the programmed or in-person manipulations. Outcomes of interest included total giving during the PD game, constriction of giving, and the use of particular strategies following rejection in the PD game, as well as various measures of relationship quality collected at the end of each round of play. It was hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would exhibit less total giving and a constricted response to low partner giving and also be less likely to use prosocial strategies to encourage cooperation (i.e., a coaxing strategy) following rejection by the partner compared to those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Additionally, we anticipated that those with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would provide lower ratings of the following relationship quality domains following the rejection condition: trust, closeness/connectedness, and perceived likeability than those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Overall, results provided little support for these hypotheses. However, there were several significant main effects that highlighted differences among those with high and low social anxiety. For example, individuals with high social anxiety had greater ratings of the expectancy of future rejection and of the importance of their next turn for maintaining the quality of their relationship with their partner. Additionally, there was a trend level (p = .08) social anxiety group by rejection condition interaction on the participant’s trust of his/her partner, such that those with high social anxiety exhibited reductions in relationship trust following rejection whereas those with low social anxiety did not. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions of study are also explored.
Temple University--Theses

Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only. (authors' abstract)

This dissertation presents the analytical solution, agent behavioral transitions and classification structures in N-person social dilemma games. The specific model in this research uses Pavlovian agents making decisions in a cellular automaton environment with linear payoff functions. This effort culminated in four papers being submitted to journals that publish in this field of study. The first paper demonstrates that the analytical solution to the N-person Prisoners' Dilemma game discussed in previous literature fails when the learning factors are unequal. The paper then derives a more general analytical solution that corrects this issue. The second paper analyzes agent behavior and transitions extending over all social games. Three plateaus are identified. It is found that the agents in each plateau have a significantly different behavior. The transitions between these plateaus are analyzed. Previous literature indicates that there are indeed transitions, but offers no explanations. The third paper presents under what conditions the analytical solution is applicable. The previous literature implies the analytical solution is always applicable in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. This paper thoroughly analyzes for which games the analytical solution actually works and concludes that it applies in the Chicken game with the parameter S slightly negative. The fourth paper views the N-Person Social Dilemma model from a new perspective based on dynamic system theory. Thirteen cases or games are identified. These cases plot the state transition formula, which is a quadratic curve with linear payoff functions, versus the 45 degree line. From case diagrams the solution structures are readily apparent without the use of simulation. Also, additional information concerning proper selection of parameter values is provided above the traditional approach. The case diagrams can be used by modelers to easily develop and validate models for specific applications. There is no previous literature viewing N-person social dilemma games from this system theoretical perspective.

This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers instances where the payoffs and the objectives may not be very clear to the players or the analyst. We develop a model for analyzing such games using a vector of reference utilities which are included in the definition of the game and assumed to be shared by all players. These are used to obtain the true utilities in the game. Conditions for the existence of equilibrium are identified by allowing players to have beliefs about the others. The solution concept is applied to the Traveler's Dilemma and a duopoly. In Chapter 3 a non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity by allowing for different failure probabilities. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and redundancy and provide an explicit characterization of star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We also explore the consequences of three alternative specifications which address criticisms of such communication networks. Chapter 4 examines noncooperative fuzzy games. Both in fuzzy noncooperative games and in abstract economies, players impose mutual restrictions on their available strategic choices. Here we combine these two theories: A player tries to minimize the restrictions he imposes on others, while respecting the restrictions imposed by others on him, but does not explicitly pursue any other objectives of his own. We establish existence of an equilibrium in this framework. In Chapter 5 normal form game is modeled using tools from fuzzy set theory. We extend the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. The formulation is preliminary
Ph. D.

This essay follows a Media Teacher in her work as a coordinator and an artistic leader for a European project called Legalopoli concerning laws and ethics in a senior level school for 13-16 year-olds in Mora, Sweden. The students write film stories about how their characters have to make choices in ethical dilemma situations. Then the learners create interactive computer games together through practical film work. At the same time we can see how the educator also gets into difficult ethical situations, when she is working with the students. This forces her to self-reflection. She realizes that the practical knowledge in her work has a greater deal of an ethical dimension, than she earlier has been aware of. She understands that the convincing force in the project consists of the confidence and trust she has to create and develop among the students, who, in the start, were unsure and lacked in respect for one another. Through the practical film work they all get close and learn to see both themselves and each other. The students develop from being afraid of saying anything in the group to become confident and capable media producers, where their voices get listened to. They have started a journey into becoming democratic and caring citizens with wider perspectives of themselves and of the world.
Denna essä följer en mediepedagogs arbete som koordinator och konstnärlig ledare för ett Europeiskt projekt kallat Legalopoli, om lagar och etik i en högstadieskola i Mora. Eleverna skriver filmberättelser om rollkaraktärer, som ställs inför olika etiska dilemman i det interaktiva dataspel, som studenterna gemensamt skapar genom praktiskt filmarbete. Samtidigt får vi följa hur pedagogen på samma sätt, ställs inför olika svåra valsituationer i det pågående arbetet med eleverna. Hon tvingas till självreflektion och inser att den praktiska kunskapen i hennes arbete innehar en större etisk dimension än hon tidigare trott. Hon inser att bärkraften i projektet är det förtroende och den tillit, som hon måste skapa och utveckla bland eleverna, som från början var osäkra och betedde sig respektlöst mot varandra. Genom det praktiska filmarbetet kommer de alla nära varandra och får efter hand syn på både sig själva och varandra. Eleverna utvecklas från att ha varit rädda för att yttra sig i gruppen, till att bli tillitsfulla och kapabla medieproducenter, där de får göra sina röster hörda. De påbörjar en bildningsresa till att bli demokratiska och solidariska medborgare med vidgade perspektiv på sig själva och världen.

The main theme of my dissertation is the analysis of several interactive decision making situations with multiple decision makers whose interests do not fully coincide. Non-cooperative game theory is invoked to carry on this analysis.The first chapter describes an experimental study of volunteer's dilemmas that evolve over time. Only a single volunteer is required for the public good to be provided. Because volunteering is costly, each prefers that some other players bear the full costs of volunteering. Reflecting on the observation that in many naturally occurring social dilemmas it is beneficial to volunteer earlier than later, I assume that the payoff to the volunteer and the (higher) payoff to each of the non-volunteers decrease monotonically over time. I derive symmetric and asymmetric subgame perfect equilibria. The experimental results provide little support to asymmetric equilibria in which only a single subject volunteers immediately. In comparison to the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, they show that subjects volunteer, on average, earlier than predicted.The second chapter explores a new type of online auction, called the unique bid auction, that has recently emerged on the Internet and gained widespread popularity in many countries. In a sharp contrast to traditional auctions, the winner in this class of auctions is the bidder who submits the lowest (highest) unique bid; all ties are discarded. I propose an algorithm to numerically compute the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution and then conduct a series of experiments to assess the predictive power of the equilibrium solution. The experimental results show that the solution accounts quite well for the subjects' bidding behavior on the aggregate level, but not on the individual level.The last chapter proposes a discrete version of William Vickrey's model of traffic congestion on a single road with a single bottleneck. In my model, both the strategy space and number of commuters are finite. An algorithm similar to the one used in the second chapter is proposed to numerically calculate the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The discrete model is then compared with the original continuous model of Vickrey in terms of the equilibrium solution and its implications.

Complexity underlying life is largely governed by the dynamics of interaction within and between living and nonliving entities. Evolutionary strategy games are extensively used in modelling and understanding complex behaviors in a wide range of fields including theoretical biology, social interactions, economics, politics, defense and security. Strategy games are said to distill the key elements of interactions be- tween real-world entities and organizations - one of the challenges lies in determining the mapping of complex real life situation dynamics to that of a certain game. That leads us to the two major research questions outlined below. In this thesis, we are taking evolutionary games a step further to investigate the interplay between local and global dynamics, where local dynamics are repre- sented by locally pairwise interactions among the population's players governed by the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. To represent the global dynamics, two main modelling ideas are proposed, in the first model; a mixed evolutionary game is in- troduced where players are competing globally on the population level in a minority game. The interplay between local and global dynamics in this model represents the interplay between different scopes of competition between the same players. Sec- ondly, we introduce a model for studying the effect of sharing global information concerning a population of players, shedding light on how global information can alter the emerging dynamics of local interactions. Furthermore, the thesis addresses the question of whether games - with different dynamics - have unique signatures (footprints) that can be used in recognizing and differentiating among them, and whether these footprints are consistent along the evolutionary path of these games. We show here that by building winning networks between players, and determining network motifs of these winning networks, we can obtain motifs' counts signals that are sufficient to categorize and recognize the game's utility matrix used by the players. We also demonstrate that these footprints - motifs' counts - are consistent along the evolutionary path of the games, due to a hyper-cyclic behavior that exists between strategies. Finally, we show that this approach is capable of identifying whether a certain population is driven by local dynamics or both local and global dynamics using the proposed mixed game.

In evolutionary theory the existence of self-sacrificing cooperative traits poses a problem that has engendered decades of debate. The principal theories of the evolution of altruism are inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, and multilevel selection. To provide a framework for the unification o f these apparently disparate theories, this dissertation identifies two fundamental conditions required for the evolution of altruism: 1) non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation and 2) positive assortment among altruistic behaviors. I demonstrate the underlying similarities in these three theories in the following two ways. First, I show that the game-theoretic model of the prisoner’s dilemm a (PD) is inherent to all three theories. While the PD has been used extensively to model reciprocal altruism, I demonstrate that the n-player PD captures fundamental aspects o f multilevel selection and inclusive fitness in that NPD model parameters relate simply to Simpson’s paradox, the Price covariance equation, and Hamilton’s rule. The tension between hierarchical levels that defines a PD reflects the tension between Abstract levels o f selection that is explicit in multilevel selection theory, and im plicit in the other two theories. Second, Ham ilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory applies to the other theories. As mentioned, I demonstrate that this rule relates to multilevel selection via the NPD. I also show that Queller’s generalization of Hamilton’s rule applies to the conditional strategies of reciprocal altmism. This challenges the selfish-gene viewpoint by highlighting the fact that it is the phenotypes o f others, not their genotypes, that is critical to the evolution o f altruism. I integrate the PD and H am ilton’s rule as follows: the evolution o f altruism in general involves PD situations in which Hamilton’s rule specifies the necessary relationship between 1) the degree of non-zero-sumness within the PD and 2) the degree of positive assortment among altruistic behaviors. Additional contributions of this research include a demonstration that randomly formed associations can provide the necessary positive assortment for strong altruism to evolve, the development of a new selection decomposition that is symmetrical to the Price equation, and a game-theoretic analysis showing the essential similarity of weak and strong altruism under selection.

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This work aims to develop a novel method to design educational games, following Extreme Programming and Scrum Agile Methods and screenplays under the dilemmas and mechanical game re-guise concepts, which are already widely accepted in the literature. Workshops using the proposed method were conducted in order to identify the demands of educators and students from elementary and middle school and also the viability in the implementation of the method as a support tool to the teaching process. The validation results and the method acceptance were evaluated by statistical tests, which are also widely explored in the literature for similar samples. The final remarks show the successful methods evolution and their validation results under the considered classrooms context.
Este trabalho tem por objetivo desenvolver um novo método para a produção de jogos educativos, baseado nos métodos ágeis Scrum e Extreme Programming, além de utilizar conceitos de produção de roteiros baseados em dilemas e utilização de técnicas de rerroupagem de mecânicas de jogos já existentes e amplamente aceitas pela literatura. Foram realizadas oficinas, que utilizaram versões do método proposto, para identificar as demandas de professores e alunos do ensino médio e fundamental, e verificar qual delas apresentavam viabilidade de implantação como ferramenta de apoio ao processo de ensino-aprendizagem. Os resultados obtidos, tanto em relação à aceitação do método e como em relação à melhora dos indicadores de aprendizagem dos conceitos apresentados durante as oficinas, foram analisados utilizando testes estatísticos específicos, amplamente explorados na literatura. Os resultados dos testes permitiram o aprimoramento e a validação do método proposto dentro do contexto de sala de aula.

Quando são mantidas as propriedades da estratégia Tit-For-Tat (TFT), no Jogo Dilema do Prisioneiro Repetido, a cooperação ocorre. Porém, quando qualquer uma das propriedades é alterada, como o acesso à soma da pontuação do outro jogador, é provável que a cooperação deixe de ocorrer. O objetivo do estudo foi verificar se o tipo de acesso à soma da pontuação do outro jogador pode afetar a freqüência de respostas cooperativas no Jogo Dilema do Prisioneiro Repetido. Vinte e quatro (24) estudantes universitários foram submetidos a um programa de computador, programado para jogar a estratégia TFT. Era informado, porém, ao participante, que ele estava jogando com outra pessoa. Uma única sessão de 100 tentativas foi conduzida. Os participantes foram divididos em três grupos de oito cada, nas seguintes condições experimentais: Grupo SEM ACESSO (SA), em que o acesso era apenas à soma da própria pontuação; Grupo ACESSO SEMPRE (AS), em que era disponibilizado o acesso à soma da própria pontuação e a do outro em todas tentativas e o Grupo ACESSO RANDÔMICO (AR), em que o acesso à soma da própria pontuação ocorria em todas as tentativas e a do outro participante ocorria em algumas tentativas, randomicamente. Todos os participantes do Grupo SA passaram a cooperar durante a sessão. No Grupo AS, a maioria delatou no início, mas depois passou a cooperar. No Grupo AR, dos oito participantes, apenas dois mostraram uma tendência em cooperar, mas emitiram uma freqüência de cooperação menor em relação à delação. Com base nos resultados, é discutido que o tipo de acesso à soma da pontuação do outro jogador, no Jogo Dilema do Prisioneiro Repetido, passou a ter uma função discriminativa no aumento ou diminuição de repostas cooperativas. Também é discutida a importância da possibilidade da emissão da resposta de observação para o estabelecimento da cooperação diante da estratégia TFT.
When the properties of Tit-For-Tat (TFT) are held in Iterated Prisoner\'s Dilemma Game, the cooperation occurs. But when any of the properties is changed such as the access to the sum of the scores another´s player is there is a probability that the cooperation no longer occurs. The objective of the study was to determine if the type of access to the sum of the scores anothers player, can affect the frequency of cooperative response in Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Game. Twenty four (24) undergraduate students were submitted to a computer program, scheduled to play the strategy TFT. But the participant was informed that he was playing with another player. One 100 trial session was conducted. Participants were divided into three groups of eight each, in the following experimental conditions: NO ACCESS Group (NA), where access was only to the sum of their own scores; ALWAYS ACCESS Group (AA), which was made available the access to the sum of their own and the anothers score in all trials and RANDOM ACCESS Group (RA), where access to the sum of their scores occurred in all trials and to the anothers score occurred in some trials, randomly. All participants of the Group NA began to cooperate during the session. In Group AA, the majority was defecting at first, but then began to cooperate. In Group RA among eight participants, only two showed a tendency to cooperate but showed a smaller frequency of cooperation than defection. Based on the results it is discussed that the type of access to the sum of the scores anothers player in the Iterated Prisoner\'s Dilemma Game began to have a role in increasing or decreasing discriminative cooperative responses. Also it is discussed the importance of observing response to the establishment of cooperation in TFT strategy.

O dilema do prisioneiro é geralmente visto como o ponto de partida para entender o problema da cooperação. Em comparação com o dilema do prisioneiro discreto e iterado, poucos estudos existem sobre o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado. A maioria dos trabalhos que investigaram o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado concentrou-se no período de 1990 a 2000, não obtendo resultados conclusivos sobre a melhor estratégia a ser adotada neste tipo de jogo. Duas estratégias diferentes se destacam neste tipo de dilema. A primeira é a estratégia RTS (Raise-the-Stakes) de Roberts e Sherrat (1998) que testa o terreno antes de aumentar os investimentos na relação. A segunda deriva do modelo LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl e Nowak (1999a). Esta última estratégia estando em equilíbrio de Nash cooperativo apresenta três características: (i) generosidade, i.e., investir o máximo possível no início da relação de cooperação; (ii) otimismo, i.e., contar com o melhor cenário para as próximas rodadas, e (iii) intransigência. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo principal contrapor as estratégias RTS e LRS num dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado, na presença e ausência de ruído, com jogadas simultâneas e alternadas e para diferentes valores do parâmetro w (probabilidade de interagir novamente). Restringimos a nossa análise a um conjunto de seis estratégias: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS e RTSM. O método utilizado foi o da simulação baseada em agente (ABM) no formato de torneios, semelhante ao de Axelrod (2006), Roberts & Sherratt (1998), Nowak & Sigmund (1992) e Nowak & Sigmund (1993). Utilizamos o software Netlogo e documentamos todo o processo da concepção e construção do modelo por meio da ferramenta TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). Os resultados mostram que as estratégias mais cooperativas são mais favorecidas quando o jogo consiste em jogadas alternadas ao invés de simultâneas. A estratégia RTS teve melhor desempenho em jogos simultâneos para valores intermediários de w, na presença ou ausência de ruído. Por sua vez, a estratégia LRS teve melhor desempenho nos jogos simultâneos, na presença ou ausência de ruído, ou alternados e na presença de ruído, em ambos os casos para valores grandes de w
The prisoner\'s dilemma is generally seen as the starting point for understanding the problem of cooperation. In comparison with the discreet and iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, few studies exist on the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma. Most of the works that have investigated the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma has concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000, not getting conclusive results on the best strategy to be adopted in this type of game. Two different strategies stand out in this kind of dilemma. The first is the RTS strategy (Raise-the-Stakes) of Roberts and Sherrat (1998) that tests the ground before increasing investment in the relationship. The second is the model deriva LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl and Nowak (1999a). This last strategy being in Nash equilibrium cooperative presents three characteristics: (i) generosity, i.e., investing as much as possible at the beginning of the cooperation relationship; (ii) optimism, i.e., rely on the best scenario for the next rounds, and (iii) intransigence. This research has as main goal to reconcile opposing RTS strategies and LRS in a continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, in the presence and absence of noise, with simultaneous moves and alternate and for different values of the parameter w (probability of interacting again). We restrict our analysis to a set of six strategies: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS and RTSM (halfway between RTS and LRS). The method used was the agent-based simulation (ABM) in tournament format, similar to that of Axelrod (2006), Roberts (1998), Sherratt & Nowak & Sigmund (1992) and Nowak & Sigmund (1993). We use the NetLogo software and document the whole process of design and construction of the tool model TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). The results show that most strategies are more favoured unions when the game consists of alternating plays rather than simultaneous. The RTS strategy had better performance in simultaneous games for intermediate values of w, in the presence or absence of noise. In turn, the IRS strategy had better performance when simultaneous games, in the presence or absence of noise, or switched, and in the presence of noise, in both cases, for large values of w

碩士
銘傳大學
國際企業學系碩士在職專班
105
With the era of network developed, people to get information and entertainment quite different, too, because rapid political and economic changes in Taiwan in recent years, causing many social problems, and criminal behavior in teenagers’ stage is the most active. We used the Game theory to complete the test and personality characteristics questionnaire, then SPSS18.0 software to analyze the data to fill out the relevance of the violence between the gender and the personality trait on teenagers. Thus, the purpose of this study is: 1. The player's gender is associated with decision-making behavior. 2. The influence of violent games on young people’s personality traits. 3. Impact of violence games on young people behavior. 4. The impact of violence personality traits on young people behavior. The main research objects are senior high students. The samples are from Neng Ren Home Economic And Commercial Vocational High School，NRVS and using Convenience Sampling. First, the predicament of the Game theory and the Trust games. And fill in the Buss and Perry (1992) Aggression Questionnaire measurements to see if the personality traits are related to the external behavior. Finally, the study obtains several conclusions: 1. The player's gender is partial correlation with decision-making behavior. Women's willingness to cooperate is higher than that of men 2. Players game experience is partial correlation with external behavior. The more frequent exposure to violent video games will reduce the trust the wishes of cooperation. 3. Violent video game experience is associated with violence personality traits. They have more significant impact on the young people. 4. Players personality trait is partial correlation with external behaviors. Long-term exposure to violent video games, the cooperation and trust behavior is low.

碩士
國立中山大學
高階經營碩士班
104
In recent years, the development of computer games have moved toward mobile devices, but the life cycle of a game is significantly decreasesing. Because of lowering the threshold for game development, many new entrants would join the competition and change the market with less cost. On the other hand, because of the different environment and characteristics of smartphone and personal computer, the player''s gaming habits has also been changed. Faced with such fierce competition, some game designers try to adopt a series of mechanisms to improve product profitability, enable these players to compete with each other, and guide the players to an iterative multiplayer prisoner''s dilemma. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is usually viewed as a Game Theory and emphasize on the ratioanl interaction among players. However, investigations require a multi-person model of the game to understand what the problem that people have had. Much has writton about the two-agent iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Some studies claim the simulation of multi-agent games are based on mutualinteractions among the agents. A stochastic learning model that Macy created has asserted that threshold effects would shift the relation ships of agents from a defective equilibrium to cooperation. This study attempts to use Agent-based model to examine the effect of various user-based parameters (payoff curve, participant personality, neighbor rang, iteration numbers) in an iterative multiplayer prisoner''s dilemma game. This tool is suitable for an unlimited number of participants with various personalities, and can be used to try to figure out the critical point of the participants'' strategy transferred from Nash equilibrium to cooperation. The critical point represents the final ratio of cooperators in the game, and also represents the end of the product life, so the iteration number required to reach the critical point can be considered as the product life cycle. When the gap between the traitor’s payoff curve and the cooperator’s payoff curve is greater, the critical point is lower, and the product life is shorter. In addition, when the neighbor range is smaller, the product life is longer; the participant personality and the initial distribution have significant effect on the product life, and it will significantly affect the final distribution of participants. The product life of a game has a clear relevance with the design of these parameters. A game designer would extend the product life by adjusting these parameters. In addition, this study asserts that social behaviors are the catalsts to the social system cooperation.

Chan, Chun Him = 論競爭環境中出現的協作現象 / 陳俊謙.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-141).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Chan, Chun Him = Lun jing zheng huan jing zhong chu xian de xie zuo xian xiang / Chen Junqian.
Title
Abstract --- p.i
Acknowledgements --- p.v
Table of Contents --- p.vii
Chapter 1 --- Prologue --- p.1
Chapter 2 --- Prisoners' Dilemma and Snowdrift Game --- p.6
Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6
Chapter 2.2 --- Formulation --- p.7
Chapter 2.3 --- The Prisoners，Dilemma (PD) --- p.8
Chapter 2.4 --- The Snowdrift Game (SG) --- p.9
Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in PD --- p.10
Chapter 2.5.1 --- The Temptation Reward Punishment Sucker System (TRPS system) --- p.10
Chapter 2.5.2 --- "Our Expanded 2-parameter System (r, s system)" --- p.10
Chapter 2.5.3 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.11
Chapter 2.5.4 --- The Benefit and Cost System (BC system) --- p.11
Chapter 2.6 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in SG --- p.12
Chapter 2.6.1 --- A Common 1-parameter System (rh system) --- p.13
Chapter 2.6.2 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.13
Chapter 3 --- Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) --- p.15
Chapter 3.1 --- Tragedy of One-shot PD Game --- p.15
Chapter 3.2 --- The First Cooperation --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.1 --- Repeated PD Game --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.2 --- Axelrod´ةs Tournament and Strategy “Tit-for-Tat´ح (TFT) --- p.17
Chapter 3.3 --- The Second Cooperation --- p.18
Chapter 3.3.1 --- Nowak and Sigmund Evolutionary Experiment --- p.18
Chapter 3.3.2 --- Stochastic Reactive Strategies (SRSs) and Evolutionary Infinite IPD --- p.19
Chapter 3.3.3 --- Experimental Setup --- p.20
Chapter 3.3.4 --- Experimental Results --- p.21
Chapter 3.3.5 --- Conclusion: TFT as a Pivot for Cooperation --- p.22
Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary IPD with Strategy Lattices --- p.23
Chapter 4.1 --- Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Numerical Accuracy in IPD --- p.24
Chapter 4.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.24
Chapter 4.3 --- Simulation Results --- p.26
Chapter 4.3.1 --- Strategy Frequencies Xi(t) versus Time --- p.27
Chapter 4.3.2 --- "Mean Final State in the Whole r, s Space" --- p.32
Chapter 4.3.3 --- Time Evolution of (p) and (q) --- p.38
Chapter 4.3.4 --- Mean Final State of a Strategy Lattice with Inclined Frequencies --- p.42
Chapter 4.3.5 --- Conclusion --- p.50
Chapter 5 --- Egoistic Exploiters Induced Global Generosity in Evolutionary IPD --- p.52
Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.52
Chapter 5.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.52
Chapter 5.3 --- "The Three Initial Conditions: Cases TO, T1 and T2" --- p.53
Chapter 5.4 --- Simulation Results --- p.54
Chapter 5.4.1 --- Distribution of the Final Dominant Strategies --- p.54
Chapter 5.4.2 --- Case TO (100 Random Strategies) --- p.56
Chapter 5.4.3 --- Case T1 (99 Random Strategies and a TFT-like Strategy) --- p.58
Chapter 5.4.4 --- Case T2 (98 Random Strategies and both a TFT-like and an AllD-like Strategies) --- p.58
Chapter 5.4.5 --- Comparing the Three Cases --- p.61
Chapter 5.4.6 --- Discussion --- p.64
Chapter 5.5 --- Analytic Manipulations for Small r Region --- p.65
Chapter 5.5.1 --- Values of (pmps) and (qmps) for Case T2 --- p.65
Chapter 5.5.2 --- Values of {pmps) and {qmps) for Case TO and T1 --- p.68
Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.71
Chapter 6 --- The Basics of Networks --- p.72
Chapter 6.1 --- Fully-connected Networks and Well-mixed Networks --- p.72
Chapter 6.2 --- Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.73
Chapter 6.3 --- Barabasi-Albert (BA) Scale-free Growing Networks --- p.74
Chapter 7 --- Proposing the N-person Snowdrift Game (NSG) --- p.76
Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.76
Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations of 2-person Games on Networks --- p.76
Chapter 7.3 --- The Existing N-person Games --- p.77
Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Public Good Game (PGG) --- p.78
Chapter 7.3.2 --- The N-person Battle of Sexes Games (NBOS) --- p.78
Chapter 7.4 --- The NSG Scenario and Payoffs --- p.79
Chapter 7.5 --- Everyday Examples of NSG --- p.80
Chapter 7.6 --- Preview of Studies in Evolutionary NSG --- p.82
Chapter 8 --- Evolutionary NSG in Well-mixed Populations --- p.84
Chapter 8.1 --- The Method of Replicator Dynamics --- p.84
Chapter 8.2 --- The Simulation Algorithm --- p.90
Chapter 8.3 --- The Simulated Equilibrium Contributor Fraction x*(r) --- p.91
Chapter 8.4 --- Analytic Manipulations on the Algorithm --- p.92
Chapter 8.4.1 --- Conversion Probabilities and Equilibrium Conditions --- p.92
Chapter 8.4.2 --- Discussions --- p.94
Chapter 8.5 --- Analytic Treatments on the Time Evolution of the Contribution Level x(t) --- p.96
Chapter 8.5.1 --- Discrete Time Equation --- p.97
Chapter 8.5.2 --- Continuous Approximations --- p.97
Chapter 8.5.3 --- Analytical Solutions of N=2 and N=S --- p.98
Chapter 8.6 --- Conclusion --- p.100
Chapter 9 --- Evolutionary NSG in Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.101
Chapter 9.1 --- Comparison between Well-mixed and Lattice Populations --- p.101
Chapter 9.2 --- Simulation Parameters --- p.103
Chapter 9.3 --- Simulation Results for ID Lattices --- p.103
Chapter 9.4 --- Analytic Theory for ID Lattices by Analyzing on the Local Configurations --- p.105
Chapter 9.4.1 --- The Absence of Connected Contributors --- p.105
Chapter 9.4.2 --- Theory for ID k=2 Chain Lattice --- p.106
Chapter 9.4.3 --- Theory for ID k=4 Chain Lattice --- p.109
Chapter 9.5 --- Simulation Results for 2D Lattices --- p.112
Chapter 9.6 --- Analytic Theory for 2D k=4 Square Lattice --- p.115
Chapter 9.7 --- Simulation Results for 3D Cubic Lattice --- p.120
Chapter 9.8 --- Conjectures for Approximate Solutions in High-Dimensional Hy- percubic Lattices --- p.120
Chapter 9.9 --- Extracting the Relation Neff=2k+1 --- p.122
Chapter 9.10 --- Conclusion --- p.123
Chapter A --- Evolutionary NSG in Barabasi-Albert Networks --- p.125
Chapter A.l --- The New Elements in BA Networks --- p.126
Chapter A.2 --- The Two Implementations - Model A and Model B --- p.126
Chapter A.3 --- Results in Model A (Varying-N) --- p.127
Chapter A.4 --- Results in Model B (Fixed-N) --- p.133
Chapter A.5 --- Conclusion --- p.135
Chapter B --- Supplementary Equations for Chapter 9 --- p.136
Chapter B.l --- Equations for ID k=4 Lattice --- p.136
Chapter B.2 --- Equations for 2D k=4 Lattice --- p.137
Bibliography --- p.139

abstract: This dissertation investigates the dynamics of evolutionary games based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which individuals are discrete, space is explicit, and dynamics are stochastic. Its focus is on 2-strategy games played on a d-dimensional integer lattice with a range of interaction M. An overview of related past work is given along with a summary of the dynamics in the mean-field model, which is described by the replicator equation. Then the dynamics of the interacting particle system is considered, first when individuals are updated according to the best-response update process and then the death-birth update process. Several interesting results are derived, and the differences between the interacting particle system model and the replicator dynamics are emphasized. The terms selfish and altruistic are defined according to a certain ordering of payoff parameters. In these terms, the replicator dynamics are simple: coexistence occurs if both strategies are altruistic; the selfish strategy wins if one strategy is selfish and the other is altruistic; and there is bistability if both strategies are selfish. Under the best-response update process, it is shown that there is no bistability region. Instead, in the presence of at least one selfish strategy, the most selfish strategy wins, while there is still coexistence if both strategies are altruistic. Under the death-birth update process, it is shown that regardless of the range of interactions and the dimension, regions of coexistence and bistability are both reduced. Additionally, coexistence occurs in some parameter region for large enough interaction ranges. Finally, in contrast with the replicator equation and the best-response update process, cooperators can win in the prisoner's dilemma for the death-birth process in one-dimensional nearest-neighbor interactions.
Dissertation/Thesis
Doctoral Dissertation Applied Mathematics 2016

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions les effets d'un environnement stochastique et de l'utilisation d'une stratégie d'opting-out sur l'évolution de la coopération dans les jeux évolutionnaires. La thèse contient 8 articles, dont 6 sont déjà publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture. Outre l'introduction, la thèse est divisée en deux parties, la partie 1 composée de 5 articles et la partie 2 de 3 articles. La partie 1 étudie l'impact de gains randomisés dans les jeux évolutionnaires. L'article 1 introduit les concepts de stabilité pour les jeux avec matrice de paiement aléatoire 2x2 dans des populations infinies avec des générations discrètes sans chevauchement dans un environnement stochastique. On y donne les conditions pour qu'un équilibre, sur la frontière ou à l'intérieur du simplexe des fréquences des stratégies, soit stochastiquement localement stable ou instable. L'article 2 étend les résultats de l'article 1 au cas où la valeur sélective est une fonction exponentielle du gain attendu suite à des interactions aléatoires par paires et montre que, de manière inattendue, le bruit aléatoire environnemental peut rompre un cycle périodique et favoriser la stabilité d'un équilibre intérieur. L'article 3 discute des effets de la sélection faible. Alors que les conditions de stabilité dans un environnement aléatoire reviennent aux conditions du cas déterministe lorsque l'intensité de la sélection diminue, les fluctuations aléatoires des gains peuvent accélérer la vitesse de convergence vers un équilibre stable sous une sélection plus faible. L'article 4 applique la théorie de la stabilité évolutive stochastique à un jeu randomisé de dilemme du prisonnier. On y montre que l'augmentation de la variance des gains de défection est propice à l'évolution de la coopération. L'article 5 étudie les jeux matriciels randomisés dans des populations finies et donne les conditions pour que la sélection favorise l'évolution de la coopération dans le contexte du jeu randomisé de dilemme du prisonnier. La partie 2 considère un jeu répété de dilemme du prisonnier dans le cas où un comportement d'opting-out est adopté par chaque joueur dans les interactions par paires. L'article 6 étudie la dynamique évolutive de la coopération et de la défection dans ce contexte et montre une possible coexistence à long terme, en supposant une population infinie et un équilibre rapide (en fait, instantané) dans les fréquences des paires. L'article 7 rapporte des résultats expérimentaux avec 264 étudiants universitaires utilisant la stratégie d'opting-out qui soutiennent la prédiction théorique d'une coexistence à long terme de coopération et de défection. L'article 8 étend l'analyse du modèle avec la stratégie d'opting-out au cas d'une population finie et fournit une preuve rigoureuse des deux échelles de temps pour les fréquences de coopération et de défection d'une part et les fréquences de paires de stratégies d'autre part.
In this thesis, we study the effects of a stochastic environment and the use of an opting-out strategy on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games. The thesis contains 8 articles, among which 6 are already published in peer-reviewed journals. Apart from the introduction, the thesis is divided into two parts, Part 1 made with 5 articles and Part 2 with 3 articles. Part 1 studies randomized payoffs in evolutionary games. Article 1 introduces stability concepts for 2x2 matrix games in infinite populations undergoing discrete, non-overlapping generations in a stochastic environment and gives conditions for an equilibrium, either on the boundary or in the interior of the simplex of all strategy frequencies, to be stochastically locally stable or unstable. Article 2 extends the results of Article 1 to the case where fitness is an exponential function of expected payoff in random pairwise interactions and shows that, unexpectedly, environmental random noise can break a periodic cycle and promote stability of an interior equilibrium. Article 3 discusses the effects of weak selection. While stability conditions in a random environment return to conditions in the deterministic case as selection intensity diminishes, random fluctuations in payoffs can accelerate the speed of convergence toward a stable equilibrium under weaker selection. Article 4 applies stochastic evolutionary stability theory to a randomized Prisoner's dilemma game and shows that increasing the variance in payoffs for defection is conducive to the evolution of cooperation. Article 5 studies randomized matrix games in finite populations and gives conditions for selection to favor the evolution of cooperation in the context of a randomized Prisoner's dilemma. Part 2 considers a repeated Prisoner's dilemma game with an opting-out behavior adopted by every player in pairwise interactions. Article 6 studies the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and defection in this context and shows possible long-term coexistence, assuming an infinite population and fast (actually, instantaneous) equilibrium in the pair frequencies. Article 7 reports experimental results with 264 university students using the opting-out strategy that support the theoretical prediction of a long-term coexistence of cooperation and defection. Article 8 extends the analysis of the model with the opting-out strategy to the case of a finite population and provides a rigorous proof of the two-time scales for the frequencies of cooperation and defection on one hand and the frequencies of strategy pairs on the other.

碩士
銘傳大學
國際企業學系碩士在職專班
100
The international business relationship has become more inter-dependent due to the trend of globalization. This phenomenon leads companies to seek for cheaper resources, or to authorize other professional agents to sell their products, in order to maximize their profit. However, because every country has its unique cultural background, when one company tries to expand its market in other countries, some cultural problems may emerge. According to some prior studies, cultural difference is considered as the key point that influences local people’s behavior and their ways of decision making. Thus, this study will focus on whether cultural difference will affect Taiwanese and Japanese producers and agents’ ways of decision making. Based on Prisoner’s Dilemma Theory, we take Taiwanese and Japanese producers and agents as our examples and conduct a “One-shot Game” and an “Infinitely Repeated Game” in order to verify that whether cultural difference will affect players’ decision making process. The result shows as follows: 1. There is no significant relationship between players’ decision and nationalities in the “one-shot Game of Deterministic Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Somehow, Taiwanese players tend to choose defection when they know that the profit they may get is uncertain. This result reveals that the Taiwanese players tend to take risks in order to earn more profit. 2. In the experiment of “Infinitely Repeated Game”, among the action strategies adopted by the participants who had experienced several transactions, Faithful strategy tended to be most highly rewarded. When one player’s rival keeps choosing to cooperate, the Japanese players will attempt to choose to cooperate (even they choose to defect their competitors in the beginning.) However, Taiwanese players’ decision won’t be affected by their rivals.

碩士
銘傳大學
國際企業學系碩士在職專班
100
This paper explores how gender and personality traits influence the decision making process of cooperation and competition in the finance industry within the context of the prisoner dilemma game. Based on single and multiple experiments within the design of the prisoner dilemma game, this research project also tests the correlation between strategy adaptation and profit making. Multi-regression and one way ANOVA was used to analyze data gathered through questionnaires on personal background and personality traits. The findings are listed as follow: 1. Gender significantly affects policy-making of price competition within single-shot game. In between competitors of the same gender crafty strategy and mixed strategy were used more often than competition among same gender competitors. 2. Within Infinitely Repeated Game, the participant Personal Characteristics will affect the policy -making strategy. In the redundant long-term competition transaction relations, competitors with Type A personality frequently chose the betrayal motion than competitors with Type B personality traits. 3. Utilization of strategy affects income of the enterprise studied. Participants who opted for sly strategy obtain the highest reward in Infinitely Repeated game setting. The finding is different from the take tits for tat the strategy described by Axelrod (1984) experiment. But for people who employed mixed strategies and received the second highest awards, half of the participants chose the tit for tat strategy. This finding indicates positive correlation between profiting making and the employment of complement strategies to the tit for tat strategy.

The dilemma of diversity is the tension that exists when prescriptive claims are required across reasonable pluralism. Scholar and philosopher Dwight Boyd believes that the dilemma of diversity must be addressed for the continued health of multicultural societies, and suggests that the solution can be found through democratic reciprocity. Though the International Olympic Committee (IOC) markets unity and peace through its Olympic Games, does the Olympics relieve the dilemma of diversity? By critically examining the IOC’s historic and recent treatment of Aboriginals, its encouragement of divisive nationalism, and its educational programs, it is clear that the IOC does not embrace reasonable pluralism. The IOC’s public pedagogy is one that conceals its dominance through diversity. In exposing this dominance, I will argue that the IOC must embrace democratic reciprocity that allows for conversation across difference. Adopting an authentic acceptance of difference will alleviate the IOC’s propagation of Western ideology through neo-imperialism.

Games have been investigated as computationally complex problems since the inception of artificial intelligence in the 1950’s. Originally, search-based techniques were applied to create a competent (and sometimes even expert) game player. The search-based techniques, such as game trees, made use of human-defined knowledge to evaluate the current game state and recommend the best move to make next. Recent research has shown that neural networks can be evolved as game state evaluators, thereby removing the human intelligence factor completely. This study builds on the initial research that made use of evolutionary programming to evolve neural networks in the game learning domain. Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) is applied inside a coevolutionary training environment to evolve the weights of the neural network. The training technique is applied to both the zero sum and non-zero sum game domains, with specific application to Tic-Tac-Toe, Checkers and the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD). The influence of the various PSO parameters on playing performance are experimentally examined, and the overall performance of three different neighbourhood information sharing structures compared. A new coevolutionary scoring scheme and particle dispersement operator are defined, inspired by Formula One Grand Prix racing. Finally, the PSO is applied in three novel ways to evolve strategies for the IPD – the first application of its kind in the PSO field. The PSO-based coevolutionary learning technique described and examined in this study shows promise in evolving intelligent evaluators for the aforementioned games, and further study will be conducted to analyse its scalability to larger search spaces and games of varying complexity.
Dissertation (MSc)--University of Pretoria, 2005.
Computer Science
unrestricted