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Journal articles on the topic 'Gamer's dilemma'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 January 2023

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1

BOURNE, CRAIG, and EMILY CADDICK BOURNE. "Players, Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77, no. 2 (March 2019): 133–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12634.

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2

Kas, Judith, David J. Hardisty, and Michel J. J. Handgraaf. "Steady steps versus sudden shifts: Cooperation in (a)symmetric linear and step-level social dilemmas." Judgment and Decision Making 16, no. 1 (January 2021): 142–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008342.

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AbstractAre groups of people better able to minimize a collective loss if there is a collective target that must be reached or if every small contribution helps? In this paper we investigate whether cooperation in social dilemmas can be increased by structuring the problem as a step-level social dilemma rather than a linear social dilemma and whether cooperation can be increased by manipulating endowment asymmetry between individuals. In two laboratory experiments using ‘Public Bad’ games, we found that that individuals defect less and are better able to minimize collective and personal costs in a step-level social dilemma than in a linear social dilemma. We found that the level of cooperation is not affected by an ambiguous threshold: even when participants cannot be sure about the optimal cooperation level, cooperation remains high in the step-level social dilemmas. We find mixed results for the effect of asymmetry on cooperation. These results imply that presenting social dilemmas as step-level games and reducing asymmetry can help solve environmental dilemmas in the long term.

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Naumov, Pavel, and Rui-Jie Yew. "Ethical Dilemmas in Strategic Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 13 (May 18, 2021): 11613–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i13.17381.

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An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a modality in strategic game settings with and without limit on sacrifice and for perfect and imperfect information games. The authors show that the dilemma modality cannot be defined through the earlier proposed blameworthiness modality. The main technical result is a sound and complete axiomatization of the properties of this modality with sacrifice in games with perfect information.

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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 8 (August 2020): 200891. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200891.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 10 (October 2018): 181085. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181085.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Chris Reinders Folmer, Dries H. Bostyn, and Alain Van Hiel. "Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation." European Journal of Personality 32, no. 4 (July 2018): 405–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2158.

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Mixed–motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non–cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed–motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed–motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one–shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed–motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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7

Rodenburg, Kathleen, Louise Hayes, Lianne Foti, and Ann Pegoraro. "Responsible Leadership in Sport: An Ethical Dilemma." Societies 11, no. 3 (July 23, 2021): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc11030085.

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Sports, apart from providing entertainment, can provide an escape from everyday troubles, a community to belong to, and an opportunity to connect to the wider world. As such, sports have contributed to the unification of people, the development of peace and tolerance, and the empowerment of women and young people globally. However, sports’ widespread popularity has also contributed to “big money” opportunities for sports organizations, sporting venues, athletes, and sponsors that have created an environment riddled with ethical dilemmas that make headlines, resulting in protests and violence, and often leave society more divided. A current ethical dilemma faced by agents associated with the Olympic games serves to demonstrate the magnitude and challenges related to resolving ethical dilemmas in the sport industry. A decision-making framework is applied to this current sport’s ethical dilemma, as an example of how better ethical decision making might be achieved.

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8

Bartel, Christopher. "Resolving the gamer’s dilemma." Ethics and Information Technology 14, no. 1 (September 23, 2011): 11–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9280-8.

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9

Luck, Morgan. "Can Young’s constructive ecumenical expressivism resolve the gamer’s dilemma?" Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 17, no. 1 (March 11, 2019): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jices-02-2018-0017.

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Purpose This paper aims to evaluate a potential resolution to the gamer’s dilemma that arises from Gary Young’s metaethical theory of constructive ecumenical expressivism (CEE). Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the gamer’s dilemma is reformulated as a paradox and the potential resolution is evaluated in light of this new formulation. Findings The author argues that this resolution does resolve the dilemma, but CEE itself has limited appeal. Originality/value This paper contributes to the growing scholarship dedicated to resolving the gamer’s dilemma.

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Kieslich, Pascal J., and Benjamin E. Hilbig. "Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics." Judgment and Decision Making 9, no. 6 (November 2014): 510–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006392.

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AbstractRecently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.

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Duca, Stefano, and Heinrich H. Nax. "Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, no. 144 (July 2018): 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.

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12

Merlone, Ugo, and Angelo Romano. "Using the Braess Paradox to Teach Tacit Negotiation." Simulation & Gaming 47, no. 6 (November 8, 2016): 780–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878116671754.

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Background. Social dilemmas are situations in which following personal interest leads to collective disasters. Pollution, tropical deforestation, and the sustainable use of natural resources, can be characterized as examples of social dilemmas. In the negotiation literature, social dilemmas are known as tacit negotiations as individuals negotiate through moves rather than verbal communication. These negotiations are difficult to manage because of the absence of binding contracts and the interdependent nature of decisions of the parties involved. Therefore, it is important for participants to learn from activities addressing these issues. Although several negotiation exercises are available, it is difficult to find educational games or simulations specifically devised to allow several participants to face social dilemmas. Purpose. In this article, we present a negotiation game based on a well-known social dilemma, the Braess paradox. The Braess paradox has been observed in many real situations and is particularly suited to highlight the core concepts of social dilemmas. Approach. We will review the main negotiation activities focusing on the number ofparticipants they are implemented for. Then we will present an activity which allows to accommodate up to thirty participants and allows them to understand some interesting aspects of social dilemmas. Findings. Through the lessons gained by experiential learning, and the discussions emerging during debriefing, this activity may provide participants with a better understanding of urgent real problems.

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De Jong, S., S. Uyttendaele, and K. Tuyls. "Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 33 (December 20, 2008): 551–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2685.

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It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents' ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case.

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14

Luck, Morgan, and Nathan Ellerby. "Has Bartel resolved the gamer’s dilemma?" Ethics and Information Technology 15, no. 3 (June 21, 2013): 229–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9322-5.

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15

Luck, Morgan. "Has Ali dissolved the gamer’s dilemma?" Ethics and Information Technology 20, no. 3 (June 5, 2018): 157–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9455-7.

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16

Nader, Karim. "Virtual competitions and the gamer’s dilemma." Ethics and Information Technology 22, no. 3 (March 12, 2020): 239–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09532-4.

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17

Zhang, Qionghan, Yingyuan Chen, Yuan Tao, Tahir Farid, and Jianhong Ma. "How Consistent Contributors Inspire Individuals to Cooperate: The Role of Moral Elevation and Social Value Orientation." Sustainability 11, no. 7 (March 28, 2019): 1874. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11071874.

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Achieving cooperation to address social dilemmas has long been a global problem. This study examined, using an environment-focused step-level public-goods-dilemma game, the effect a consistent contributor (CC) has on group cooperation, as well as the mediating role moral elevation and the moderating role social value orientation (SVO) play in this process. A total of 196 students were recruited and classified as “pro-selfs” or “pro-socials” based on their SVOs; individuals with the same SVO characterization were randomly allocated to groups of four, and then randomly assigned to the CC condition or the control condition to play 15 rounds of public-goods-dilemma games. In the CC condition, additional computer-controlled players represented the CCs. The results showed that the CC groups cooperated and earned more than the control groups did. Multi-level mediation analysis confirmed that moral elevation partially mediates the CC effect. Although the CCs had a direct impact on both pro-socials and pro-selfs, multi-level moderated-mediation analysis demonstrated that CCs influenced pro-socials directly, but affected pro-selfs’ decision-making indirectly, through moral elevation. This study contributes to a better understanding of sustainability of cooperation in social dilemmas by showing that consistent cooperative behaviors are contagious, and that their effects differ based on an individuals’ SVO.

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Sun, Qingzhou, Haozhi Guo, Jiarui Wang, Jing Zhang, Chengming Jiang, and Yongfang Liu. "Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss." Judgment and Decision Making 16, no. 6 (November 2021): 1506–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008524.

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AbstractIn social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.

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Ali, Rami. "A new solution to the gamer’s dilemma." Ethics and Information Technology 17, no. 4 (December 2015): 267–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9381-x.

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20

Ramirez, Erick Jose. "How to (dis)solve the Gamer’s Dilemma." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, no. 1 (January 11, 2020): 141–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10049-z.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Alain Van Hiel, Kim Dierckx, and Chris Reinders Folmer. "Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games?" Judgment and Decision Making 15, no. 3 (May 2020): 330–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500007142.

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AbstractMost prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials — with different payoff structures — to measure participants’ behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma. We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma. Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behavior and prosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement.

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Hassan, Awais, Maida Shahid, Faisal Hayat, Jehangir Arshad, Mujtaba Hussain Jaffery, Ateeq Ur Rehman, Kalim Ullah, Seada Hussen, and Habib Hamam. "Improving the Survival Time of Multiagents in Social Dilemmas through Neurotransmitter-Based Deep Q-Learning Model of Emotions." Journal of Healthcare Engineering 2022 (January 25, 2022): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3449433.

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In multiagent systems, social dilemmas often arise whenever there is a competition over the limited resources. The major challenge is to establish cooperation among intelligent virtual agents for solving the situations of social dilemmas. In humans, personality and emotions are the primary factors that lead them toward a cooperative environment. To make agents cooperate, they have to become more like humans, that is, believable. Therefore, we hypothesize that emotions according to the personality give birth to believability, and if believability is introduced into agents through emotions, it improves their survival rate in social dilemma situations. The existing researches have introduced different computational models to introduce emotions in virtual agents, but they lack emotions through neurotransmitters. We have proposed a neurotransmitters-based deep Q-learning computational model in multiagents that is a suitable choice for emotion modeling and, hence, believability. The proposed model regulates the agents’ emotions by controlling the virtual neurotransmitters (dopamine and oxytocin) according to the agent’s personality. The personality of the agent is introduced using OCEAN model. To evaluate the proposed system, we simulated a survival scenario with limited food resources in different experiments. These experiments vary the number of selfish agents (higher neuroticism personality trait) and the selfless agents (higher agreeableness personality trait). Experimental results show that by adding the selfless agents in the scenario, the agents develop cooperation, and their collective survival time increases. Thus, to resolve the social dilemma problems in virtual agents, we can make agents believable through the proposed neurotransmitter-based emotional model. This proposed work may help in developing nonplayer characters (NPCs) in games.

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Gallangher, S., and Seung Ho Park. "The dilemma of games." IEEE Potentials 22, no. 2 (April 2003): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mp.2003.1197893.

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Esmaeili, Parinaz, Ahmad Makui, Seyed Mohammad Seyedhosseini, and Rouzbeh Ghousi. "The effect of probabilistic incentives to promote cooperation during the pandemics using simulation of multi-agent evolutionary game." International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 13, no. 3 (2022): 319–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5267/j.ijiec.2022.3.001.

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Social dilemmas describe conflict situations between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. In these situations, it is better that all players work together to attain a common goal, but individuals may threaten the best payoff of the group by free-riding. Human behavior in a pandemic is one example of a social dilemma but wait-and-see games and relying on herd immunity to get a free ride generates a threat of continuing the pandemic. This study aims to use probabilistic incentives given by a third party as a mechanism to inhibit free-riding behavior by promoting cooperation in the volunteer dilemma game. For more realistic human behavior simulation, we use an agent-based model of network topology. When the parameters of the problem change gradually, an abrupt jump in the cooperation rate may happen and lead to a significant shift in the outcome. Catastrophe theory is a valuable approach to survey these nonlinear changes. This study tries to give some managerial insights to the decision-makers to find the minimum level of necessary effort in which the cooperation dominates the defection.

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Hilbig, Benjamin E., Pascal J. Kieslich, Felix Henninger, Isabel Thielmann, and Ingo Zettler. "Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation." European Journal of Personality 32, no. 2 (March 2018): 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2149.

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Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay–offs in a symmetric two–person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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Stewart, Hamish. "The Law of Damages and the Prisoners' Dilemma: A Comment on ‘Pure and Utilitarian Prisoners' Dilemmas’." Economics and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (October 1997): 231–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100004491.

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Kuhn and Moresi (1995) (henceforth, K&M) have proposed a useful taxonomy for classifying prisoners' dilemmas (henceforth, PDs). This comment is concerned with K&M's observation that legal penalties for defection can transform PDs into cooperative games, and their argument that the role of the law may vary depending on how the PD is classified by their taxonomy. The purpose of this note is to support K&M's analysis by demonstrating that the law of damages, as understood by economic analysis, already performs the function that K&M assign to legal penalties for defection.

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Bosma, Esmee, and Vincent Buskens. "Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel." Mens en maatschappij 95, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm.

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Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

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Holt, Charles A., and Monica Capra. "Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Education 31, no. 3 (January 2000): 229–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220480009596781.

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Holt, Charles A., and Monica Capra. "Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Education 31, no. 3 (2000): 229. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1183093.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Alain Van Hiel, Jasper Van Assche, Dries H. Bostyn, and Chris Reinders Folmer. "An exploration of the motivational basis of take-some and give-some games." Judgment and Decision Making 14, no. 5 (September 2019): 535–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500004836.

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AbstractSurprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way.

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MERLONE, UGO, DAREN R. SANDBANK, and FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY. "SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES: CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS." International Game Theory Review 14, no. 03 (September 2012): 1250015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500156.

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This paper presents a new systematic review of N-person social dilemma games using a new approach based on dynamic properties of the corresponding system. Traditionally N-person social dilemma games are classified by relative orders of magnitude of payoff parameters. Without border-line cases 24 are identified. The new approach introduced in this paper categorizes the social dilemma games in cases with different number and asymptotic properties of the equilibria. In these cases the solution structure or the trajectory of the percentage of cooperators is readily apparent. These cases also provide the modeler with additional information concerning the impacts of the model parameters on the game outcomes. The example of a simple cartel illustrates this methodology.

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Wang, Zilu, and Michael C. W. Yip. "The foreign language effects on strategic behavior games." PLOS ONE 17, no. 11 (November 17, 2022): e0277556. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0277556.

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The present study examined foreign language effects on the decisions made in a series of strategic behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Oligopolistic Competition, and the Volunteer’s Dilemma). We recruited 154 native Chinese-speaking university students, with English as their second language, as participants. They were asked to make decisions while playing four simple behavioral games in either Chinese or English language version and to complete a Language History Questionnaire. The results showed that 1) the participants in each language group performed differently in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and in one condition of the Volunteer’s Dilemma Game which involved a relatively high level of uncertainty; and 2) foreign language proficiency, frequency of application and cultural identity triggered by the corresponding foreign language moderated the foreign language effects. This pattern of results is consistent with the Cultural Accommodation Hypothesis and the risk-aversion preference to use one’s native language.

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OSIECKA, Gabriela, and Maciej JASIŃSKI. "Solution of Traveler’s Dilemma." Central European Review of Economics and Management 2, no. 3 (September 27, 2018): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.29015/cerem.502.

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Aim: The aim of the article is to show: 1) that the reasoning of perfectly rational players presented in 1994 by the author of the Traveler's Dilemma Kaushik Basu is incorrect and therefore leads to wrong conclusions, 2) how the reasoning of these players should look like and what solution it leads to. Design / Research methods: Logical analysis. Conclusions / findings: Perfectly rational Traveler’s Dilemma players should use, according to game theory, so-called retrograde (iterative) induction. This is wrong, as in the set of Traveler’s Dilemma games results the principle of transitivity is not met. We believe that perfectly rational players will achieve a better result when they make a random decision from a suitably limited set of decisions. After applying this method of decision making, perfectly rational players will achieve a result similar to those obtained by real players in experiments. Thus, the paradox described in the theory of games disappears, that perfectly rational players achieve worse results than real players Originality / value of the article: A new way of making decisions in the Traveler’s Dilemma game. Implications of the research: A new way of making decisions in other games similar to the Traveler’s Dilemma may allow to find new solutions in these games. Limitations of the research: The described decision-making method can potentially be used in decision-making situations when the following five conditions are met: 1) the set of possible decisions of each player is greater than 2, 2) the winning matrix is known to both players and both know the purpose of their choices, 3) when it is played once with an unknown opponent, 4) when both players have to make their decision without knowing the opponent's choice, 5) when there is no decision, which is a stable balance point or when it is, but its choice means that the player does not achieve a satisfying result.

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AHMED, E., and A. S. ELGAZZAR. "ON LOCAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME WITH PARETO UPDATING RULE." International Journal of Modern Physics C 11, no. 08 (December 2000): 1539–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183100001334.

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Prisoner's Dilemma games with two and three strategies are studied. The corresponding replicator equations, their steady states and their asymptotic stability are discussed. Local Prisoner's Dilemma games are studied using Pareto optimality. As in the case with Nash updating rule, the existence of tit for tat strategy is crucial to imply cooperation even in one dimension. Pareto updating implies less erratic behavior since the steady state configurations are mostly fixed points or at most 2-cycle. Finally, Prisoner's Dilemma game is simulated on small-world networks which are closer to real systems than regular lattices. There are no significant changes compared to the results of the regular lattice.

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Kamel, Amir Magdy. "Libya and the Prisoner’s Dilemma." Contemporary Arab Affairs 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2022): 25–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2022.15.2.25.

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This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of interactions between Libya’s Tripoli- and Tobruk-led actors in the period between Gaddafi’s 2011 ousting and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. In so doing, it reveals the extent to which Libyan decisions aligned with the game’s principal outcome-maximizing strategy to ascertain authority and a non-outcome-maximizing strategy’s conflict resolution-through-cooperation goal. In contrast to the game’s assumptions, however, the findings convey how negotiations between the two players were driven by contextual factors, predominantly: Libya’s historical makeup, internal–external links, and hydrocarbon control. This informs my contention that the complexities of the Libya case study demonstrate the limits of the prisoner’s dilemma in illuminating the dynamics of a given political phenomenon. As a result, this account presents a novel Libya-specific blueprint of the prisoner’s dilemma that highlights the limitations of this framework and concludes with a reflection on what this means for understanding this type of game.

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Tanimoto, Jun. "Dynamics of spatial traveler's dilemma games." Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2014, no. 11 (November 6, 2014): P11010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/2014/11/p11010.

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Carroll, John W. "Iterated N-player prisoner's dilemma games." Philosophical Studies 53, no. 3 (May 1988): 411–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00353514.

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Lambertini, Luca. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games." Journal of Economic Theory 77, no. 1 (November 1997): 181–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2328.

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HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN, and JÖRG OECHSSLER. "Zero-Knowledge Cooperation in Dilemma Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 220, no. 1 (January 2003): 47–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2003.3129.

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McLean, Iain, John M. Orbell, and Robyn M. Dawes. "What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?" American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1417–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963954.

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In the June 1991 issue of this Review John Orbell and Robyn Dawes have argued that prisoner's dilemma games are shaped, in part, by “cognitive misers”—players who assume other players are like themselves. In such games, this results in more play and in a higher expected payoff by cooperators than by defectors, lain McLean agrees with the conclusions of Orbell and Dawes but takes issue with their reasons and their model. In turn, Orbell and Dawes retort, arguing that players in prisoner's dilemma games do not respond as McLean assumes they will.

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Duong, Manh Hong, and The Anh Han. "On Equilibrium Properties of the Replicator–Mutator Equation in Deterministic and Random Games." Dynamic Games and Applications 10, no. 3 (November 27, 2019): 641–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00338-8.

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AbstractIn this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator–mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Descartes’ rule of signs, we provide a formula to compute the number of equilibria in multi-player games via the number of change of signs in the coefficients of a polynomial. For two-player social dilemmas (namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snow Drift, Stag Hunt and Harmony), we characterize (stable) equilibrium points and analytically calculate the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when the payoff entries are uniformly distributed. For multi-player random games whose pay-offs are independently distributed according to a normal distribution, by employing techniques from random polynomial theory, we compute the expected or average number of internal equilibria. In addition, we perform extensive simulations by sampling and averaging over a large number of possible payoff matrices to compare with and illustrate analytical results. Numerical simulations also suggest several interesting behaviours of the average number of equilibria when the number of players is sufficiently large or when the mutation is sufficiently small. In general, we observe that introducing mutation results in a larger average number of internal equilibria than when mutation is absent, implying that mutation leads to larger behavioural diversity in dynamical systems. Interestingly, this number is largest when mutation is rare rather than when it is frequent.

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DU, JIANGFENG, XIAODONG XU, HUI LI, XIANYI ZHOU, and RONGDIAN HAN. "PLAYING PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH QUANTUM RULES." Fluctuation and Noise Letters 02, no. 04 (December 2002): R189—R203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477502000993.

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Quantum game theory is a recently developing field of physical research. In this paper, we investigate quantum games in a systematic way. With the famous instance of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we present the fascinating properties of quantum games in different conditions, i.e. different number of the players, different strategic space of the players and different amount of the entanglement involved.

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dos Santos, Miguel. "The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 282, no. 1798 (January 7, 2015): 20141994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1994.

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Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

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Chowdhury, Sayantan Nag, Srilena Kundu, Matjaž Perc, and Dibakar Ghosh. "Complex evolutionary dynamics due to punishment and free space in ecological multigames." Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 477, no. 2252 (August 2021): 20210397. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2021.0397.

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The concurrence of ecological and evolutionary processes often arises as an integral part of various biological and social systems. We here study eco-evolutionary dynamics by adopting two paradigmatic metaphors of social dilemmas with contrasting outcomes. We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games as the backbone of the proposed mathematical model. Since cooperation is a costly proposition in the face of the Darwinian theory of evolution, we go beyond the traditional framework by introducing punishment as an additional strategy. Punishers bare an additional cost from their own resources to try and discourage or prohibit free-riding from selfish defectors. Our model also incorporates the ecological signature of free space, which has an altruistic-like impact because it allows others to replicate and potentially thrive. We show that the consideration of these factors has broad implications for better understanding the emergent complex evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we report the simultaneous presence of different subpopulations through the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, and we determine various stationary points using traditional game-theoretic concepts and stability analysis.

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AHMED, E., A. S. HEGAZI, and A. S. ELGAZZAR. "SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES." International Journal of Modern Physics C 14, no. 07 (September 2003): 963–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183103005091.

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The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.

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Bahel, Eric, Sheryl Ball, and Sudipta Sarangi. "Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games." Games and Economic Behavior 133 (May 2022): 126–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.008.

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Jensen, Niels Holm. "Male mating signaling in social dilemma Games." Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 11, no. 3 (September 2013): 131–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jep.11.2013.3.3.

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Drouvelis, Michalis. "Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games." Games 6, no. 3 (September 21, 2015): 368–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g6030368.

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Yang, Xiqing, Feng Zhang, and Wanxiong Wang. "Predation promotes cooperation in Prisoner’s dilemma games." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 514 (January 2019): 20–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2018.09.054.

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Schmidt, David, Robert Shupp, James Walker, T. K. Ahn, and Elinor Ostrom. "Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 46, no. 4 (December 2001): 357–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00158-5.

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