Journal articles: 'Gamme entry'

1

Pitchik, Carolyn. "Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence." Games and Economic Behavior 5, no. 2 (1993): 268–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1016.

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Gromb, Denis, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, and David Sevy. "Selection in Dynamic Entry Games*." Games and Economic Behavior 21, no. 1-2 (1997): 62–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0571.

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3

Osborne, Martin J. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition." Games and Economic Behavior 5, no. 1 (1993): 133–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1007.

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4

Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport. "Coordination, “Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game." Games and Economic Behavior 23, no. 2 (1998): 146–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0619.

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5

Salonen, Hannu. "Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing under Asymmetric Information about Common Costs." Games and Economic Behavior 6, no. 2 (1994): 312–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1017.

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6

Bolger, Fergus, Briony D. Pulford, and Andrew M. Colman. "Market Entry Decisions." Experimental Psychology 55, no. 2 (2008): 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.55.2.113.

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Abstract. In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure rates and suboptimal industry profits. Excessive entry has been attributed to overconfidence arising when expected payoffs depend partly on skill. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, 96 participants played 24 rounds of a market entry game, with expected payoffs dependent partly on skill on half the rounds, after their confidence was manipulated and measured. The results provide direct support for the hypothesis that high levels of confidence are largely responsible for excessive entry, and they suggest that absolute confidence, independent of interpersonal comparison, rather than confidence about one's abilities relative to others, drives excessive entry decisions when skill is involved.

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Jianya, Zheng, and Li Weigang. "Market Entry Game Application in e-Commerce." Journal of Software 11, no. 6 (2016): 589–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.17706/jsw.11.6.589-597.

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8

Lee, C. B., L. R. Fletcher, J. M. Binner, and W. D. Murphy. "Market share in a post-entry game." Journal of the Operational Research Society 52, no. 5 (2001): 503–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601114.

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9

Yano, Makoto. "A price competition game under free entry." Economic Theory 29, no. 2 (2005): 395–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0028-8.

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10

Lee, CB, LR Fletcher, JM Binner, and WD Murphy. "Market share in a post-entry game." Journal of the Operational Research Society 52, no. 5 (2001): 503–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.jors.2601114.

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11

Rapoport, Amnon. "Individual strategies in a market entry game." Group Decision and Negotiation 4, no. 2 (1995): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01410098.

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12

Darrough, Masako N., and Neal M. Stoughton. "Financial disclosure policy in an entry game." Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, no. 1-3 (1990): 219–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(90)90048-9.

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13

LAHMANDI-AYED, RIM. "DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 04 (2006): 701–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919890600120x.

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In the case of natural duopoly, we suggest a finitely repeated game between two incumbent firms and a potential entrant that limits the incumbent firms' power and compels them to approach economic efficiency. We prove that such a game admits a perfect subgame equilibrium along which the incumbent firms maintain with equal quantities while preventing entry. Moreover, the incumbents' strategies along this path converge to average cost pricing quantities as the number of periods goes to infinity.

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14

Borgeaud, Philippe. "Quelques réflexions sur le rapport entre jeu et pratique rituelle." Quelques réflexions sur le rapport entre jeu et pratique rituelle 1, no. 35 (2022): 19–43. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10060942.

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En partant de la capacité enfantine du « faire comme si, pas pour de vrai, mais très sérieusement », deux dossiers familiers sont repris sous l'angle du jeu : celui du rituel des jardins d'Adonis (à l'horizon de l'opposition platonicienne entre jeu et sérieux) ; celui aussi de l'hymne homérique où Hermès enfant joue avec la louange hymnique et le sacrifice, au risque de compromettre son statut divin. Cela nous entraîne à reconsidérer l'historiographie du rapport entre jeu et religion.<i>Starting from the childish capacity to "act as if, not for real, but very seriously", two familiar cases are reexamined from the angle of play: the gardens of Adonis (on the horizon of the Platonic opposition between play and seriousness); and Hermes in the Homeric hymn, where the infant-god plays with hymnal praise and sacrifice at the risk of compromising his divine status. This leads us to reconsider the historiography of the relationship between play and religion.</i>

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15

Riker, W. H. "The Entry of Game Theory into Political Science." History of Political Economy 24, Supplement (1992): 207–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-supplement-207.

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16

Bergstrom, Theodore, Shane Parendo, and Jon Sonstelie. "Competition and Personality in a Restaurant Entry Game." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 16, no. 1 (2016): 411–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0049.

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AbstractWe explore the question of whether personality traits as measured by standard psychological tests are significant explanators of behavior in an entry game. The experimental data and psychological test results come from classroom experiments designed to teach the concepts of short and long run equilibrium in a competitive market. These experiments were conducted in 42 classroom sessions, each with about 35 students.

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17

Melikyan, Gregory B. "HIV entry: a game of hide-and-fuse?" Current Opinion in Virology 4 (February 2014): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coviro.2013.09.004.

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18

Lipman, Barton L. "Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 14, no. 3-4 (1990): 685–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-i.

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19

Gillet, Laurent, Bruno Frederico, and Philip G. Stevenson. "Host entry by gamma-herpesviruses — lessons from animal viruses?" Current Opinion in Virology 15 (December 2015): 34–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coviro.2015.07.007.

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Gillet, Laurent, and Philip G. Stevenson. "Evidence for a Multiprotein Gamma-2 Herpesvirus Entry Complex." Journal of Virology 81, no. 23 (2007): 13082–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/jvi.01141-07.

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ABSTRACT Herpesviruses use multiple virion glycoproteins to enter cells. How these work together is not well understood: some may act separately or they may form a single complex. Murine gammaherpesvirus 68 (MHV-68) gB, gH, gL, and gp150 all participate in entry. gB and gL are involved in binding, gB and gH are conserved fusion proteins, and gp150 inhibits cell binding until glycosaminoglycans are engaged. Here we show that a gH-specific antibody coprecipitates gB and thus that gH and gB are associated in the virion membrane. A gH/gL-specific antibody also coprecipitated gB, implying a tripartite complex of gL/gH/gB, although the gH/gB association did not require gL. The association was also independent of gp150, and gp150 was not demonstrably bound to gB or gH. However, gp150 incorporation into virions was partly gL dependent, suggesting that it too contributes to a single entry complex. gp150− and gL− gp150− mutants bound better than the wild type to B cells and readily colonized B cells in vivo. Thus, gp150 and gL appear to be epithelial cell-adapted accessories of a core gB/gH entry complex. The cell binding revealed by gp150 disruption did not require gL and therefore seemed most likely to involve gB.

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21

Santos-Pinto, Luis, and Tiago Pires. "Overconfidence and Timing of Entry." Games 11, no. 4 (2020): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11040044.

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We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers the profit of the rational player but can increase that of the overconfident player. Consumer rents increase with overconfidence while producer rents decrease which leads to an ambiguous welfare effect.

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22

Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A., Bastian Westbrock, and Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst. "Rational Signals of Weakness in a Market Entry Game." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169, no. 3 (2013): 519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245613x669439.

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23

De Francesco, Massimo A. "A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY." Bulletin of Economic Research 66, no. 4 (2012): 406–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00435.x.

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24

Kuzmanovic, Marija, Vera Kovacevic-Vujcic, and Milan Martic. "Three-stage entry game: The strategic effects of advertising." Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research 21, no. 2 (2011): 163–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/yjor1102163k.

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This paper analyzes the effects of investment in advertising in the three-stage entry game model with one incumbent and one potential entrant firm. It is shown that if a game theory is applied, under particular conditions, advertising can be used as a strategic weapon in the market entry game. Depending on the level of the advertising interaction factor, conditions for over-investment in advertising for strategic purposes are given. Furthermore, three specific cases are analyzed: strictly predatory advertising, informative advertising and the case when one firm?s advertising cannot directly influence the other firm's profit. For each of them, depending on the costs of advertising and marginal costs, equilibrium is determined, and conditions under which it is possible to deter the entry are given. It is shown that if the value of the advertising interaction factor increases, power of using advertising as a weapon to deter entry into the market decreases. Thus, in the case of informative advertising, advertising cannot be used as a tool for deterring entry into the market, while in the case of predatory advertising, it can. Also, we have proved that in the case of strictly informative advertising an over-investment never occurs, while in the two other cases, there is always over-investment either to deter or to accommodate the entry.

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25

Bae, Sang Hoo, Arpita Joardar, and Joseph Sarkis. "A game theoretic analysis of firms' entry mode decisions." International Journal of Operational Research 26, no. 2 (2016): 196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijor.2016.076301.

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26

Nti, Kofi O. "Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game." Journal of Economics 71, no. 2 (2000): 149–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01227449.

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27

Holden, Steinar, and Christian Riis. "Entry into a new market a game of timing." International Journal of Industrial Organization 12, no. 4 (1994): 549–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(94)90007-8.

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28

Sarmento, Paula, and António Brandão. "Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand." Economics Research International 2010 (October 24, 2010): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/105049.

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We investigate how an incumbent firm can use the regulatory policy about entry and the informational advantage to protect his market position. This question is studied through the construction of a signalling game where we assume that the regulator has less information about demand than the firms. We conclude that there is a pooling equilibrium and partially separating equilibria in which entry is deterred and, if demand is high, there will be insufficient entry. The final effect on welfare depends on the tradeoff between short-run benefits (lower price) and long-run losses (weaker competition).

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29

Moura Campos, Arthur. "Entre ler e jogar." DAT Journal 8, no. 2 (2023): 253–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.29147/datjournal.v8i2.688.

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A partir das reflexões que surgiram durante a apresentação guiada da obra “SAÍDA game” no “Congresso LitDig-BR da Electronic Literature Organization – ELO 2022” (28/06/2022), proponho nesse texto recordar brevemente o processo criativo da obra e discutir possíveis diferenças entre ler e jogar.

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30

Ren, Junqiushi. "Effects of Southwest Airlines on Carrier Profits and Entry Probabilities." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (April 17, 2021): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6625584.

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This paper studies the effects of Southwest Airlines, the largest low-cost carrier (LCC) in the U.S., on other carriers’ payoff functions and entry probabilities. A static entry game model is developed and estimated by viewing entry as an indicator of underlying profitability and making use of Nash Equilibrium. Results indicate that Southwest has a remarkable and negative impact on the payoffs of other carriers. This impact is firm-specific, with LCCs being more affected than full-service carriers (FSCs). Comparing the two service types, the results show that Southwest’s nonstop presence apparently imposes more downward pressure on opponents’ profits than its connecting presence. A counterfactual experiment is then conducted. Once Southwest is counterfactually removed, the probability of each carrier entering a market significantly changes. This paper examines Southwest’s impacts from a new perspective and extends literature on entry game estimation.

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Souza, Josiane Maria Oliveira, Tayse Tâmara Paixão Duarte, Sandra Renata Nakashoji, Michelle Zampieri Ipolito, and Marcia Cristina Silva Magro. "Tuberculose latente entre pessoas com hiv/aids." Revista de Enfermagem UFPE on line 12, no. 9 (2018): 2451. http://dx.doi.org/10.5205/1981-8963-v12i9a236490p2451-2458-2018.

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RESUMOObjetivo: buscar evidências sobre o uso da terapia preventiva com isoniazida na redução do risco da tuberculose ativa entre as pessoas vivendo com HIV/Aids mediante os resultados dos ensaios de liberação do interferon-gama (IGRA). Método: trata-se de estudo bibliográfico, descritivo, tipo revisão integrativa, com busca de artigos nas bases de dados publicados de 2010 a 2017. Os descritores utilizados foram HIV, AIDS, terapia preventiva com isoniazida, tratamento da infecção latente da tuberculose, interferon-gama, ensaios de liberação do interferon-gama. Resultados: selecionaram-se três artigos, com 1815 PVHA e desenvolvimento de tuberculose em apenas um caso, após 24 meses de terapia preventiva com isoniazida. Altas taxas de reversão e conversão durante o seguimento. Conclusão: consideraram-se os estudos abordando os benefícios da terapia preventiva com isoniazida a partir do resultado do IGRA apresentam-se escassos, com incipiente sugestão da limitação do teste seriado para o seguimento da resposta da terapia entre as PVHA. Além disso, destaca-se a necessidade de se investir em mais estudos que explorem a temática e superem as limitações já encontradas tendo em vista a alta relevância de se investir em novas estratégias que impactem o controle da coinfecção TB/HIV. Descritores: Tuberculose Latente; Teste Tuberculínico; Interferon-gama; HIV; Enfermagem; Prevenção de Doenças. ABSTRACT Objective: to search for evidence on the use of isoniazid preventive therapy in reducing the risk of active tuberculosis among people living with HIV / AIDS through the results of interferon-gamma (IGRA) release trials. Method: a descriptive, descriptive, integrative review type, with search of articles in the databases published from 2010 to 2017. The descriptors used were HIV, AIDS, isoniazid preventive therapy, treatment of latent tuberculosis infection, interferon-gamma, of interferon-gamma release. Results: three articles were selected, with 1815 PLHA and tuberculosis development in only one case, after 24 months of preventive therapy with isoniazid. High rates of reversal and conversion during follow-up. Conclusion: studies addressing the benefits of preventive therapy with isoniazid from the IGRA result are scarce, with an incipient suggestion of limiting the serial test for the follow-up of the therapy response among PLHA. In addition, there is a need to invest in more studies that explore the issue and overcome the limitations already encountered in view of the high relevance of investing in new strategies that impact the control of TB / HIV co-infection. Descriptors: Latent Tuberculosis; Tuberculin Test; Interferon-gamma; HIV; Nursing; Prevention of Diseases. RESUMEN Objetivo: buscar evidencias sobre el uso de la terapia preventiva con isoniazida en la reducción del riesgo de la tuberculosis activa entre las personas que viven con el VIH / SIDA, a través de los resultados de los ensayos de liberación del interferón gamma (IGRA). Método: estudio bibliográfico, descriptivo, tipo revisión integrativa, con búsqueda de artículos en las bases de datos publicados de 2010 a 2017. Los descriptores utilizados fueron: VIH, SIDA, terapia preventiva con isoniazida, tratamiento de la infección latente de la tuberculosis, interferón-gamma, ensayos de liberación del interferón-gamma. 0 se seleccionaron tres artículos, con 1815 PVHA y desarrollo de tuberculosis en apenas un caso, después de 24 meses de terapia preventiva con isoniazida. Altas tasas de reversión y conversión durante el seguimiento. Conclusión: los estudios abordando los beneficios de la terapia preventiva con isoniazida a partir del resultado del IGRA se presentan escasos, con incipiente sugerencia de la limitación de la prueba seriada para el seguimiento de la respuesta de la terapia, entre las PVHA. Además, se destaca la necesidad de invertir en más estudios que puedan explorar la temática y supere las limitaciones ya encontradas, visto la alta relevancia de invertir en nuevas estrategias que impacten en el control de la coinfección TB / VIH. Descritores: Tuberculosis Latente, Prueba de Tuberculina, Interferón Gamma; VIH, Enfermería; Prevención de Enfermedades.

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32

Park, Kwan-Yong, and Woo-Sung Cho. "A Study on China Market entry of Online Game Industries." E-Business Studies 22, no. 6 (2021): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.20462/tebs.2021.12.22.6.141.

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33

Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel. "Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game." RAND Journal of Economics 28, no. 4 (1997): 662. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555781.

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34

Anandhakumar, Jayamani, Sylvain Fauquenoy, Philippe Materne, Valérie Migeot, and Damien Hermand. "Regulation of entry into gametogenesis by Ste11: the endless game." Biochemical Society Transactions 41, no. 6 (2013): 1673–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1042/bst20130225.

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Sexual reproduction is a fundamental aspect of eukaryotic cells, and a conserved feature of gametogenesis is its dependency on a master regulator. The ste11 gene was isolated more than 20 years ago by the Yamamoto laboratory as a suppressor of the uncontrolled meiosis driven by a pat1 mutant. Numerous studies from this laboratory and others have established the role of the Ste11 transcription factor as the master regulator of the switch between proliferation and differentiation in fission yeast. The transcriptional and post-transcriptional controls of ste11 expression are intricate, but most are not redundant. Whereas the transcriptional controls ensure that the gene is transcribed at a high level only when nutrients are rare, the post-transcriptional controls restrict the ability of Ste11 to function as a transcription factor to the G1-phase of the cell cycle from where the differentiation programme is initiated. Several feedback loops ensure that the cell fate decision is irreversible. The complete panel of molecular mechanisms operating to warrant the timely expression of the ste11 gene and its encoded protein basically mirrors the advances in the understanding of the numerous ways by which gene expression can be modulated.

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35

ORHUN, EDA. "DISCLOSURE DECISION IN AN ENTRY GAME WITH COSTLY INFORMATION INTERPRETATION." Global Economy Journal 19, no. 01 (2019): 1950005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2194565919500052.

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This paper analyzes a firm’s incentives to disclose private information related to its market situation when there is a potential competitor. However, I adopt a more realistic definition of transparency that has been mostly overlooked by the earlier literature. In a realistic situation, financial transparency does not imply that all the relevant information are automatically transmitted to the receiver of the signal but instead the available information needs to be understood. When the model is adjusted to incorporate this realistic definition of transparency, fully revealing equilibrium associated with the “Revelation Principle” does not exist anymore. It is observed that the model with interpretation costs of transparency yields both pooling and partially pooling equilibria.

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36

Wells, Alexandra I., and Carolyn B. Coyne. "Enteroviruses: A Gut-Wrenching Game of Entry, Detection, and Evasion." Viruses 11, no. 5 (2019): 460. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/v11050460.

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Enteroviruses are a major source of human disease, particularly in neonates and young children where infections can range from acute, self-limited febrile illness to meningitis, endocarditis, hepatitis, and acute flaccid myelitis. The enterovirus genus includes poliovirus, coxsackieviruses, echoviruses, enterovirus 71, and enterovirus D68. Enteroviruses primarily infect by the fecal–oral route and target the gastrointestinal epithelium early during their life cycles. In addition, spread via the respiratory tract is possible and some enteroviruses such as enterovirus D68 are preferentially spread via this route. Once internalized, enteroviruses are detected by intracellular proteins that recognize common viral features and trigger antiviral innate immune signaling. However, co-evolution of enteroviruses with humans has allowed them to develop strategies to evade detection or disrupt signaling. In this review, we will discuss how enteroviruses infect the gastrointestinal tract, the mechanisms by which cells detect enterovirus infections, and the strategies enteroviruses use to escape this detection.

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37

Nitzan, Shmuel. "The Game of Political Entry with Truly Effective Identical Players." Journal of Theoretical Politics 3, no. 2 (1991): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692891003002003.

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38

Argenziano, Rossella, and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler. "Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game." Economics Letters 120, no. 3 (2013): 509–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.009.

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39

Chocron, Michael, and Inesse Laouini. "Jeux vidéo : relation entre game et play." Cliniques méditerranéennes 107, no. 1 (2023): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/cm.107.0115.

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40

Newton, Bruce. "Game Changer." Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Technology International 2018, no. 1 (2018): 116–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/s1467-5560(22)60332-4.

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Mike Carcamo, Nissan’s global motorsport director, believes the OEM’s entry into the fifth season of Formula E will provide a welcome platform to further its electric road car program and spread the message of Nissan Intelligent Mobility

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Schaubroeck, John, and Stephen G. Green. "Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Change as Outcomes for Organizational Entry Research." Academy of Management Proceedings 1988, no. 1 (1988): 216–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.1988.4980559.

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Fumagalli, Chiara, and Massimo Motta. "Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete." American Economic Review 96, no. 3 (2006): 785–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.785.

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Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak. Under fierce downstream competition, if entry took place, a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry, no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur. This result is robust across different specifications of the game.

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43

Agarwal, Khushee. "GAME THEORY IN STARTUP STRATEGY: INSIGHTS INTO FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS, COMPETITIVE MARKETS, AND MARKET ENTRY TIMING." International Journal of Advanced Research 12, no. 09 (2024): 1005–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/19532.

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This research delves into the application of game theory in enhancing decision making within businesses by structuring data into a payoff matrix, for evaluating the relative benefits of cooperation and competition, among enterprises. The study illustrates that game theory contributes to shaping decisions and impacts the planning for a companys expansion. Business owners who understand game theory acquire perspectives on when to collaborate and compete in ventures. This insight is very useful, for firms that aim to thrive in the startup ecosystem. The paper will focus on the primary decisions such as the agreement with the venture capitalist making decisions in competitive markets and determining the optimal market entry timing.

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Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco, and Margarida Catalão-Lopes. "Economies of Scope, Entry Deterrence and Welfare." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 13, no. 1 (2013): 419–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0078.

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Abstract This paper develops a model where the incumbent may expand to a related market to signal economies of scope and deter entry in the former market. We show that the incumbent only expands when scope economies are large enough. Thus expansion is a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, leads to entry deterrence. Although our game is two-period, the expansion strategy creates a long-term advantage. We further investigate the implications of prohibiting an entry-deterrent expansion. A major finding is that, in our model, this prohibition always decreases consumer surplus. In terms of global welfare, the impact is ambiguous but negative for many parameter values.

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Ribeiro Junior, Pedro Carlos Elias, Lia Raquel Oliveira, Regina Helena Munhoz, and Tatiana Comiotto. "Do jogo ao game: considerações teóricas e articulações entre game e aprendizagem." Revista de Estudios e Investigación en Psicología y Educación, no. 13 (December 17, 2017): 057. http://dx.doi.org/10.17979/reipe.2017.0.13.2301.

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Filipcic, Ales, Bojan Leskosek, Miguel Crespo, and Tjasa Filipcic. "Matchplay characteristics and performance indicators of male junior and entry professional tennis players." International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 16, no. 3 (2021): 768–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747954120988002.

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Performance analysis during match play is vital for the long-term development of tennis players. The primary goal of this study was to establish the differences between junior and entry professional tennis player's selected performance indicators in five-game situations. Data were collected using the Sagit/Tennis tracking system during six junior and four professional tennis matches. Eight boys performed 3,112 strokes, while eight male professional players hit 1,631 strokes. The results showed slight differences in the distance covered by the two observed groups in the specific game situations. Professional players performed faster shots in all game situations, except when playing at the net. They played at a significantly faster tempo than the juniors. This difference was also affected by the higher shots speed and shorter distance between the two players during the rallies. When playing from the baseline, the entry professional players performed shots at a smaller angle than the juniors; and when serving, receiving and playing at the net, they hit shots at a greater angle than the juniors. Our findings may assist coaches and players in improving the effectiveness of their tactical and technical training to enhance their competitive performance.

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Zhou, Ai-nong. "Spatial Competition with Entry Deterrence considering Horizontal Product Differentiations." Journal of Applied Mathematics 2013 (2013): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/426345.

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Spatial competition plays important roles in economics, which attracts extensive research. This paper addresses spatial competitions along with horizontal product differentiations and entry deterrence. By the dynamic game theory model about one firm and a potential entrant with different cost in a linear city, this paper finds that both the higher fixed setup cost and the higher transportation cost deter entrants. To efficiently deter the entrants, the establisher is inclined to locating at the middle point of the linear city.

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Drumond Negrao, Maryangela. "Rediseñando las reglas del (video)juego." Economía Creativa, no. 3 (June 30, 2015): 25–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.46840/ec.2015.03.03.

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El artículo expone las interacciones entre la estructura organizacional, la estrategia de mercadotecnia, la creatividad y la innovación dentro de la industria creativa de los videojuegos, considerada como una de las más importantes en el aprovechamiento de la creatividad y del capital intelectual en sus procesos. Como resultado de investigación cualitativa con desarrolladores de videojuegos en Brasil, el artículo destaca estándares de gestión innovadores, las habilidades creativas y las modernas técnicas de control utilizadas en esa industria, bajo la perspectiva de las pequeñas empresas. Basado en el modelo de ejecución de estrategia de Sashittal y Jassawalla (2001) y en los conceptos de creatividad e innovación propuestos por Amabile (1997), el resultado de la investigación muestra que la mezcla entre una producción y una gestión creativas, el empleo de tecnología en procesos, la orientación al mercado y la entrega de valor son esenciales para mantener un círculo virtuoso en esos emprendimientos.

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Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel. "ADAPTIVE LEARNING vs. EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS IN AN ENTRY LIMIT PRICING GAME*." Economic Journal 107, no. 442 (1997): 553–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00027.x.

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Wei, Yang. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Entry Decision of Manufacturers and Distributors." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 440 (March 19, 2020): 022040. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/440/2/022040.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Gamme entry'

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