Academic literature on the topic 'Gays – Political activity – Europe'

In the aftermath of the fall of Constantinople, the political and cultural elite of the Byzantine Empire, who had chosen the path of exile, did everything in their power to encourage Europe to oppose Ottoman expansion in arms. At the same time, the Greek diaspora undertook a complex operation to preserve the Byzantine cultural heritage. Their activity in the West gave a boost to the cultural renewal promoted by humanism through the rediscovery of the roots of classical thought and science, but also through an impulse to theological reflection eager to return to Christian roots. In this panorama, still far from being reconstructed in its entirety, mainly due to the fragmentation of knowledge and predominantly national historiographical perspectives, an important page of European cultural history remains in the shadows: the concomitant attempt to involve the Grand Principality of Moscow in the resistance to Ottoman expansion and the commitment of the Greek diaspora to the cultural and religious updating of the Eastern Slavic world, with which it shared the same Christian tradition.

Starting from the reconstruction of Bruno Trentin's transnational network of political and intellectual relationships, the essay analyzes the European and international dimensions of his political and trade union activity from the years of his leadership of the General Secretary up to his experience in the European Parliament. The union of rights and the political program on Europe are the main themes of the essay. They are combined with the question of the construction of political Europe and the institutional reform of the Union, and culminate in his contribution to the European Parliament, in the aftermath of the elaboration of the "European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union," and on the occasion of the debate on the European Constitution.

The section offers a critical selection of documents from a transnational perspective, both published and unpublished, in French, English, Spanish and Italian within a time span from 1988 to 2006. Trentin's writings document not only the breadth and depth of his reflections on the question of rights and solidarity, on Europe and the European social space, the Mediterranean and the Middle East quadrant, but also on issues such as war and peace, inequality and migration that also mark the international dimension of his trade union-political activity.

The essay traces Bruno Trentin's political biography and intellectual research from a transnational perspective. Through the work notebooks (1953-1995), the diaries on the CGILGeneral Secretary (1988-1994), the activity in the European Parliament (1999-2004) and the following two years, the elaboration of The Freedom Comes First(2005) is rooted in a long term criticism against the subalternity of the communist and social-democratic culture to the Fordist model. It is also based on the necessity of a libertarian socialism, based on the centrality of the person and on the unavoidable link between work and knowledge. What stands outis the originality of Trentin's political thought, the intellectual circuit in which his research is developed and his vision of a federal Europe in the international system following the Cold War and the aftermath of September 11th, 2001.

AbstractThe Winter Palace (TWP) was a venue and association within the left-wing alternative environment in Malmö between 1987–1989, with premises in the port area. The venue ran a pub and café; arranged concerts, public lectures, and movie screenings; broadcasted radio; published fanzines; and more. The idea was that the proceeds would be used to build a Southern Swedish center for anarchist propaganda and political struggle. However, this idea did not fully realize, and the extensive mix of cultural activities is probably better remembered today than the more explicit political activities that were carried out. In the early 1990s, the far-left environment in Sweden changed. A more autonomous (and violent) group led a long and controversial squatting event in Malmö, resulting in the biggest operation to date by Swedish police against this kind of activity. Apparently, a generational shift had taken place and the methods used by TWP were criticized for not being political enough. This article follows the events at TWP during its active period and draws several conclusions from the similar squatting movement in western Europe at the same time. It also discusses if there was a specific way of Swedish alternative left-wing actions in the 1980s.

AbstractOceans and seas have been vital food sources for both coastal and terrestrial communities for thousands of years. Traditionally, the main actors were small-scale fishers adopting more ecologically-benign fishing practices either for their own subsistence or small-scale commercial use and livelihood. Members of small-scale fishing communities frequently combine other socioeconomic activities such as small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry with their fishing activity as well. Thus, they usually have broader and different understandings and narratives regarding their relations and interdependency with the fish and the seas compared with industrial capture fisheries targeting the most profitable commercial fish species using more destructive gears and high technological capacities. In this chapter, we aim to shed light on their past and present—as well as highlight their existence as a rather neglected and marginalized social group, their political agency and their global movement for food sovereignty in order to uncover their social, political and ecological roles for the future of oceans, coastal communities, and the society in general. Our research methodology relies on participant observation and action methods based on 3 years of continuous work with small-scale fishing cooperatives in Turkey, Spain and Europe, as well as following and collaborating with the WFFP (World Forum of Fisher People) members both in Europe and globally. We conducted more than 80 interviews with key actors from fisheries sector including policy makers, NGOs, members of fishing cooperatives, and fisheries and marine scientists that inform this investigation. We claim that even though small-scale fishing communities are usually neglected actors of the ‘present’ in most mainstream marine policies, narratives and agendas such as the Blue Economy, their ‘presence’ in ocean governance is of utmost importance and their future existence needs to be ensured for an ecologically, socially and economically just ocean governance.

AbstractTo rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragmatism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is known for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They argued that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair-splitting abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their practice and problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not accept foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique ‘scientific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science as a plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real world problems and subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the potential and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the philosophy of science, after 1950 it lost it standing. After the demise of analytical philosophy, in the 1980s of the previous century, there was a resurgence of pragmatism led by several so-called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Hillary Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy have written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early days they were frowned upon by their esteemed colleagues. This new pragmatist movement gained traction first in the US, in particular through works of Bernstein, Toulmin, Rorty, Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on though the works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.

This chapter looks into how international solidarity affected gay liberation and the Iranian Revolution. It explains how Islam was marshaled as a repressive force threatening women and gays. The efflorescence of gay liberation in 1971 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 bore the fruit of the consequences of wider claims that Islam was incompatible with Europe. The 1970s marked the concerted efforts on the part of queer activists to push back against persistent legal and societal homophobia in the Federal Republic after activists developed transnational networks. The internationalization of West German queer politics in the 1970s was crucial to how white, queer West Germans racialized Islam.

Latvia is one of the leaders in production and use of forest biofuel in Europe. The rapid increase of forest biofuel market raises questions about sustainability of the supply chains and contribution of the forest biofuel produced in Latvia to the climate change mitigation. Sustainability of forest biofuel is addressed in multiple recent international political initiatives; particularly, the European 2030 climate and energy package and the nature restoration regulation. Climate change mitigation potential of forest biofuel is surrounded by multiple speculations, which have to be addressed by comprehensive evaluation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to production and delivery of forest biofuel. According to the study results, average GHG emissions due to delivery of harvesting residues from the state forests correspond to 1.4 kg CO2 eq GJ-1, including forwarding, comminution and delivery to a 68 km distance. This is significantly less than the default values provided in the regulation (EC) 2018/2001, particularly during the delivery of forest biofuel. GHG emissions due to delivery of forest biofuel from removal of vegetation in abandoned farmlands are 1.9 kg CO2 eq GJ-1, from forest drainage ditches – 1.7 kg CO2 eq GJ-1, from pre-commercial thinning – 2.1 kg CO2 eq GJ-1. Estimation of the GHG emissions is complicated by limited information on some of the sources and productivity. Building of the system for collection of activity data is a crucial task for transparent demonstration of GHG emissions and the effect of applied mitigation measures.

It is well-known that navigating the waterway from the primary trade hubs in northern Europe to the Asia-Pacific ports and contrariwise along the Russian Arctic Coast (Northern Sea Route - NSR) is much shorter and faster, than southern ways via Suez or around Africa. The NSR can significantly save costs (through saving time and fuel) and avoids the risk of attack by pirates. In addition, an increase in oil and gas activity in the North, forecasts of global warming and an ice-free Arctic have stimulated interest in Arctic navigation. However, Arctic transportation poses significant challenges because of the heavy ice conditions that exist during both the winter and summer. The profitability of using the NSR is called into question if possible high tariffs are included in the cost estimates. For many years, the NSR was principally used for internal Russian transport and since the end of the 1980s up until 2010, it was in stagnation with total amount of cargo transported annually stood at less than two million tons. Important political decisions in the 90s and increased economic feasibility intensified traffic and freight turnover. In 2013, the NSR Administration (NSRA) was established, new rules for navigation were approved and tariff policies were modified. In 2013, the NSRA issued 635 permits to sail in NSR waters, and 71 transit voyages have since been completed. The total amount of transit cargo was 1.36 million tons. More than 40% of the total number of permits were issued to vessels without ice class [1] according to the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping [2]. There are strong technical requirements for vessels attempting to sail the NSR; regardless, several accidents occurred in 2012–2013. Two vessels were dented by ice in the Chukchi Sea in 2012. A tanker was holed in September 2013 and created a real danger of an ecological disaster from fuel leakage for several days. Despite the expectation of an ice-free Arctic, the ice conditions in 2013 were rather difficult, and the Vilkitsky Strait (a key strait in the NSR between the Kara and Laptev seas) was closed by ice for almost the entire navigation period. In this paper, we review the current situation in the Russian Arctic, including political and administrative actions, recent accidents and the associated conditions and lessons learned.

The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) requires from European enterprises to intensively engage in reporting and monitoring their sustainability related performance. Known as “climate-first” approach, fighting climate change has become the priority in politics. To contribute to that aim, companies face new regulations with a special focus on their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission performance. For the product specific measurement of GHG emissions, references are given to the methodology proposed in the established GHG Protocol Product Standard (GHG Protocol, 2011). In this standard the product’s GHG emission – subsequently called “unit carbon footprint” (uCFP) – is measured via a generic activity-based methodology. Due to its deliberately generic definition, this methodology constitutes a conceptual model that contains no operationalization which is needed for practical implementations. In this paper this gap is closed by introducing the “3-Levers of Emission Control (3- LoEC)”-model, which has the following advantages: it measures the uCFP via three levers of emission control that are related to the consumption and procurement of energy, it is connected to data contained in activity-based costing (ABC) systems, and it is a forecasting instrument so that it is at the core of activity-based GHG emission budgeting and the corresponding management control system (MCS) with respect to GHG emission.

This article presents the results of an analysis of energy cooperation between the EU and Israel, which is aimed at reducing the dependence of European states on Russian energy carriers. The need for getting rid of energy dependence on Russian oil, gas and coal among the EU member states arose after the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The Russian-Ukrainian war led not only to the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations, but also to the imposition of Western sanctions against Russia, a country that is the main supplier of energy to the European market. The desire to abandon Russian energy carriers forced the European states to look for new suppliers of oil, gas and coal. One of these suppliers decided to become Israel, which, according to Western human rights activists, is pursuing a policy of apartheid. The purpose of this study was to analyze the cooperation between the European Union and Israel in the field of natural gas supplies from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. During the study, the author came to the conclusion that this cooperation: 1) most likely will not help the countries of the European Union to fully compensate for the reduction in natural gas supplies from Russia; 2) carries risks for the reputation of the European Union as a defender of human rights and freedoms in the world (because Israel continues to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East, continues to occupy and annex the territories of neighboring states, build illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied territories11 of Palestine and Syria, conduct apartheid, commit politically motivated assassinations of their critics).

The EU ratification of the Paris Agreement initiated extensive political and legislative activities within the EU to reach agreed climate objectives. The declaration of the climate crisis, the publication of the European Green Deal, and the obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels created the foundations for establishing an ambitious climate legal framework at the EU level. At the center of that legal framework is the European Climate Law, which obliges the EU to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Completing the set goals requires a strong climate transition, which includes, among other actions, a change to a low-carbon economy. At the EU level, the obligation to fulfill the goals of the Paris Agreement and the related goals of the European Climate Law is primarily on the institutions of executive and legislative power that have the democratic legitimacy to act actively to achieve climate neutrality. However, the international agreements concluded by the EU (including the Paris Agreement) are binding upon all EU institutions, i.e., the European Central Bank, as explicitly prescribed in the TFEU. The European Central Bank, simply put, represents the supranational central bank of the eurozone. With regard to its legal nature, the European Central Bank is often defined as an EU institution sui generis, which reflects its unique position given by the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. Apart from the fact that the European Central Bank has a legal personality and regulatory powers and that its financial resources are separated from those of the EU, the ECB’s unique position derives from the fact that the TFEU strictly limits its legal mandate. The primary mandate of the European Central Bank is to maintain price stability within the eurozone. The secondary mandate of the European Central Bank is to support, without prejudice to its price stability objective, the general economic policies in the EU, with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the EU, including a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. Considering its strictly prescribed goals, addressing the climate objectives could contradict the European Central Bank’s legal mandate. Even though the European Central Bank has already decided to take into consideration climate- related objectives, there is still an ongoing debate in academic and central banks’ circles whether the European Central Bank could or must address climate objectives in its activities or, following the rule of law principle, is precluded in doing so. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by giving the legal perspective of the European Central Bank’s price stability mandate and its secondary mandate, as well as their relation to EU climate objectives.

The article considers the main milestones of the military and political activity of prince Alexander Nevskiy reflecting the most important milestones of the Russian people's struggle for independence and saving of the Orthodox faith in the XIII century. The public need in saving historical and cultural memory led to the erection of memorable places and objects of cult architecture in honor of A. Nevskiy, including in modern Volgograd. On the basis of the existing objects of the cultural space of Volgograd, the methodological ways of A. Nevskiy's image formation as the defender of medieval Russia and the notion of confrontation with the aggressive aims of Western Europe and the Mongol-Tatars are offered.

Due to COVID-19, economic activity decreased considerably all across Europe. Our paper reviews the various pandemic effects and changes in the European banking sector. Using a dataset merged from four different secondary databases, we created a panel of countryquarters with 513 items covering the period 2016 Q1 – 2020 Q3 including the effects of the first wave of the pandemic. Correlation analysis revealed that during the pandemic, the connectedness of the banking system to the macroeconomy increased, and that the open economies had a more stable banking system. Performance fluctuations on the national banking system level increased, and banking performance became more closely linked to quarterly GPD growth. Covid-19 had a significant adverse effect on the banking sector's profitability on top of the standard macroeconomic fallbacks. Data also underpin that the countries where citizens had stronger trust in their government (political system, legal system, police) suffered less due to the Covid-19 crisis than other EU27 members. High-trust EU27 countries lost less in GDP, import, export, and banking profitability during the first wave of the pandemic. However, this might be partly also a result of some cultural characteristics linked to geography.

The paper aims to analyze the need to transform the global economy into an economy with low CO2 emissions, a "decarbonized" economy, an economy with low climate risk, finally becoming a sustainable economy. The transformation of the economy will extend over a long time horizon and, as a result of the limits and resistance factors of the current economic system, it will not take place quickly, essential transformations being necessary in all areas of activity, but also in the way of thinking, the lifestyle, education, health and political organization. The recent global economic crisis, the registration of the continuous and irreversible damage to the environment, with negative effects, including on human subjects, have demonstrated the capacity and reduced reaction limits of the economic system to the environmental instabilities. Analyis performed proves that treating and studying the governance of sustainable development is particularly complex. Determining the choice of appropriate public policies is all the more obvious as the sectoral dimension used in public administration mainly needs to be changed, giving way to integrated and horizontally coordinated approaches. Also, the increase in the degree of globalization and integration entails a vertical integration of public policies that will have to include converging objectives of sustainable development. There is a need for a policy focused on a functional productive industry, with jobs in Europe, a policy beneficial for European society; the products, their applications, but also the employees, represent the foundation of a prosperous European society, energy efficient, with low carbon emissions.

Abstract. Computerized education is a pedagogical strategy adapted / adaptable to the policy model education in the post-cultural model of society. At the operational level, the process involves the concept of assimilation and exploitation of new information technologies in activities designed to level the educational system in the context of specific activities. This are: computerized and “computerial” literacy; ownership of knowledge in the studied disciplines of profile information, making management education, application of computer assisted instruction, teaching method or as a special educational means integrated into any teaching strategy. Cumulative contributions show that important progress has been achieved in Europe, particularly in the development of ICT in education, while one is notable heterogeneity of practices and policies presented in agreement with different political priorities, ideals and educational funding. In Romania, a characterization in general terms, might read: The educational system will undergo significant changes, as the main orientation and design of a system of permanent education. As routine tasks in any field of activity will be taken over by computers, the individual will have more free time to train. At this training will add competition increasingly harshness, which will require the use of leisure time for qualification. In essence, computerization is not limited to teaching a new method, which would enter into the traditional methods. Through their social role, designated the concept of “computer culture” signifies transforming computerization of education system by education, not only as a form of organization, but also as contents. Finally we should mention that the importance and complexity of the process of computerization of education requires attention to the state level. It is appropriate to develop a concept of implementing information technologies in education that would reflect all aspects of the process, its directions and propose to exploit resources, that Romania has already today in an efficient way.

This paper examines the organisational and discursive strategies of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and its differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe, with the primary focus on the movement’s educational activities. The paper describes the characteristics of organisational activity among Turkish Muslims in Europe. Then it analyses two mainstream religious-communitarian movements and the contrasting settlement strategies of the “neo- communitarian” Gülen movement. Despite the large Turkish population in western Europe, the movement has been active there for only about ten years – relatively late compared to other Islamic organisations. Mainly, the associational organisation of Turkish Islam in Europe is based on two axes: the construction/ sponsoring of mosques and Qur’anic schools. By contrast, the Gülen movement’s members in Europe, insisting on ‘the great importance of secular education’, do not found or sponsor mosques and Qur’anic schools. Their principal focus is to address the problems of the immi- grant youth population in Europe, with reintegration of Turkish students into the educational system of the host societies as a first goal. On the one hand, as a neo-communitarian religious grouping, they strive for a larger share of the ‘market’ (i.e. more members from among the Turkish diaspora) by offering a fresh religious discourse and new organisational strategies, much as they have done in Turkey. On the other hand, they seek to gain legitimacy in the public sphere in Germany and France by building an educational network in these countries, just as they have done in Central Asia and the Balkans region. Accordingly, a reinvigorated and reorganised community is taking shape in western Europe. This paper examines the organizational and discursive strategies1 of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and it is differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe. We seek to analyse particularly the educational activities of this movement which appeared in the Islamic scene in Diaspora of Europe for the last 10 years. We focus on the case of Gülen movement because it represents a prime example amongst Islamic movements which seek to reconcile-or ac- commodate- with the secular system in Turkey. In spite of the exclusionary policy of Turkish secular state towards the religious movements, this faith-based social movement achieved to accommodate to the new socio-political conditions of Turkey. Today, for many searchers, Gülen movement brings Islam back to the public sphere by cross-fertilizing Islamic idioms with global discourses on human rights, democracy, and the market economy.2 Indeed, the activities of Gülen movement in the secular context of France and Germany represent an interesting sociological object. Firstly, we will describe the characteristics of organizational ability of Anatolian Islam in Europe. Then we will analyse the mainstream religious-com- munitarian movements (The National Perspective movement and Suleymanci community) and the settlement strategies of the “neo-communitarian”3 Gülen movement in the Turkish Muslim Diaspora. Based on semi-directive interviews with the directors of the learning centres in Germany and France and a 6 month participative observation of Gülen-inspired- activities in Strasbourg; we will try to answer the following questions: How the movement appropriates the “religious” manner and defines it in a secular context regarding to the host/ global society? How the message of Gülen is perceived among his followers and how does it have effect on acts of the Turkish Muslim community? How the movement realises the transmission of communitarian and `religious’ values and-especially-how they compete with other Islamic associations? In order to answer these questions, we will make an analysis which is based on two axes: Firstly, how the movement position within the Turkish-Islamic associational organisation? Secondly, we will try to describe the contact zones between the followers of Gülen and the global society.

1. Macroeconomic Summary In December, headline inflation (13.1%) and the average of the core inflation measures (10.3%) continued to trend upward, posting higher rates than those estimated by the Central Bank's technical staff and surpassing the market average. Inflation expectations for all terms exceeded the 3.0% target. In that month, every major group in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) registered higher-than-estimated increases, and the diffusion indicators continued to show generalized price hikes. Accumulated exchange rate pressures on prices, indexation to high inflation rates, and several food supply shocks would explain, in part, the acceleration in inflation. All of this is in a context of significant surplus demand, a tight labor market, and inflation expectations at different terms that exceed the 3.0% target. Compared to the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, the forecast path for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items: EFR) increased (Graphs 1.1 and 1.2), reflecting heightened accumulated exchange rate pressures, price indexation to a higher inflation rate (CPI and the producer price index: PPI), and the rise in labor costs attributed to a larger-than-estimated adjustment in the minimum wage. Nevertheless, headline inflation is expected to begin to ease by early 2023, although from a higher level than had been estimated in October. This would be supported initially by the slowdown forecast for the food CPI due to a high base of comparison, the end anticipated for the shocks that have affected the prices of these products, and the estimated improvement in external and domestic supply in this sector. In turn, the deterioration in real household income because of high inflation and the end of the effects of pent-up demand, plus tighter external and domestic financial conditions would contribute to diluting surplus demand in 2023 and reducing inflation. By the end of 2023, both headline and core (EFR) inflation would reach 8.7% and would be 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively, by December 2024. These forecasts are subject to a great deal of uncertainty, especially concerning the future behavior of international financial conditions, the evolution of the exchange rate, the pace of adjustment in domestic demand, the extent of indexation of nominal contracts, and the decisions taken regarding the domestic price of fuel and electricity. In the third quarter, economic activity surprised again on the upside and the growth projection for 2022 rose to 8.0% (previously 7.9%). However, it declined to 0.2% for 2023 (previously 0.5%). With this, surplus demand continues to be significant and is still expected to weaken during the current year. Annual economic growth in the third quarter (7.1 % SCA)1 was higher than estimated in October (6.4 % SCA), given stronger domestic demand specifically because of higher-than-expected investment. Private consumption fell from the high level witnessed a quarter earlier and net exports registered a more negative contribution than anticipated. For the fourth quarter, economic activity indicators suggest that gross domestic product (GDP) would have remained high and at a level similar to that observed in the third quarter, with an annual variation of 4.1%. Domestic demand would have slowed in annual terms, although at levels that would have remained above those for output, mainly because of considerable private consumption. Investment would have declined slightly to a value like the average observed in 2019. The real trade deficit would have decreased due to a drop in imports that was more pronounced than the estimated decline in exports. On the forecast horizon, consumption is expected to decline from current elevated levels, partly because of tighter domestic financial conditions and a deterioration in real income due to high inflation. Investment would also weaken and return to levels below those seen before the pandemic. In real terms, the trade deficit would narrow due to a lower momentum projection for domestic demand and higher cumulative real depreciation. In sum, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would stand at 8.0%, 0.2% and 1.0%, respectively (Graph 1.3). Surplus demand remains high (as measured by the output gap) and is expected to decline in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024 (Graph 1.4). Although the macroeconomic forecast includes a marked slowdown in the economy, an even greater adjustment in domestic absorption cannot be ruled out due to the cumulative effects of tighter external and domestic financial conditions, among other reasons. These estimates continue to be subject to a high degree of uncertainty, which is associated with factors such as global political tensions, changes in international interest rates and their effects on external demand, global risk aversion, the effects of the approved tax reform, the possible impact of reforms announced for this year (pension, health, and labor reforms, among others), and future measures regarding hydrocarbon production. In 2022, the current account deficit would have been high (6.3 % of GDP), but it would be corrected significantly in 2023 (to 3.9 % of GDP) given the expected slowdown in domestic demand. Despite favorable terms of trade, the high external imbalance that would occur during 2022 would be largely due to domestic demand growth, cost pressures associated with high freight rates, higher external debt service payments, and good performance in terms of the profits of foreign companies.2 By 2023, the adjustment in domestic demand would be reflected in a smaller current account deficit especially due to fewer imports, a global moderation in prices and cost pressures, and a reduction in profits remitted abroad by companies with foreign direct investment (FDI) focused on the local market. Despite this anticipated correction in the external imbalance, its level as a percentage of GDP would remain high in the context of tight financial conditions. In the world's main economies, inflation forecasts and expectations point to a reduction by 2023, but at levels that still exceed their central banks' targets. The path anticipated for the Federal Reserve (Fed) interest rate increased and the forecast for global growth continues to be moderate. In the fourth quarter of 2022, logistics costs and international prices for some foods, oil and energy declined from elevated levels, bringing downward pressure to bear on global inflation. Meanwhile, the higher cost of financing, the loss of real income due to high levels of global inflation, and the persistence of the war in Ukraine, among other factors, have contributed to the reduction in global economic growth forecasts. In the United States, inflation turned out to be lower than estimated and the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the growth forecast for 2023. Nevertheless, the actual level of inflation in that country, its forecasts, and expectations exceed the target. Also, the labor market remains tight, and fiscal policy is still expansionary. In this environment, the Fed raised the expected path for policy interest rates and, with this, the market average estimates higher levels for 2023 than those forecast in October. In the region's emerging economies, country risk premia declined during the quarter and the currencies of those countries appreciated against the US dollar. Considering all the above, for the current year, the Central Bank's technical staff increased the path estimated for the Fed's interest rate, reduced the forecast for growth in the country's external demand, lowered the expected path of oil prices, and kept the country’s risk premium assumption high, but at somewhat lower levels than those anticipated in the previous Monetary Policy Report. Moreover, accumulated inflationary pressures originating from the behavior of the exchange rate would continue to be important. External financial conditions facing the economy have improved recently and could be associated with a more favorable international context for the Colombian economy. So far this year, there has been a reduction in long-term bond interest rates in the markets of developed countries and an increase in the prices of risky assets, such as stocks. This would be associated with a faster-than-expected reduction in inflation in the United States and Europe, which would allow for a less restrictive course for monetary policy in those regions. In this context, the risks of a global recession have been reduced and the global appetite for risk has increased. Consequently, the risk premium continues to decline, the Colombian peso has appreciated significantly, and TES interest rates have decreased. Should this trend consolidate, exchange rate inflationary pressures could be less than what was incorporated into the macroeconomic forecast. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their impact on the country remains high, given the unpredictable course of the war in Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, local uncertainty, and the extensive financing needs of the Colombian government and the economy. High inflation with forecasts and expectations above 3.0%, coupled with surplus demand and a tight labor market are compatible with a contractionary stance on monetary policy that is conducive to the macroeconomic adjustment needed to mitigate the risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations and to ensure that inflation converges to the target. Compared to the forecasts in the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed level of output exceeding the productive capacity of the economy. In this context of surplus demand, headline and core inflation continued to trend upward and posted surprising increases. Observed and expected international interest rates increased, the country’s risk premia lessened (but remains at high levels), and accumulated exchange rate pressures are still significant. The technical staff's inflation forecast for 2023 increased and inflation expectations remain well above 3.0%. All in all, the risk of inflation expectations becoming unanchored persists, which would accentuate the generalized indexation process and push inflation even further away from the target. This macroeconomic context requires consolidating a contractionary monetary policy stance that aims to meet the inflation target within the forecast horizon and bring the economy's output to levels closer to its potential. 1.2 Monetary Policy Decision At its meetings in December 2022 and January 2023, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) agreed to continue the process of normalizing monetary policy. In December, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to increase the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps) and in its January meeting by 75 bps, bringing it to 12.75% (Graph 1.5). 1/ Seasonally and calendar adjusted. 2/ In the current account aggregate, the pressures for a higher external deficit come from those companies with FDI that are focused on the domestic market. In contrast, profits in the mining and energy sectors are more than offset by the external revenue they generate through exports. Box 1 - Electricity Rates: Recent Developments and Indexation. Author: Édgar Caicedo García, Pablo Montealegre Moreno and Álex Fernando Pérez Libreros Box 2 - Indicators of Household Indebtedness. Author: Camilo Gómez y Juan Sebastián Mariño