Journal articles: 'German Corporate Governance'

1

Cromme, Gerhard. "Corporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance Code." Corporate Governance: An International Review 13, no. 3 (May 2005): 362–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00430.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Ceschinski, Willi, Carl-Christian Freidank, and Franziska Handschumacher. "Which characteristics determine the quality of corporate governance reporting? Concepts, reporting practices and empirical evidence from Germany." Corporate Ownership and Control 17, no. 4, Special Issue (2020): 279–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i4siart6.

Full text

Abstract:

This study examines the factors influencing the quality of corporate governance reporting by listed German companies. Additionally, we analyse the development of corporate governance reporting practices in Germany over a three-year observation period. Using panel data regressions, we analyse the relationship between various corporate characteristics, performance characteristics, and corporate governance characteristics and the quality of corporate governance reporting. We quantify the reporting quality using a scoring model for the largest listed German companies in the period 2016-2018. Our results indicate that the quality of corporate governance reporting has improved steadily in recent years. This trend, however, should not detract from the fact that the quality of corporate governance reporting is dependent on corporate characteristics but not on firm performance, nor corporate governance characteristics. Our empirical findings elucidate these relationships.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Rühmkorf, Andreas, Felix Spindler, and Navajyoti Samanta. "Evolution of German corporate governance (1995-2014): an empirical analysis." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 19, no. 5 (October 7, 2019): 1042–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-07-2018-0251.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose This paper aims to address the evolution of corporate governance in Germany with a particular regard to whether there can be observed a gradual convergence to a shareholder primacy corporate governance system. Design/methodology/approach To investigate a potential shift of the German corporate governance system to an Anglo-American tiled corporate governance system, the authors have empirically assessed on a polynomial base 52 separate company and corporate governance variables for 20 years (1995-2014). Findings This research suggests that a gradual convergence has taken place prior to the global financial crisis. However, the results suggest that the convergence process experienced a slowdown in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which may be linked to the stability of the German corporate governance system during the global financial crisis and the political environment during this time. Originality/value This paper contributes to the research by not only analysing the development of the German corporate governance system but also identifying new reasons for this development and explaining why a new convergence process may be observed in the future again.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Stiglbauer, Markus. "Does the well governed firm perform better? Regulatory implications for SMEs in the financial sector." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2 (2011): 30–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8si1p3.

Full text

Abstract:

Although bad corporate governance has been identified as one reason for the failure of financial companies in the current financial crisis, the discussion almost exclusively refers to big players so far. This paper therefore investigates SMEs in the financial sector. Against theoretical assumptions and previous findings for big companies, in regressions for 21 SMEs in the German financial sector we find compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (as a proxy for “good” corporate governance) not to affect performance significantly positively. This opens the discussion whether the existing rules of “good” corporate governance in Germany do also fit to SMEs and which actions have to be taken into consideration by politics, financial authorities and regulators to solve the situation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Eulerich, Marc, Stefanie Haustein, Stephan Zipfel, and Carolin van Uum. "The publication landscape of German corporate governance research: A bibliometric analysis." Corporate Ownership and Control 10, no. 2 (2013): 661–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i2c4art1.

Full text

Abstract:

Although the importance and urgency of the corporate governance debate has increased in media, public and scientific literature after the financial crisis, there is no systematic and holistic approach to the phenomenon of corporate governance and the associated economic research in the Germanspeaking countries. Due to this, the literature on corporate governance research in the Germanspeaking area is examined by means of bibliometric methods and social network analysis in order to identify thematic clusters and the most influential documents and authors. Based on a co-citation analysis of over 10,000 references cited in 267 source documents, a map is constructed that depicts the landscape of corporate governance research in German-speaking countries. The analysis identifies a large body of accumulated corporate governance research, which is mostly based on the theoretical work from English-speaking scholars. Our findings and interpretations allow a new view on the German corporate governance research and on the particular understanding of corporate governance in the German-speaking research community. Today, around 10 years after the introduction of the German Corporate Governance Code, corporate governance research is a well-established segment of German business administration research characterized by diverse research focuses

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

KRAUS, PATRICK, and BERND BRITZELMAIER. "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE." International Journal of Management Cases 13, no. 3 (January 1, 2011): 327–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5848/apbj.2011.00068.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Gal, Jens. "Corporate governance of insurers in Germany. German National Report." Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 109, no. 1 (February 2020): 41–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12297-020-00467-9.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Corporate governance is the set of rules, be they legal or self-regulatory, practices and processes pursuant to which an insurance undertaking is administrated. Good corporate governance is not only key to establishing oneself and succeeding in a competitive environment but also to safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders in an insurance undertaking. It is insofar not surprising that mandatory requirements on the administration of insurance undertakings have become rather prolific in recent years, in an attempt by regulators to protect especially policyholders against perceived risks hailing from improperly governed insurance undertakings. In Germany this has been regarded by many undertakings as an overly paternalistic approach of the legislator, especially considering that the German insurance sector has experienced for decades if not centuries a remarkably low number of insolvencies and that German insurers were neither the trigger nor the (especially) endangered actors in the financial crisis commencing in 2007. Notwithstanding the true core of this criticism, that the insurance industry was taken to a certain degree hostage by the shortcomings within the banking sector, the reform of German Insurance Supervisory Law via implementation of the Solvency II-System has brought many advances in the sense of better governance of insurance undertakings and has also brought to light many deficiencies that the administration of some insurance undertakings may have suffered from in the past, which are now more properly addressed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Fear, Jeffrey, and Christopher Kobrak. "Banks on Board: German and American Corporate Governance, 1870–1914." Business History Review 84, no. 4 (2010): 703–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007680500001999.

Full text

Abstract:

This examination of the foundations of German and American corporate governance highlights the role of money-centered banks, both as board members in large corporations and as intermediaries on the stock exchange. German banks, by acting as surrogate regulators, became institutional stabilizers, and German regulators encouraged banks to participate in corporate boards in order to overcome agency problems in firms and to control speculation. American investment banks, prior to 1914, often managed to overcome regulatory obstacles, which enabled them to wield more power over corporations than their legendary German counterparts. American banks had more opportunities to intervene in the event of panics, bankruptcies, foreign investment, and corporate consolidation. In contrast to Germany, the United States increasingly imposed regulations that circumscribed the supervisory role of banks as board members.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Goergen, Marc, Miguel C. Manjon, and Luc Renneboog. "Recent developments in German corporate governance." International Review of Law and Economics 28, no. 3 (September 2008): 175–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2008.06.003.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Haller, Axel, Jürgen Ernstberger, and Christian Kraus. "Extraterritorial impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on external corporate governance – current evidence from a German perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 3 (2006): 113–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3p9.

Full text

Abstract:

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has not only had tremendous impact on the U.S corporate governance system, but also on other countries with companies subject to SOX. The paper analyzes the major direct impacts of SOX on the European Union (EU) and Germany as a Member State. The focus of the analysis is on rules concerning external corporate governance instruments, i.e. the auditing professions’ oversight, auditors’ independence and auditing standards. Additionally, the paper investigates whether the contemporary regulatory activities in the EU and Germany concerning external corporate governance can be explained as indirect institutional consequences of SOX. Although the EU Commission says for the record that it has an own long-term strategy of modernizing corporate governance, the paper demonstrates that several rules of SOX quite obviously served as a model for the EU regulatory activities. The same phenomenon can be observed for the new German regulations of external corporate governance

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Berger, Matthew. "German Corporate Convergence to a Market Based System." International Community Law Review 9, no. 2 (2007): 209–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187197407x210283.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractGermany has implemented several legal reforms in an attempt to attract international investment. Commentators proclaimed that a transition from a bank-based system of corporate governance to a market-based system was required in order for Germany to attract international investors. Debates still transpire regarding the success of the legal reforms implemented in an effort to make this change. This analysis explains Germany's previous corporate governance system and the new laws implemented to transform it to a market-based system. Empirical data is recited concerning the changes in foreign direct investment, German household investment decisions, and the German financial markets. The paper concludes that an analysis of this data reveals an increase of foreign investment in Germany and a substantial movement towards a market-based system throughout the duration of the legal reform.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Graf, Andrea, and Markus Stiglbauer. "Measuring corporate governance in Germany: An integrated framework on compliance and transparency & disclosure." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 2 (2008): 456–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i2c4p4.

Full text

Abstract:

Compliance as well as transparency and voluntary corporate disclosure are essential within the concept of ´good` corporate governance. Consequently, there is an increasing demand for methods enabling investors to compare companies by means of country-specific criteria. However, measures in Germany do not provide a broad spectrum of criteria for evaluating corporate compliance and governance transparency & disclosure. Our framework covers all rules of the German Corporate Governance Code as well as additional criteria, enabling investors to analyse how companies are managed. Furthermore, we raise quality criteria of social sciences to confirm our findings.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Stiglbauer, Markus, and Patrick Velte. "Impact of soft law regulation by corporate governance codes on firm valuation: the case of Germany." Corporate Governance 14, no. 3 (May 27, 2014): 395–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-05-2012-0043.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose – This paper aims to provide insight whether disclosed compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) leads to higher valuation on the German stock market. Design/methodology/approach – Based on agency theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory, the authors conduct a meta-analysis and evaluate the value relevance of the compliance with the GCGC. Findings – The research finds that compliance with the GCGC is mainly not a value-relevant factor for German companies listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Research limitations/implications – The research considered is not fully comparable with regard to observation date, full integration of the GCGC rules and company selection/sample size. Future research is encouraged to research the valuation effects of compliance with the GCGC for a longer time horizon, the use of uniform performance measures and the integration of all GCGC rules. Practical implications – Compliance with the GCGC has not proven to be a value-driver for German listed companies. The authors recommend companies to search for opportunities to make their corporate governance more comprehensive by expanding their corporate governance reporting and thus providing deeper insights on how their processes of management and control work. Originality/value – The paper is the first investigation integrating the results of ten years of “code compliance – market valuation” research in Germany. We detect reasons why soft law regulation by corporate governance codes did not function on the German stock market. We additionally address behavioral aspects why investors do not give enough relevance to companies’ corporate governance statements so far.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Steger, Thomas, and Ronald Hartz. "On the way to “good” corporate governance? A critical review of the German debate." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 1 (2005): 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i1p1.

Full text

Abstract:

Corporate governance was widely debated in recent years, in Germany as elsewhere. The question what “good” corporate governance constitutes and how it should be achieved stands in the centre of all those discussions. This paper critically draws on the German case. It tries to identify the key issues as well as recent changes in the character of this debate. It is argued that the reform spirit in Germany stands at the edge and needs some considerable refreshment in the near future

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Bebenroth, Ralf. "German corporate governance code and most commonly unaccepted recommendations: Introduction and some explanation." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 10–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p1.

Full text

Abstract:

This study presents an empirical analysis of compliance. In the year 2002 the German Corporate Governance Commission introduced a Corporate Governance Code to companies listed on the German stock exchange. Each company in noncompliance with one or more of the recommendations must explain in writing. Regarding the 2003 amended Code, this study identifies the Most Commonly Unaccepted Recommenations (MCURs). Finally it gives some explanation why some companies have good reason not to follow all the recommendations like the German Corporate Governance Commission want them to

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Krackhardt, Oliver. "New Rules for Corporate Governance in the United States And Germany - A Model for New Zealand?" Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 36, no. 2 (August 1, 2005): 319. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v36i2.5601.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper surveys the possibilities for implementing new rules for corporate governance in New Zealand. It focuses on the new rules issued in Germany (the German Code of Corporate Governance) and the United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The paper analyses both to find out which rules might be appropriate for New Zealand. It is argued that New Zealand needs to adopt a code of corporate governance in order to keep up with international developments, otherwise it risks repelling local investors and failing to attract international investors. It is concluded that most importantly New Zealand should adopt a principles-based "comply-or-explain" approach rather than strict rules, as it offers greater flexibility. The paper further concludes that many of the rules issued in Germany and the United States could improve corporate governance in New Zealand and hence should be implemented.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Freidank, Carl-Christian, and Patrick Velte. "Corporate governance and controlling - a German perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 4 (2008): 49–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p5.

Full text

Abstract:

This article is focused on the interdependencies between corporate governance and controlling from a German perspective. An impact analysis based on the area of auditing, supervision and control will follow. Using the example of intangible assets and long-term manufacturing contracts according to IFRS, the influences of internationalisation on controlling will be presented. The details show that the development of financial accounting into an integral business reporting system together with an increase in importance of controlling goes hand in hand. In the future, controlling will form the central link between corporate governance and business reporting

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Miles, Lilian. "The German Corporate Governance Code: What Implications." Business Law Review 23, Issue 6 (June 1, 2002): 140–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/5092784.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Casper, Matthias. "Three Topics at the Periphery of Corporate Governance: Business Rescues and Wrongful Trading, Supervisory Law for Financial Institutions and the Perspective on Islamic Financial Institutions." European Business Law Review 26, Issue 1 (February 1, 2015): 203–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2015011.

Full text

Abstract:

In this paper three specific areas and their impact of corporate governance are analysed. The first part of the article questions the adequacy of current obligations under German law to inform shareholders of a financial crisis. The risk that directors and other managers will make risky decisions because of a desire to avoid insolvency and the rules governing corporate conduct in situations of insolvency or near-insolvency in Germany are considered and contrasted with the English approach. The approach to supervision of financial institutions, and the potential for these rules to apply to companies other than financial institutions, are considered. The current rules for financial institutions in Germany, and the ways in which the managements and auditing of such companies differs from the norm are analysed. The potential for Islamic law to have an effect on the management of corporations forms the subject matter of the final part of this article. The role of Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB) in the German unitary and two-tier systems, and the proper classification of such boards are thoroughly explored. The possible consequences for SSBs and the corporations that use them under the German laws on Corporate Governance are considered. The article concludes with a summary outlining the ways in which Corporate Governance affects the areas covered; business rescue laws, supervisory laws for financial institutions, and Islamic Financial Institutions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Sassen, Remmer. "Comparison of risk management regulation from a corporate governance perspective within the German and united states legal areas." Journal of Governance and Regulation 3, no. 4 (2014): 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v3_i4_c1_p6.

Full text

Abstract:

Risk management is one of the main corporate governance components or management tasks. This paper details a comparison of risk management regulation from a corporate governance perspective of listed stock corporations in Germany and the United States (U.S.). Obviously, there are differences and commonalities between the national legal norms and the regulatory levels of risk management in both countries. The comparison helps to understand different traditions and practices in terms of how significant corporate governance rules are for risk management. Therefore, this article intends to inspire future research on the regulation of risk management across different regions and explore the relevance of national interests in the regulation of risk management. A principal finding of the comparison is that the U.S. corporate governance system seems to be more strongly regulated than the German system. This results from the powerful and coordinating role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Thus, the seemingly more liberal system of non-binding standards in the U.S. has a higher impact on the regulation of risk management than in Germany.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Velte, Patrick, and Marc Eulerich. "Determinants of executive board remuneration new insights from Germany." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 4 (2014): 96–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i4p7.

Full text

Abstract:

Board remuneration in German listed companies becomes more and more subject of public and political discussion, concerning the presumed lack of transparency and too short-term orientation. Besides the increasing regulatory activity, the arrangement of board compensation constitutes a focal economic issue of current empirical corporate governance research. The purpose of our analysis is to identify factors determining the amount and the structure of board compensation in Germany. Our study of 128 German listed companies for the business year 2011 investigates the impact of company-, performance and corporate governance-related factors on board remuneration by means of a multivariate-regression analysis. The analysis indicates that company size has a positive impact and leverage a negative on management board compensation. Furthermore, ROE and return on total capital, as indicators for performance-related variables, both have a positive impact on the average level of management remuneration. However, the corporate governance-related characteristics as ownership concentration and size of the supervisory board have no significant impact on management board remuneration.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Bassen, Alexander, Stefan Prigge, and Christine Zöllner. "Behind broad corporate governance aggregates: A first look at single provisions of the German corporate governance code." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 3 (2009): 388–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c3p4.

Full text

Abstract:

This study contributes to the emerging research that analyzes the relation between performance and single components of broad corporate governance aggregates, such as governance codes and ratings. Available research is confined to the U.S., Japan, and emerging markets. We enlarge the geographical scope to the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC). For a sample of 100 large listed German stock corporations, compliance with the GCGC at large is significantly associated only with one of our performance measures (Tobin’s q); this connection is negative. Individual analysis of eleven GCGC recommendations reveals that for three of them, association with all performance measures is insignificant. Four (four) components are significantly positively (negatively) connected with at least one performance measure

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Schwetzler, Bernhard, and Marco O. Sperling. "Corporate governance and the dynamics of ownership of German firms between 1997 and 2007." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 2 (2008): 25–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i2p2.

Full text

Abstract:

La Porta et al. (1999) find that countries with weak corporate governance tend to have higher ownership concentration than countries with legal systems that protect shareholders well. Changes in the quality of corporate governance are often followed by adjustments in ownership structure. On a sample of first layer as well as ultimate ownership (10% and 20% cut-off threshold) data for 11 years between 1997 and 2007 for German firms listed in the DAX, we examine the dynamics of ownership structure. We find that ownership concentration strongly declined. Further, foreign financial institutions became an important investor group with an increase of average stake from 0.4% in 1997 to 9.1% in 2007. We conclude that the quality of corporate governance increased and the Germany capital market became more open during that period.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Palda, Kristian. "Czech Privatization and Corporate Governance." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 83–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(96)00023-2.

Full text

Abstract:

The rapid privatization of the Czech economy has contributed to its first rank in the economic performance of the post-communist countries. The claim that 75 per cent of its GDP originates in the private sector may, however, be only formally true. Many of the voucher-privatized former state-owned enterprises and financial institutions are still influenced through core stakes in their share capital by the Fund of National Property and by their mutual interdependence. This article concludes that full privatization will likely be attained through a hybrid of German and American corporate governance systems.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Bassen, Alexander. "The implementation of good corporate governance by institutional investors: The Scorecard for German Corporate Governance." International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 2, no. 3 (September 2005): 244–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040056.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Wooldridge, Frank, and Frank Wooldridge. "The German Corporate Governance Code: Status and Development." European Business Law Review 16, Issue 2 (April 1, 2005): 225–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2005011.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Steger, Thomas, and Markus Stiglbauer. "The German corporate governance code and its adoption by listed SMEs – just another ‘Procrustes bed’?" Problems and Perspectives in Management 14, no. 3 (September 27, 2016): 494–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.14(3-2).2016.05.

Full text

Abstract:

The discussion of companies’ compliance with corporate governance standards and codes has widely neglected the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Accordingly, the authors examine a sample of 151 SMEs listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 2006 (before the financial crisis) and 2012 (after the financial crisis) and, thus, required to declare whether they comply with the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code or not. While code compliance seems to be quite homogenous comparing different branches, the authors found that company size has a positive impact on code compliance. With regard to a remarkably high number of recommendations a lot of companies do not comply to, company size might be a major problem, why the existing GCGC does not fit very well to the situation of SMEs. This is why, most remarkably, code compliance does not exert any significant influence on either market reaction or on operating performance of SMEs. Keywords: corporate governance, SMEs, Germany, firm performance. JEL Classification: G3, G34, M10, L25

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Chhillar, Palka, and Ramana Venkata Lellapalli. "Divergence or convergence: paradoxes in corporate governance?" Corporate Governance 15, no. 5 (October 5, 2015): 693–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-05-2015-0066.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose – This review paper aims to compare the various dimensions in the finance literature pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon Model (Stockholder Model) prevalent in the USA and the UK with the German Model (Stakeholder Model) of corporate governance prevalent in Germany and continental Europe. The present study identifies different strands of research on the various dimensions of these models, along with aspects of governance in emerging economies and the phenomenon of the convergence of these governance mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach – The literature review on corporate governance models has been carried out on the themes of internal and external governance mechanisms. The review considers agency theory along with principal–principal (PP) conflicts as the fundamental blocks explaining the need for governance structures. Findings – The traditional models of governance, along with the incorporation of PP conflicts, will result in a hybrid model inculcating the best of both the traditional models. However, convergence in the true sense may not be possible owing to fundamental differences pertaining to cultural, economic, legal and socio-economic aspects of the firm. Originality/value – This paper proposes a framework incorporating the interplay of managerial talent and controlling shareholders to understand the governance system that may be applicable for firms in emerging economies.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Mintz, Steven M. "A comparison of corporate governance systems in the US, UK and Germany." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 4 (2006): 24–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i4p12.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper compares corporate governance principles in the US, UK, and Germany. The U.S. and UK represent shareholder models of ownership and control whereas in Germany a stakeholder approach to corporate governance provides greater input for creditors, employees and other groups affected by corporate decision making. Recent changes in the US and UK as evidenced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and a variety of reports including the Cadbury Committee Report recognize the importance of a more independent board of directors, completely independent audit committee, and strong internal controls. In Germany, some of these initiatives have been suggested as well. The U.S. can learn from their British counterparts and endorse governance advances such as to separate out the role of the chair of the board of directors and the CEO. Other changes that would strengthen governance in the U.S. include to: limit the number of boards on which a person can serve; recognize the rights of stockholders to nominate directors; and give shareholders a more direct role in board oversight. The U.S. should consider adopting some of the German attributes in their governance system by incorporating employees and employee representative groups into the oversight process. After all, it was the employees that worked for Enron who suffered the most as a result of corporate fraud including a loss of jobs and the near wipe-out of their 401K retirement plans

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Jo, Hoje, Annie Hsu, Rosamaria Llanos-Popolizio, and Jorge Vergara-Vega. "Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud of Wirecard." European Journal of Business and Management Research 6, no. 2 (March 25, 2021): 96–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.2.708.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the collapse of Wirecard AG, in June 2020, the “German Enron.” Specifically, we investigate how the Wirecard’s ineffective corporate governance under the German’s financial regulatory system fails to serve their stakeholders, and how its management’s unethical behavior of earnings manipulation contribute to significant financial collapse for the company, and lead to the destruction of shareholders’ value. This paper examines how the internal and external governance and monitoring mechanisms failed to uncover the vast fraud at the German payments group at a much earlier stage. Furthermore, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the continuous pressure of meeting or exceeding consensus on earnings estimates, management’s performance compensation based on the growth of Wirecard’s stock price, and the lack of proper supervision from the board of directors ultimately create the opportunities for management to manipulate earnings without being uncovered for several years. Such course of action has caused significant financial corporate misconduct for Wirecard and led to the destruction of firm value.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Ulrich, Patrick, and Alexandra Fibitz. "Corporate governance mechanisms in family firms – A socioemotional wealth perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 15, no. 3 (2018): 32–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv15i3art3.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper examines how German family firms differ in the usage of corporate governance mechanisms in comparison to non-family firms. We give an overview about the relation of corporate governance and family firms, and deliver hypotheses from an empirical study. The study was conducted in 2017 as a written survey and 86 questionnaires could be used for statistical analysis. Based on socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, we find that with a higher extent of family influence in the firm, less corporate governance instruments are used. Furthermore, corporate governance is used primarily to prevent stakeholder confidence in the long-run. However, a formalization of corporate governance mechanisms does not take place. We draw implications for more corporate governance formalization and awareness in family firms both for theory and practice.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Ashurov, Zufar. "The corporate governance in Uzbekistan: A special focus on the board’s supervisory role compared with German practice." Corporate Board role duties and composition 10, no. 3 (2014): 77–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv10i3art6.

Full text

Abstract:

Today, the topic of corporate governance has become vital for the most researches and scientific controversies. The corporate governance is now playing a key role in economic and social development of a country, and it has began to significantly matter for both industrialized and most of the developing countries. In the meantime, little is known for the world community about the state and problems of corporate governance in Uzbekistan. In this regard, in this paper we mainly address the present situation in Uzbek corporate governance as well as, as a special focus, make comparison of the Uzbek and German board’s supervisory role practices. This paper may be interesting for those who are not aware of the corporate governance in Uzbekistan and who would like to more or less know about it.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Börsch-Supan, Axel, and Jens Köke. "An Applied Econometricians' View of Empirical Corporate Governance Studies." German Economic Review 3, no. 3 (August 1, 2002): 295–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00061.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract The economic analysis of corporate governance is in vogue. In addition to a host of theoretical papers, an increasing number of empirical studies analyze how ownership structure, capital structure, board structure, and the market for corporate control influence firm performance. This is not an easy task, and indeed, for reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. This paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance - to show which methodological lessons can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance, paying particular attention to German institutions and data availability.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Michelberger, Knut J. "Survey On Competence and Administration of Supervisory Board Activities in German Stock-Listed Companies." Economics and Business 30, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 62–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/eb-2017-0006.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractAccording to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976), it is expected that there exists a positive relationship between corporate governance and company performance which is also generally assumed in recent research (Dignam & Galanis 2016). This relationship is investigated in the study performed by the author of this paper. Two different approaches were chosen in parallel: (1) quantitative data analysis, based on financial figures and corporate governance variables, and (2) a survey of supervisory board members of listed German companies. This paper is about the results of structured interviews with 30 supervisory board members. The survey confirms that corporate governance regulations have an important influence on the administration of supervisory board activities and on board competence. Many supervisory board members stated that the German Corporate Governance Codex leads to extended meeting time to fulfil regulatory requirements, more data requirements to identify and estimate risk issues and to rising risk awareness. The interview results converge with the results from the multivariate analysis.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Fauver, Larry, and Michael E. Fuerst. "Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards." Journal of Financial Economics 82, no. 3 (December 2006): 673–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.10.005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

El-Bassiouny, Dina, and Noha El-Bassiouny. "Diversity, corporate governance and CSR reporting." Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal 30, no. 1 (January 14, 2019): 116–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/meq-12-2017-0150.

Full text

Abstract:

PurposeTaken from an institutional theory perspective, the purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of organizational-level factors, specifically diversity and corporate governance structure, on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting practices of corporations operating in developing and developed country contexts, namely, Egypt, Germany and the USA. Since developed countries are exposed to different settings, the paper argues that there is likely to be a difference in the organizational-level drivers of CSR reporting in developed vs developing countries.Design/methodology/approachThe sample consists of companies listed on the Egyptian EGX 30 index, the German DAX 30 index and the US Dow Jones 30 index. Governance- and diversity-related data are gathered from multiple sources including the BoardEx and Orbis databases. Content analysis is used to analyze the CSR information of sample companies using the software package MAXQDA. To examine the relationship between the explanatory variables of the study and CSR disclosures, multiple regression analysis is used.FindingsThe results are mostly consistent with institutional theory where the effects of diversity and governance structure, observed mainly by foreign BOD, board independence and institutional ownership, are found to be significant on the CSR disclosure levels of sample Egyptian companies only. On the other hand, no significant influence of tested factors was observed on the level of CSR reporting in the USA and Germany. The results thus indicate that the influence of organizational-level factors on CSR is highly dependent on the institutional context where companies operate.Originality/valueThe influence of diversity and corporate governance on CSR has been separately studied in the management literature. Yet, the potential effects of both variables on CSR have received limited attention. In addition, no study combining such explanatory variables of CSR was carried out in the specific context of developing Middle Eastern countries. Also, illustrating how institutional contexts can influence the dynamics of interaction between organizational-level variables and CSR is still understudied. This kind of multi-level research can help broaden the understanding of the drivers and practices of CSR in developing vs developed countries that have distinct institutional environments.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Fear, Jeffrey, and Christopher Kobrak. "Diverging Paths: Accounting for Corporate Governance in America and Germany." Business History Review 80, no. 1 (2006): 1–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007680500080971.

Full text

Abstract:

American and German accountancy took different paths in the early part of the twentieth century. In Germany, a persistent disconnect arose between relatively sophisticated managerial accounting practices for insiders and the methods used in public financial accounting. The “equity revolution” America experienced—an enormous shift in the number and expectations of shareholders—prompted new demands for financial statements designed to help evaluate the future earning power of companies. In contrast, the effects of World War I retarded equity–market development in Germany. Political frictions reinforced the Germans's; discomfort with equity markets and increased their resistance to revising accounting principles. Banks, tax law, courts, and lawyers, instead of professional accountants, became the primary source of accounting principles. Only in past decades, under pressure from the European Union and global capital markets, have the accounting systems begun to reconverge.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Dilger, Alexander, and Ute Schottmüller-Einwag. "Corporate governance reporting: Compliance with upper limits for severance payments to members of executive boards in Germany." Corporate Law and Governance Review 2, no. 2 (2020): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/clgrv2i2p2.

Full text

Abstract:

We examine how corporate governance reporting corresponds to actual conduct regarding severance payment caps for prematurely departing members of executive boards in Germany. Firstly, we evaluate the declarations of conformity for all companies listed in the CDAX between 2010 and 2014, which we use to determine conformity and deviation rates, and analyse the reasons for deviation, contributing to current research on comparative corporate governance, which focuses on when, why and how companies deviate from legitimate corporate governance goals (Aguilera, Judge, & Terjesen, 2018). Secondly, we assess the compensation amounts of all severance payments made and published by DAX companies to compare the respective severance ratio with the cap recommended by the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC). We find that more than 20% of companies listed in the CDAX declared deviation in the declaration of conformity. Moreover, in 57% of actual severance cases where DAX companies had previously declared their conformity, the cap was exceeded. Yet, none of the companies that had exceeded the cap disclosed this in the following declaration of conformity. In most cases, the corporate reports deviated from reality and therefore could not serve as a suitable basis for decisions by the capital market.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Bhankaraully, Shabneez, and Michel Goyer. "Internal Diversity in German Corporate Governance: A QCA Analysis." Academy of Management Proceedings 2020, no. 1 (August 2020): 22115. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2020.22115abstract.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Nowak, Eric. "RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14, no. 3 (September 2001): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00436.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Nietsch, Michael. "Corporate Governance and Company Law Reform: a German perspective." Corporate Governance: An International Review 13, no. 3 (May 2005): 368–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00431.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Talaulicar, Till, and Axel v. Werder. "Patterns of Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code." Corporate Governance: An International Review 16, no. 4 (July 2008): 255–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00696.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Jenkinson, Tim, and Alexander Ljungqvist. "The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance." Journal of Corporate Finance 7, no. 4 (December 2001): 397–446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00034-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Crane, Dwight B., and Ulrike Schaede. "Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance." International Review of Law and Economics 25, no. 4 (December 2005): 513–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Kouloridas, Athanasios, and Jens von Lackum. "Recent Developments of Corporate Governance in the European Union and their Impact on the German Legal System." German Law Journal 5, no. 10 (October 1, 2004): 1275–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200013213.

Full text

Abstract:

The collapses of several US-businesses like those of Enron and Worldcom and a number of scandals in the EU – in the recent past that of Parmalat – have strongly affected public confidence in the operation and governance of large entities trading their shares in organized capital markets. The European Commission reacted by issuing the Action Plan on Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU on 21 May 2003. The Action Plan contains measures which the Commission wants to implement over the short term (until 2005), medium term (until 2008) and long term (until 2010). The key issues set up in the Action Plan concern corporate governance, capital maintenance, recapitalization as well as decreasing capital, groups of companies, international corporate restructuring and the introduction of a new legal form of incorporation. The fact that the big rating agencies have begun to rate the corporate governance performances of major companies, can well be seen as a further indicator that good corporate governance has an important concern for managers, shareholders and for policy makers. As part of the Action Plan, the Commission has recently launched consultations on board responsibilities and improving financial and corporate governance information, on directors’ remuneration and on the role of (independent) non-executive or supervisory directors. In the light of these recent consultations and the results of the public consultation on the Action Plan, this Article offers an overview and assessment of the corporate governance measures planned at Community level.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Eulerich, Marc, Carolin van Uum, and Sarah Zipfel. "Comparing corporate governance codes in Germany and Eastern Europe – An analysis of different corporate governance characteristics." Corporate Ownership and Control 14, no. 3 (2017): 170–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i3c1art2.

Full text

Abstract:

A series of accounting scandals and company failures led to a loss of trust by investors in an organization’s management, which triggered extensive debates regarding Corporate Governance. Eastern European countries require additional regulatory actions due to the privatization programs as a result of the transformation from the planned to market economy. The different corporate governance systems of the individual countries in terms of the monistic one-tier or the dualistic two-tier system resulted in distinctive contents of the corporate governance codes. Despite the differences, all codes have a common objective: to strengthen the confidence of investors through good corporate governance. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the similarities and differences of the Corporate Governance Codes (CGC) in various Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. To do so, the CGCs of Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are illustrated and compared to the German Corporate Governance Code. On the basis of a broad theoretical model, the national characteristics of the CEE countries are linked to the respective code and the central components are evaluated in detail.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Weissenberger-Eibl, Marion, and Patrick Spieth. "Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 4 (2009): 382–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i4c3p4.

Full text

Abstract:

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Mushkevych, Yuliia V. "The main aspects of effective corporate governance at the modern level." Economies' Horizons, no. 3-4(18) (December 30, 2021): 64–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.31499/2616-5236.3-4(18).2021.245223.

Full text

Abstract:

The article outlines the main aspects of effective corporate governance, the formation of corporate relations in Ukraine. The main components of modern corporate enterprise management are studied. The problems of modern corporate management of enterprises related to the implementation of control processes are considered. The international experience in corporate governance is analyzed, which demonstrates a solid basis for creating basic principles and provisions for conducting this type of activity. It is proved that for the reliability and legitimacy of economic relations, for the protection and investment confidence of shareholders and their partners, the corporate governance system is obliged to provide full and timely demonstration of information on financial condition, performance, ownership and management. The directions of development of the corporate governance system for the economy of the country in general are determined, and the necessity of partnership relations between the shareholders in particular is considered. It is investigated that the current conditions require the development of an effective corporate governance policy during the global pandemic. To do this, the main tasks must be solved, such as the formation and implementation of a strategic modern system of corporate governance and the creation of conditions for effective interaction between all participants in the management process. It is considered that there is no generally accepted model of corporate governance, which would be used at the international level. It is noted that the vast majority of Ukrainian enterprises use the national model of corporate governance. This model was formed on the basis of a combination of basic principles of the German and Anglo-American models. According to this model, the main shareholders of companies are its employees, management, banks, the state. At the same time, banks remain the main source of funding, and this is more typical of the German model of corporate governance. The domestic model of corporate governance, which also has common features with the Japanese model, namely, a significant role is given to the state in the management process. It is noted that in Japan, the inclusion of government representatives in the system of corporate governance is not based on the presence of a significant stake in the state, as in Ukraine. In the Japanese model of corporate governance, the interaction between the main participants in the relationship is aimed at establishing new business contacts, rather than obtaining the maximum amount of profit It is determined that corporate governance at the current level is a system of relationships that sets up certain procedures for making management decisions. The effectiveness of corporate governance is to increase the level of profitability of the enterprise through the introduction of proper control, effective management and financial transparency.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

PLATONA (ELENES), Iulia. "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." ANNALS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA. ECONOMIC SCIENCES 30, no. 2 (December 2021): 42–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.47535/1991auoes30(2)004.

Full text

Abstract:

The german continental model of corporate governance is long term oriented satisfying the different interest of stakeholders-the state, the employees, the society in general and the anglo-saxon model is short term oriented to the purpose of creating value for the shareholders of the company. The research and development objective are corelated with the objective of german model of stakeholder value or of the objective of the anglo-saxon model of shareholder value. We use Eurostat data for European countries for regression analysis to find the relation between gross domestic product as measure of economic growth with the general expenditure for research and development for businness, goverment and academia. We analyse if fixed effects or random effects are more appropriate for our model. The regression analysis shows that the fixed effects model fitts better to our research model.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Rolshoven, Max Philipp. "The Last Word? – The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial." German Law Journal 5, no. 8 (August 1, 2004): 935–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200012967.

Full text

Abstract:

[Editors’ Note: This short note concerns the most recent acquittals in the Mannesmann criminal trial against former Mannesmann CEO, Klaus Esser; Deutsche Bank's CEO (Vorstandssprecher) and then Member of Mannesmann's supervisory board, Josef Ackermann, and other members of the Supervisory Board. The Landgericht [Regional Court] Düsseldorf acquitted all six defendants on 22 July 2004, and this timely note provides but for a first rendition of the circumstances, the reactions and the thrust of the judgment. For more extensive background to the criminal proceedings against Esser, Ackermann et al. and the importance that domestic and international observers have regularly been assigning to this case in the context of a worldwide corporate governance debate, see already Peter Kolla's article in the 1 July 2004 Issue of German Law Journal. German Law Journal will publish a more extensive case commentary in the coming months. Meanwhile, the Mannesmann proceedings have, once more, highlighted to German, European and International observers the particular features of law and politics in “Germany Inc.”, “Rhenish Capitalism”, or “Rhineland Capitalism”. As begun in the aftermath of Josef Ackermann's inthronization at the head of Deutsche Bank and Ackermann's subsequent transformation of the Board's control structure, German Law Journal has published several contributions to the ongoing changes in German corporate governance and its embeddedness within the specific German economic and legal system. In this issue, we are publishing a fine piece by Jürgen Hoffmann, Professor of Sociology in Hamburg, on the current interdisciplinary debate over the future fate of so-called Rhineland Capitalism. In the next issue, to be published on 1 September 2004, Professor Christopher Allen of the University of Georgia will further deepen this inquiry and place the contemporary debate over the possible end of Rhineland capitalism in the historical context of Germany's development in the 20th Century. The Editors of German Law Journal are very pleased and honored to be able to provide for a further forum for this important debate, bringing together lawyers, economists, political scientists and sociologists, for a much needed exploration of the historical and political origins as well as of the legal framework of Germany's much critizised and, at the same time, ardently praised system of corporate governance and industrial relations. We invite our readers to contribute to this debate, which has so far found too little resonance in Germany itself. The Editors.]

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'German Corporate Governance'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles