Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / German Naval Intelligence

Contents

Journal articles
Dissertations / Theses
Books
Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'German Naval Intelligence'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'German Naval Intelligence.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "German Naval Intelligence"

1

Maiolo, Joseph A. "The Knockout Blow against the Import System: Admiralty Expectations of Nazi Germany's Naval Strategy, 1934–9*." Historical Research 72, no. 178 (June 1, 1999): 202–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.00081.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions and capabilities in the nineteen‐thirties. It demonstrates that the British Naval Staff developed through a methodical war planning process a distinct image of Germany's sea strategy. As the planning process advanced, the Naval Staff became convinced by a steady influx of reliable intelligence that German strategists intended in a future war to launch an aggressive air‐sea offensive against British sea lines of communication. British naval planners maintained that the only way in which German surface and subsurface forces could be made deadly was to combine them with a rapid all‐out air strike on the British import system. Germany did not launch this ‘knockout blow’ in 1939, but its elaboration by the Admiralty illustrates that the Royal Navy's appreciation of German strategy at sea was far more sophisticated, prudent and informed than historians have previously acknowledged.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Kohnen, David. "Seizing German Naval Intelligence from the Archives of 1870-1945." Global War Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 133–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5893/19498489.120105.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Weinberg, Gerhard L. "German Documents in the United States." Central European History 41, no. 4 (November 14, 2008): 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938908000848.

Full text

Abstract:

At the end of World War II, vast quantities of German documents had fallen into the hands of the Allies either during hostilities or in the immediately following weeks. Something will be said near the end of this report about the archives captured or seized by the Soviet Union; the emphasis here will be on those that came into the possession of the Western Allies. The United States and Great Britain made agreements for joint control and exploitation, of which the most important was the Bissell-Sinclair agreement named for the intelligence chiefs who signed it. The German naval, foreign office, and chancellery archives were to be physically located in England, while the military, Nazi Party, and related files were to come to the United States. Each of the two countries was to be represented at the site of the other's holdings, have access to the files, and play a role in decisions about their fate. The bulk of those German records that came to the United States were deposited in a section of a World War I torpedo factory in Alexandria, Virginia, which had been made into the temporary holding center for the World War II records of the American army and American theater commands. In accordance with the admonition to turn swords into plowshares, the building is now an artists' boutique.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Lambert, A. "Naval Intelligence from Germany: The Reports of the British Naval Attaches in Berlin, 1906-1914." English Historical Review CXXV, no. 513 (March 24, 2010): 479–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cep329.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Epkenhans, Michael. "Book Review: Naval Intelligence from Germany: The Reports of the British Naval Attachés in Berlin, 1906–1914." International Journal of Maritime History 20, no. 1 (June 2008): 446–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/084387140802000179.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Hiley, Nicholas. "The Failure of British Counter-Espionage against Germany, 1907–1914." Historical Journal 28, no. 4 (December 1985): 835–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00005094.

Full text

Abstract:

Modern British counter-espionage effectively began in April 1907, when a joint conference of naval and military officials, formed the previous year to consider ‘the Powers Possessed by the Executive in Time of Emergency’, recommended both an immediate strengthening of the laws against espionage, and a War is Office investigation of ‘the question of police surveillance and control of aliens’. These recommendations were to prove an important initiative, and did much to determine the course of British counter-espionage before 1914, yet at the time they probably seemed little more than an airing of old grievances unlikely to find new support, for they were among the last remnants n. of the abortive ‘Emergency Powers Bill’ which the War Office intelligence department had been advocating to strengthen home defence ever since the invasion scare of 1888. The 1906 joint conference had in fact hoped to further the cause of this great legislative package, with its radically new powers of access, requisition and seizure but, faced with the Liberal administration's commitment to the ‘continuous principle’ that a full-scale landing was impossible, had been forced instead to confine itself to the purely naval and military aspects of home defence. As its report confessed in April 1907, in the prevailing climate of opinion the only hope for the great ‘Emergency Powers Bill’ was as a series of ‘small and independent measures’.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

James Marchio. "World Turned Upside Down: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Early Cold War Struggle for Germany (review)." Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (2008): 1329–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jmh.0.0149.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

"1871-1918." Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift 68, no. 1 (July 1, 2009): 184–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1524/mgzs.2009.0007.

Full text

Abstract:

Zusammenfassung Peter Walkenhorst, Nation – Volk – Rasse. Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890-1914 (Bruno Thoß ) André Tiebel, Die Entstehung der Schutztruppengesetze für die deutschen Schutzgebiete Deutsch-Ostafrika, Deutsch-Südwestafrika und Kamerun (1884-1898) (Christian Senne) Eberhardt Kettlitz, Afrikanische Soldaten aus deutscher Sicht seit 1871 (Ulrich van der Heyden) Thomas Morlang, Askari und Fitafita. »Farbige« Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien (Winfried Speitkamp) Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform. British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War (Stephen Schröder) Naval Intelligence from Germany. The Reports of the British Naval Attachés in Berlin, 1906-1914. Ed. by Matthew S. Seligmann (Nicolas Wolz) Michael B. Barrett, Operation Albion. The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands (Gerhard P. Groß) Jeff Lipkes, Rehearsals. The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 (Martin Moll) Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Christian Stachelbeck) Christine Brocks, Die bunte Welt des Krieges. Bildpostkarten aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Christoph Nübel) Anton Holzer, Das Lächeln der Henker. Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914-1918 (Markus Pöhlmann) David C. Homsher, American Battlefields of World War I, Château-Thierry – Then and Now. A Guidebook, Anthology and Photographic Essay (Heiner Bröckermann) Der Erste Weltkrieg in der populären Erinnerungskultur. Hrsg. von Barbara Korte, Sylvia Paletschek und Wolfgang Hochbruck (Hiram Kümper)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "German Naval Intelligence"

1

Boghardt, Thomas. "German naval intelligence and British counter-espionage, 1901-1918." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.369596.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "German Naval Intelligence"

1

Showell, Jak P. Mallmann. German naval code breakers. Hersham: Ian Allan, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Showell, Jak P. Mallmann. German naval code breakers. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Rintelen, Franz von. The dark invader: Wartime reminiscences of a German naval intelligence officer. London: F. Cass, 1998.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Axis warships: As seen on photos from Allied intelligence files. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2011.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Hitler's espionage machine: German intelligence agencies and operations during World War II. Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 2004.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

R, Sadler Louis, ed. The archaeologist was a spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Gellermann, Günther W. Geheime Reichssache, geheime Kommandosache: Rätselhafte Fälle aus der Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Hamburg: E.S. Mittler, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

McCue, Brian. U-boats in the Bay of Biscay: An essay in operations analysis. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

McCue, Brian. U-boats in the Bay of Biscay: An essay in operations analysis. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Enigma U-boats: Breaking the code. Shepperton: Ian Allan, 2000.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

More sources

Book chapters on the topic "German Naval Intelligence"

1

Boghardt, Thomas. "The Origins of German Naval Intelligence." In Spies of the Kaiser, 13–20. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230508422_2.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Boghardt, Thomas. "The Decline of German Naval Intelligence, 1917–1919." In Spies of the Kaiser, 135–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230508422_8.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Faulkner, Marcus. "“A Most Disagreeable Problem”." In Decision in the Atlantic, 169–94. University Press of Kentucky, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9781949668001.003.0008.

Full text

Abstract:

In the vast literature concerning the German attack on Allied maritime communications in the Atlantic theater during the Second World War, one particular factor has received little to no consideration – the potential threat that German aircraft carriers posed to Allied naval operations and the passage of maritime traffic in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. While ultimately the Kriegmarine never fielded an operational carrier, such a development could not be discounted at the time. This chapter addresses what the British knew about the German effort and what implications this had on British strategy, naval planning, and fleet deployments. In covering these aspects, this chapter by Marcus Faulkner fills an existing gap concerning the Admiralty's perception and contributes to understanding the complexity of the maritime threat Britain faced during the war. It also illustrates the problems involved in evaluating enemy military capabilities and intentions on the basis of a very limited intelligence picture. This in turn helps historians understand why the Admiralty remained so apprehensive of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet until 1943.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Smith, Michael. "How It Began: Bletchley Park Goes to War." In Colossus. Oxford University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192840554.003.0009.

Full text

Abstract:

The breaking of the German teleprinter cipher that led to the construction of the Colossus computer was the culmination of a series of triumphs for British codebreakers. British interception of other countries’ radio communications had begun in earnest during the First World War. The War Office ‘censored’ diplomatic communications passing through the hands of the international telegraph companies, setting up a codebreaking operation to decipher the secret messages. The British Army intercepted German military wireless communications with a great deal of success. E. W. B. Gill, one of the army officers involved in decoding the messages, recalled that ‘the orderly Teutonic mind was especially suited for devising schemes which any child could unravel’. One of the most notable successes for the British cryptanalysts came in December 1916 when the commander of the German Middle-East signals operation sent a drunken message to all his operators wishing them a Merry Christmas. With little other activity taking place over the Christmas period, the same isolated and clearly identical message was sent out in six different codes, only one of which, until this point, the British had managed to break. The army codebreaking operation became known as MI1b and was commanded by Major Malcolm Hay, a noted historian and eminent academic. It enjoyed a somewhat fractious relationship with its junior counterpart in the Admiralty, formally the Naval Intelligence Department 25 (NID25) but much better known as Room 40, after the office in the Old Admiralty Buildings in Whitehall that it occupied. The navy codebreaking organisation had an even more successful war than MI1b, recruiting a number of the future employees of Britain’s Second World War codebreaking centre at Bletchley Park, including Dillwyn ‘Dilly’ Knox, Frank Birch, Nigel de Grey, and Alastair Denniston, who by the end of the war was head of Room 40. Among the many successes of the Royal Navy codebreakers was the breaking of the Zimmermann telegram, which showed that Germany had asked Mexico to join an alliance against the United States, offering Mexico’s ‘lost territory’ in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona in return, and brought the United States into the war.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Batey, Mavis. "Breaking machines with a pencil." In The Turing Guide. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198747826.003.0019.

Full text

Abstract:

Dilly Knox, the renowned First World War codebreaker, was the first to investigate the workings of the Enigma machine after it came on the market in 1925, and he developed hand methods for breaking Enigma. What he called ‘serendipity’ was truly a mixture of careful observation and inspired guesswork. This chapter describes the importance of the pre-war introduction to Enigma that Turing received from Knox. Turing worked with Knox during the pre-war months, and when war was declared he joined Knox’s Enigma Research Section at Bletchley Park. Once a stately home, Bletchley Park had become the war station of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), of which the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was part. Its head, Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, was responsible for both espionage (Humint) and the new signals intelligence (Sigint), but the latter soon became his priority. Winston Churchill was the first minister to realize the intelligence potential of breaking the enemy’s codes, and in November 1914 he had set up ‘Room 40’ right beside his Admiralty premises. By Bletchley Park’s standards, Room 40 was a small-scale codebreaking unit focusing mainly on naval and diplomatic messages. When France and Germany also set up cryptographic bureaux they staffed them with servicemen, but Churchill insisted on recruiting scholars with minds of their own—the so-called ‘professor types’. It was an excellent decision. Under the influence of Sir Alfred Ewing, an expert in wireless telegraphy and professor of engineering at Cambridge University, Ewing’s own college, King’s, became a happy hunting ground for ‘professor types’ during both world wars—including Dillwyn (Dilly) Knox (Fig. 11.1) in the first and Alan Turing in the second. Until the time of Turing’s arrival, mostly classicists and linguists were recruited. Knox himself had an international reputation for unravelling charred fragments of Greek papyri. Shortly after Enigma first came on the market in 1925, offering security to banks and businesses for their telegrams and cables, the GC&CS obtained two of the new machines, and some time later Knox studied one of these closely.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!