Journal articles on the topic 'Germany (West). Bundestag. Grünen'

This article deals with the evolving role of the Greens (Die Grünen) in the West German political system. It focuses on the “parliamentarization” of the Greens in the Bundestag (federal parliament) and in the Landtage (state parliaments) of Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and Hamburg. Utilizing personal interviews, parliamentary archives, opinion polls, and party documents, it considers both the impact of the Greens upon the parliamentary system and the impact of the system upon the Greens. The study finds that, despite serious situational and organizational constraints, the Greens in these parliaments have generally been a “creative” oppositional force. However, parliamentary learning experiences have contributed inevitably to the classical dilemma confronting the Greens: How can the “alternative” party become more influential in parliamentary politics without also becoming more like the established parties?

The author presents in this paper the developing process of German Green Party. In the 1970s new social movements like environmentalists, peace organizations and feminist founded political party The Greens (Die Grünen). It was an act of opposition against pollution, use of nuclear power, and some aspects of life in highly developed and industrialized society, the formal inauguration was held 1980 in West Germany. 1990 three civil rights groups in East Germany combined to form Bündnis 90, which merged with Die Grünen after long uniting process in 1993. 18 years after foundation they built together with social democrats from SPD government which lasted for two term of office between 1998 and 2005. So day there are a lot of green parties all over the world, but and the German greens are the most successful, they are an example for other green parties.

This article discusses the ways of conceptualizing politics in parliamentary debates. When the politics-vocabulary is ubiquitous in them, which kind of speech act lies in emphasizing the political aspect? Focusing on thematized uses allows us to identify conceptual revisions in the politics-vocabulary in digitalized plenary debates of the German Bundestag from 1949 to 2017. My fourfold scheme for conceptualizing politics (polity, policy, politicization, politicking) provides the analytical apparatus. The units of analysis in this study are compound words around politics written as single words, a German language specialty. Their frequency has remarkably risen in the Bundestag debates, and the search engine can easily find them. This research interest allows me to speculate with changes in the understanding and appreciation of politics in postwar (West)Germany.

The September 2013 Bundestag election, which reelected Angela Merkelas chancellor, was a clear defeat for the Green Party. Alliance 90/TheGreens (henceforth the Greens) fared far better than the Free DemocraticParty (FDP), which failed even to score the five percent of the vote requiredfor representation in parliament, but still fell from 10.7 percent to 8.4 percent,losing five of their sixty-eight seats in parliament. Since in March ofthat same year, surveys had shown their support at 17 percent, this disappointingresult forced Jürgen Trittin, the leader of the parliamentary delegationto step down.1 In many ways, this perceived electoral debacle markedthe end of an era. The former Federal Minister of the Envi ron ment, whohad originally joined the party in 1980, told reporters that “a new generation” would have to step forward and lead the party into the 2017campaign. This statement suggested not only that the Greens’ rebelliousfounding impulse was spent, but also that they had become part of theestablishment in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), now requiring areinvigoration of their own. Since the Greens were once expected to be littlemore than a short-lived byproduct of the social conflicts of the 1970s, acloser look at the party’s founding moment at the beginning of the 1980smight shed new light on its current predicament.

Abstract This article discusses the ways of conceptualizing politics in parliamentary debates. When the politics-vocabulary is ubiquitous in them, which kind of speech act lies in emphasizing the political aspect? Focusing on thematized uses allows us to identify conceptual revisions in the politics-vocabulary in digitalized plenary debates of the German Bundestag from 1949 to 2017. My fourfold scheme for conceptualizing politics (polity, policy, politicization, politicking) provides the analytical apparatus. The units of analysis in this study are compound words around politics written as single words, a German language specialty. Their frequency has remarkably risen in the Bundestag debates, and the search engine can easily find them. This research interest allows me to speculate with changes in the understanding and appreciation of politics in postwar (West)Germany

On 20 December 1950, the Secretary General of the United Nations invited the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948. For several reasons the West German authorities treated the Convention as a tool to conduct foreign policy. The ratification of the Convention by West Germany and the form in which it was to take place were also important for Lemkin. Lemkin’s aforementioned fears explain why it was so important to him that the German language version of the Convention did not include phrases that distorted its original connotation and bring it closer to the Nuremberg principles. After a meeting of the Bundestag Law Committee on 3 May 1954, the West German justice minister informed Lemkin about the course of the discussions and also informed him that most of the proposed amendments and changes were accepted.

There Has Been Much Concern In The Past Few Years About the ‘decline of parliament’ in West European democracies. In the United Kingdom, criticism of the New Labour government has included its apparent neglect of Parliament demonstrated by the style and strategies of the government, ranging from reduction in the time allotted to prime minister's question-time and the utilization of the mass media rather than Parliament as the forum for important policy statements, to the government's refusal to accept reforms to the method of appointments to House of Commons select committees, as recommended by the House of Commons Liaison Committee. Strong party discipline, coupled with sanctions which can affect the political careers of MPs for failure to obey the edicts of the party leadership, have limited the autonomy of MPs in Britain, and, to a varying degree, in other West European countries also. Certainly the German Bundestag has been criticized for being too much under the control of the leaderships of the political parties, in terms of voting on legislation, the stage-management of debates and the choice of leaders of the parliamentary parties (the removal by Chancellor Schröder of Scharping as leader of the SPD parliamentary party in 1998 at the instigation of Lafontaine, the then party chairman, is a notorious instance).

AbstractThis article situates the establishment of the Bundeswehr and the implementation of compulsory military service in the 1950s and early 1960s within contemporary efforts to define a “sexual-moral order” for the Federal Republic of Germany. It argues that West Germany's rearmament offered contemporaries an opportunity to stipulate not only acceptable soldierly behavior, but also adequate male behavior in general. In the context of heightened concerns about juvenile delinquents (so-called Halbstarken), female prostitution, homosexuality, and the distribution of pornographic materials, West German citizens became interested in the social and sexual conduct of Bundeswehr soldiers and officers. Whereas some still considered the military to be a “school of the nation” and of proper masculinity, others worried about the armed forces as a possible breeding ground for immorality. Partly sharing these concerns, government representatives, members of the Bundestag, church officials, and military commanders sought to guide soldiers’ behavior, emphasizing the ideal of the “complete” (vollkommene) Christian male-breadwinner family.

In the article, the so-called eastern German museums and the way they operate is discussed in view of a document ratified by Bundestag in 2016. The document concerned the further action plan for implementing the provisions of paragraph 96 of the Federal Expellee Law of 1953, popularly referred to as a “cultural paragraph”. The term “German East” bears reference to the historic territories of German settlement prior to 1945, whose heritage is a focus of attention for museums as well as science and culture institutions in contemporary Germany. Those eastern German museums have been reviewed herein, whose interest lies, inter alia, in territories presently belonging to Poland: the East Prussian State Museum (Ostpreuβisches Landesmuseum) in Lüneburg, the West Prussian State Museum (Westpreuβisches Landesmuseum) in Warendorf, the State Museum of Pomerania (Pommersches Landesmuseum) in Greifswald, the Silesian Museum (Schlesisches Museum) in Görlitz.

When Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der went public and announced his plan for early elections on the evening of 22 May 2005, the SPD and the Green Party had just lost the state election in North-Rhine West-phalia. It was the last German state ruled by a Red-Green government, which left the federal government without any stable support in the Bundesrat. The chancellor's radical move resulted in early elections that neither the left (SPD and Greens) nor the conservative political camp (CDU/CSU and FDP) was able to win. While the citizens considered the CDU/CSU to be more competent to solve the country's most important problems, unemployment and the economy, the SPD once again presented the preferred chancellor. The new govrnment, build on a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, might be able to solve some of the structural problems of the country. While this will be beneficial for Germany as a whole, it will at the same time weaken the major German parties, which are running the risk of becoming politically indistinguishable.

Recent historical studies on the organizations of German expellees and their influence on West German political culture highlight the insincere attitude and deception by the whole West German political establishment toward the expellee politicians and activists and their cause. One study in this field is Matthias Stickler's important book “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” and a more recent one by Manfred Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen?, takes Stickler's thesis even further. It creates the impression that the expellee organizations, highly dependent on the government for financial and political support, had no option in this matter and were even helpless in that they had to accept the noncommittal rhetoric and the West German government's unwillingness to obligate West Germany for their cause. In this article, I probe this portrayal of the expellee politicians and activists as objects rather than subjects of German politics by inquiring into the political and public relations activities of the German Sudeten Council (Sudetendeutscher Rat) in the field of foreign policy during and around the tenure of Hans-Christoph Seebohm as the leader (Sprecher) of the German Sudeten Expellee Homeland Society (Landsmannschaft) (1959–1967). The Sudeten Council is a non-party association; one half of its members are elected by the federal assembly of the German Sudeten Landsmannschaft and the other half by the political parties of the Bundestag. As well as being a politician of the expellee organization, Hans-Christoph Seebohm pursued the longest political career in the German federal cabinet—seventeen years. He served as Minister of Transportation and Mail of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1966 under Chancellors Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard. To date, no monographic work has been written about Seebohm.

In the West German general election of 1983 the newly formed Green Party received 5.6 per cent of the popular vote and was (at only its second attempt) able to send 27 delegates to the federal Parliament (Bundestag). It was the first time since the 1950s that a new party had joined the three major parties (SPD, CDU-CSU, FDP) in the federal Parliament. In the 1987 federal election the Green Party achieved an even better result: it received 8.3 per cent of the popular vote and 42 seats in the federal Parliament. Because of this remarkable success the analysis of the Green Party in Germany has become a major research object in political science. Several studies have described the development of the Green Party, its social bases, its organizational structure and its ideology.1 However, these findings have not been related to the role as well as the function of the Green Party in the West German party system. This research note represents such an attempt. The debate on ‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’ of West European party systems is the most useful in this respect.2 Is the Green Party vulnerable and consequently likely to disappear from the political scene or will it become a stable component of the party system? It is hypothesized that the Green Party will consolidate its position as the fourth party in the German party system because it is a ‘new type of party’ that differs significantly from the established parties and hence can mobilize its own voter clientele.

The last parliament of the GDR, the 10. Volkskammer, existed only from March to October 1990 and was undoubtedly different from those in other eastern European communist countries. This had to do with its special situation as the parliament of one half of a former united nation. After the victory of the conservatives in the election of March 1990 it was clear that the majority of voters wanted unification with West Germany according to Art. 23 of the German Constitution and as quickly as possible. This meant reunification by accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic. It was the Volkskammer’s main task to organize this process. Given that the 400 newly elected MPs were completely unexperienced following the model of the German Bundestag was probably the only way to be able to tackle the problems they were faced with. But this meant too that there was little room and no time to develop own solutions to their problems. Critics saw the massive support by West German political parties and institutions as a form of colonization. And a lot of MPs too were highly critical of their work. A feeling of lack of influence and powerlessness was widespread. But, as the example of the reintroduction of the five Länder shows, both sides could pull in the same direction too.This article tries to answer the question whether this parliament was only an assiduous student of its West German master or despite the circumstances able to develop its own culture and its own pace.

Stability and predictability had been the norm in the German political system before the unification. The seven federal elections in the unified Germany from 1990 to 2013 did have significant consequences on the traditional continuity. After the last two governments headed by Helmut Kohl (1990-1998), the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder became Chancellor in a Red-Green coalition (1998-2005) and the Christian Democrat Angela Merkel became Chancellor, fi rst in a Grand Coalition with the Social Democrats (2005-2009), than in a coalition with the Liberals (2009-2013), and after the 2013 elections in a Grand Coalition again. These frequent changes can be explained by the mobility of the electorate: the cumulative effect of the growth of the middle class and the general social mobility have eroded traditional loyalties, as the disaffection of the youth includes changing electoral choices or tendency to no-vote. Economic and social issues too did have effect on voting behavior: because their critical social situation the electors of the East had preferred fi rst Kohl’s CDU, than Schröder’s SPD and again the CDU under Merkel’s leadership; in the West millions of left electors disappointed by Schröder’s contentious reforms of the labor market leaved the SPD in the 2009 and 2013 elections; the performance of the economy in the last years after periods of crisis, collocating Germany at the top of the European Union, has stimulated the support to Merkel. Because a new party, the PDS than Linke, which has stable roots in the East, but can’t be partner of a government; because the exclusion from the Bundestag of the liberal FDP; and, finally, because the least reform of the electoral system toward more proportionality: all that injects uncertainty into a “fluid” party and political system.

The purpose of the article is to present the evolution of the political agenda of the German Green Party (Die Grünen) between 1980 (establishment of the party, its first program manifesto – Das Bundesprogramm) and 2017 (recent German federal elections program – Zukunft Wird aus Mut Gemacht. Bundestagswahlprogramm). The research was conducted on the basis of the literature and the comparison of the two mentioned program manifestos. The hypothesis of the work is that the successes of the Greens in West Germany mainly result from the ideological, program, and strategic reorientation of the party that took place at the turn of 1980s and 1990s.

Home is the place where one knows oneself best; it is where one belongs, a space one longs to be. Indeed, the longing for home seems to be grounded in an anthropological need for anchorage. Although in English the German loanword ‘Heimat’ is often used synonymously with ‘home’, many would have claimed up till now that it has been a word particularly ill equipped for use outside the German speaking community, owing to its specific cultural baggage. However, I would like to argue that – not least due to the political dimension of home (such as in homeland security and homeland affairs) – the yearning for a home has experienced a semantic shift, which aligns it more closely with Heimat, a term imbued with the ambivalence of home and homeland intertwined (Morley 32). I will outline the German specificities below and invite an Australian analogy. A resoundingly positive understanding of the German term ‘Heimat’ likens it to “an intoxicant, a medium of transport; it makes people feel giddy and spirits them to pleasant places. To contemplate Heimat means to imagine an uncontaminated space, a realm of innocence and immediacy.“ (Rentschler 37) While this description of Heimat may raise expectations of an all-encompassing idyll, for most German speakers “…there is hardly a more ambivalent feeling, hardly a more painful mixture of happiness and bitterness than the experience vested in the word ‘Heimat’.” (Reitz 139) The emotional charge of the idiom is of quite recent origin. Traditionally, Heimat stimulates connotations of ‘origin’, ‘birth place, of oneself and one’s ancestors’ and even of ‘original area of settlement and homeland’. This corresponds most neatly with such English terms as ‘native land’, ‘land of my birth’, ‘land of my forefathers’ or ‘native shores’. Added to the German conception of Heimat are its sensitive associations relating, on the one hand, to Romanticism and its idolisation of the fatherland, and on the other, to the Nazi blood-and-soil propaganda, which brought Heimat into disrepute for many and added to the difficulties of translating the German word. A comparison with similar terms in Romance languages makes this clear. Speakers of those tongues have an understanding of home and homeland, which is strongly associated with the father-figure: the Greek “patra”, Latin and Italian “patria” and the French “patrie”, as well as patriarch, patrimony, patriot, and patricide. The French come closest to sharing the concept to which Heimat’s Germanic root of “heima” refers. For the Teutons “heima” denoted the traditional space and place of a clan, society or individual. However, centuries of migration, often following expulsion, have imbued Heimat with ambivalent notions; feelings of belonging and feelings of loss find expression in the term. Despite its semantic opaqueness, Heimat expresses a “longing for a wholeness and unity” (Strzelczyk 109) which for many seems lost, especially following experiences of alienation, exile, diaspora or ‘simply’ migration. Yet, it is in those circumstances, when Heimat becomes a thing of the past, that it seems to manifest itself most clearly. In the German context, the need for Heimat arose particularly after World War Two, when experiences of loss and scenes of devastation, as well as displacement and expulsion found compensation of sorts in the popular media. Going to the cinema was the top pastime in Germany in the 1950s, and escapist Heimat films, which showed idyllic country scenery, instead of rubble-strewn cityscapes, were the most well-liked of all. The industry pumped out kitsch films in quick succession to service this demand and created sugar-coated, colour-rich Heimat experiences on celluloid that captured the audience’s imagination. Most recently, the genre experienced something of a renaissance in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent accession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, also referred to as East Germany) to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) in 1990. Described as one of the most seminal moments in modern history, the events led to large-scale change; in world politics, strategic alliances, but were most closely felt at the personal and societal level, reshaping community and belonging. Feelings of disbelief and euphoria occupied the hearts and minds of people all around the world in the days following the night of the 9 November 1989. However, the fall of the Wall created within weeks what the Soviet Union had been unable to manage in the previous 40 years; the sense of a distinctly Eastern identity (cf. Heneghan 148). Most of the initial positive perceptions slowly gave way to a hangover when the consequences of the drastic societal changes became apparent in their effects on populace. Feelings of disenchantment and disillusionment followed the jubilation and dominated the second phase of socio-cultural unification, when individuals were faced with economic and emotional hardship or were forced to relocate, as companies folded, politically tainted degrees and professions were abolished and entire industry sectors disappeared. This reassessment of almost every aspect of people’s lifestyles led many to feel that their familiar world had dissipated and their Heimat had been lost, resulting in a rhetoric of “us” versus “them”. This conceptual divide persisted and was cemented by the perceived difficulties in integration that had emerged, manifesting a consciousness of difference that expressed itself metaphorically in the references to the ‘Wall in the mind’. Partly as a reaction to these feelings and partly also as a concession to the new citizens from the East, Western backed and produced unification films utilised the soothing cosmos of the Heimat genre – so well rehearsed in the 1950s – as a framework for tales about unification. Peter Timm’s Go, Trabi, Go (1991) and Wolfgang Büld’s sequel Go, Trabi, Go 2. Das war der Wilde Osten [That Was the Wild East, 1992] are two such films which revive “Heimat as a central cultural construct through which aspects of life in the new Germany could be sketched and grasped.” (Naughton 125) The films’ references to Eastern and Western identity served as a powerful guarantor of feelings of belonging, re-assuring audiences on both sides of the mental divide of their idiosyncrasies, while also showing a way to overcome separation. These Heimat films thus united in spirit, emotion and consumer behaviour that which had otherwise not yet “grown together” (cf. Brandt). The renaissance of the Heimat genre in the 1990s gained further momentum in the media with new Heimat film releases as well as TV screenings of 1950s classics. Indeed Heimat films of old and new were generally well received, as they responded to a fragile psychological predisposition at a time of change and general uncertainty. Similar feelings were shared by many in the post-war society of the 1950s and the post-Wall Europe of the 1990s. After the Second World War and following the restructure after Nazism it was necessary to integrate large expellee groups into the young nation of the FRG. In the 1990s the integration of similarly displaced people was required, though this time they were having to cope less with territorial loss than with ideological implosions. Then and now, Heimat films sought to aid integration and “transcend those differences” (Naughton 125) – whilst not disputing their existence – particularly in view of the fact that Germany had 16 million new citizens, who clearly had a different cultural background, many of whom were struggling with perceptions of otherness as popularly expressed in the stereotypical ethnographies of “Easterners” and “Westerners”. The rediscovery of the concept of Heimat in the years following unification therefore not only mirrored the status quo but further to that allowed “for the delineation of a common heritage, shared priorities, and values with which Germans in the old and new states could identify.” (Naughton 125) Closely copying the optimism of the 1950s which promised audiences prosperity and pride, as well as a sense of belonging and homecoming into a larger community, the films produced in the early 1990s anticipated prosperity for a mobile and flexible people. Like their 1950s counterparts, “unification films ‘made in West Germany’ imagined a German Heimat as a place of social cohesion, opportunity, and prosperity” (Naughton 126). Following the unification comedies of the early 1990s, which were set in the period following the fall of the Wall, another wave of German film production shifted the focus onto the past, sacrificing the future dimension of the unification films. Leander Haußmann’s Sonnenallee (1999) is set in the 1970s and subscribes to a re-invention of one’s childhood, while Wolfgang Becker’s Goodbye Lenin (2003) in which the GDR is preserved on 79 square metres in a private parallel world, advocates a revival of aspects of the socialist past. Referred to as “Ostalgia”; a nostalgia for the old East, “a ‘GDR revival’ or the ‘renaissance of a GDR Heimatgefühl’” (Berdahl 197), the films achieved popular success. Ostalgia films utilised the formula of ‘walking down memory lane’ in varying degrees; thematising pleasing aspects of an imagined collective past and tempting audiences to revel in a sense of unity and homogeneous identity (cf. Walsh 6). Ostalgia was soon transformed from emotional and imaginary reflection into an entire industry, manifesting itself in the “recuperation, (re)production, marketing, and merchandising of GDR products as well as the ‘museumification’ of GDR everyday life” (Berdahl 192). This trend found further expression in a culture of exhibitions, books, films and cabaret acts, in fashion and theme parties, as well as in Trabi-rallies which celebrated or sent up the German Democratic Republic in response to the perceived public humiliation at the hands of West German media outlets, historians and economists. The dismissal of anything associated with the communist East in mainstream Germany and the realisation that their consumer products – like their national history – were disappearing in the face of the ‘Helmut Kohl-onisation’ sparked this retro-Heimat cult. Indeed, the reaction to the disappearance of GDR culture and the ensuing nostalgia bear all the hallmarks of Heimat appreciation, a sense of bereavement that only manifests itself once the Heimat has been lost. Ironically, however, the revival of the past led to the emergence of a “new” GDR (Rutschky 851), an “imaginary country put together from the remnants of a country in ruins and from the hopes and anxieties of a new world” (Hell et al. 86), a fictional construct rather than a historical reality. In contrast to the fundamental social and psychological changes affecting former GDR citizens from the end of 1989, their Western counterparts were initially able to look on without a sense of deep personal involvement. Their perspective has been likened to that of an impartial observer following the events of a historical play (cf. Gaschke 22). Many saw German unification as an enlargement of the West; as soon as they had exported their currency, democracy, capitalism and freedom to the East, “blossoming landscapes” were sure to follow (Kohl). At first political events did not seem to cause a major disruption to the lives of most people in the old FRG, except perhaps the need to pay higher tax. This understanding proved a major underestimation of the transformation process that had gripped all of Germany, not just the Eastern part. Nevertheless, few predicted the impact that far-reaching changes would have on the West; immigration and new minorities alter the status quo of any society, and with Germany’s increase in size and population, its citizens in both East and West had to adapt and adjust to a new image and to new expectations placed on them from within and without. As a result a certain unease began to be felt by many an otherwise self-assured individual. Slower and less obvious than the transition phase experienced by most East Germans, the changes in West German society and consciousness were nevertheless similar in their psychological effects; resulting in a subtle feeling of displacement. Indeed, it was soon noted that “the end of German division has given rise to a sense of crisis in the West, particularly within the sphere of West German culture, engendering a Western nostalgica for the old FRG” (Cooke 35), also referred to as Westalgia. Not too dissimilar to the historical rehabilitation of the East played out in Ostalgic fashion, films appeared which revisit moments worthy of celebration in West German history, such as the 1954 Soccer World Championship status which is at the centre of the narrative in Sönke Wortmann’s Das Wunder von Bern [Miracle of Bern, 2003]. Hommages to the 1968 generation (Hans Weingartner’s Die fetten Jahre sind vorbei [The Educators, 2004]) and requiems for West Berlin’s subculture (Leander Haußmann’s Herr Lehmann [Mr Lehmann, 2003]) were similar manifestations of this development. Ostalgic and Westalgic practices coexisted for several years after the turn of the millennium, and are a tribute to the highly complex interrelationship that exists between personal histories and public memories. Both narratives reveal “the politics, ambiguities, and paradoxes of memory, nostalgia, and resistance” (Berdahl 207). In their nostalgic contemplation of the good old days, Ostalgic and Westalgic films alike express a longing to return to familiar and trusted values. Both post-hoc constructions of a heimatesque cosmos demonstrate a very real reinvention of Heimat. Their deliberate reconstruction and reinterpretation of history, as well as the references to and glorification of personal memory and identity fulfil the task of imbuing history – in particular personal history – with dignity. As such these Heimat films work in a similar fashion to myths in the way they explain the world. The heimatesque element of Ostalgic and Westalgic films which allows for the potential to overcome crises reveals a great deal about the workings of myths in general. Irrespective of their content, whether they are cosmogonic (about the beginning of time), eschatological (about the end of time) or etiologic myths (about the origins of peoples and societal order), all serve as a means to cope with change. According to Hans Blumenberg, myth making may be seen as an attempt to counter the absolutism of reality (cf. Blumenberg 9), by providing a response to its seemingly overriding arbitrariness. Myths become a means of endowing life with meaning through art and thus aid positive self-assurance and the constructive usage of past experiences in the present and the future. Judging from the popular success of both Ostalgic and Westalgic films in unified Germany, one hopes that communication is taking place across the perceived ethnic divide of Eastern and Western identities. At the very least, people of quite different backgrounds have access to the constructions and fictions relating to one another pasts. By allowing each other insight into the most intimate recesses of their respective psychological make-up, understanding can be fostered. Through the re-activation of one’s own memory and the acknowledgment of differences these diverging narratives may constitute the foundation of a common Heimat. It is thus possible for Westalgic and Ostalgic films to fulfil individual and societal functions which can act as a core of cohesion and an aid for mutual understanding. At the same time these films revive the past, not as a liveable but rather as a readable alternative to the present. As such, the utilisation of myths should not be rejected as ideological misuse, as suggested by Barthes (7), nor should it allow for the cementing of pseudo-ethnic differences dating back to mythological times; instead myths can form the basis for a common narrative and a self-confident affirmation of history in order to prepare for a future in harmony. Just like myths in general, Heimat tales do not attempt to revise history, or to present the real facts. By foregrounding the evidence of their wilful construction and fictitious invention, it is possible to arrive at a spiritual, psychological and symbolic truth. Nevertheless, it is a truth that is essential for a positive experience of Heimat and an optimistic existence. What can the German situation reveal in an Australian or a wider context? Explorations of Heimat aid the socio-historical investigation of any society, as repositories of memory and history, escape and confrontation inscribed in Heimat can be read as signifiers of continuity and disruption, reorientation and return, and as such, ever-changing notions of Heimat mirror values and social change. Currently, a transition in meaning is underway which alters the concept of ‘home’ as an idyllic sphere of belonging and attachment to that of a threatened space; a space under siege from a range of perils in the areas of safety and security, whether due to natural disasters, terrorism or conventional warfare. The geographical understanding of home is increasingly taking second place to an emotional imaginary that is fed by an “exclusionary and contested distinction between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ (Blunt and Dowling 168). As such home becomes ever more closely aligned with the semantics of Heimat, i.e. with an emotional experience, which is progressively less grounded in feelings of security and comfort, yet even more so in those of ambivalence and, in particular, insecurity and hysteria. This paranoia informs as much as it is informed by government policies and interventions and emerges from concerns for national security. In this context, home and homeland have become overused entities in discussions relating to the safeguarding of Australia, such as with the establishment of a homeland security unit in 2003 and annual conferences such as “The Homeland Security Summit” deemed necessary since 9/11, even in the Antipodes. However, these global connotations of home and Heimat overshadow the necessity of a reclaimation of the home/land debate at the national and local levels. In addressing the dispossession of indigenous peoples and the removal and dislocation of Aboriginal children from their homes and families, the political nature of a home-grown Heimat debate cannot be ignored. “Bringing them Home”, an oral history project initiated by the National Library of Australia in Canberra, is one of many attempts at listening to and preserving the memories of Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders who, as children, were forcibly taken away from their families and homelands. To ensure healing and rapprochement any reconciliation process necessitates coming to terms with one’s own past as much as respecting the polyphonic nature of historical discourse. By encouraging the inclusion of diverse homeland and dreamtime narratives and juxtaposing these with the perceptions and constructions of home of the subsequent immigrant generations of Australians, a rich text, full of contradictions, may help generate a shared, if ambivalent, sense of a common Heimat in Australia; one that is fed not by homeland insecurity but one resting in a heimatesque knowledge of self. References Barthes, Roland. Mythen des Alltags. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1964 Berdahl, Daphne. “‘(N)ostalgie’ for the Present: Memory, Longing, and East German Things.” Ethnos 64.2 (1999): 192-207. Blumenberg, Hans. Arbeit am Mythos. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979. Blunt, Alison, and Robyn Dowling. Home. London: Routledge, 2006. Brandt, Willy. “Jetzt kann zusammenwachsen, was zusammengehört [Now that which belongs together, can now grow together].” From his speech on 10 Nov. 1989 in front of the Rathaus Schöneberg, transcript available from http://www.bwbs.de/Brandt/9.html>. Cooke, Paul. “Whatever Happened to Veronika Voss? Rehabilitating the ‘68ers’ and the Problem of Westalgie in Oskar Roehler’s Die Unberührbare (2000).” German Studies Review 27.1 (2004): 33-44. Gaschke, Susanne. “Neues Deutschland. Sind wir eine Wirtschaftsgesellschaft?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B1-2 (2000): 22-27. Hell, Julia, and Johannes von Moltke. “Unification Effects: Imaginary Landscapes of the Berlin Republic.” The Germanic Review 80.1 (Winter 2005): 74-95. Heneghan, Tom. Unchained Eagle: Germany after the Wall. London: Reuters, 2000. Kohl, Helmut. “Debatte im Bundestag um den Staatsvertrag.” 21 June 1990. Morley, David. Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity. London: Routledge, 2000. Naughton, Leonie. That Was the Wild East. Film Culture, Unification, and the “New” Germany. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002. Rentschler, Eric. “There’s No Place Like Home: Luis Trenker’s The Prodigal Son (1934).” New German Critique 60 (Special Issue on German Film History, Autumn 1993): 33-56. Reitz, Edgar. “The Camera Is Not a Clock (1979).” In Eric Rentschler, ed. West German Filmmakers on Film: Visions and Voices. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988. 137-141. Rutschky, Michael. “Wie erst jetzt die DDR entsteht.” Merkur 49.9-10 (Sep./Oct. 1995): 851-64. Strzelczyk, Florentine. “Far Away, So Close: Carl Froelich’s Heimat.” In Robert C. Reimer, ed., Cultural History through the National Socialist Lens. Essays on the Cinema of the Third Reich. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2000. 109-132. Walsh, Michael. “National Cinema, National Imaginary.” Film History 8 (1996): 5-17. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Ludewig, Alexandra. "Home Meets Heimat." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/12-ludewig.php>. APA Style Ludewig, A. (Aug. 2007) "Home Meets Heimat," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/12-ludewig.php>.

The variable examines which political topics are prevalent in fictional entertainment. Studies differentiate either between the two categories political and sociopolitical issues (e.g., Eilders & Nitsch, 2015) or they take a closer look at the presented political topics by differentiating between the three thematic dimensions of politics: polity for the institutional and normative infrastructure, policy for particular political issues, and politics for competition and power relations (e.g., Nitsch et al., 2019; Nitsch & Eilders, 2015). Field of application/theoretical foundation The differentiation between the three dimensions of politics goes back to political science and allows insights into which picture of politics is presented in the media. Analyses show that fictional (and non-fictional) media content tends to have a strong focus on the dimension of politics, i.e. movies and TV-series typically concentrate on negotiation processes between the parties and the power struggle between political camps (e.g., Jandura et al., 2016; Nitsch & Eilders, 2015; Nitsch et al., 2019). References/combination with other methods of data collection --- Example study Nitsch & Eilders, 2015 Information on Nitsch & Eilders, 2015 Authors: Cordula Nitsch & Christiane Eilders Research interest: depiction of politics (centrality of politics, topics, actors, political actions) in political dramas of two different countries (US and Germany) Object of analysis: two political dramas (“The West Wing”, US; “Kanzleramt”, Germany) Timeframe of analysis: 2004-2005 Information about variable Variable name/definition: Politische Themen [political topics] Pro Szene können bis zu drei politische Themen codiert werden, nämlich jeweils ein Thema aus den drei Bereichen polity, policy und politics. Eine Codierung von zwei Themen innerhalb eines der Bereiche (z.B. zwei policy Themen) ist NICHT möglich. In einer Szene, in der mehrere Themen durcheinander eingeworfen werden (z. B. eine Gruppe von Menschen redet durcheinander), muss folglich das zentrale Thema bestimmt werden. Lässt sich nicht bestimmen, welches das dominanteste Thema ist, wird das erstgenannte codiert. Politics, policy, polity wird ausschließlich für den eigenen nationalen Kontext codiert. Außenpolitik wird als nationale policy codiert. Justizthemen werden meist im Bereich polity codiert; außer es wird Handlungsbedarf für die Politik artikuliert, dann werden diese Themen als Rechtspolitik bei den policies codiert. [Up to three political topics can be coded per scene, namely one topic each of the three dimensions polity, policy and politics. The coding of two topics within one of the dimensions (e.g. two policy topics) is NOT possible. In a scene where several topics are addressed (e.g. a group of people talking), the central topic must be determined. If it is not possible to determine which is the most dominant topic, the first one is coded. Politics, policy, polity is coded exclusively for its own national context. Foreign policy is coded as a national policy. Justice issues are usually coded in the area of polity; unless the need for political action is articulated, in which case these topics are coded as legal policy in the policies.] Level of analysis: Szenenebene Scale level: Nominal Reliability: .83 (polity .70, policy .96, politics .84) V10 [THEMA-polity] Polity (Strukturen und Institutionen) 0 kein polity Thema angesprochen 101 Bundesrat (USA: Senat) 102 Bundestag (USA: Congress) 103 Parlamente 104 Parteien bzw. Fraktionen (nur, wenn es um die Strukturen geht, aber nicht, wenn nur Parteien oder Fraktionen genannt werden!) 105 Regierung/ Regierungssysteme 106 Andere politische Institutionen 201 Internationale Richtlinien/ Internationale Abkommen und Regelungen 301 Gewaltenteilung 302 Föderalismus 303 Verfassung/-sgrundsätze / Zentrale Verfassungsprinzipien 304 Gesellschaftsordnung 401 Entscheidungsfindung/ Verfahrensordnung (sofern nicht ein Gremium bei den 100er Ausprägungen bezogen: Warum gibt es einen Vermittlungsausschuss? Regeln und Infrastruktur der Entscheidungsfindung  Erklärungen über Abläufe) 402 Politische Kultur: Normen und Sitten (für die Stabilität des politischen Systems, z.B.: Sind Parteispenden Kavaliersdelikte…) 403 Bürokratie/ Verwaltung 501 Gerichte (Judikative) 502 Gesetze und Rechtsnormen/ Grundgesetz 503 Bürgerrechte 504 Menschenrechte 505 Öffentliches Recht (Völkerrecht, Staatsrecht, Sozialrecht usw.) 506 Strafrecht (Strafgesetzbuch) 507 Zivilrecht (Erbrecht, Familienrecht, Schuldrecht usw.) 600 Polity in anderen Ländern 999 Sonstige Strukturen und Institutionen V11 [THEMA-policy] Policy (Politikbereiche) Die Zuordnung einzelner Politikthemen zu den aufgeführten Bereichen ist kontextabhängig. So kann z.B. Drogenpolitik je nach Fokus unter Sozialpolitik, Arbeitspolitik oder Gesundheitspolitik verortet werden). Beim Thema Antisemitismus ist eine Zuordnung unter Diskriminierung möglich (wenn es um Antisemitismus allgemein geht) oder unter innere Sicherheit (wenn es um kriminelle Energie geht) oder unter Rechtspolitik (wenn ein Verfahren wegen antisemitischer Gewalt thematisiert wird). 0 kein policy Thema angesprochen 101 Außenpolitik (diplomatische Beziehungen, Konflikte usw.; Achtung: Hier wird nur das codiert, was nicht unter Verteidigungspolitik fällt; Außenpolitik wird auch codiert, wenn spezifische policies angesprochen werden, wie z. B. die Medienfreiheit in Ungarn oder die Bildungspolitik in Italien) 102 EU-Politik (Institutionen, Erweiterung europäische Integration) 103 Entwicklungspolitik 104 Politik in anderen Ländern (nur, wenn keine Beziehung zu D bzw. USA) 105 Verteidigungspolitik (betrifft „äußere Sicherheit“ wie Bundeswehr, NATO, Abrüstung) 201 Innere Sicherheit (Terrorismus, Verfassungsschutz, Polizei, Links- und Rechtsradikalismus) 301 Bildungs- und Forschungspolitik (Hochschulpolitik, Lehrpläne, Technikentwicklung, ggf. Kindergärten-/Kindergartenknappheit  sind je nach Kontext aber auch als Sozial- oder Familienpolitik denkbar) 302 Kulturpolitik (Film, Theater, Musik) 303 Medienpolitik (Meinungsfreiheit, Inhalte) 401 Sozialpolitik (Achtung: Sozialpolitik wird nur codiert, wenn keine Zuordnung zu detaillierteren Bereichen wie Familien- oder Rentenpolitik möglich ist; ansonsten fallen hierunter z.B. Armut, Reichtum, Sozialabbau, Kinderarmut, Hartz4, Demografischer Wandel, Obdachlosigkeit) 402 Familienpolitik (Familie, Ehe, Scheidung, Erziehung, Kindergärten, Väterrechte) 403 Jugendpolitik 404 Rentenpolitik 501 Gesundheitspolitik 502 Drogenpolitik 503 Lebensmittelpolitik 504 Verbraucherschutzpolitik 601 Umwelt- und Klimapolitik 602 Energiepolitik 603 Agrar- und Forstwirtschaftspolitik 604 Infrastrukturpolitik (Wohnungsbau/Mietrecht/Eigentum, Städtebau, Post- und Fernmeldewesen) 605 Verkehrspolitik (Straßenbau, Schifffahrt, Luftfahrt, Schienenwege) 701 Arbeitspolitik (soziale Sicherung, Recht auf Arbeit, Tarife- und Lohnpolitik, Gewerkschaften, Arbeitsschutz, Arbeitnehmerrechte, Beschäftigungspolitik, Sexismus/sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz, berufstätige Mütter, Diskriminierung am Arbeitsplatz, Arbeitslosigkeit) Wenn Wirtschafts- und Arbeitspolitik innerhalb einer Szene gleichwertig sind, wird Arbeitspolitik codiert. 702 Wirtschaftspolitik (Unternehmertum, Wirtschaftsförderung) 703 Finanzpolitik (Subventionen, Steuerpolitik, Haushalt, Geld- und Währungspolitik) 801 Rechtspolitik (Gesetzgebung, Grundrechte, Strafrecht, Kriminalität) 901 Migrationspolitik (Einwanderungspolitik, Ausländer- und Flüchtlingsfragen, Integrationsfragen, Migration) 902 Minderheitenpolitik (z.B. Diskriminierung, ethnische Minderheiten, Rassismus, Antisemitismus, religiöse Minderheiten, Homosexuelle, Menschen mit Behinderung) 903 Asyl 999 Sonstige Politikbereiche V12 [THEMA-politics] Politics (Wie wird etwas durchgesetzt? Diskussionen/Kämpfe; auch wenn es nicht um Parteienstreit im engeren Sinne geht, also auch bei außenpolitischen Verhandlungen) 0 kein politics Thema angesprochen 10 Abstimmungen/Entscheidungsverfahren (Darstellungen des Prozesses) 11 Ausschussarbeit 12 Parlamentsarbeit (große/kleine Anfragen, Anhörungen) 13 Gesetzgebungsverfahren 14 Gipfelkonferenzen 15 Untersuchungsausschuss 16 Sonstige politische Auseinandersetzungen 20 Bildung von Interessenskoalitionen 21 Interessenvermittlung/-artikulation/-auswahl/-bündelung/-durchsetzung 22 Kampf um Entscheidungsbefugnis/ Legitimationsbeschaffung durch Verhandlungen 23 Koalitionsverhandlungen 24 Kompromisssuche/Konsensfindung 30 Lobbyismus/ Überzeugungsarbeit von außen 31 Öffentlichkeitsarbeit/ Pressekampagnen/ Instrumentalisierung von Medien 40 Personalentscheidung (Bewerbung um einen Posten, Entlassungen etc.) 41 Postenverteilung 50 Putsch/ Staatsstreich in anderen Ländern 60 Wahlen/Wahlkampf 61 Andere Partizipationsformen (Volksbegehren, Bürgerinitiative) 99 Sonstige Prozesse References Eilders, C., & Nitsch, C. (2015). Politics in Fictional Entertainment: An Empirical Classification of Movies and TV Series. International Journal of Communication, 9, 1563–1587. Jandura, O., Gladitz, P., & Nitsch, C. (2016). Parlamente in non-fiktionalen und fiktionalen Angeboten. Was man in „Berlin direkt“ und „Borgen“ über parlamentarische Abläufe erfährt [Parliaments in non-fictional and fictional formats. What we learn about parliamentary procedures in “Berlin direkt” and “Borgen”. Publizistik, 61(3), 287–304. Nitsch, C. & Eilders, C. (2015). Fictional politics on TV: Comparing the representations of political reality in the US-series “The West Wing” and the German series “Kanzleramt”. Global Media Journal. German Edition, 5(1), 1–19. Nitsch, C., Jandura, O., & Bienhaus, P. (2019). The democratic quality of political depictions in fictional TV-entertainment. A comparative content analysis of the political drama Borgen and the journalistic magazine Berlin direkt. Communications. The European Journal of Communication Research. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2019-2076.