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Journal articles on the topic 'Gerrymandering'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 July 2024

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1

Ratto Trabucco, Fabio. "Gerrymandering Hypothesis in the Italian Constituencies: the Case of Genoa’s District." Oñati Socio-legal Series 9, no. 6 (June 12, 2019): 1097–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1039.

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Gerrymandering is a practice intended to establish a political advantage for a particular party or group by manipulating district boundaries. The term gerrymandering has negative connotations. Two principal tactics are used in gerrymandering: “cracking” (i.e. diluting the voting power of the opposing party’s supporters across many districts) and “packing” (concentrating the opposing party’s voting power in one district to reduce their voting power in other districts). Partisan gerrymandering to increase the power of a political party has been practiced since the beginning of the US. What’s happening in Italy? The paper examines a hypothesis of Italian gerrymandering: the uninominal constituencies of the Genoa’s District where typically progressive voting areas are united with conservative suburbs and municipalities. Last but not least the initiatives against the gerrymandering in American history to understand how to identify and contrast the techniques of gerrymandering. El gerrymandering es una práctica destinada a establecer una ventaja política para un partido o grupo en particular mediante la manipulación de los límites del distrito electoral. El término gerrymandering tiene connotaciones negativas. Se utilizan dos tácticas principales para manipular: “romper” (es decir, diluir el poder de voto de los partidarios de la parte opuesta en muchos distritos) y “empacar” (concentrar el poder de voto de la parte contraria en un distrito para reducir su poder de voto en otros distritos). La práctica partidaria de aumentar el poder de un partido político se ha practicado desde el comienzo de los EEUU. ¿Qué está pasando en Italia? El artículo examina una hipótesis del gran albedrío italiano: las circunscripciones uninominales de la Provincia de Génova donde las áreas de votación típicamente progresivas se unen con los suburbios y municipios conservadores. Por último, pero no menos importante, las iniciativas contra el gerrymandering en la historia de EEUU para comprender cómo identificar y contrastar las técnicas del gerrymandering.

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2

Martínez i Coma, Ferran, and Ignacio Lago. "Gerrymandering in comparative perspective." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (April 12, 2016): 99–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816642806.

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Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project, we measure the level of gerrymandering according to country expert surveys in Lower House elections in 54 democracies from the second half of 2012 until the first half of 2015. We show that majoritarian systems are more prone to gerrymandering than mixed-member and above all in Proportional Representation (PR) systems. When majoritarian systems are employed in large countries, gerrymandering is exacerbated. Per capita GDP and the age of electoral systems do not significantly affect gerrymandering.

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3

Filipiak, Mateusz. "Gerrymandering – próba symulacji na przykładzie województwa zachodniopomorskiego." Horyzonty Polityki 13, no. 44 (September 29, 2022): 121–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/hp.2277.

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Cel naukowy: Celem artykułu pozostaje weryfikacja, czy manipulacja granicami okręgów wyborczych (gerrymandering) może stanowić zagrożenie dla wolności i uczciwości wyborów parlamentarnych w Polsce oraz czy geograficzna stabilność preferencji wyborczych może być podstawą do dokonywania manipulacji granicami okręgów. Problemy i metody badawcze: Główna hipoteza zaproponowana w artykule brzmi: Przedwyborcza manipulacja granicami okręgów, przeprowadzona na podstawie wyników wyborów z 2015 roku, skutkowałaby korzystniejszym rozkładem mandatów dla zwycięzcy wyborów również w roku 2019. Weryfikacja przyjętych hipotez i analiza zagadnienia będzie obejmować wykorzystanie metody porównawczej, metody analizy danych zastanych oraz metody instytucjonalno-prawnej. Proces wywodu: W artykule przeprowadzona zostanie symulacja, której zasadnicza część będzie obejmować wyznaczenie powiatów województwa zachodniopomorskiego charakteryzujących się wyższym poparciem dla jednej z partii politycznych. Na tej podstawie dokonana zostanie manipulacja granicami okręgów wyborczych. W ostatnim etapie oficjalne wyniki wyborów parlamentarnych zostaną przeliczone na mandaty pod kątem podziału na nowe zmanipulowane okręgi. Wyniki analizy naukowej: Wyniki badania wskazują na odmienny rozkład mandatów w wyniku dokonanej manipulacji granicami okręgów wyborczych. Nowy rozkład mandatów jest korzystny dla partii politycznej, która z założenia miała być beneficjentem dokonanych manipulacji. Dowodzi to, że gerrymandering może potencjalnie stanowić zagrożenie dla wolnych i uczciwych wyborów w Polsce. Wnioski, innowacje, rekomendacje: Znane są konsekwencje zmian takich elementów systemu wyborczego, jak formuła wyborcza czy metoda przeliczania głosów na mandaty. W artykule wykazano, że manipulacja granicami okręgów wyborczych również może stanowić zagrożenie dla uczciwości wyborów i całego systemu wyborczego. Wskazana jest zatem pogłębiona analiza zjawiska gerrymanderingu oraz związanych z nim zagrożeń.

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4

Kelly, Benjamin. "Gerrymandering under Uncertain Preferences (Student Abstract)." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 11 (June 28, 2022): 12979–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i11.21626.

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Gerrymandering is the manipulating of redistricting for political gain. While many attempts to formalize and model gerrymandering have been made, the assumption of known voter preference, or perfect information, limits the applicability of these works to model real world scenarios. To more accurately reason about gerrymandering we investigate how to adapt existing models of the problem to work with imperfect information. In our work, we formalize a definition of the gerrymandering problem under probabilistic voter preferences, reason about its complexity compared to the deterministic version, and propose a greedy algorithm to approximate the problem in polynomial time under certain conditions.

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5

Richards, Meredith P., and Kori J. Stroub. "An Accident of Geography? Assessing the Gerrymandering of School Attendance Zones." Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education 117, no. 7 (July 2015): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016146811511700701.

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Context Despite the recent emphasis on public school choice, more than four-fifths of public school students still attend the traditional school to which they are assigned (NCES CCD, 2013), making attendance zone boundaries critical and fercely contested determinants of educational opportunity. Historical and anecdotal evidence suggests that attendance zone boundaries are not “accidents of geography,” but have been “gerrymandered” into irregular shapes in ways that alter patterns of student attendance. However, no empirical evidence has directly examined the issue of attendance zone gerrymandering. Purpose of Study Drawing on the literature on electoral gerrymandering, we outline a framework for conceptualizing and measuring educational gerrymandering. Using geospatial techniques, we then provide initial empirical evidence on the gerrymandering of school attendance zones and the variation in gerrymandering across geographic and demographic contexts. Research Design We analyze the boundaries of a large national sample of 23,945 school attendance zones obtained from the School Attendance Boundary Information System (SABINS). For each attendance zone, we compute complementary measures assessing two dimensions of gerrymandering: (1) dispersion, or the elongation of the area of a boundary; and (2) indentation, or the irregularity of the perimeter of a boundary. Results Overall, we find that attendance zones are highly gerrymandered—nearly as much as legislative districts—and are becoming more gerrymandered over time. Findings underscore the racial and, to a lesser extent, socioeconomic character of gerrymandering, which is particularly acute in Whiter and more affluent schools and in areas experiencing rapid racial change. Conclusions The gerrymandering of school attendance zones has significant implications for students and schools. Gerrymandering alters patterns of attendance and, thereby, student access to educational opportunity and resources, by “zoning out” certain students living closer to schools while “zoning in” others living farther away. Gerrymandered boundaries also hold the potential to significantly alter the racial and ethnic composition of schools and may serve as a mechanism of segregation. In addition, gerrymandered attendance zones are inherently inefficient and may impose additional transportation costs on students and districts. We conclude with implications for state and federal policy.

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6

Richards, Meredith P. "Gerrymandering educational opportunity." Phi Delta Kappan 99, no. 3 (October 23, 2017): 65–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0031721717739597.

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Gerrymandering is known best as a tool to manipulate boundaries for voting districts, but school districts have long used the same tool to manipulate school boundaries. The author used geospatial techniques — mapping various kinds of demographic data onto school boundaries — to examine public school attendance zones and their effect on students. The author’s research yielded several key insights. Like congressional districts, school zones are highly gerrymandered; the gerrymandering of school zones serves to worsen the already severe racial segregation of public schools, but affirmative gerrymandering can effectively increase diversity and reduce racial segregation.

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7

Gillman, Rick. "Geometry and Gerrymandering." Math Horizons 10, no. 1 (September 2002): 10–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10724117.2002.11974602.

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8

Tapp, Kristopher. "Measuring Political Gerrymandering." American Mathematical Monthly 126, no. 7 (July 9, 2019): 593–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00029890.2019.1609324.

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9

Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. "Optimal partisan gerrymandering." Political Geography Quarterly 7, no. 1 (January 1988): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0260-9827(88)90032-8.

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10

Duchin, Moon. "Geometry v. Gerrymandering." Scientific American 319, no. 5 (October 16, 2018): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1118-48.

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11

Hodge, Jonathan K., Emily Marshall, and Geoff Patterson. "Gerrymandering and Convexity." College Mathematics Journal 41, no. 4 (September 2010): 312–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.4169/074683410x510317.

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12

Räz, Tim. "Gerrymandering individual fairness." Artificial Intelligence 326 (January 2024): 104035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.104035.

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13

Grofman, Bernard. "Editor's Introduction." PS: Political Science & Politics 18, no. 03 (1985): 536–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096500022150.

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This minisymposium brings together excerpts from the expert witness declarations of four political scientists in an important case challenging California's congressional reapportionment as an unconstitutional political gerrymander,Badham v. Eu(D.C. California, 1984). These declarations are merely the “opening gun” inBadham. If the case goes to trial, we can anticipate additional statistical analyses will be performed and, of course, each of these experts would be subject to cross-examination about his testimony. Nonetheless, these four declarations represent an excellent illustration of the potential for political science (and political scientists) to be helpful to (even if not determinative of) judicial decision-making in an important policy arena.The basic issues raised byBadhamare as follows:What is a gerrymander? Are there manageable standards through which political gerrymandering can be detected and measured? Is there (prima facie) evidence giving rise to a (rebuttable) presumption that the California congressional plans in 1981 and 1983 were political gerrymandering? Ought political gerrymandering to be justiciable? If so, did the degree of political manipulation in the California congressional plan(s) rise to the level of constitutional violation? If political gerrymandering is held justiciable, on whom should the burden of proof of gerrymandering rest?

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Grofman, Bernard. "Editor's Introduction." PS 18, no. 3 (1985): 536–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0030826900624013.

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This minisymposium brings together excerpts from the expert witness declarations of four political scientists in an important case challenging California's congressional reapportionment as an unconstitutional political gerrymander, Badham v. Eu (D.C. California, 1984). These declarations are merely the “opening gun” in Badham. If the case goes to trial, we can anticipate additional statistical analyses will be performed and, of course, each of these experts would be subject to cross-examination about his testimony. Nonetheless, these four declarations represent an excellent illustration of the potential for political science (and political scientists) to be helpful to (even if not determinative of) judicial decision-making in an important policy arena.The basic issues raised by Badham are as follows:What is a gerrymander? Are there manageable standards through which political gerrymandering can be detected and measured? Is there (prima facie) evidence giving rise to a (rebuttable) presumption that the California congressional plans in 1981 and 1983 were political gerrymandering? Ought political gerrymandering to be justiciable? If so, did the degree of political manipulation in the California congressional plan(s) rise to the level of constitutional violation? If political gerrymandering is held justiciable, on whom should the burden of proof of gerrymandering rest?

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15

Sibley, Thomas Q. "How effective is the efficiency gap?" Mathematical Gazette 107, no. 569 (July 2023): 218–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mag.2023.52.

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Gerrymandering has affected U. S. politics since at least 1812. A political cartoon that year decried this tactic by then Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry. (Gerrymandering is manipulating the boundaries of districts to benefit a group unfairly.)

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16

Zeigler, Derek, and Jose Urteaga. "Is There Anything Left in the Fight Against Partisan Gerrymandering? Congressional Redistricting Commissions and the “Independent State Legislature Theory”." Michigan Law Review, no. 122.3 (2023): 561. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.122.3.there.

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Partisan gerrymandering is a scourge on our democracy. Instead of voters choosing their representatives, representatives choose their voters. Historically, individuals and states could pursue multiple paths to challenge partisan gerrymandering. One way was to bring claims in federal court. The Supreme Court shut this door in Rucho v. Common Cause. States can also resist partisan gerrymandering by establishing congressional redistricting commissions. However, the power of these commissions to draw congressional districts is at risk. In Moore v. Harper, a case decided in the Supreme Court’s 2022-2023 Term, the petitioners asked the Court to embrace the “Independent State Legislature Theory.” The ISLT, at a minimum, would allow federal review of state interpretations of state law governing congressional elections, including redistricting. Part I distills the Supreme Court’s opinions on redistricting commissions into two potential doctrinal routes: a more restrained version (ISLT-Lite) and a maximalist version (ISLT-Max). Part II proposes a framework to analyze existing congressional redistricting commissions for their constitutionality under each theory. Part III makes recommendations for building constitutionally sound congressional redistricting commissions under each theory, both for states with existing commissions and for those looking to reduce partisan gerrymandering in the future. While the future of ISLT, and congressional redistricting commissions more broadly, remains uncertain, this Note offers an analytical framework so states may continue to constitutionally alleviate partisan gerrymandering through the congressional redistricting commission framework.

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17

Kelly, Benjamin, Inwon Kang, and Lirong Xia. "Crowdsourcing Perceptions of Gerrymandering." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing 10, no. 1 (October 14, 2022): 124–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21993.

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Gerrymandering is the manipulation of redistricting to influence the results of a set of elections for local representatives. Gerrymandering has the potential to drastically swing power in legislative bodies even with no change in a population’s political views. Identifying gerrymandering and measuring fairness using metrics of proposed district plans is a topic of current research, but there is less work on how such plans will be perceived by voters. Gathering data on such perceptions presents several challenges such as the ambiguous definitions of ‘fair’ and the complexity of real world geography and district plans. We present a dataset collected from an online crowdsourcing platform on a survey asking respondents to mark which of two maps of equal population distribution but different districts appear more ‘fair’ and the reasoning for their decision. We performed preliminary analysis on this data and identified which of several commonly suggested metrics are most predictive of the responses. We found that the maximum perimeter of any district was the most predictive metric, especially with participants who reported that they made their decision based on the shape of the districts.

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18

Soberón, Pablo. "Gerrymandering, Sandwiches, and Topology." Notices of the American Mathematical Society 64, no. 09 (October 1, 2017): 1010–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1090/noti1582.

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19

Issacharoff, Samuel. "Gerrymandering and Political Cartels." Harvard Law Review 116, no. 2 (December 2002): 593. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1342611.

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20

Konishi, Hideo, and Chen‐Yu Pan. "Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering." Journal of Public Economic Theory 22, no. 5 (March 6, 2020): 1183–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12433.

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21

Guest, Olivia, Frank J. Kanayet, and Bradley C. Love. "Gerrymandering and computational redistricting." Journal of Computational Social Science 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 119–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42001-019-00053-9.

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22

Marino. "Ethical Gerrymandering in Science." Journal of Animal Ethics 1, no. 2 (2011): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/janimalethics.1.2.0119.

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23

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 (July 2009): 666–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.x.

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24

Beck, William C. "Endoscopy, Specialization, and Gerrymandering." Guthrie Journal 61, no. 3 (July 1992): 135–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/guthrie.61.3.135.

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25

Jones, Daniel, Neil Silveus, and Carly Urban. "Partisan Gerrymandering and Turnout." Journal of Law and Economics 66, no. 3 (August 1, 2023): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725767.

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26

Alexeev, Boris, and Dustin G. Mixon. "Partisan gerrymandering with geographically compact districts." Journal of Applied Probability 55, no. 4 (December 2018): 1046–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jpr.2018.70.

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Abstract Bizarrely shaped voting districts are frequently lambasted as likely instances of gerrymandering. In order to systematically identify such instances, researchers have devised several tests for so-called geographic compactness (i.e. shape niceness). We demonstrate that under certain conditions, a party can gerrymander a competitive state into geographically compact districts to win an average of over 70% of the districts. Our results suggest that geometric features alone may fail to adequately combat partisan gerrymandering.

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27

Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. "Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting." American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 541–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944794.

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We demonstrate the surprising benefits of legislative redistricting (including partisan gerrymandering) for American representative democracy. In so doing, our analysis resolves two long-standing controversies in American politics. First, whereas some scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting incumbents, others, that the relationship is spurious, we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases responsiveness. Second, while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases partisan bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering biases electoral systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting reduces partisan bias as compared to an electoral system without redistricting. Incorrect conclusions in both literatures resulted from misjudging the enormous uncertainties present during redistricting periods, making simplified assumptions about the redistricters' goals, and using inferior statistical methods.

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Wong, Stan Hok-Wui. "Gerrymandering in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Hong Kong." British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 2 (March 23, 2017): 579–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000685.

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To authoritarian rulers, holding somewhat competitive elections enhances legitimacy, but entails political risks. Committing electoral fraud can secure victory, but may jeopardize regime legitimacy. However, there is a tool of electoral manipulation that allows authoritarian rulers to reduce electoral risk while preserving legitimacy: gerrymandering. This article undertakes a systematic study of gerrymandering in Hong Kong, using a dataset that documents boundary changes at the level of residential buildings. The empirical findings show a significant partisan bias in electoral redistricting: opposition constituencies are more likely to be redistricted. Redistricting, however, fails to deter opposition incumbents from seeking re-election. No significant negative relationship is found between redistricting and opposition incumbents’ vote share, although redistrictingdoesreduce their overall chances of re-election. The results suggest that gerrymandering, which involves the use of packing and cracking strategies in different districts, can be employed to undermine the aggregate electoral performance of the opposition parties.

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Siaroff, Alan. "Electoral Bias in Quebec Since 1936." Canadian Political Science Review 4, no. 1 (April 26, 2010): 62–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.24124/c677/2010152.

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In the period since 1936, Quebec has gone through two eras of party politics, the first between the Liberals and the Union Nationale, the second and ongoing era between the Liberals and the Parti Québécois. This study examines elections in Quebec in terms of all relevant types of electoral bias. In both eras the overall electoral bias has clearly been against the Liberal Party. The nature of this bias has changed however. Malapportionment was crucial through 1970, and of minimal importance since the 1972 redistribution. In contrast gerrymandering, ultimately involving an ‘equivalent to gerrymandering effect’ due to the geographic nature of Liberal core support, has been not only a permanent phenomenon but indeed since 1972 the dominant effect. The one election where both gerrymandering and the overall bias were pro-Liberal — 1989 — is shown to be the ‘exception that proves the rule’. Finally, the erratic extent of electoral bias in the past four decades is shown to arise from very uneven patterns of swing in Quebec.

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Ito, Takehiro, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yusuke Kobayashi, and Yoshio Okamoto. "Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs." Theoretical Computer Science 868 (May 2021): 30–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.03.037.

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31

Flickinger, David. "Standing in Racial Gerrymandering Cases." Stanford Law Review 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 381. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1229300.

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Barnett, Arnold, Pengchen Han, and Gege Zhang. "A Simple Fix for Gerrymandering?" CHANCE 35, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 4–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09332480.2022.2038993.

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Rottinghaus, Brandon. "Gerrymandering Texas by Steve Bickerstaff." Southwestern Historical Quarterly 125, no. 2 (2021): 215–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/swh.2021.0092.

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34

McGhee, Eric. "Partisan Gerrymandering and Political Science." Annual Review of Political Science 23, no. 1 (May 11, 2020): 171–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060118-045351.

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Recent years have seen a tremendous surge of public interest in partisan gerrymandering, including robust reform efforts and multiple high-profile court cases. Political scientists have played an important role in this debate, reaching an unusually high level of public engagement. Yet this public-facing period has to some extent obscured promising avenues for future research within the discipline. I review the history of political science and redistricting and describe how research on this topic has been shaped by the newfound interest. The goals of the law differ from those of political science, so research that focuses squarely on the former often misses opportunities to advance the latter. I lay out the contours of this difference and then suggest reframing the existing metrics of partisan gerrymandering to make them useful for more traditionally scientific questions. Finally, I offer some ideas about what those future questions might look like when reframed in this way.

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35

Cox, Adam B. "Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting." Supreme Court Review 2004 (January 2004): 409–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/scr.2004.3536974.

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Stewart, Alexander J., Mohsen Mosleh, Marina Diakonova, Antonio A. Arechar, David G. Rand, and Joshua B. Plotkin. "Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions." Nature 573, no. 7772 (September 4, 2019): 117–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6.

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37

Herschlag, Gregory, Han Sung Kang, Justin Luo, Christy Vaughn Graves, Sachet Bangia, Robert Ravier, and Jonathan C. Mattingly. "Quantifying Gerrymandering in North Carolina." Statistics and Public Policy 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 30–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2330443x.2020.1796400.

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Alexeev, Boris, and Dustin G. Mixon. "An Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering." American Mathematical Monthly 125, no. 10 (November 26, 2018): 878–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00029890.2018.1517571.

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Kennedy, Sheila Suess. "Electoral Integrity: How Gerrymandering Matters." Public Integrity 19, no. 3 (September 16, 2016): 265–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2016.1225480.

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Kobayashi, Katsuya, and Attila Tasnádi. "Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature." Theory and Decision 87, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 253–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09704-9.

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Beitz, Charles R. "How Is Partisan Gerrymandering Unfair?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 46, no. 3 (July 2018): 323–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papa.12125.

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Lunday, Brian J. "A metric to identify gerrymandering." International Journal of Society Systems Science 6, no. 3 (2014): 285. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijsss.2014.065207.

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Lee, Hyeong Seok. "A study on the Effect of inducing Bias in Digital Gerrymandering on Basic Rights and Legislative Countermeasures." Korean Society of Private Security 23, no. 1 (March 30, 2024): 25–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.56603/jksps.2024.23.1.25.

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Digital gerrymandering refers to the phenomenon of using information technology to artificially manipulate electoral district boundaries to favor a particular party or group. It involves the use of data analysis and information technology to redraw electoral boundaries in a way that results in advantageous outcomes for specific parties or groups. Through digital gerrymandering, it's possible to artificially design the distribution of voters to benefit certain parties or candidates. As a result, this undermines the fairness of elections and induces bias, allowing the votes of certain groups to have disproportionately greater influence compared to others. This process poses several critical threats to the principles and fundamental rights of democracy. First, it violates the principle that every voter's vote should be treated equally. Digital gerrymandering can artificially adjust the value of votes in certain areas, diminishing the influence of some voters while overestimating that of others. Second, it leads to the distortion of political representation. When electoral district boundaries are manipulated, the outcome can differ from the actual will of the voters, resulting in a political representation system that fails to accurately reflect the opinions of some voters. Third, it infringes upon freedom of expression and political diversity. Voters' rights to freely express their political preferences and choose from a variety of political options can be restricted. This study aims to analyze the impact of digital gerrymandering on fundamental rights, especially the right to vote and freedom of expression, and to propose legislative measures to counteract it. It examines how digital technologies can distort the electoral process and specifically how they can infringe upon voters' rights to freely express their will and vote. Additionally, the study explores necessary legislative responses to address these issues, aiming to protect the core values of democracy and ensure the fairness of elections. To achieve this, the study seeks to clarify the concept of digital gerrymandering, illustrate how it can infringe upon fundamental rights through specific examples, and identify concrete legislative measures to ensure transparency and fairness.

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Wink, Kenneth A., and Ronald E. Weber. "A Reply to “What to Do about Turnout Bias in American Elections”." American Review of Politics 27 (November 1, 2006): 261–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2006.27.0.261-266.

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Thomas Brunell (2006a) critiques our article, “Do Democrats and Republicans Pay the Same Price for Seats in U.S. State Lower House Elections” (Wink and Weber 2005). We found that partisan turnout bias exists in state lower-house elections, and mostly the turnout bias favors Democratic Party candidates. Brunell does not dispute our findings on distributional bias or take issue with our methodology; rather, his main argument is that turnout bias is not significant enough to warrant concern from legislative parties or the courts. In our reply, we elaborate on our earlier proposition that turnout bias is important in American legislative elections. We also take issue with some of the assumptions made by Brunell in which he argues in favor of “sweetheart gerrymandering” as a solution to the partisan gerrymandering woes that have so frequently accompanied recent legislative redistrictings. Far from being tangential to our argument about turnout bias, Brunell’s affinity for the sweetheart gerrymander reveals his understanding of the broader context in which redistricting concerns should be addressed, and his position on a remedy for partisan gerrymandering is one with which we disagree.

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Safi, Farshid, Sarah B. Bush, and Siddhi Desai. "Gerrymandering: When Equivalent Is Not Equal!" Mathematics Teaching in the Middle School 24, no. 2 (October 2018): 82–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/mathteacmiddscho.24.2.0082.

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Safi, Farshid, Sarah B. Bush, Siddhi Desai, and Introduction by: Kevin J. Dykema. "“Gerrymandering: When Equivalent Is Not Equal!”." Mathematics Teacher: Learning and Teaching PK-12 115, no. 6 (June 2022): 444–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/mtlt.2021.0339.

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McCune, David, and Samuel Luke Tunstall. "Calculated democracy— E xplorations in gerrymandering." Teaching Statistics 41, no. 2 (October 8, 2018): 47–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/test.12181.

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Engstrom, Richard L. "Partisan Gerrymandering and State Legislative Districts." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 8, no. 3 (June 2009): 227–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2009.8304.

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Warrington, Gregory S. "Quantifying Gerrymandering Using the Vote Distribution." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 17, no. 1 (March 2018): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2017.0447.

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Warrington, Gregory S. "A Comparison of Partisan-Gerrymandering Measures." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 262–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2018.0508.

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