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Journal articles on the topic 'Gettier cases'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 17 June 2025

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1

Stone, Jim. "‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2013): 421–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12006.

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2

Kardash, A. M. "What is mentioned in the famous article by Edmund Gettier." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2023): 127–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-1-127-139.

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The paper analyzes the problem of interpretations of the Gettier problem. The author draws a distinction between counterexamples presented in Edmund Gettier’s article and Gettier-style cases, between the Gettier problem and general epistemological problem supposedly occurring in all or many Gettier-style cases. It is argued that in Gettier’s article there is a gap associated with an insufficiently defined concept of justification, which does not allow talking about Gettier problem without any explicit or implicit interpretation of his views on justification. Along with this, it is indicated that the same concept of justification has strict features (deductive closure principle, non-factive justification and internalism), which do not allow arbitrary interpretations of the Gettier problem, and therefore we can say that some interpretations are closer to the text of a well-known article.

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3

Atkins, Philip. "Are Gettier Cases Misleading?" Logos & Episteme 7, no. 3 (2016): 379–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20167335.

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4

Duff, John C. "Gettier Unscathed for Now." Logos & Episteme 13, no. 3 (2022): 317–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202213325.

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Moti Mizrahi (2016) argues that Gettier cases are unsuccessful counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge (TAK) because such cases inadequately reveal epistemic failures of justified true belief (JTB); and because Gettier cases merely demonstrate semantic inadequacy, the apparent epistemic force of Gettier cases is misleading. Although Mizrahi claims to have deflated the epistemic force of Gettier cases, I will argue that the presence of semantic deficiency in Gettier cases neither requires nor indicates the denial of the epistemic force of those cases. I will provide an extracted version of Mizrahi’s argument, which I believe to be most charitable to his motivation. Then I will offer a counterexample to a pivotal premise in Mizrahi’s argument, ultimately rendering the argument unsound. Finally, upon the examination of a plausible objection, I conclude that Gettier cases are epistemically sustained.

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5

Mizrahi, Moti. "Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading." Logos & Episteme 7, no. 1 (2016): 31–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2016712.

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6

Williamson, Timothy. "Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic." Inquiry 56, no. 1 (2013): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775010.

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7

Nagel, Jennifer. "Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases." Inquiry 56, no. 1 (2013): 54–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775014.

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8

Levin, Michael. "Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?" Erkenntnis 64, no. 3 (2006): 381–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5470-2.

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9

Besson, Corine. "LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES." Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 234 (2009): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.565.x.

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10

Khalaj, M. Hosein M. A. "Gettier Cases, Mimicking, and Virtue Reliabilism." Logos & Episteme 13, no. 3 (2022): 273–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202213323.

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It has been argued that virtue reliabilism faces difficulties in explaining why the “because-of” relation between true belief and the relevant competence is absent in Gettier cases. However, prominent proponents of this view such as Sosa and Turri suggest that these difficulties can be overcome by invoking the manifestation relation. In his Judgment and Agency, Sosa supports this claim based on an analogy between Gettier cases and what in the literature on dispositions is called mimic cases. While there are initial motivations for the alleged analogy, I claim there are at least two arguments against it: 1. there is an asymmetry in the nature of context-sensitivity between the problem of mimicking and the Gettier problem; 2. while causal deviance and double luck can be found in both the mimic case and the Gettier case, their causal processes are different in important respects, making it challenging to see them as both falling under the same category. If these arguments are on the right track, the upshot is that virtue reliablists such as Sosa and Turri who describe the “because-of” relation in terms of the manifestation relation still owe us an account of why the manifestation relation is absent in Gettier cases.

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11

Hofmann, Frank. "GETTIER FOR JUSTIFICATION." Episteme 11, no. 3 (2014): 305–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.12.

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AbstractI will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justified belief. Justified belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unified virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justification.

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12

Ward, Andrew. "Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry." Southwest Philosophy Review 37, no. 1 (2021): 101–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137112.

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In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.

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13

Stephens, Andreas. "Consistency and Shifts in Gettier Cases." Logos & Episteme 12, no. 3 (2021): 331–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112324.

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Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and reflexive desiderata. It is argued that the Gettier problem does not pose a problem for conceptions of knowledge as long as we are consistent in how we understand justification and knowledge. It is only by reading the cases with a reflective understanding of justification but a reflexive understanding of knowledge, without acknowledging that this takes place, that the cases become ‘problems.’

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14

Demin, Timofey S. "Gettier Problem." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 58–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956349.

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Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by changing the elements in order to avoid the Gettier problem. There are three possible ways of doing so: adding new elements to the justification, changing the justification on the other criteria or strengthen the justification in such a way, that it would resolve any possible Gettier cases. For each strategy analysis of the theories of knowledge is given. In the paper idea of the inescapability of Gettier cases for analysis of knowledge was supported by the argumentation of Linda Zagzebski. In that ground, the analysis of knowledge was refuted. From that perspective, two of the most influenced ways of answering the question “what is knowledge” was proposed. First, the irreducible theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a mere state of the mind. Second, rejection existence of the universal invariant of the knowledge in every case. There are multiple senses of what the knowledge is and none of them is prior to other. The author lives as the open question the right way to think about the knowledge. In the closing part of the paper, the author presents a perspective critique of the knowledge problem as the project of overrated significance, and argues for a need to create new arguments that supporting that problem.

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15

Mizrahi, Moti. "Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading." Logos & Episteme 8, no. 1 (2017): 129–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2017818.

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Turri, John. "Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases." Philosophical Psychology 29, no. 5 (2016): 759–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1154140.

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17

Kim, Gi Hyun, and Doe Sik Kim. "A New Solution to the Gettier Cases." Journal of The Society of philosophical studies 132 (March 31, 2021): 251–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.23908/jsps.2021.3.132.251.

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18

Mizrahi, Moti. "Gettier Cases, Mental States, and Best Explanations." Logos & Episteme 9, no. 1 (2018): 75–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2018915.

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19

Ryan, Shane. "STANDARD GETTIER CASES: A PROBLEM FOR GRECO?" Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, no. 1 (2014): 201–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004298767_013.

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20

Cohen, Stewart, and Juan Comesaña. "Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic." Inquiry 56, no. 1 (2013): 15–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775012.

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21

Douven, Igor. "A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 207–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001011.

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According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic duty with respect to a given proposition, many so-called Gettier cases, which are supposed to be cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge, will be seen to be not really cases of justified belief after all. A second important claim is that the remaining alleged Gettier cases can be qualified as cases of knowledge. This requires that we countenance a notion of epistemic luck, but the requisite kind of luck is of a quite benign nature.

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22

Williamson, Timothy. "A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic." Philosophical Studies 172, no. 1 (2014): 129–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0357-1.

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23

Zhao, Guo. "Nozick and Gettier-style Problems: Reviewing the Sensitivity Condition." Communications in Humanities Research 62, no. 1 (2025): 172–75. https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/2025.21043.

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This essay explores the challenges of analyzing knowledge by focusing on the Gettier problem and the notion of sensitivity. The Gettier problem highlights that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Sensitivity is introduced as a condition to address Gettier cases by requiring that a belief tracks the truth of the proposition. However, sensitivity clashes with the concept of closure that states knowledge being closed under entailment. This creates a dilemma: giving up sensitivity or closure. The essay argues for rejecting sensitivity because it has more problems than closure. First, even without closure, it's difficult to reconcile everyday knowledge with the limitations imposed by sensitivity. Second, sensitivity struggles to address all Gettier cases. Finally, a modified Gettier recipe is presented to demonstrate how sensitivity is vulnerable to counterexamples. The essay concludes that both attempts to revise Nozicks conditions of knowledge with sensitivity and the traditional project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions face significant challenges.

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24

Simpson, James. "Gettier Beliefs and Serious Beliefs." Logos & Episteme 11, no. 1 (2020): 113–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201117.

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In a recent exchange in the pages of this journal, John Biro responds to Gabor Forrai’s argument against Biro’s argument that in most, if not all, Gettier cases the belief condition, contra popular opinion, isn’t satisfied. In this note, I’ll argue that Biro’s response to Forrai satisfactorily resolves the first of Forrai’s two central objections to Biro’s argument that the belief condition isn’t satisfied in most, if not all, Gettier cases. But Biro’s response leaves mostly unaddressed the most plausible way of construing Forrai’s second objection. I’ll take up the mantle of successfully defending Biro’s argument from this more plausible construal of Forrai’s second objection. However, even though I’ll argue that Biro’s argument is in good shape with respect to Forrai’s objections, I’ll show that the definition of serious belief that Biro offers us is mistaken.

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25

Kim, Minsun, and Yuan Yuan. "NO CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE GETTIER CAR CASE INTUITION: A REPLICATION STUDY OF WEINBERG ET AL. 2001." Episteme 12, no. 3 (2015): 355–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.17.

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AbstractIn “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (NEI), Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier-style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Gettier Car Case. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI's 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross-cultural difference about the intuition concerning the case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication studies (Nagel et al. 2013; Seyedsayamdost 2014), our data provide strong evidence that the purported cross-cultural difference in intuitions about Gettier-style cases does not exist.

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26

Xu, Yingjin. "There are no Justified True Beliefs in Gettier Cases." Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 12, no. 3 (2019): 407–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40647-019-00266-2.

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27

Nagel, Jennifer, Raymond Mar, and Valerie San Juan. "Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman." Cognition 129, no. 3 (2013): 666–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.016.

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28

Harris, Keith Raymond. "Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?" American Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2022): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.04.

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Abstract Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the forms of epistemic luck with which knowledge-how is allegedly compatible. Second, existing cases intended to serve as counterexamples to knowledge intellectualism are flawed, and revised versions of these cases no longer elicit the judgments necessary to challenge knowledge intellectualism.

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29

Brajkovic, Ema. "Elusive luck: Contextualist approach to the Gettier problem." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 4 (2021): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2104083b.

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Lewis' philosophical ambition to eradicate the skeptical threat towards infallibilism was the driving force behind his contextualist approach to knowledge. One of the discerning characteristics of his conversational contextualism is the claim that it can solve the Gettier problem. The first part of this paper will be directed towards explicating the arguments Lewis employed in reaching said solution. The second part will be concerned with Cohen?s critique of the proposed explanation. Cohen?s considerations result in an insight that contextualism does not have the adequate means to answer the Gettier challenge. Finally, I shall make an attempt at further motivating Cohen?s claim by investigating the essential component of Gettier cases - epistemic luck. This will be done by appealing to Pritchard?s concept of veritic epistemic luck. The author?s goal is to suggest that contextualist resources are neither suitable to solve nor exhaustively articulate the Gettier problem.

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30

Pardo, Michael S. "THE GETTIER PROBLEM AND LEGAL PROOF." Legal Theory 16, no. 1 (2010): 37–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325210000054.

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This article explores the relationships between legal proof and fundamental epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification. A survey of the legal literature reveals a confusing array of seemingly inconsistent proposals and presuppositions regarding these relationships. This article makes two contributions. First, it reconciles a number of apparent inconsistencies and tensions in accounts of the epistemology of legal proof. Second, it argues that there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically argued for or presupposed in the legal literature. This connection is illustrated through a discussion of the Gettier problem in epistemology. It is argued that the gap or disconnect between truth and justification that undermines knowledge in Gettier cases also potentially undermines the success of legal verdicts.

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Beebe, James R., and Joseph Shea. "GETTIERIZED KNOBE EFFECTS." Episteme 10, no. 3 (2013): 219–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.23.

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AbstractWe report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.

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Pardo, Michael S. "MORE ON THE GETTIER PROBLEM AND LEGAL PROOF:." Legal Theory 17, no. 1 (2011): 75–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232521100005x.

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In “The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,” I argue that epistemic conditions that undermine knowledge in Gettier-type cases also potentially undermine legal verdicts. For this reason, I argue, there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically presupposed or argued for in the scholarly legal literature. To support these claims, I present several examples illustrating how conditions that render epistemically justified beliefs merely accidentally true (and thus disqualify them as cases of genuine knowledge) may also render evidentially well-supported verdicts merely accidentally true for similar reasons. Such “Gettierized” verdicts, I contend, fail to realize the epistemic goal or aim of legal proof. Thus I conclude there, legal proof includes something like a knowledge requirement—in the sense that legal verdicts aim not only at truth and sufficient evidential support but also, as with knowledge, at an appropriate connection between their truth and justifying evidential support.

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33

Hughes, Nick. "IS KNOWLEDGE THE ABILITY TO ϕ FOR THE REASON THAT P?" Episteme 11, № 4 (2014): 457–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.16.

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AbstractHyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can ϕ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject's belief that p. One can ϕ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge is not best conceived as an ability of this kind.

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Biro, John. "Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”." Logos & Episteme 10, no. 3 (2019): 327–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910328.

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In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion.

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35

Fett, J. R. "Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?" Principia: an international journal of epistemology 22, no. 2 (2019): 301–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p301.

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The safety condition on knowledge, in the spirit of anti-luck epistemology, has become one of the most popular approaches to the Gettier problem. In the first part of this essay, I intend to show one of the reasons the anti-luck epistemologist presents for thinking that the safety theory, and not the sensitivity theory, offers the proper anti-luck condition on knowledge. In the second part of this essay, I intend to show that the anti-luck epistemologist does not succeed, because the safety theory fails to capture a necessary requirement for the possession of knowledge. I will attack safety on two fronts. First, I will raise doubts about whether there is any principled safety condition capable of handling a kind of case, involving inductive knowledge, that it was designed to handle. Second, I will consider two cases in which the safety condition is not met but the protagonist seems to have knowledge nonetheless, and I will vindicate my intuitions for thinking that those are in fact cases of knowledge by contrasting them with traditional, well-known Gettier cases. I want to conclude, finally, that safety failures do not necessarily prevent one from acquiring knowledge.

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Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Knowledge and Luck." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057222.

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There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. This gave rise to a set of theories introducing additional conditions of knowledge which could exclude veritic luck. In this paper the author critically discusses main modifications of the tripartite concept of knowledge aimed at making it independent on veritic luck, and show that they are unable to solve this problem. He agrees with those who think that the very thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with veritic luck is wrong. But he disagrees that all kinds of veritic luck are compatible with knowledge: the author supposes that good veritic luck is compatible with knowledge only when it compensates some negative effect of antecedent bad epistemic luck. According to this view original Gettier examples are not cases of knowledge whereas broken-clocks case and fake-barns case are. This account allows treating many classic cases of dependence of knowledge on luck as cases of knowledge-acquirement, but in the same time it excludes the inclusion into the class of knowledge such intuitively irrelevant outcomes as lucky guess and wishful thinking.

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Zhao, Bin. "On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom in Different Ways." American Philosophical Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2024): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.61.1.07.

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Abstract The sensitivity account of knowledge is a modal epistemology, according to which S knows that p only if S's belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. There are different ways to state the sensitivity condition by means of a possible worlds heuristic. The sensitivity account is thus rendered into different versions. This paper examines cases of knowledge and cases of luckily true beliefs (e.g., the Gettier cases) and argues that no version of the sensitivity account accommodates all cases. Therefore, the account is unsuccessful as an account of knowledge.

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38

Williamson, Timothy. "Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic." Inquiry 56, no. 1 (2013): 77–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775016.

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39

Schnee, Ian. "THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE FROM FALSEHOOD." Episteme 12, no. 1 (2014): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.26.

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AbstractA growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based in a critical or essential way on false premises, and they argue that KFF has important implications for many areas of epistemology (whether evidence can be false, the Gettier debate, defeasibility theories of knowledge, etc.). I argue, however, that there is no KFF, because in any supposed example either the falsehood does not contribute to the knowledge or the subject lacks knowledge. In particular, I show that if the subject actually has knowledge in putative KFF cases, then there is always a veridical evidential path meeting the basing conditions that accounts for her knowledge; if there is no such path, then the subject is in a type of Gettier case. All the recent arguments that rely on KFF are therefore based on a mistake.

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40

Cusmariu, Arnold. "Is JTB Knowledge Hopeless?" Logos & Episteme 14, no. 3 (2023): 261–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202314321.

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An argument structure that covers both cases Gettier described in his 1963 paper reinforces the conclusion of my 2012 Logos & Episteme article that the justified true belief (JTB) conception of knowledge is inconsistent. The stronger argument makes possible identification of fundamental flaws in the standard approach of adding a fourth condition to JTB, so that a new kind of skepticism becomes inevitable unless conceptual change occurs.

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41

Shope, Robert K. "The Problem of Defining Useful False Beliefs." Grazer Philosophische Studien 101, no. 1 (2024): 47–69. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000213.

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Abstract Those who recognize the type of knowledge acquisition that involves what Peter D. Klein calls ‘a useful false belief’ face the problem of defining appropriate boundaries for such a belief. Klein’s own proposal encounters counterexamples and should be replaced by a definition inspired by a position that may be called ‘circumstantialism,’ which emphasizes certain circumstances belonging to the knower’s situation. The revised definition also offers a solution to ‘The False Lemma Problem’ of distinguishing cases involving useful false beliefs from classic Gettier-type cases involving a false lemma in the reasoning underlying the inferential process.

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Forrai, Gábor. "Gettiered Beliefs are Genuine Beliefs." Logos & Episteme 10, no. 2 (2019): 217–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910219.

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In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles.

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Crozat, Elliott R. "Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge." Logos & Episteme 13, no. 2 (2022): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202213211.

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In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification (PJ), which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases of veritic luck, and loose justification (LJ), which is sufficient for practical cases in which beliefs are reasonable to hold even if they fall short of being items of knowledge. In addition, I provide a reason for holding that PJ is required for all items of propositional knowledge, and not only for cases of veritic luck. Lastly, I propose that Gettier-style cases pertain to an ambiguity between PJ and LJ.

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Lin, Zhiru. "For Mathematical Truth to Be Known: A Provability-based Condition Construction." Communications in Humanities Research 9, no. 1 (2023): 69–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/9/20231117.

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One of the defining characteristics of mathematics is its emphasis on proof, which is the process of demonstrating the truth or falsehood of a mathematical claim through a rigorous and logical argument. However, while the concept of proof is central to mathematics, it is also a complex and multifaceted notion that raises a range of philosophical and practical questions. This article proposed a condition beyond the JTB framework for mathematical knowledge by using mathematics provability with a careful reflection on Gettier cases.

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Ding, Yankai. "The Collaboration of Knowing-How and The Safety Principle." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 45 (December 26, 2024): 554–58. https://doi.org/10.54097/8j385x61.

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Nowadays, the challenge of defining JTB (Justified True Belief) by Gettier's cases has not had a satisfying solution. Considering the difficulties caused by the K =df. True belief + X paradigm, this paper replaces belief with competence as a more fundamental component of knowledge. Moreover, by the way of using the safety principle to illustrate knowing-how, necessary conditions for knowledge definition are obtained. This paper aligns with Pritchard's anti-luck virtue epistemology, specifically elaborating on the concept of ability-based knowledge as a robust necessary condition for defining knowledge. Therefore, the main findings of this paper are: 1) taking knowing-how as the basic element of knowledge can strengthen the reliability of the knowledge definition and get closer to the essence of knowledge; 2) the safety principle is compatible with knowing-how; 3) the collaboration of the safety principle and knowing-how as a necessary condition for knowledge definition can effectively avoid the Gettier problem. Through establishing a reliable method for testing knowledge, this approach may ultimately deepen readers’ understanding of what knowledge truly entails.

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Beddor, Bob, and Simon Goldstein. "Mighty Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 118, no. 5 (2021): 229–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118518.

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We often claim to know what might be—or probably is—the case. Modal knowledge along these lines creates a puzzle for information-sensitive semantics for epistemic modals. This paper develops a solution. We start with the idea that knowledge requires safe belief: a belief amounts to knowledge only if it could not easily have been held falsely. We then develop an interpretation of the modal operator in safety (could have) that allows it to non-trivially embed information-sensitive contents. The resulting theory avoids various paradoxes that arise from other accounts of modal knowledge. It also delivers plausible predictions about modal Gettier cases.

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Bondy, Patrick. "Revisiting Anti-Luck Epistemology." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 107–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201935111.

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According to anti-luck approaches to the analysis of knowledge, knowledge is analyzed as unlucky true belief, or unlucky justified true belief. According to virtue epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is true belief which a subject has acquired or maintained because of the exercise of a relevant cognitive ability. ALE and VE both appear to have difficulty handling some intuitive cases where subjects have or lack knowledge, so Pritchard (2012) proposed that we should take an anti-luck condition and a success-from-ability condition as independent necessary conditions on knowledge. Recently, Carter and Peterson (2017) have argued that Pritchard’s modal notion of luck needs to be broadened. My aim in this paper is to show that, with the modal conception of luck appropriately broadened, it is no longer clear that ALE needs to be supplemented with an independent ability condition in order to handle the problematic Gettier cases.

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Levin, Janet. "Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2011): 391–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0027.

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IntroductionIt is standard practice in philosophical inquiry to test a general thesis (of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’) by attempting to construct a counterexample to it. If we can imagine or conceive of an F that isn't a G, then we have evidence that there could be an F that isn't a G — and thus evidence against the thesis in question; if not, then the thesis is (at least temporarily) secure. Or so it is standardly claimed.But there is increasing skepticism about how seriously to take what we can imagine or conceive as evidence for (or against) a priori philosophical theses, given the many historical examples of now-questionable theses that once seemed impossible to doubt — and also the recent experimental research suggesting that our verdicts on Gettier cases, trolley cases, and the scenarios depicted in other familiar thought-experiments may be affected by cultural, situational, and other adventitious factors.

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Cohen, Stewart, and Juan Comesaña. "Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply." Inquiry 56, no. 4 (2013): 400–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.816087.

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Brons, Lajos Ludovic. "Patterns, noise, and Beliefs." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 1 (2019): 19–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p19.

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In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications.

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