Academic literature on the topic 'Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy'
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Journal articles on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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Talijan, Miroslav, Dragan Jevtić, Miroslav Terzić, and Mišo Planojević. "Contemporary security strategies : The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy." Vojno delo 69, no. 8 (2017): 72–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo1708072t.
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Lonardo, Luigi. "Common Foreign and Security Policy and the EU’s external action objectives: an analysis of Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union." European Constitutional Law Review 14, no. 3 (2018): 584–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019618000329.
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Boundaries within EU policies – Common Foreign and Security Policy – EU external relations – Management of boundaries – Institutional interpretation – External action objectives – Linking policies to objectives – Restrictive measures – Area of Freedom Security and Justice – Securitisation of migration – Energy policy – Development – Multilateral diplomacy – Global strategy
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Guseinov, Kamran, and Aleksandr S. Burnasov. "Strategic Shift: from the Global Strategy 2016 to the Strategic Compass 2022." Koinon 3, no. 3-4 (2022): 165–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/koinon.2022.03.3.4.040.
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In this article the author examines the dynamic of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the adoption of the two strategic documents — Global Strategy on EU Foreign and Security Policy “Shared Vision, Common Action: Stronger Europe” and the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence. Both documents were adopted during the period of transformation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy institutions, and influence on the further dynamic of the EU security and defence. The article evaluates the practical changes in the sphere of EU Security and Defence policy after the adoption of the strategic documents. The author studies the preconditions and causes of the adoption of these strategic documents and conducting a comparative analysis of the Global Strategy and the Strategic Compass by studying the official texts. The research on EU Common Security and Defence Policy is based on the neorealism theory of international relations. Particularly, the article is based on the “structural realism” theory by John J. Mearsheimer. The author applies the model of collective securitization for the examination of the common security and defence, and for the explanation of the modern trends in EU CSDP transformation. The research attempts to provide the results of the examination of the realization of the Global Strategy 2016, that lead to the adoption of the new document — Strategic Compass. The article notes the features of the EU Strategic autonomy and examines the factors affecting the Strategic autonomy.
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Węc, Janusz J. "Perspektywy reformy Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej do 2025 roku. Autonomia strategiczna UE?" Politeja 19, no. 3(78) (2022): 211–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.19.2022.78.12.
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PROSPECTS FOR REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY TO 2025: EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY?
 The research objective of the paper is to highlight the prospects for the implementation of the main directions of the reform of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union until 2025. The caesuras of the work are marked by two events: the adoption of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union by the European Council on 28 June 2016 and the decision of the European Council of 24 March 2022 on the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defense. First of all, the research hypothesis should be established that the full implementation of CSDP reform, which was initiated with the adoption of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, and the resulting projects can significantly strengthen the position of the EU in the international arena. This will lead to the establishment of the European Security and Defense Union and the EU Rapid Reaction Force (5,000 troops) by the end of 2025. However, since many of the planned reform elements have not yet been completed or initiated, much will depend on the political will of individual member state governments, the level of spending on reform implementation by member states and the EU, and the progress of other reforms already underway (including addressing the economic and social consequences of the pandemic crisis and implementing eurozone systemic reform). The following research questions should then be asked: (1) How has the implementation process of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy gone so far? (2) How has the implementation of new projects (including the European Defense Fund, PESCO, and the Strategic Compass) affected EU-NATO relations? (3) How do selected EU member states assess these projects? (4) To what extent can the project to establish a European Security Council with the participation of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Poland compete with and usefully complement the EU Strategic Compass project? The first part of the analysis presents the implementation process of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union until 2022. The second part analyzes the goals, priorities, and assumptions of the Strategic Compass, the implementation of which is intended to lead the EU to strategic autonomy by 2030.
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Ananieva, E. V. "RUSSIA IN THE UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY." Вестник Удмуртского университета. Социология. Политология. Международные отношения 5, no. 4 (2021): 453–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2587-9030-2021-5-4-453-459.
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The unsatisfactory state of Russian-UK relations should be considered not so much in a bilateral format as in the context of global change in the balance of power. It is necessary to take into account not only the factor of Britain's exit from the EU and Britain's search for its place in the world, but also the traditions and principles of the United Kingdom's foreign policy throughout history. The new National Security Strategy of Britain (March 2021) is integrated, for the first time including in a single concept traditional areas of defense and security, as well as aid to development and foreign policy. The author analyzes the evolution of approaches to the content and the implementation of London's foreign policy strategy after Brexit in the light of its significance for Russian-UK relations.
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Sus, Monika. "Supranational entrepreneurs: the High Representative and the EU global strategy." International Affairs 97, no. 3 (2021): 823–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab037.
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Abstract By applying the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) developed by Kingdon and adapted to EU policy-making, this article explores a new analytical lens that provides a more substantiated insight into the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) in the policy-making process. According to the MSA, policy change happens when policy entrepreneurs successfully explore a window of opportunity that opens in the problems or policies stream. Applying a single case-study approach, this article argues that it was the entrepreneurship of HR Federica Mogherini that coupled problems, politics and policies streams which presented themselves between 2014 and 2015, made use of the window of opportunity, and pushed for policy change in EU's foreign and security policy. By finding observable evidence for the HR's deployment of entrepreneurial strategies during the drafting and implementation of the European Union's Global Strategy, this contribution unpacks Mogherini's footprint in the recent progress. The conceptualization of the HR office-holder as a policy entrepreneur lets us systematically investigate their agency and impact on the policy change within the existing formal constraints, and thus it paves a way towards a more fruitful research direction regarding the HR's role than the concept of the constrained agent that is dominant in the literature. More broadly, since the office-holder can be perceived as a supranational agent that is dependent upon an intergovernmental system for its mandate, by examining its entrepreneurial strategies this article offers insights on the role of supranational agents beyond the EU context, i.e. within UN and NATO.
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Dr. Muhammad Tariq, Amjad Ali Khan, and Ejaz Khan. "An overview of the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union." sjesr 3, no. 4 (2020): 394–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.36902/sjesr-vol3-iss4-2020(394-399).
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The European Union comprises 27 countries that aim at carving out a separate foreign and security policy for their unification and singleness. The whole union is a symbol of unity and cohesiveness for which the theory of bargain provides the basic framework. This article focuses on the elements of the European Union's external policy, the principles and policy of the European Union, the foreign policy, security strategy, and the common foreign and security policy coupled with the defense strategy of the European Union. It also aims at describing the coherence and consensus of the EU on all important measures with particular reference to foreign and security policy and importance in the world as a global actor.
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Węc, Janusz J. "Reforma wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej w latach 2016-2017." Politeja 15, no. 54 (2019): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.15.2018.54.03.
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The Reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union in 2016‑2017The subject of the article is the reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2016‑2017 following the adoption of the new EU External Security Strategy by the European Council in June 2016. The first part of the article analyzes the European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. However, the second part of the article reconstructs the process of implementing the global strategy and describes the successes and failures of the reform.
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Iryna, Grushko. "EU security policy: new challenges and priorities." Political Science and Security Studies Journal 2, no. 3 (2021): 31–38. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5544191.
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The article is devoted to the study of a set of problems of European security policy, in particular the analysis of the new challenges to the priority directions of its development. It is noted that the current institutional system of European security policy is undergoing serious challenges associated with profound changes in international relations. The systematization of various aspects of EU security policy according to the following methodological approaches is proposed: the theory of behaviorism, the theory of political realism, liberal-idealist paradigm, postmodernist theory, alternative theoretical models. The conceptual substantiation of the development of European integration in the field of security and defense policy is the EU strategies, which are developed in accordance with current challenges and threats. It is proved that the real institutional changes in the EU foreign policy occurred after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service. The European Security Strategy (2003), the Global Strategy of the European Union (2016), the Security Union Strategy (2020) were analyzed, in particular, new challenges for the European security system and priority areas of EU security policy were identified. Based on the analysis, the most pressing challenges, risks and threats are identified, the probability of which is considered high for the EU until 2025.
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Delphin, Hervé. "Above the Fog and the Fury: EU Strategic Policy Planning and the EU’s Future in Times of Global Uncertainty." European Foreign Affairs Review 26, Issue 1 (2021): 35–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021005.
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Foreign policy is often dominated by the short term and dealing with urgencies at the expense of strategic planning. EU foreign policy is not immune to this risk. This begs the question of the EU’s ability to articulate strategic thinking and longer-term policy action in times of great uncertainty as caused by the Covid-19. Put simply, strategic planning and strategic foresight are disciplines that aim at identifying possible futures, mapping options and charting possible responses and strategic goals and as such support informed and sound policy-making. On that account, the EU has developed over time strategic policy frameworks for its foreign policy, such as the European Security Strategy in 2003 and the Global Strategy in 2016, that have served the Union rather well in navigating the global environment. The Covid-19 has come at a defining moment. Fraught with geopolitical stakes and global challenges, the EU’s ability to act strategically is being stress-tested on an unprecedented scale. Strengthening European strategic autonomy has emerged from policy planning work as the compass that can guide EU action through this period of geopolitical and global reshuffling. At the same time strengthening the Union’s strategic policy planning function and means has become a necessity to secure the effectiveness of external action. Foreign policy, Strategic planning, Climate changes, Covid-19, Strategic autonomy
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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Sevinc, Tugba. "The Eu As A Security Actor In The Post-cold War Era: A Civilian And/or Military (strategic) Actor In Crisis Management?" Master's thesis, METU, 2006. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12608003/index.pdf.
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The objective of this thesis is to analyze whether the EU can be considered as a &lsquo<br>limited&rsquo<br>military/strategic actor or as a civilian actor in the Post-Cold War international security architecture. In this framework, the impacts of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the US-led war in Iraq on the EU crisis management capabilities are analyzed more specifically. In this framework, firstly, the historical dynamics of European foreign and security policy from the Post-World War II period to the Post-September 11 period are analyzed. Secondly, the EU&rsquo<br>s changing role in the international arena together with its crisis management capability is evaluated. Thirdly, the EU&rsquo<br>s international actorness in the Post-September 11 era is discussed with a special reference to the US-led war in Iraq. In this general framework, following a brief analysis on reactions of the US and the EU against global terrorism, crisis management strategy of the EU during and after US-led war in Iraq is analyzed in detail. The last part allocated to, a critical analysis of the security actorness of the EU is made in order to conceptualize it and to draw a more theoretical framework. Moreover, it is mentioned in this thesis that while having triggering effect on the CFSP and ESDP, the 9/11 events and the US-led war in Iraq provides the emergence of new methods for crisis management and the European Security Strategy. Accordingly, considering the new international security context beginning with the end of Cold War period and transforming to another dimension by means of September 11 attacks, the main argument of this thesis is that the EU still tends to be a civilian actor as it was before and it is envisaged to be so in the foreseeable future despite its latest attempts to develop its common security and defence policies.
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Petersson, Emmy. "The EU Foreign Policy." Thesis, Halmstad University, School of Social and Health Sciences (HOS), 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-1015.
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<p>This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP.</p><p>Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy</p>
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Adolfsson, Tobias. "The Rise of Resilience in EU Foreign Policy – A Shift of Paradigm or Parlance? : A comparative case study of the EU foreign policy before and after the EU Global Strategy." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-375766.
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This master’s thesis studies the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy in the Eastern Partnership before and after the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and investigates whether or not there has been a policy shift towards the paradigm of resilience. Previous research disagrees on the implications of the EUGS and I argue that more empirical research on the matter is needed. The purpose of this thesis is thus to empirically investigate whether or not a shift in EU foreign policy towards a paradigm of resilience has indeed taken place in practice after the launch of the EUGS. Two sources of data are used in the study: the first and principal are the annual action programmes for the Eastern Partnership used by the EU for planning and delivering of external assistance; the second is a set of semi-structured elite interviews conducted with respondents representing the Eastern Partnership and the EU respectively. The results are mixed, showing a slight trend towards resilience-building but no ground-breaking paradigm shift has occurred. I argue that the resilience-building focus and principled pragmatism approach presented by the EUGS rather should be seen as an attempt by the EU to be honest with the foreign policy it is already conducting.
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Klossek, Lara. "EU and India Foreign Policy Engagement in Global Security Governance – Compliance, Localisation and Contestation in Peace Operations." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/673199.
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Aquesta tesi doctoral per compendi de publicacions analitza l’aproximació de la UE i l’Índia a la governança global de la seguretat a través del prisma de les operacions de pau. Tot i que les operacions de pau, i les normes relacionades amb aquesta matèria, s’han estudiat en el passat, el centre d’atenció ha estat sobretot en la contestació discursiva que ha tingut lloc en els debats a Nacions Unides. La literatura ha explorat molt poc la contestació a nivell de comportament; així, no ha prestat atenció als “practitioners” en el sentit, per exemple, de la seva formació com a “pacificadors” en el marc de les missions. La tesi mira d’omplir aquest buit. Per fer-ho es basa en una literatura molt nova, que explora la possibilitat de combinar la literatura sobre normes amb la literatura provinent del “practices turn”. Un altra aspecte que aborda aquesta tesi és la contribució del Sud Global en la conformació de les normes en les operacions de pau, tema gens abordat per la literatura. Per abordar aquests buits en la recerca, la tesi explora l’aproximació de l’Índia i la seva contribució a les normes i a les pràctiques internacionals, fins ara poc explorada. En general, la tesi es guia per dos preguntes centrals d’investigació: Quines són les normes i les pràctiques que l’Índia i la UE apliquen en les operacions de pau? ¿Per què la UE i l’Índia compleixen, localitzen i impugnen les normes i les pràctiques existents en les operacions de pau i quina forma adopta aquesta contestació?
Aquestes preguntes d’investigació troben resposta en tres publicacions individuals que es centren en tres temes: la formació dels pacificadores, l’apropiació des de la dimensió local en les operacions, i la incorporació de la perspectiva de gènere en les missions. El treball es basa en dades recollides a través d’entrevistes semiestructurades, observació participant i anàlisi de documents. La tesi demostra que les aproximacions de la UE i l’Índia a les operacions de pau no són tan divergents com la literatura prèviament ha predit. A més, l’Índia ha contribuït substancialment als debats sobre normes en operacions de pau i, de fet, ha actuat com a innovador normatiu. Finalment, per entendre l’aproximació d’un actor a les operacions de pau, és crucial donar compte de l’etapa d’implementació de les normes i les pràctiques internacionals on els coneixements de base dels professionals tenen un paper important.
En resum, el treball empíric de la tesi aporta una aproximació nova sobre els diferents enfocaments que els actors tenen a l’hora d’implementar les missions de pau de Nacions Unides. Aquesta aproximació és crucial perquè les operacions de pau de les Nacions Unides continuïn sent un instrument eficaç de governança de la seguretat mundial. A més, aquesta tesi informa de la nostra aproximació teòrica de les operacions de pau mitjançant la introducció d’un marc conceptual que combina la literatura sobre el compliment, la localització i la contestació de les normes, per una banda, i la teoria de pràctiques, per l’altra.<br>Esta tesis doctoral, basada en artículos, analiza cómo la Unión Europa y la India abordan la gobernanza de la seguridad global a través del prisma de las operaciones de paz. A pesar de que las operaciones de paz, y las normas relacionadas con ellas, han sido estudiadas en el pasado, la literatura se ha centrado en la contestación discursiva que tiene lugar en los debates de Naciones Unidas, dejando de lado la contestación en materia de comportamiento. Por ejemplo, no se ha estudiado el comportamiento en materia de formación del personal que participa en las misiones de mantenimiento de la paz. La tesis intenta llenar este vacío. Para ello, se basa en una literatura muy nueva, que explora la posibilidad de combinar la literatura sobre normas con la literatura procedente del "practices turn". Además, la literatura ha ignorado la contribución del Sur Global en el desarrollo de las normas para las operaciones de paz. A fin de abordar esta limitación de la literatura, la tesis explora la aproximación de la India y su contribución a las normas y prácticas internacionales, hasta ahora poco exploradas. En general, la tesis se guía por dos preguntas centrales de investigación: ¿Cuáles son las normas y las prácticas que la Unión Europea y la India aplican en las operaciones de paz? ¿Por qué la Unión Europea y la India cumplen, localizan e impugnan las normas y las prácticas actuales de las operaciones de paz, y qué forma adopta la contestación?
Las preguntas de investigación se responden con tres publicaciones individuales de la tesis, centradas en tres temas: la formación de los pacificadores, la apropiación desde la dimensión local en las operaciones y la incorporación de la perspectiva de género en las misiones. El trabajo se basa en datos recabados a través de entrevistas semiestructuradas, observación participativa y análisis de documentos. La tesis demuestra que las aproximaciones de la Unión Europea y la India en las operaciones de paz no son tan divergentes como la literatura había predicho. También demuestra que la India ha contribuido de manera sustancial a los debates sobre operaciones de paz y, de hecho, ha actuado como emprendedor normativo. Finalmente, demuestra que para comprender la manera como cada actor aborda las operaciones de paz, es crucial considerar la etapa de la implementación de las normas y prácticas internacionales, ya que el conocimiento de fondo de los actores juega un papel importante.
En resumen, el estudio informa nuestra aproximación sobre los distintos enfoques que los actores tienen para abordar las operaciones de paz de la ONU. Esta aproximación es crucial para que las operaciones de paz de la ONU continúen siendo un instrumento eficaz de la gobernanza de la seguridad global. Además, esta tesis informa de nuestra aproximación teórica sobre las operaciones de paz, al introducir un marco conceptual que combina la literatura sobre cumplimiento, localización y contestación de normas, por un lado, y la teoría de prácticas, por el otro.<br>This article-based doctoral dissertation analyses the EU’s and India’s approach to global security governance through the prism of peace operations. Although approaches to peace operations and norms related to this endeavour have been studied in the past, the focus of the literature had been on discursive contestation in UN debates and has underexplored behavioural contestation, particularly at the level of practitioners both in the training of peacekeepers and in the missions. To fill this gap, the dissertation builds upon a nascent field in the literature, which has explored the possibility to combine the literature on norms with that of the practice theoretical turn. Moreover, the literature has overlooked the contribution of the Global South in shaping norms in peace operations. To address this shortcoming of the literature, the study offers an exploration into India’s understanding of – and contribution to international norms and practices, hitherto underexplored. Overall, the dissertation is guided by two core research questions: What are the norms and practices India and the EU are supporting in peace operations? Why do the EU and India comply, localise, and contest existing norms and practices in peace operations and which form does this contestation take?
These research questions are answered in the three individual publications of the dissertation on training, local ownership, and gender mainstreaming. Building on data collected through semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis, the dissertation finds that the EU and India’s approaches to peace operations are not as divergent as the literature has previously predicted. Moreover, that India has substantially contributed to normative debates in peace operations and has indeed acted as a norm entrepreneur. Finally, that to understand an actor’s approach to peace operations, it is crucial to account for the implementation stage of international norms and practices at which the background knowledge of practitioners plays an important role.
In sum, the study informs our empirical understanding of the different approaches that actors bring to the table in their conduct of UN peace operations. This understanding is crucial for UN peace operations to remain an effective instrument of global security governance. Moreover, it informs our theoretical understanding of peace operations by introducing a conceptual framework combing the literature on norm compliance, localisation, contestation, and practice theory.<br>Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Programa de Doctorat en Ciència Política, Polítiques Públiques i Relacions Internacionals
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Morillas, Bassedas Pol. "Strategy-making in the era of intergovernmentalism: The policy-making processes of the european security strategy (2003) and the EU global strategy (2016)." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/461181.
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Cada vez más, la UE parece regirse por el intergubernamentalismo. Los estados miembros han ganado la batalla a las instituciones supranacionales, marginadas en la toma de decisiones en asuntos clave de la agenda europea. El nuevo intergubernamentalismo recoge esta tendencia y renueva el interés sobre la naturaleza de la integración europea, a la vez que supone la continuación del tradicional debate entre intergubernamentalismo y supranacionalismo.
Esta teoría argumenta que, desde el Tratado de Maastricht, los estados han tomado las riendas de la integración europea, dejando de lado a las instituciones. También considera que las instituciones en las que los estados miembros están representados se encuentran en el centro de estas dinámicas, con el Consejo Europeo actuando como catalizador de la integración y el Consejo siendo la institución central en la toma de decisiones. Cuando se delegan poderes, el nuevo intergubernamentalismo entiende que los estados utilizan organismos como el SEAE para apoyar sus iniciativas, aunque éstos carecen de liderazgo.
La mayor parte de las contribuciones al nuevo intergubernamentalismo han analizado la Unión Económica y Monetaria y la política de seguridad y defensa de la UE. Esta tesis, en cambio, cubre un vacío analítico sobre su uso en áreas híbridas como la acción exterior. Con el objetivo de aumentar la coherencia, el Tratado de Lisboa ha aunado las relaciones exteriores -supranacionales y pertenecientes a la Comisión Europea- con la PESC y la PCSD -intergubernamentales y en manos de los estados miembros. El Tratado también ha instaurado importantes novedades institucionales como el SEAE y la AR/VP, dotándola del derecho de iniciativa.
Esta investigación contrasta las asunciones del nuevo intergubernamentalismo con las dinámicas políticas generadas por Lisboa. Para ello, utiliza el proceso de toma de decisiones de las estrategias para ilustrar las relaciones inter-institucionales en la PESC y la acción exterior. Sus estudios de caso son la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad (2003) -adoptada bajo el antiguo sistema de pilares y en el marco de la PESC- y la Estrategia Global de la UE (2016) -la primera estrategia post-Lisboa y que cubre la totalidad de la acción exterior. El estudio del proceso de formulación de las estrategias -en sí mismo un vacío empírico en la literatura- se realiza mediante el análisis en cuatro fases: la definición de la agenda, el proceso de elaboración, los resultados y la implementación.
Los resultados de la investigación muestran un refuerzo de las instituciones de Bruselas en ambas estrategias. Esta tendencia nace con la EES, cuya novedosa elaboración se basó en el intergubernamentalismo institucionalizado, en el cual el Alto Representante y la Secretaría General del Consejo centralizaron el proceso de elaboración. Ello se debió al activismo de Solana y a la delegación parcial de la iniciativa por parte de los estados miembros, obteniendo como resultado un proceso de elaboración altamente institucionalizado en un área preeminentemente intergubernamental, la PESC.
Este proceso se refuerza con la EGUE, en la que la AR/VP ha sido el motor de su elaboración. Haciendo uso del derecho de iniciativa, Mogherini ha ejercido una alta influencia en el proceso y los contenidos de la EGUE para reforzar la concepción global de la acción exterior. La centralidad de la AR/VP y el SEAE son muestra de mayor autonomía en el intergubernamentalismo y la EGUE se ha convertido en el vehículo para la implementación de iniciativas posteriores.
Esta investigación matiza aspectos centrales del nuevo intergubernamentalismo referentes al predominio de los estados en las dinámicas actuales de la integración y argumenta que el paso de la PESC a la acción exterior ha reforzado la capacidad de los nuevos organismos para liderar y delinear los contornos de nuevas iniciativas políticas.<br>The EU is seen as a body increasingly ruled by intergovernmentalism. Member states are portrayed as the winners of a power contest with supranational institutions, which have been marginalised in critical decisions of European politics. Following up on the traditional intergovernmental-supranational debate, new intergovernmentalism has captured this trend and inaugurated a renewed interest on the nature of European integration in the literature.
The central premise of this theory is that, since the Maastricht Treaty, member states have taken the reins of European integration and sidelined supranational institutions in setting the pace and direction of current policy developments. It also assumes that the institutions where member states are represented are at the centre of these dynamics, with the European Council acting as the catalyst of integration and the Council becoming the central decision-making institution. When delegation of power occurs, new intergovernmentalism understands that member states make use of de novo bodies such as the EEAS to provide support to their initiatives, but not to exercise leadership.
Most scholarly contributions to new intergovernmentalism have analysed the dynamics of the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU security and defence policies. However, there is an analytical gap in the literature, which this thesis aims to address, in applying new intergovernmentalism to hybrid areas of activity such as external action. In here, the Lisbon Treaty has brought together the supranational external relations of the European Commission and the intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP, in the hands of member states, for the purpose of policy coherence. The Treaty has also put forward remarkable institutional innovations such as the EEAS and created the position of the HR/VP, giving it a formal right of initiative.
This research aims to contrast the main assumptions of new intergovernmentalism against the policy-making dynamics generated by the Lisbon Treaty. To do so, it uses the policy-making processes of EU strategies as a way to illustrate the inter-institutional relations in CFSP and external action. The case studies of this research are the European Security Strategy (2003), adopted under the former pillar system and in the realm of the CFSP, and the EU Global Strategy (2016), the first post-Lisbon strategy covering the whole of external action. The study of the policy-making processes of strategies -an empirical gap in the literature in itself- is performed by breaking down strategy-making into four different phases: agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy output and implementation.
The results of this research show an increased role of Brussels-based institutions in strategy-making. This trend can be traced back to the ESS, which inaugurated a novel policy-making mode based on institutionalised intergovernmentalism, whereby HR Solana and the Council Secretariat centralised the strategy-making process. This came as a consequence of Solana's strong activism and the partial delegation of initiative by member states, setting up a highly institutionalised policy formulation process in a prominently intergovernmental policy area, the CFSP.
This novel policy-making mode is further reinforced in the EUGS, where the HR/VP has become the policy entrepreneur of a new strategy-making process. Making full use of her right of initiative, Mogherini has shaped the process and the contents of the new strategy, in the benefit of a "whole of EU" approach to external action. The centrality of the HR/VP and the EEAS has resulted in a process of autonomy in intergovernmentalism, where the EUGS has become the vehicle for subsequent implementation initiatives.
In sum, this research nuances central aspects of new intergovernmentalism regarding the predominance of member states in current integration dynamics, arguing that the shift from CFSP to external action has fundamentally strengthened the capacity of de novo bodies to lead and shape policy initiatives.
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Ivanovski, Hristijan. "A common defence for Europe." Israel Defence, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/31255.
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One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of European defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the ‘anomalous,’ ‘elusive’ CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. Drawing extensively from primary sources and predicated on an overarching evolutionist approach, this thesis shows that the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation.<br>May 2016
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Cemus, Victor Peter Corrado. "Strategická autonomie EU - šnace a výzvy pro Evropu." Master's thesis, 2020. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-435011.
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The thesis explores the use of the term European Strategic Autonomy in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. The security environment around Europe has become increasingly unstable in the last 15 years. The EU Commission has tried to take account of the deteriorating geopolitical landscape by publishing an EU Global Strategy document in 2016 to share its vision for a stronger Europe. The document calls for strategic autonomy without properly defining it. Since then, many policy papers have captured the term and used it as a popular buzzword. Because it has not been properly defined on the political level, European Strategy Autonomy (ESA) was subject to speculations and national interpretations which did not help to advance the debate. Based on an extensive literature review the paper provides a comprehensive understanding by giving an historic overview and presenting different configurations of ESA in the contemporary context. A comparative case study, including France, Germany, and the Czech Republic has been conducted to assess their interpretation of the notion. The result of the case studies showed inherently different perceptions underlaid by different motivations and identifies the political layer to be the biggest challenge for moving forward with the topic....
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Křiklán, Jan. "Americká grand strategy na počátku studené války, 1945-1953." Master's thesis, 2021. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-438466.
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(English): The Cold War is a major milestone in world history and the general history of mankind. He created a world order that confirmed Western hegemony over the world for decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the Cold War did not emerge from nothing. It was created by people after World War II (Americans, Russians, British etc.). Since the defeat of Germany was inevitable, the Allies, together with their disputes on individual issues (Iran, Turkey and Greece), began to create a spawn for the next conflict, which we call the Cold War. This struggle for domination over the world lasted for decades and cost many lives in the name of dubious ideas about social engineering, where it is possible to ,,revolutionize" society from above or manage life according to abstract economic calculations. Behind the phrases of progress was the great power desires of people and politicians, emphasized by the individual ideologies of liberal democracy and Stalinist communism.
Books on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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United States. White House Office., ed. A national security strategy for a global age. White House, 2000.
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S, Cline Ray, Miller James A, and Kanet Roger E. 1936-, eds. Western Europe in Soviet global strategy. Westview, 1987.
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Zaharov, Aleksandr, and Elizaveta Anikina. The global energy problem and the global energy complex (Russia, USA, Europe, China). INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/2080066.
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The authors of the textbook focus on the global energy problem, understood taking into account modern realities. The first chapter examines the international fuel and energy complex (FEC) in the context of the current geopolitical situation, the specifics of using energy resources to solve urgent problems of the global fuel and energy complex. The second chapter describes in detail the main aspects of China's fuel and energy sector, its energy security strategy and the development of renewable energy sources, the specifics of the work of Chinese companies in international markets. The third chapter of the manual shows the leading players in the energy market of individual countries of the world, analyzes the development of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations in the energy sector between Russia, the United States, Europe, China and a number of other foreign countries, presents the prospects for the development of global energy until 2050 and the problem of global energy management in the context of the global energy crisis. Meets the requirements of the federal state educational standards of higher education of the latest generation. It is intended for teachers, postgraduates and students of economic specialties of universities, as well as for researchers and specialists involved in the study of energy policy issues.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. Eu and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
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Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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Riddervold, Marianne. "EU Maritime Foreign and Security Policy Integration: Explaining the EU Maritime Security Strategy." In The Maritime Turn in EU Foreign and Security Policies. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_7.
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Ginsberg, Roy H., and Susan E. Penksa. "CSDP in the EU Foreign Policy System and Beyond." In The European Union in Global Security. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230367524_6.
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Morillas, Pol. "An Ever More Intergovernmental EU? From Foreign and Security Policy to External Action." In Strategy-Making in the EU. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98627-2_2.
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Riddervold, Marianne. "A Maritime Global Commons Power in the Making? On the Characteristics of EU Policies Towards the High Seas: The Arctic and the Maritime Security Strategy." In The Maritime Turn in EU Foreign and Security Policies. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_4.
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Mahmutaj, Noela. "Russian Government Policy in the Western Balkans." In Securitization and Democracy in Eurasia. Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4_8.
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AbstractThis article aims to explain the nature of Russian foreign policy towards the Western Balkan states, taking into account the role of other actors such as the European Union, an increasingly important player in this radically changed geopolitical context. Since the fall of the communist regime, the Western Balkans have faced major challenges and have been at the forefront of debates on critical issues such as transatlantic relations (with regard to NATO and EU enlargement, as well as EU defence policy and security). In recent times, the Balkan region has come under the influence of the Great Powers. Therefore, as a Great Power, Russia is building a foothold in the Balkans, a move criticized and not welcomed by other countries or actors. Furthermore, Moscow is unique in terms of its range of capabilities, including its “hard” and “soft power.” This article aims to understand and analyse Russia’s policy and strategy in the Western Balkans.
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Miadzvetskaya, Yuliya. "Between Strategic Autonomy and International Norm-setting." In Global Studies. transcript Verlag, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14361/9783839457474-011.
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According to the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), today's world is characterized by an increased strategic competition and rising threats to multilateralism and a rules-based order. In this fast-evolving environment, the EU has shifted from its traditional “values-based” approach in foreign policy to a “principled pragmatism”. This holds that the EU should solidify relations with countries with shared values, while also engaging strategically with rivals. The EU's goal is to protect its strategic interests in the world marked by the US-China rivalry, a confrontational relationship with the Trump administration, and Russia's growing ambitions in their shared neighborhood. The present chapter examines some aspects of the EU's efforts to secure its autonomy in an emergent terrain for international competition: cyberspace. The analysis will begin with an explanation of the broader context for the EU's approach to cybersecurity, which should be understood as part of the Union's longstanding pursuit of “strategic autonomy” in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. It then offers a description of deterrence theory and its application to cyberspace, before turning to the development of the EU Cyber Diplomacy toolbox and targeted restrictive measures in response to cyberattacks. It will then seek to assess the deterrence potential of restrictive measures on the basis of some generic attributes of the concept of deterrence identified in rich theoretic contributions on deterrence theory and cyberspace. It concludes that while sanctions might appear to be ineffective and non-aligned with the operational characteristics of the cyber domain, their potential for establishing good practices should not be discarded. They should instead be used as a vehicle for promoting and informing the international discourse on the norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.
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Liu, Zuokui. "The “Pan-Securitization” of the EU’s Connectivity Policy and China–EU Cooperation." In The Belt and Road Initiative. Springer Nature Singapore, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-1128-7_13.
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Abstract With the proposal of the “Global Gateway” initiative, the EU’s participation in global connectivity has entered a new stage. The EU’s connectivity strategy shows a significant trend of pan-securitization, which means expanding the connotation of connectivity products, strengthening the security screening of connectivity investments, highlighting ideology and values, and competing with China for discourse power. China and the EU are highly complementary in connectivity, but in the context of pan-securitization of the EU’s connectivity strategy, the cooperation between the two partners faces many challenges. In the future, China and the EU can start from less controversial areas such as green finance, energy, and climate change, make good use of the existing connectivity cooperation platforms, and carry out more “small but refined” projects, so to consolidate the foundation of bilateral pragmatic cooperation more firmly.
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Krga, Branko. "Тhe Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the Security of the Republic of Serbia." In Europe in Changes: The Old Continent at a New Crossroads. Institute of International Politics ; Economics ; University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18485/iipe_euchanges.2021.ch8.
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Futák-Campbell, Beatrix. "Justifying the EU’s interests in the region: energy security." In Practising EU Foreign Policy. Manchester University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719095894.003.0007.
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Building on the three previous chapters’ findings on collective ‘European’ identity, norms and moral concerns, this chapter turns to collective EU interest formulations. There are numerous collective interests such as terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy security that have been identified by the EU Global Strategy (EU HR/VP 2016). These interests not only bind EU member states into acting together, but also signify to other, non-EU states what the EU is focusing on. The practitioners who participated in the study also identified migration, the environment, organised crime and transport as collective EU interests. Unsurprisingly they identified energy security as the most pressing common security interest that unites EU member states. Three main patterns emerge from the corpus. First, practitioners’ constructions of energy interests are examined. The second pattern reveals practitioners’ accounts of future plans to manage the collective EU concern over energy supplies. In the third and final pattern, practitioners offer justifications of EU interests in the eastern region, beyond the collective interests in energy supplies, and again through invoking moral concerns and the vocation attributes the EU has for the eastern neighbours.
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Ruse, Ilze. "Multiple Actors in Framing EU External Policy." In How International Law Works in Times of Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849667.003.0005.
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There is a strong correlation between the EU’s institutional architecture and policy output. The more complex the institutional set-up, the more challenges it poses for achieving an ambitious and coherent policy output. This is particularly at stake in the situation when the EU has to handle numerous crises and respond to international security challenges. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a new institutional architecture by adding complexity with multiple actors in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European External Action Service (EEAS) is in charge of EU foreign and security policy. At the same time, it must accommodate the interests of the EU Member States and those of the EU institutions in order to make the policy output credible and efficient. By contributing to this volume with its multidisciplinary approach, this chapter applies the Principal–Agent (P–A) theory of political science, which argues that the relationship between the Member States and the EEAS can be perceived as a delegation arrangement where the Member States (principal) sign a contract of delegation with the EEAS (agent) for fulfilling the mandate, yet deliberately leave a particular level of ‘discretion’ to the EEAS. The agent’s abuse of its empowered position may lead to ‘slippage’. To avoid this happening, the Member States could employ various control measures to keep the agent adhering to the preferences of the principal. The hypothesis is tested by drawing on the case of the EU Global Security Strategy. The chapter explores the means of control that the Member States use to maintain ownership in framing the new EU security strategy.
Conference papers on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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Katsagounos, Ilias, and Jochen Rehrl. ""PESCO - PM2 - ESDC" COULD E-LEARNING BRING CLOSER TOGETHER EU'S SUCCESS STORIES?" In eLSE 2018. ADL Romania, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-18-001.
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The publication of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, led to the development of several new instruments one of them, being the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), that had already existed for a decade but was waiting for the right moment to be implemented. PESCO can be considered the biggest project for European security to date, which brings together the EU Member States, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European External Action Service, the main actors when it comes to the Union’s foreign and security policy. The authors argue that the Open PM2 methodology should be used to manage PESCO. The necessary education and training for project managers and team leaders should be offered by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and its 140 network partners, under the auspices of the Open PM2 Centre of Excellence by using the well-established and widely recognised e-learning management system of the number one CSDP training provider. The article provides concrete solutions and a detailed training needs analysis.
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Densmaa, Oyuntsetseg, Gerelchimeg Kaliinaa, Norovsuren Nanzad, and Tsogzolboo Otgonbayar. "MONGOLIA’S “THIRD NEIGHBOR POLICY”." In Proceedings of the XXV International Scientific and Practical Conference. RS Global Sp. z O.O., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31435/rsglobal_conf/25012021/7365.
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Geographically Mongolia has two neighbors. Mongolia’s existence today depends largely on mutually friendly relationships with two big neighbors. The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30, 1994. This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity, and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade. In today’s world of globalization and interdependence, Mongolia has to engage with other countries beyond these two neighbors, Russia and China. This is fundamental thing of the Mongolia’s searching third neighbor. Mongolia needs more friends to ensure its national security interests and achieve economic prosperity its ‘Third Neighbor Policy’1 is a policy of extending its friends all around the world. Two immediate neighbors of Mongolia, Russia and China, remain the foreign policy priority and this priority is not contradictory to the policy of having more friends. Mongolia is becoming an arena of clashes of economic interests of developed countries, multinational corporations due its rich mining deposits. Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy is aimed to leverage the influence of neighboring countries in the national security issues of Mongolia. In contrast with other satellite states of the former Soviet Union, Mongolia concurrently instituted a democratic political system, a market-driven economy, and a foreign policy based on balancing relations with Russia and China while expanding relations with the West and East. Mongolia is now pursuing a foreign policy that will facilitate global engagement, allow the nation to maintain its sovereignty, and provide diplomatic freedom of maneuver through a “third neighbor” policy. 2 This policy is very much alive today but there is no reason to claim that its implementation is satisfactory. Mongolia has major investors from the US, Japan, Germany and France from the EU, for example. There are many universal conventions related to landlocked country. For Mongolia, access to sea via our two neighbors, means promoting economic ties with the third neighbors, as an important factor conducive to reinforcing the material foundations of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy.
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ZapSa, Andrei. "Conceptualizing the foreign policy of the European Union." In Conferința științifică națională cu participare internațională "Integrare prin cercetare și inovare", dedicată Zilei Internaționale a Științei pentru Pace și Dezvoltare. Moldova State University, 2025. https://doi.org/10.59295/spd2024s.31.
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This paper delves into the European Union’s grand strategy and the spectrum of its capabilities in addressing contemporary challenges. It critically evaluates the conceptual foundations and operational dimensions of EU powers, referencing seminal works by scholars such as John Lewis Gaddis and Colin Gray. The analysis dissects how the EU deploys its economic, civilian, ethical, and military instruments to realize strategic objectives, with a particular focus on the integrationist success of the single market. The research underscores the economic power of the EU, evidenced by the single market’s role in enhancing economic cohesion and resilience. However, it also critiques the rigidity and procedural inertia of EU mechanisms in the face of external geopolitical threats, notably from Russia. The study acknowledges the robustness of the EU’s ethical and civilian powers, despite internal inconsistencies in member states. Ultimately, the paper posits that while the EU’s strategic deployment of its powers has largely ensured regional stability and prosperity, it must continuously evolve to effectively navigate and mitigate emergent global challenges, thereby sustaining its strategic relevance in the 21st century.
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Gerginova, Tatjana. "POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF MONTENEGRO." In SECURITY HORIZONS. Faculty of Security- Skopje, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.20544/icp.11.01.20.p09.
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In the introductory part of the paper, the author defines the terms of policy and strategy for national security. Furthermore, the author determines the national security policy of Montenegro in accordance with the National Security Strategy of Montenegro from 2006, 2008, and 2018, as well as the components of the national security policy, such as national security interests and goals with special reference to strategic interests, overview of the global and regional environment, and security risks and threats. At the end of the paper, the author outlines the external components of national security policy – cooperation with European countries in responding to modern challenges, risks and threats, Montenegro's possible response to security risks and threats, and developing a crisis management system and participation in missions. The content will be based on an analysis of foreign literature and the use of electronic content. The subject of research in this paper is the national security policy of Montenegro in modern global conditions. The purpose of this study is to focus on the importance of national security and global security in the scientific literature. Keywords: national security policy, national security strategy, security interests and goals.
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Satyanarayana, Dr Putta V. V. "BALANCING ASPIRATIONS AND REALITIES: INDIA’S SOUTH ASIA POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY." In Transforming Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Research on Integrative Learning Across Disciplines. The Bhopal School of Social Sciences, 2025. https://doi.org/10.51767/ic250302.
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This paper explores India’s evolving foreign policy towards South Asia in the 21st century, with a particular focus on balancing the country’s strategic aspirations with the geopoliti-cal and economic realities it faces. India has long sought to assert itself as a regional lead-er in South Asia, with aspirations to enhance its security, economic influence, and diplomat-ic standing. However, its ambitions are consistently challenged by internal and external fac-tors, including territorial disputes, the rise of China, regional political rivalries, and the changing dynamics of global power. The primary objective of this study is to examine how India navigates these competing aspi-rations and realities in its South Asia policy, particularly since the turn of the 21st century. The study seeks to answer several key research questions: How has India’s foreign policy towards its South Asian neighbours evolved in the face of new geopolitical challenges? What are the primary drivers behind India’s regional strategy, and how does it balance eco-nomic cooperation with security concerns? How do India’s relationships with its neigh-bours, such as Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, reflect broader regional dynam-ics? The paper employs a qualitative methodological approach, drawing upon an analysis of both primary and secondary sources, including government documents, academic literature, and reports from regional think tanks. It also includes critical analysis of India’s relations with South Asian countries to illustrate the practical application of its foreign policy strate-gies. The study finds that while India’s regional aspirations remain strong, the country’s policy is often constrained by the complex realities of a fragmented South Asian region. India’s re-gional policy has adapted to include pragmatic diplomacy, economic partnerships, and se-curity arrangements, but challenges such as the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict and Chi-na's growing influence remain central to its strategy. The paper concludes by offering rec-ommendations for India to better align its aspirations with the evolving regional and global context, focusing on strengthening multilateral cooperation and regional trust-building
Reports on the topic "Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy"
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Sus, Monika, Cornelius Adebah, and Angel Saz-Carranza. 10 Recommendations to Make the European Union a Stronger Global Actor. EsadeGeo. Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, 2024. https://doi.org/10.56269/202406/ms.
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Following the European Parliament elections in June, a new EU leadership will take the helm to navigate the Union through an array of significant challenges. The EU faces an unprecedented combination of external threats: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the growing influences of Russia and China in the EU’s neighbourhood; the repercussions of the Israel-Gaza war; the Union’s economic, energy, and military dependencies and exposure to climate change; the rise of right-wing authoritarianism across many countries in Europe and its neighbourhood; and the uncertainty of the United States’ commitment to European security. This critical geopolitical juncture, at which the very existence of the European integration project is at risk, requires a robust EU foreign and security policy. The task of the incoming leadership is to make the Union fit for geopolitical purposes. All too often, the EU’s global action has been ineffective. It has suffered from a crippling lack of strategic foresight, a dearth of instruments to address acute threats, piecemeal responses because of the lack of a common vision, and overstretch of the Union’s resources across too many regions and domains. To address these shortcomings, the EU needs to become far more strategically selective in how it pursues its interests and goals, as defined by the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and the Strategic Compass of 2022. Given its finite resources and limited clout in certain parts of the world, the Union needs to consciously decide in which regions and crises it engages and how it can do so most effectively. This includes critically reviewing, improving, and deliberately phasing out some existing mechanisms and instruments. To this end, the EU needs to leverage its heft in trade and investment policy, financial power, diplomatic presence, and rule-making capacities while steadily building security and defence capabilities. It also needs to harness its institutional structure to make the most of its comparative advantages vis-à-vis other international organisations and states. The following ten recommendations would help the EU become a stronger global actor capable of effectively addressing current and future geopolitical challenges. The first four concern the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy, while the next six tackle individual policy areas. Taken together, they represent a comprehensive plan for improving the way the EU operates on the international stage.
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Vandendriessche, Marie, ed. Policy Brief 3: Coordinating External Action Beyond Crisis. EsadeGeo. Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, 2023. https://doi.org/10.56269/20230725/mv.
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Despite the widely acknowledged links between health hazards and foreign policy and security threats, health concerns were largely ignored in EU external action until the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Since COVID-19, a new Global Health Strategy has been developed and health concerns are more deeply integrated into the EU’s foreign policy. But it should not take a crisis to integrate policies with external effects. This brief presents recommendations to boost the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s external action by creatively coordinating tools, instruments and resources across multiple policy areas. There is no need to create new structures to do so – more effective use of existing resources can go a long way. 1. Boost inter-section coordination in EU Delegations 2. Improve tracking and oversight of mainstreamed policies 3. Exploit the full potential of the Team Europe approach in crisis and non-crisis situations.
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Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, Gustavo Müller, Monika Sus, et al. Assessing the European Union's External Action Towards Its Strategic Partners and Formulating Policy Recommendations. EsadeGeo. Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, 2024. https://doi.org/10.56269/202401/mmb.
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The European Union’s foreign policy aimed at building and sustaining effective multilateralism as a key strategic objective, as outlined in its 2003 European Security Strategy and later revised in the 2016 Global Strategy into effective global governance. The European Union’s foreign policy encompasses bilateral agreements with global players, identified as strategic partners, both with state actors and international organisations. There are multiple facets of the EU’s engagement with global strategic partners, some of which are defined within a legal framework, and some selected on a more ad hoc basis and in an informal manner. This working paper provides an assessment of the European Union’s engagement with its strategic partners, building on the previous research findings of the ENGAGE project. The EU’s external environment has altered significantly since the beginning of the project, with the unprecedented global pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the Israeli-Hamas war in October 2023. Whilst the EU’s relations with some strategic partners has led to the drafting of new agreements, its relations with certain strategic partners have deteriorated – Russia, which was previously defined as a partner, has become a strategic rival. The dynamic aspect and flexibility of the EU’s engagement with strategic partners is critical to enhance the effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of this foreign policy tool. This working paper aims to unpack the EU’s strategic partnerships and to assess whether they are effective, coherent and sustainable tools. The former toolbox for building a multilateral world order – strategic partnerships being one of these instruments – has proven unable to respond to rising power competition, populism and nationalism at the international level. Intensified complexity at the global level brings multilateralism at odds with the recent emphasis on nationalism and national interests. This contestation on the merits of multilateralism is a new complication for the EU’s strategic partnerships and their role in building a multilateral, rule-based international order driven by both values and material interests. As a result, strategic partnerships need a major update, with an in-depth review of existing agreements, harmonisation of Member State and EU institution positions, and increasing multilateral management of bilateral agreements.
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Niblett, Robin. Global Britain in a divided world: Testing the ambitions of the Integrated Review. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/9781784135195.
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In the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, the UK government set out four strategic objectives for ‘Global Britain’. A year later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift to a more divided world have put the vision of the UK as a ‘problem-solving and burden-sharing nation with global perspectives’ to an urgent and severe test. This research paper finds that the UK has made clear contributions to its objectives of upholding the values and security of the liberal democracies. But it has undercut its commitments to support global resilience, and its international economic agenda remains very much a work in progress. The government must now prioritize rebuilding its relationship with the EU; leverage the G7 to avoid being sidelined by closer US–EU cooperation; and give greater strategic purpose to its trade agenda. It also needs to follow through on its commitments to support the resilience of the international community, or it will fail to live up to its goal of launching a truly global Britain.
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Allan, Duncan, and Ian Bond. A new Russia policy for post-Brexit Britain. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/9781784132842.
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The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.
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Vandendriessche, Marie, ed. Policy Brief 2: Making Faster and Better Decisions in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. EsadeGeo. Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, 2023. https://doi.org/10.56269/202307/mv.
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Delayed, or even vetoed, decisions on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have marred the efficiency of decision-making in CFSP for years – and by extent, they hinder the EU on its path to becoming a more assertive global actor. This brief shows realistic options the EU can use to implement more qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP and closely related policy areas. In addition to activating underused CFSP Treaty provisions, the EU could boost its use of trade, and to some extent, internal competences – and thereby QMV – to pursue CFSP objectives. 1. Use EU trade competences to pursue CFSP objectives by QMV 2. Rely on internal policies to exert external influence 3. Keep pushing towards QMV in CFSP frameworks 4. Convince hesitant Member States through the QMV variations offered by the Treaties
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Kelly, Luke. Characteristics of Global Health Diplomacy. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.09.
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This rapid review focuses on Global Health Diplomacy and defines it as a method of interaction between the different stakeholders of the public health sector in a bid to promote representation, cooperation, promotion of the right to health and improvement of health systems for vulnerable populations on a global scale. It is the link between health and international relations. GHD has various actors including states, intergovernmental organizations, private companies, public-private partnerships and non-governmental organizations. Foreign policies can be integrated into national health in various ways i.e., designing institutions to govern practices regarding health diplomacy (i.e., health and foreign affairs ministries), creating and promoting norms and ideas that support foreign policy integration and promoting policies that deal with specific issues affecting the different actors in the GHD arena to encourage states to integrate them into their national health strategies. GHD is classified into core diplomacy – where there are bilateral and multilateral negotiations which may lead to binding agreements, multistakeholder diplomacy – where there are multilateral and bilateral negotiations which do not lead to binding agreements and informal diplomacy – which are interactions between other actors in the public health sector i.e., NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations. The US National Security Strategy of 2010 highlighted the matters to be considered while drafting a health strategy as: the prevalence of the disease, the potential of the state to treat the disease and the value of affected areas. The UK Government Strategy found the drivers of health strategies to be self-interest (protecting security and economic interests of the state), enhancing the UK’s reputation, and focusing on global health to help others. The report views health diplomacy as a field which requires expertise from different disciplines, especially in the field of foreign policy and public health. The lack of diplomatic expertise and health expertise have been cited as barriers to integrating health into foreign policies. States and other actors should collaborate to promote the right to health globally.
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Wolfmaier, Susanne, Adrian Foong, and Christian König. Climate, conflict and COVID-19: How does the pandemic affect EU policies on climate-fragility? Adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/casc018.
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The links between climate change and conflict have been well-documented in recent observations and academic literature: far from being causally direct, these links often depend on specific conditions and occur through certain pathways (Koubi, 2019). For example, conflicts have been found to be more likely in areas with poor access to infrastructure and facilities (Detges, 2016), or where government distrust and political bias are prevalent (Detges, 2017). As such, climate change has often been described as a ‘threat multiplier’, making it imperative for security and development actors to consider these fragility risks collectively in their policies and strategies. In addition to the expected impacts of climate change on the European Union (EU), such as increasing temperatures, extreme weather events or rising sea levels, climate change also has “direct and indirect international security impacts” for the EU’s foreign- and security policy (Council of the European Union, 2016). These affect for example migration, food security, access to resources and socio-economic factors that possibly contribute to disruptions (ibid.). The resulting fragility may affect the EU by contributing to changes in geopolitical power dynamics, whilst at the same time needs for support in neighbouring and partner countries could increase (Brown, Le More & Raasteen, 2020). The EU has increasingly acknowledged climate-fragility risks over the last years, as is evident from several key foreign policy strategies, agreements, and decisions. The European Green Deal, for example, aims to cushion climate and environmental impacts that may exacerbate instability (European Commission, 2019). At the regional level, individual policies underline the links between climate impacts and security in partner regions, such as for the Sahel (Council of the European Union, 2021a) and the Neighbourhood (EEAS, 2021a), stressing the importance in tackling those risks. To that end, the EU has been at the forefront in providing multilateral support for its partner regions, through its various instruments related to climate, environment, development, and security. According to official EU sources, EU funding for official development assistance (ODA) rose by 15% in nominal terms from 2019 to €66.8 billion in 2020 (European Commission, 2021a). Furthermore, the share dedicated to climate action is also growing: the EU initiative Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) received an additional €102.5 million for the period 2014-2020 compared to the previous phase 2004- 2014 (European Commission, n.d.). Looking ahead, the EU’s recently approved Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 is set to provide €110.6 billion in funding for external action and pre-accession assistance to its Neighbourhood and rest of the world (European Commission, 2021b). Despite the increased recognition of climate-related fragility risks in EU policies and the funding committed to climate action and international development, implementation of concrete measures to address these risks are lagging behind, with only a handful of EUfunded projects addressing climate-fragility risks (Brown, Le More & Raasteen, 2020). Compounding these challenges is the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the current vaccine rollout worldwide, and with some countries seeing a potential end to the health crisis, the pandemic has taken – and continues to take – its toll in many parts of the world. The unprecedented nature of COVID-19 could ultimately make it more difficult for the EU to address the impacts of climate change on fragility and security in its partner regions. In other words: How does the pandemic affect the EU’s ability to address climate-fragility risks in its neighbourhood? To answer this question, this paper will explore the implications of COVID-19 on relevant EU policies and strategies that address the climate security nexus, focusing on three regions: the Sahel, North Africa, and Western Balkans. These regions were chosen for geographical representativeness (i.e., being the EU’s southern and eastern neighbouring regions), as well as being priority regions for EU external action, and, in the case of the Western Balkans, for EU accession.1 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines, in general terms, the impacts of the pandemic on the political priorities and ability of the EU to address climate-fragility risks. Section 3 explores, for each focus region, how the pandemic affects key objectives of EU policies aiming at reducing climate-fragility risks in that region. Section 4 provides several recommendations on how the EU can better address the interlinking risks associated with climate-fragility and COVID-19.
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Mosello, Beatrice, Christian König, Emily Wright, and Gareth Price. Rethinking human mobility in the face of global changes. Adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/casc010.
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Migration and displacement related to climate change have received increasing attention in the media, in research and among policymakers in recent years. A range of studies have produced extremely concerning statistics and forecasts about the potential scale of migration and displacement due to climate change now and in the future. For example, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre calculated that in 2019 alone almost 25 million people were displaced by disasters such as floods and tropical storms – three times the number displaced by conflict and violence (IDMC 2020a). The World Bank’s 2018 Groundswell report estimated that, if substantial climate change mitigation and development measures are not taken, slow-onset climate impacts could displace as many as 143 million people in just three world regions, or 55 percent of the developing world’s population, by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). These kinds of figures have been widely reported and drive the prevailing narrative in media and policy debates that climate change will lead to mass migration and displacement, which, in turn, can lead to conflict. There is empirical evidence that rising temperatures, leading to disasters and slow-onset impacts such as drought or sea-level rise are already playing a role in setting people across the world on the move, and these numbers are likely to increase as climate change impacts intensify (UNINE n.d.; IOM’s GMDAC 2020). However, the links between climate change, migration, displacement and conflict are complex, and vary widely between contexts. The growing community of research on this topic has warned that, without an adequate understanding of the pathways of mobility, predictions of millions of climate migrants and displaced people can cast responses in alarmistic and counter-productive tones (Flavell et al. 2020). Policy on displacement, migration and climate change can therefore profit from investing in fine-grained analyses of the different factors shaping human mobility, and using them to support the development of effective responses that address the needs of migrants, as well as their home and destination communities. Along these lines, this paper examines the interaction between biophysical climate impacts, migration, displacement and (in)security. It aims to go beyond the prevailing narratives to better understand the different ways in which mobility can serve as an adaptive strategy to climate- and conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities. It also aims to assess how effective mobility is as an adaptation strategy and will continue to be in light of other stresses, including the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis focuses on two case studies, Bangladesh and Central Asia, each presenting different human mobility pathways. It adopts a diversity lens to consider how the success/effectiveness of mobility strategies is sensitive to the position of individuals in society and the opportunities they have. It also considers how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the ability of climate-vulnerable populations to use mobility as an effective adaptation strategy, considering movement restrictions, increased unemployment in cities, reduced opportunities for seasonal work (e.g. in the agriculture sector), return migration and impacts on remittance flows. In conclusion, the paper makes recommendations to inform governments in countries of origin and international development and humanitarian policies and programmes in relation to mobility and climate change/security, including those of the EU and EU member states. Firstly, climate-induced mobility should be included in and addressed through broader adaptation and development efforts, for example building urban infrastructure, promoting nature-based adaptation, and ensuring adequate social protection and education. Policies and legal frameworks on migration and displacement in countries of origin should also be strengthened, ensuring the coordination between existing policies at all levels. Global cooperation will be essential to build international standards. And finally, all programming should be supported by an improved knowledge base on climate-induced migration and displacement, including gender- and age- disaggregated data.
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Kelsey, Tom. When Missions Fail: Lessons in ‘High Technology’ From Post-War Britain. Blavatnik School of Government, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-wp_2023/056.
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The idea that national security and economic prosperity stem from being at the technological frontier (‘techno-nationalism’) is once again a dominant feature of global politics. The post-war United States has emerged as the key model in these discussions, with the ‘moonshot’ seen as an outstanding example of how to direct state resources towards technological breakthroughs, while the capacity of the American government is praised more generally for its ability to sponsor ground-breaking technology. This paper, however, suggests that the United States was the exception, not the rule, and that the failures of post-war Britain highlight the limitations of ‘techno-nationalism’ with vivid clarity. During the 1950s and 1960s, the British state took long-term bets on securing a leading role in the world’s technological future, specifically in the areas of supersonic flight via Concorde and nuclear power generation. The result, however, was not export glory but industrial calamity. These long-running programmes were eventually cut back in the 1970s, when it became accepted in Whitehall that Britain should no longer try to be the Science and Tech Superpower, attempting to leapfrog the United States to technological glory. Understanding this trajectory in Britain dislodges the sense that focusing on emerging technology and the long term is a silver bullet in policymaking. We must appreciate that the realities of technological power matter, and grasp that the post-war US was an unrepresentative case: no country today will have the relative level of industrial and technological might that it enjoyed at that time. While my arguments will resonate in other national contexts, my focus is on ensuring that any strategy for ‘high technology’ in the UK today continues to learn the lessons from the errors of the post-war period. It must be wary of expert capture within the state. It must also think about industrial strategy in an integrated way, across national security, economics, and foreign policy, with a policymaking machinery set up to deal with this level of complexity. Moreover, despite the attention afforded to national state funding, the UK should continue to see forging alliances as essential alongside working with international business and be clear-eyed about where it does and does not need to sustain national capabilities.