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1
Horowitz, Amir. "What Can God Do? What Should God Do?" Religions 13, no. 12 (2022): 1178. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178.
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The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba’s argument from evil to the effect that God does not exist.
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Yandell, Keith. "Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence." Religious Studies 25, no. 1 (1989): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500019697.
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God, who is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Creator and Providence, exists and There is evil are logically compatible claims. God exists, If God exists, then He has a morally sufficient reason for allowing any evil that He does allow, and There is evil is a consistent triad of propositions. Thus any pair from that triad is also consistent. Thus God exists and There is evil are logically compatible. But this does not settle the question as to whether the truth of There is evil in the world has such consequences for theism as making it highly improbable that God exists or making it unreasonable to believe that God exists. That propositions P and Q are logically compatible does not entail that one does not provide powerful evidence against the other. In particular, it has seemed that some actual evils are gratuitous or in some manner just could not fit into a God-made world. Thus the simple argument is offered that: (1) There are gratuitous evils; (2) If there are gratuitous evils, then there is no God; so: (3) There is no God. I will call this simple argument the ‘root argument’, for it is this argument and sophistications of it that will occupy us hereafter.
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Swinburne, Richard. "Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (1988): 287–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717178.
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To many atheists the existence of evil seems to provide a conclusive argument against the existence of God. God is by definition omnipotent and perfectly good; a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can, an omnipotent being can remove any evil he chooses, so if there is a God there will be no evil, but there is evil, hence there is no God. Theists normally challenge this argument by challenging the premiss that a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can. The theistic defence is usually put as the defence that many evils are logically necessary conditions of greater goods, and hence a perfectly good being may allow them to occur in order to bring about the greater good; so a perfectly good being may well allow some evils to occur.
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Walls, Jerry L. "Heaven and the Goodness of God." Religions 12, no. 5 (2021): 316. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12050316.
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In this essay, I argue that we should take fully seriously the doctrine of heaven when dealing with the problem of evil in our world. The hope of heaven is integral to Christian theism so it cannot be neglected in any substantive discussion of the problem of evil. Indeed, heaven provides resources to respond to even the worst of evils and to fully redeem them in such a way that the victims of those evils can fully affirm the goodness of their lives. Anyone who achieves heaven will experience a good of such significance and value that the ultimate beauty and goodness of their life could not be questioned. The Christian doctrine of the afterlife also provides resources to make sense of ultimate accountability. The perpetrators of horrendous evil cannot escape and will be called to account for their actions. However, even those who have committed such evil evils can be fully transformed in such a way that they can be fully reconciled with their victims and heartily embraced by them. This shows the doctrine of heaven to be not only profoundly hopeful, but also starkly honest and realistic.
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Olisaemeka, Chukwunweolu, Stephen, Okoro, Christian Chukwuma, and Orji, Dominic Chinasa. "The Examination of the Problem of Evil in Alvin Plantinga." International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science VIII, no. X (2024): 3295–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.47772/ijriss.2024.8100278.
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This study explores Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense as a response to one of the perennial problems of philosophy; problem of evil which challenges the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God. Plantinga refutes traditional theodicies that attempt to specify why God permits evil and argues that the human free will is a crucial component in understanding the coexistence of God and evil in the world. He posits that evil stems from the misuse of free will by humans and non-human free agents such as Satan. This study examines how Plantinga’s approach addresses natural, physical and moral evils while refuting the logical inconsistencies proposed by atheologians. The essay drawing from the positions of philosophers like Augustine, Leibniz, and Mackie highlights how the existence of evil does not invalidate belief in God. This Free Will Defense maintains that God allows evil as it is a necessary condition for the greater good of free will. It emphasises that God’s reason for permitting evil may be beyond human comprehension. The study concludes that Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is logically consistent, providing a compelling refutation of atheistic arguments, while reinforcing the rationality of theistic belief in the face of evil.
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Reitan, Eric. "Divine Omnipotence, Divine Sovereignty and Moral Constraints on the Prevention of Evil: A Reply to Sterba." Religions 13, no. 9 (2022): 813. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13090813.
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In Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba uses the analogy of a just political state to develop evil-prevention principles he thinks a good God would follow. With the assumption that God is omnipotent, these principles entail that God would never permit free agents to bring about horrendous evil. But free agents routinely succeed in doing so: entailing a logical incompatibility between the world’s evils and the existence of a good, omnipotent God. I challenge this conclusion by sketching two ways divine omnipotence arguably entails that God would face moral constraints on the prevention of moral evil that human agents and political states do not. If my account is sound, God would be morally precluded from functioning as a sovereign governing authority in the manner of just political states. If this is correct, Sterba’s arguments might be taken to show, not that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the existence of a good, almighty God, but that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the common theistic belief that such a God is the sovereign ruler of the world.
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Hrmo, Patrik. "Does the Analogy of an Ideal State Disprove God’s Existence? James Sterba’s Argument and a Thomistic Response." Religions 13, no. 10 (2022): 931. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13100931.
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This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a representative name for pointless evil and suffering in the world. Sterba claims that the existence of such evil is not logically compatible with the existence of the all-good theistic God. If such a God existed, according to Sterba, he would have intervened in time and prevented and not permitted horrendous evil consequences; in other words, he would have acted as an ideal state. The author of this paper argues that the analogy of an ideal state does not disprove the existence of God of theism. Furthermore, people would prefer if God was not like an ideal state. Applying the characteristics of an ideal state to a theistic God is not reasonable because it relies on anthropomorphism. Such anthropomorphism is incoherent with some basic theistic beliefs. The author of this paper applies Thomistic concepts to the problem of horrendous evils.
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Coetsee, Marilie. "In Answer to the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will." Religions 14, no. 1 (2022): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14010028.
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James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come from it, and according to Sterba, this principle implies that God may not permit significant evils even if that permission would be necessary to secure other, greater goods. By contrast, I argue that the occurrence of significant evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God because victims of significant evils may themselves reasonably consent to their suffering. In particular, I argue that they may be able to accept their suffering if it turns out that there was no way for God to secure relevant greater goods (or prevent other, greater evils) except by way of allowing their suffering, and God also provides them with other compensating, heavenly comforts. After using this consent-based argument to address Sterba’s logical problem from evil, I briefly consider how this argument may also help address a related evidential problem from evil, which suggests that while it is possible that victims of significant evils would consent to their suffering, it is unlikely that they would do so. While I do not provide a definitive solution to this evidential problem of evil, I highlight one important example of a trade-off that God may need to make that would—along with the provision of compensating, heavenly comforts—potentially persuade victims of significant evils to consent to their suffering. Specifically, I argue that there may be a necessary trade-off that God needs to make between permitting significant evils (on the one hand) and protecting a certain, morally significant form of free will (on the other hand).
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Burns, Elizabeth. "Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil." Religions 12, no. 6 (2021): 442. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12060442.
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In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness.
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Huffling, J. Brian. "The Problem of Evil and God’s Moral Standing: A Rejoinder to James Sterba." Religions 13, no. 11 (2022): 1031. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111031.
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This article is a rejoinder to James Sterba’s response to my previous article on the topic of his book, Is a Good God Logically Possible? Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible given the amount of horrendous evil in the world. If God did exist, Sterba asserts, then he would be able to prevent such evils from happening while not losing any goods. My original article was a response to the notion that God is morally obligated to prevent such evil. The main points considered here are whether there really is a logical problem of evil and how God can have moral virtues ascribed to him while not being morally obligated in the sense that Sterba’s position requires.
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MARING, LUKE. "A new problem of evil: authority and the duty of interference." Religious Studies 48, no. 4 (2012): 497–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412511000321.
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AbstractThe traditional problem of evil sets theists the task of reconciling two things: God and evil. I argue that theists face the more difficult task of reconciling God and evils that God is specially obligated to prevent. Because of His authority, God's obligation to curtail evil goes far beyond our Samaritan duty to prevent evil when doing so isn't overly hard. Authorities owe their subjects a positive obligation to prevent certain evils; we have a right against our authorities that they protect us. God's apparent mistake is not merely the impersonal wrong of failing to do enough good – though it is that too. It is the highly personal wrong of failing to live up to a moral requirement that comes bundled with authority over persons. To make my argument, I use the resources of political philosophy and defend a novel change to the orthodox account of authority.
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Reichenbach, Bruce R. "Assessing a Revised Compensation Theodicy." Religions 13, no. 11 (2022): 1080. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111080.
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Attempts to resolve the problem of evil often appeal to a greater good, according to which God’s permission of moral and natural evil is justified because (and just in case) the evil that is permitted is necessary for the realization of some greater good. In the extensive litany of greater good theodicies and defenses, the appeal to the greater good of an afterlife of infinite reward or pleasure has played a minor role in Christian thought but a more important role in Islamic thought. In a recent article, Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad invites us to reconsider the greater good theodicy of compensation. He contends that not only are all evils justified in that God compensates the sufferer in an afterlife, but because the evils experienced produce some good, God has reason for bringing about or allowing evils in the first place. In what follows, I argue that this modified compensation theodicy is flawed in its premises, faces serious problems with its concept of justice, treats people as means only and not as intrinsically valuable, and ultimately fails to show that an afterlife compensation, along with some good produced here and now by evil, justify God bringing about or allowing evil.
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THELAKAT, Paul. "God Suffers Evil." Louvain Studies 14, no. 1 (1989): 16–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ls.14.1.2013929.
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Tilley, Terrence W. "God and Evil." Thought 66, no. 4 (1991): 419–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought199166413.
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Beyer, Jason A. "God and Evil." Teaching Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2000): 303–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil200023351.
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Wood, Adam Noel. "Evil Prevention Requirements and the God of Theism." Religions 13, no. 12 (2022): 1164. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13121164.
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The central argument of James Sterba’s “Is a Good God Logically Possible?” relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God does not exist. I challenge the notion that theists must accept the notion that God is bound by the particular set of evil prevention requirements Sterba’s argument presupposes. However, I argue that investigating ways God may in fact be required to prevent evils may serve as a helpful heuristic for theists as they seek further to understand God’s nature and purposes.
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McIntosh, Don. "Horrendous Evil and Christian Theism: A Reply to John W. Loftus." Trinity Journal of Natural and Philosophical Theology 2, no. 1 (2024): 25–44. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12429386.
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In his recent article, “God and Horrendous Suffering,” John W. Loftus argues that what he calls horrendous suffering is incompatible with traditional theism. The extent of horrendous suffering in the world, he says, “means that either God does not care enough to eliminate it, or God is not smart enough to eliminate it, or God is not powerful enough to eliminate it.” For Loftus, however, the problem is not simply evil, but horrendous suffering, a particularly acute form of evil which renders theism completely untenable. Here I will argue in reply, first, that because horrendous suffering is itself a form of evil, it cannot be easily reconciled with naturalism, since naturalism actually precludes the existence of evil. Then I will argue that horrendous suffering is not only compatible with theism, but is best explained in the context of Christian theism in particular. Finally I will suggest that because God’s work of creation is not yet complete, we have good reason for maintaining hope even in the face of horrendous evils.
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Visala, Aku. "The Problems of Divine Manipulation." Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, no. 2 (2023): 186–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0018.
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Abstract Many Christian theologians believe in the existence of cases of divine hardening and divine election, where God either actively contributes to human evil or preordains it. God seems to act like a manipulator, who first covertly incites or determines people’s evil actions and then condemns those actions and punishes the wrongdoers. I raise three questions regarding such cases: (1) how can humans be responsible for wrongdoings that are determined by God via either direct involvement or predestination; (2) is God justified in using covert manipulation to achieve his goals; (3) how can God judge human evil, if God predestines them or actively incites humans to commit evils? The article outlines two cases of supposed divine manipulation, discusses the general nature of manipulation and then examines each question outlined above. The argument is that the problems surrounding divine manipulation present significant challenges to especially those Christian theists that subscribe to divine determinism.
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Alvaro, Carlo. "The Incoherence of an Evil God." Religions 13, no. 1 (2022): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13010054.
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The evil god challenge is for theists to explain why a good god’s existence should be considerably more reasonable than an evil god’s existence. Challengers note that there is a symmetry between a good god and an evil god. Moreover, the classical arguments for a good god can prove the existence of an evil god just as well. Furthermore, theodicies can be mirrored by reverse theodicies. Consequently, the evil god challenge leads to two implications. One, if an evil god is deemed absurd, by logical symmetry, a good god must also be absurd. Two, if an evil god is not absurd, then no reason exists in favor of the existence of a good god. This paper offers two strategies to show that a good god’s existence is plausible, but an evil god’s is not. One is to argue that an evil god’s motivations for creating the world are inconsistent with its alleged nature. The other is a close examination of theodicies and reverse theodicies, which shows that no symmetry exists between them and that theodicies are effective, but reverse theodicies are not.
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Byron, Chris. "WHY GOD IS MOST ASSUREDLY EVIL: CHALLENGING THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE." Think 18, no. 51 (2019): 25–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175618000325.
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The evil God challenge argues that for every theodicy that justifies the existence of an omnibenevolent God in the face of evil, there is a mirror theodicy that can defend the existence of an omnimalevolent God in the face of good. People who invoke the evil God challenge further argue that because we find evil God theodicies to be implausible, we should find good God theodicies to be equally implausible. This article argues that in fact evil God theodicies are more reasonable than good God theodicies by expanding upon arguments offered by David Benatar regarding the nature of existence, and David Hume regarding the asymmetry in our sensations of pain and pleasure.
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Ali, Farhad, and Ahmad Hassan Khattak. "Islam, Atheism and Anti-natalism: A critical analysis." Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) 2, no. 2 (2021): 228–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.2.17.
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The fact that every one of us in this life has to face difficulties, pain, sadness cannot be denied. Quran and Hadith also accept the presence of evil and calamities in this world. There comes the question in our mind that how is the evil present in this world although the world is created by Allah (S.W.T), and He is the merciful and controls everything in the universe. If somehow, the evil was present Allah (S.W.T) could have ended it, but we see that the reality is different. The existence of evil has been used by people as a justification for not believing in God since ages. In today’s world we see people who believe in Anti-natalism and consider life as an evil and in order to save ourselves from the evil they suggest that humans should not procreate. This article has been written after studying the arguments of people who do not believe in God and are the followers of Anti-natalism. The study concludes that evils, pains, and sadness are natural product of this world, and these evils are not a part of Allah’s (S.W.T) creations. Moreover, the changes are part of the existence of the universe and humans, and these calamities cannot be used as an excuse for not believing in God or justify believing in Anti-natalism.
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Meister, Chad. "Personalistic Theism, Divine Embodiment, and a Problem of Evil." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 2 (2019): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2974.
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One version of the problem of evil concludes that personalistic forms of theism should be rejected since the acts that one would expect a God with person-like qualities to perform, notably acts that would prevent egregious evils, do not occur. Given the evils that exist in the world, it is argued, if God exists as a person or like a person, God’s record of action is akin to that of a negligent parent. One way of responding to this “argument from neglect” is to maintain that there is a good reason for the apparent neglect—namely, that God could not intervene even once with respect to suffering (the “not-even-once principle”) without thereby incurring the responsibility of doing so on every occasion, which would be deleterious. So God never responds to evil. It is argued in this paper that a profoundly integrated, personalistic model of God and the God-world relation—one that is reflected in a soul-body analogy—provides a way of addressing the argument from neglect without affirming the not-even-once principle.
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Balci, Elif Nur. "A Modified Free-Will Defense: A Structural and Theistic Free-Will Defense as a Response to James Sterba." Religions 13, no. 8 (2022): 700. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13080700.
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In his book Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba argues that the Plantingian free-will defense, which reconciles the existence of a good and omnipotent God with the existence of evil, is a failed argument when it comes to the terrible evils in the world. This study discusses that Sterba’s claim is invalid when Plantinga’s free-will defense is modified with a structural perspective. In order to reconcile the structural and inevitable possibility of evil with God’s moral imperatives, a structural free-will defense was complemented by an Islamic moral theology that Mu’tazila and its great scholar Qādi Abd al-Jabbar advanced. Such a modified free-will defense can show that the existence of all evil, including terrible ones, is still compatible with a good and omnipotent God.
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COLLINS, JOHN M. "The evil-god challenge: extended and defended." Religious Studies 55, no. 1 (2018): 85–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000070.
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AbstractStephen Law developed a challenge to theism, known as the evil-god challenge (Law (2010) ). The evil-god challenge to theism is to explain why the theist's responses to the problem of evil are any better than the diabolist's – who believes in a supremely evil god – rejoinders to the problem of good, when all the theist's ploys (theodicy, sceptical theism, etc.) can be parodied by the diabolist.In the first part of this article, I extend the evil-god challenge by showing that additional theist replies to the problem of evil (more theodicies, the privation view of evil, and others) also may be appropriated, with just as much plausibility, in support of the diabolist position. In the second part of the article, I defend the evil-god challenge against several objections.
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COLLIN, JAMES HENRY. "What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (2018): 333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000598.
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AbstractMichael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley's argument begs the question against the theist, and, in doing so, commits an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.
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TAŞKIN, Ferhat. "The Free Will Defense and the Problem of Heavenly Freedom." Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 64, no. 1 (2023): 121–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.33227/auifd.1258091.
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According to the logical problem of evil, the co-existence of evil and the theistic God who is considered to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent is impossible. The fact that our world contains evils invalidates the existence of the theistic God. A libertarian theistic response to this problem, the free will defense, holds that if God actually has or could have a sufficient reason to actualize a world containing evils, the problem fails. This good reason, according to the defense, might be significant freedom, the freedom to choose between moral good and evil. Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis, however, approach this debate from a different angle and argue that the traditional theistic view of heaven is a problem for this theistic response when we ask whether there is freedom in heaven. They contend that if the inhabitants of heaven do not have significant freedom, free will cannot be a great good that gives God a good reason to create a world containing evils. Thus, the free will defense fails. In this paper, I claim that this is mistaken. I argue that even though the inhabitants of heaven are not free in the most robust sense (i.e. they are no longer capable of sinning), this does not show that significant freedom is not a great good that justifies God’s creating a world containing evils.
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HENDRICKS, PERRY. "Sceptical theism and the evil-god challenge." Religious Studies 54, no. 4 (2018): 549–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000094.
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AbstractThis article is a response to Stephen Law's article ‘The evil-god challenge’. In his article, Law argues that if belief in evil-god is unreasonable, then belief in good-god is unreasonable; that the antecedent is true; and hence so is the consequent. In this article, I show that Law's affirmation of the antecedent is predicated on the problem of good (i.e. the problem of whether an all-evil, all-powerful, and all-knowing God would allow there to be as much good in the world as there is), and argue that the problem of good fails. Thus, the antecedent is unmotivated, which renders the consequent unmotivated. Law's challenge for good-god theists is to show that good-god theism is not rendered unreasonable by the problem of evil in the same way that evil-god theism is rendered unreasonable by the problem of good. Insofar as the problem of good does not render belief in evil-god unreasonable, Law's challenge has been answered: since it is not unreasonable to believe in evil-god (at least for the reasons that Law gives) it is not unreasonable to believe in good-god. Finally, I show that – my criticism aside – the evil-god challenge turns out to be more complicated and controversial than it initially appears, for it relies on the (previously unacknowledged) contentious assumption that sceptical theism is false.
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Beaty, Michael Douglas. "A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil: Revisited." Religions 14, no. 1 (2022): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14010035.
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In this essay, I revisit the univocity thesis, Sterba’s analogy between God and a leader of a politically liberal society, and, most fundamentally, whether the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God. I concede that the typical appeals to free will and greater goods defenses to block the logical problem of evil are not sufficient because they do not adequately address the horrendous evils that are all too much a feature of human existence. While acknowledging that a compensatory response to the problem of evil is suggested by several important philosophers, I rely most centrally on the work of Marilyn McCord Adams. In so doing, I defend the thesis that the existence of a good God is logically compatible with the existence of horrendous evils, given God’s capacity to absorb, defeat, or engulf it.
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Rubio, Daniel. "Against the New Logical Argument from Evil." Religions 14, no. 2 (2023): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14020159.
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Jim Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? looks to resurrect J. L. Mackie’s logical argument from evil. Sterba accepts the general framework that theists seeking to give a theodicy have favored since Leibniz invented the term: the search for some greater good provided or greater evil averted that would justify God in permitting the type and variety of evil we actually observe. However, Sterba introduces a deontic twist, drawing on the Pauline Principle (let us not do evil that good may come) to introduce three deontic side constraints on God’s choice of action. He then splits the possible goods into four categories: first- vs. second-order goods, goods to which we have a right, and goods to which we do not have a right. He argues that his deontic constraints rule out each combination, thereby showing that no God-justifying good is on offer. To defuse the argument, I draw on a pair of ideas from Marilyn McCord Adams: (i) God is outside the bounds of morality, and (ii) God can defeat evils by incorporating them into an incommensurately valuable friendship with each human. Properly appreciated, these show that the new logical argument relies on a false premise that is not easily repaired.
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Attfield, Robin. "Panentheisms, Creation and Evil." Open Theology 5, no. 1 (2019): 166–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opth-2019-0012.
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Abstract Can panentheism cope with the problem of evil? This problem is often understood as one for classical theists, who maintain that the cosmos, together with its evils, was created by an all-powerful and benevolent God. For classical theists need to reconcile the world’s evils with divine creation. But corresponding problems re-emerge for theologies of both pantheistic and panentheistic kinds. Thus a problem arises for panentheists, with their teachings about a close relation between God and the cosmos. The closer the relation, the more intense the problem. Thus panentheists who regard the world as necessary to or part of God must hold that its evils are likewise necessary to or part of God. I explore in this paper whether panentheism can overcome the corresponding problem. This exploration involves sifting different varieties of panentheism. While for some varieties the problem is insoluble, this turns out to be less so for others, which retain central features of classical theism, while stressing interaction between God and the created world. In particular, grounds will be offered for holding that the version of panentheism put forward by Jürgen Moltmann and by Arthur Peacocke is defensible and can overcome this problem.
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Stump, Eleonore. "Does God Will Evil?" Monist 80, no. 4 (1997): 598–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist199780432.
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Zamulinski, Brian. "God, Evil, and Evolution." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 2 (2010): 201–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i2.374.
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Most evil is compatible with the existence of God if He has an aim that He can achieve only by using an unguided process of evolution and if He cannot be condemned for trying to achieve His aim. It is argued that there is an aim that could reasonably be attributed to God and that God cannot achieve it without using evolution. There are independent grounds for thinking an evolutionary response is necessary if God is to be defended at all. Issues that require further investigation are pointed out and desirable features of the evolutionary response indicated.
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Bergmann, Michael. "God and Inscrutable Evil." Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 4 (1999): 562–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199916445.
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Basinger, David. "God, Evil, and Design." Faith and Philosophy 27, no. 4 (2010): 474–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201027449.
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Reed, Robert P. "Must God Prevent Evil?" Southwest Philosophy Review 33, no. 1 (2017): 163–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201733117.
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LAW, STEPHEN. "The evil-god challenge." Religious Studies 46, no. 3 (2010): 353–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990369.
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AbstractThis paper develops a challenge to theism. The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god. Theists typically dismiss the evil-god hypothesis out of hand because of the problem of good – there is surely too much good in the world for it to be the creation of such a being. But then why doesn't the problem of evil provide equally good grounds for dismissing belief in a good god? I develop this evil-god challenge in detail, anticipate several replies, and correct errors made in earlier discussions of the problem of good.
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SHEA, MATTHEW, and C. P. RAGLAND. "God, evil, and occasionalism." Religious Studies 54, no. 2 (2017): 265–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000129.
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AbstractIn a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga defends occasionalism against an important moral objection: if God is the sole direct cause of all the suffering that results from immoral human choices, this causal role is difficult to reconcile with God's perfect goodness. Plantinga argues that this problem is no worse for occasionalism than for any of the competing views of divine causality; in particular, there is no morally relevant difference between God directly causing suffering and God indirectly causing it. First, we examine Plantinga's moral parity argument in detail and offer a critical evaluation of it. Then we provide a positive argument, based on the doctrine of doing and allowing, to show why there is a morally relevant difference between God's direct and indirect causation of suffering.
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Langtry, Bruce. "God, evil and probability." Sophia 28, no. 1 (1989): 32–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02789852.
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Suttle, Bruce B. "On God tolerating evil." Sophia 26, no. 3 (1987): 53–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02781292.
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Hewitt Suckocki, Marjorie. "Evil, Eschatology, and God." Process Studies 18, no. 1 (1989): 63–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process198918134.
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McLeod-Harrison, Mark. "God, Evil, and Design." Teaching Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2008): 401–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil200831440.
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McNAUGHTON, DAVID. "Is God (almost) a consequentialist? Swinburne's moral theory." Religious Studies 38, no. 3 (2002): 265–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250200608x.
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Swinburne offers a greater-goods defence to the problem of evil within a deontological framework. Yet deontologists characteristically hold that we have no right to inflict great evil on any individual to bring about the greater good. Swinburne accepts that humans generally do not have that right, but argues that God, as the supreme care-giver, does. I contend that Swinburne's argument that care-givers have such a right is flawed, and defend the classical deontological objection to imposing evils that good may come.
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SWINBURNE, RICHARD. "Reply to Richard Gale." Religious Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 221–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005217.
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I am most grateful to Richard Gale for the detailed attention which he has paid to my detailed arguments, and for the kind remarks between which he sandwiches his hard-hitting criticisms. The first of the latter is that I ‘slosh back and forth’ (211) between different theses, Ss, Sw, and W. I hope not, but I agree that I may not have made the relation between these sufficiently clear. I am certainly committed to, and sought to argue for, the strong version of the strong thesis:Ss For every instance of evil, God is justified in allowing it.But I cannot examine every instance of evil in order to show that – I do not know of all the evils, let alone have time or space to discuss each of them. So I need to produce an inductive argument for Ss, and I seek to do so by considering the various kinds of evil, and trying to show that God is justified in allowing any evil of that kind. Hence I consider the evils of having bad desires, making wrong choices which cause suffering to oneself, making wrong choices which cause suffering to others, suffering occurring through natural processes, ignorance of God etc. I divide evils into kinds, in such a way that the morally significant differences between evils of a given kind is simply one of degree – different instances of suffering occurring through natural processes differ in respect of their intensity and the period of time they last.
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Cordeiro-Rodrigues, Luís. "Christianity in the Kingdom of Kongo and Western Theism: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Evil." Philosophia Africana 21, no. 1 (2022): 13–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0013.
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Abstract Philosophers have been intrigued by the problem of evil for centuries: How can God and evil coexist? This article tries to answer this question by using Kongolese religious thought from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I contend that the Kongolese view gleaned from historical sources and complemented by contemporary African philosophical scholarship contains sufficient resources to reply to this problem coherently. Particularly, I argue that, from the Kongolese viewpoint, evil in the world can be explained as follows. God and other morally good entities (e.g., the morally good living dead) are not morally perfect and may commit moral errors. Moreover, God does not have unlimited power over morally bad entities who may commit moral wrongs. This view, I contend, deserves consideration since, unlike the mainstream Western perspective, it does not imply the unacceptable view that horrendous evils are morally justified.
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KODAJ, DANIEL. "The problem of religious evil." Religious Studies 50, no. 4 (2014): 425–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412514000122.
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AbstractThe article argues that evils perpetrated in the name of God (‘religious evils') generate a special version of the problem of evil, and a concomitant evidential argument, that cannot be solved by any of the current defences and theodicies. The article draws on historical examples to clarify the concept of religious evil, it shows that religious evil is a candidate defeater of theism, and it claims that the resulting evidential argument cannot be defused by defences and theodicies currently on offer. The last section outlines a solution.
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Basinger, David. "Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem of Evil: Is the Type of Knowledge God Possesses Relevant?" Religious Studies 28, no. 1 (1992): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500021338.
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The problem of evil normally discussed in philosophical theology is concerned with the pain and suffering experienced in this life. Why do so many innocent children die slow, torturous deaths as the result of disease, famine or earthquakes? Why do so many seemingly innocent adults suffer as the result of the greed, indifference or perversity of others? If God is all-good, then he certainly does not want such suffering. If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do away with such evils. Thus, must we not conclude that the existence of such evil counts against belief in the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful God?
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Klein, Johannes. "Wenn das Böse von Gott kommt…" Review of Ecumenical Studies 16, no. 1 (2024): 24–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ress-2024-0003.
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Abstract The article begins by noting a discrepancy between systematic-theological discourse of God, which speaks of ideal qualities, and biblical discourse of God, which does not refrain from associating God with evil, and analyzes this in more detail in a first section. The argument then turns to biblical texts and establishes that, especially where hopes rest on Yhwh as the only God, the authors of biblical texts seem to assume that God is also behind evil. Since most of the texts that see evil together with God are fictional narratives, the lessons drawn are pragmatic in the sense that they are warnings against abuse of power (Saul), aggression and attempts at destruction (Noah and Jonah) and insight into the background of evil (evil spirit, Satan, human culpability, omnipotence and uniqueness) rather than systematic considerations of the attributes of God.
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HOROWITZ, AMIR. "Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (2020): 436–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000477.
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AbstractIn an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.
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Lancaster-Thomas, Asha. "Can Heaven Justify Horrendous Moral Evils? A Postmortem Autopsy." Religions 14, no. 3 (2023): 296. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14030296.
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James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the existence of horrendous evil and the God of classical monotheism. In response, Jerry L. Walls, among others, has claimed that the doctrine of heaven can explain why God is justified in permitting horrendous evils in the world—an argument known as the afterlife theodicy. In this article, I explore this line of defense against Sterba’s logical problem of evil. I suggest that if the afterlife theodicy is to be effective, it must accept non-speciesist, strong universalism; deny or explicate divinely informed prior consent; reject an elective model of forgiveness; discard postmortem libertarian free will; and explain why God values libertarian free will in earthly life but not in the afterlife.
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Almeida, Michael James. "On Necessary Gratuitous Evils." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, no. 3 (2020): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v12i3.3019.
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The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.