Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Gorgias (Plato)'

Orientador: Trajano Augusto Ricca Vieira
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem
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Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo oferecer uma interpretação sobre o problema da retórica no diálogo Górgias de Platão. O enfoque específico, todavia, não é o problema ético-político ressaltado pela crítica platônica, que certamente é central no pensamento do filósofo, mas a presença de elementos típicos dos gêneros retóricos na própria constituição do diálogo enquanto novo gênero literário. Minha proposta de leitura, portanto, é mostrar como a retórica está presente, de diversas formas, no modo de discurso e de escrita que Platão opta para expor suas idéias filosóficas. Analiso também a interface entre o diálogo e a comédia e a tragédia do ponto de vista da construção dos caracteres das personagens, tendo em vista as referências de Platão a Epicarmo e Eurípides no drama filosófico. Por fim, apresento a tradução do diálogo Górgias como complemento ao trabalho
Abstract: This work intends to offer an interpretation of the problem of rhetoric in the Plato¿s Gorgias. The specific approach, however, is not the ethic and politic problem emphasized by the platonic criticism, which is certainly central in the philosopher¿s thought, but the presence of typical elements of the rhetoric genres in the constitution of the dialogue as a new literary genre. My interpretation¿s purpose, then, is to show how the rhetoric participates in different ways in the mode of discourse and writing that Plato opts to explain his philosophical ideas. I analyze too the interface between dialogue and comedy and tragedy in the point of view of the characters¿ construction, since Plato refers to Epicarmus and Euripides in the philosophical drama. Finally, I present the Gorgias¿ translation as complement of this work
Doutorado
Letras Classicas
Doutor em Linguística

Platão constrói sua argumentação filosófica no Górgias sobre um pano de fundo dramático intenso, em que Sócrates discute, ao longo de três \"atos\", questões que versam sobre a natureza da retórica, da justiça, da felicidade e do prazer. Sócrates discute com três interlocutores que defendem a prática da retórica; ao levá-los, pela vergonha, à refutação de suas posições, o protagonista do diálogo deslegitima a prática, relacionando-a ao prazer, em detrimento do bem, e defendendo a filosofia como a única prática política legítima. Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar o papel dos elementos dramáticos e literários presentes no Górgias. Defendo a tese de que ao considerar a integração entre os procedimentos literários e dramáticos e os argumentos no texto, notada, por exemplo, a partir da centralidade do tema da vergonha, somos capazes de oferecer uma compreensão mais completa sobre a definição da filosofia enquanto boa retórica alternativa.
Plato constructs his philosphical argument in the Gorgias upon an intense three-act sctructured dramatic backgroud, in which Sorates discusses questions regarding the natures of rhetoric, justice, happiness and pleasure. Throughout the dialogue, Socrates debates with three interlocutors that defend rhetoric as a social practice. He refutes their positions through shame, deslegitimizes rhetoric by showing its intrisic relation with pleasure and argues that philosophy is the only legitimate and true political pratice. This work intends to analyze the role of the dramatic and literary elements found in the Gorgias. I argue that the integration between literary and dramatic devices and the arguments in the text leads us to a better comprehension about the definition of philosophy as an alternative good rhetoric and its power of acting through shame, which is displayed in the dramatic confrontation between Socrates and his opponents.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis
Plato’s interlocutors discuss at length about psychology, politics, poetry, cosmology, education, nature, and the gods, in short, about the things that inscribe the transcendent and the grounding poles of human life. It stands to reason that what we wish to glean from Plato’s thinking will show itself more readily if we remain attentive to the self-undermining and the subversive elements of the dialogues. I call the interpretation, which follows the shape- and, hence, meaning-shifting structure of Plato’s writing, “paradigmatic procedure.” By this I do not mean that we ought to find, explain, and then interpretively apply to the whole of Plato’s thought any particular passages from the Republic, the Timaeus, or the Statesman, which mention paradigms. However, I, following Benardete, propose that “Plato must have learned from poets” who produced epos, tragedy, comedy, and myth. This means that Plato borrows these poetic elements and form when he writes the philosophical dialogues. Paradigmatic method of interpretation is conscious of the dramatic form. It situates and analyzes the arguments made both through speeches and through actions as these arise out of the play of literary images. The latter, in their turn, are made up of the tripartite convergence between the dialogical characters, their speeches, and their deeds. Depending on the colorations that the three impart to one another, the images of Plato are comic, tragic, or, which is most often the case, they are tragicomic. The dramatic tone of a given image, once it is detected, reflects back onto the dialogical discussion or account and presents the argument in this newly discovered light. It often happens that the difference between the initial and the paradigmatic reading is so drastic that the straightforward meaning of the studied passage is undone as Plato’s writing begins to show its self-undermining nature. This does not mean that Plato’s philosophizing, also, is undone. On the contrary, when we begin to think together with and through Plato’s subversive writing, instead of retrofitting our lives to some systems that may arise out of it and instead of forcing it to substantiate our views, then we begin to get a sense for the liberating force of Plato’s philosophy. In chapter one, I explain the relationship between paradigms and the tragicomic character of Plato’s writing. Consequently, I offer a reading of select passages from the Timaeus and from the Republic. My discoveries showcase how paradigms inform and how the paradigmatic reading uncovers the tragic dimension of the Timaeus. I show how comedy shines through the, seemingly, most serious passages in the Republic. Plato’s dialogues do not strictly divide into the tragic, comic, epic, mythic, sophistic, or pre-Socratic ones, but rather, most are woven out of all of these orientations. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that within parts or passages, such as those from the Republic, for example, a given form and theme is most pronounced. I turn to the examination of tragedy in the second chapter. There, I first argue that Sophocles’ Oedipus is a tyrant and then I expose the relationship between the psychopathology of tyranny, tragedy, and poetry in books VIII and IX of the Republic. The third chapter carries on the exploration of pathology and offers an examination of tyranny and the soul in the Timaeus. Paradigmatic analysis plays up the theatricality of the Timaeus and identifies several axes around which the dialogical accounts revolve. The three main horizons are made up of nous, necessity, and dream or choric logic. These are fleshed out by the distention given to the dialogical arguments through the enmeshment of φύσις, μῦθος, and πόλις. The fourth kind of emphasis, senselessness, ushers the dialogue’s grotesquely humorous ending and prepares the readers for the considerations of comedy in the fourth chapter of the present work. The comedy of divisions, mythic tall tales, the halving and the fitting cuts, with which Plato’s Statesman is woven through and through, reveal statesmanship’s sinister underbelly. If it were not for the comedic tone, the fourth chapter argues, the monstrousness of tyranny, which is interred in all of the paradigms entertained as models of rule in the Statesman, would have remained unseen. Attunement to the comical passages and references, in the Statesman, is made expedient by an analysis of tyranny in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. The fifth and final chapter sees to the convergence of the speciously opposite forms and themes. Tragedy is brought together with comedy, poetry with philosophy, and theater with ordinary life under the auspices of the twice-born god, Dionysus. The Dionysian, duplicitously evasive, nature is shown to be contemporaneous with the double-edged nature of shame. The contemplation of shame in Sophocles’ Oedipus and Aristophanes’ Clouds, aids the investigation of the humanity preserving and the corrupting role of shame in Plato’s Gorgias. The findings of the final chapter serve to locate the pressure points of pathology and tyranny as these recede into the tragicomic dramas of our lives
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell
No rational decision can be made concerning how to live without confronting the problem of justice—both what it is and whether it is good to be just. In this essay I examine Plato’s articulation of these problems in the Gorgias and the Republic. Through detailed analyses of Socrates’ exchanges with several interlocutors, I establish, first, that despite some real and apparent differences, all the interlocutors share the same fundamental conception of justice, which could be called justice as fairness or reciprocal equality (to ison). The core of justice lies in refraining from pleonexia (seeking to benefit oneself at the expense of another). Second, according to this view, the practice of justice is not intrinsically profitable; it is valuable only as a means to the acquisition or enjoyment of other, material goods. This conception thus implies that committing successful injustice is often more profitable than being just. Third, the critics of justice recognize and openly acknowledge this fact; hence, their position is more coherent than common opinion. Fourth, the core of the Socratic defense of justice lies in the claims that the practice of pleonexia is incompatible with the possession of a well-ordered soul and that the possession of a well-ordered soul is necessary for happiness. Thus, despite appearances to the contrary, Socrates does not argue that justice, as it is commonly conceived, is intrinsically profitable. He is able to refute the critics of justice because the latter lack a coherent understanding of the human good. Finally, Socrates’ defense of justice nonetheless remains incomplete because he deliberately refrains from giving a sufficient account of the nature of the soul and its good
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2008
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2009.
Title from file title page. Tim O'Keefe, committee chair ; Andrew I. Cohen, Jessica Berry, committee members. Electronic text (53 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 24, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 53).

On considère souvent que le projet de fondation d’une rhétorique philosophique chez Platon ne s’effectue que dans les dialogues du Phèdre et des Lois. Pourtant, la puissance du Gorgias tient dans le fait qu’il articule à la fois l’appréhension du nouveau phénomène social, politique, éducatif que représente la rhétorique, sa critique et sa refondation par le philosophe idéal, Socrate, tout en apportant un nouvel éclairage à l’histoire d’Athènes. Le présent travail propose d’en faire l’étude en accordant une attention particulière au mouvement du dialogue et aux différents visages de la rhétorique qu’incarnent les personnages. On discernera trois étapes fondamentales dans le dialogue : la réception, la réfutation et la refondation dialectique de la rhétorique qui sont finalement reproduites à une échelle plus réduite et métaphorique dans le mythe eschatologique qui conclut l’œuvre
We often consider that the Platonic project of founding a philosophical rhetoric is carried out only in the Phaedrus and the Laws. However, the force of the Gorgias lies at once in its presentation of the new social, political, and pedagogical phenomenon of rhetoric, the dialogue’s critique and refoundation of this new phenomenon by the ideal philosopher, Socrates, as well as the light it sheds on the history of Athens. The following study proposes to examine these features of the Gorgias by affording a particular attention to the movement of the dialogue and to the different faces of rhetoric embodied by its characters. We will set out three fundamental steps in the dialogue: the reception, refutation, and dialectical refoundation of rhetoric, which are finally reproduced metaphorically, though on a smaller scale, in the eschatological myth that concludes the work

Both Thomas Love Peacock and Plato use dialogue for their works while they differ in what they envisage and what they achieve, i.e. same form, different objectives. Thus, having Peacock and Plato writing dialogues in different frames - one literary and one philosophical - raises an important question: can literary writers be more provocative of thought in the audience than writers of philosophical dialogues? If so, what then are the features of dialogical writing, whether literary or philosophical, or common features that pertain to both these fields, that cause it to be respectful or nurturing to the minds that encounter it? This question will underlie the whole paper. It actually comes from the fact that in dialogue, whether deployed in philosophical or literary texts, we do not see the author's opinion clearly expressed. In dialogue, and this is often true for Plato, the author's dogma loses itself under the various dogmas that the characters have; the author hides himself behind his personages. The readers do not encounter only one mind that has claims of revealing a truth - the philosophical approach - or that lays out a story - the literary one. In dialogue, the reader finds an ongoing discussion and becomes part of it. Through the analysis of two of Plato's dialogues, the Crito and the Gorgias, and Peacock's satirical novel, Nightmare Abbey, I intend to show that, used in philosophy or literature, dialogue seems to be the perfect tool to communicate the idea that once expressed becomes its negative: the only thing that we know is that we do not know anything.
Master of Arts

This thesis examines the role appearances play, with notable continuity, in the psychology and ethics of Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. Common to these dialogues is the claim that evaluative appearances are almost invariably false: what appears to be good or bad is typically not in fact so and what is good or bad typically does not appear so. I argue that this disparity between apparent and real value forms the basis of Plato's diagnoses of a wide range of practical errors: psychological phenomena like akrasia, mistaken conceptions of the good like hedonism, and the influence of cultural sources of corruption like oratory, sophistry, and poetry. It also, relatedly, forms the basis of his account of lower passions like appetite, anger, or fear. Such passions are especially prone to lead us astray because their objects -- appetitive pleasures like food, drink, or sex, for example -- present especially deceptive appearances. One of the principal aims of this thesis is to show that this presents a significant point of agreement between the psychologies of the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. In all three dialogues, I argue, motivational errors result from a specific kind of cognitive error: the uncritical acceptance of appearances. Plato's early and middle psychologies differ in their account of the subject of this error -- in the Protagoras and Gorgias, the whole person; in the Republic, the appetitive or spirited part of a person's soul -- but not in their basic theory of how our passions arise or, crucially, why they are liable to motivate us towards harmful ends.

Afin de comprendre le processus d’acquisition de connaissance chez Platon, nous proposons une étude de la dialectique selon un spectre large, en se focalisant principalement sur la nature dramatique des textes du corpus. À partir d’une analyse des fondement éléates de la méthode antilogique, nous tenterons par le biais de la dialogique (ou sémantique des jeux) de comprendre le caractère agonistique de la méthode proposée par Platon dans ses dialogues. Nous tâcherons par la suite de faire le lien entre les conclusions intermédiaires et la structure générale de la métaphysique platonicienne afin de ne pas perdre la cohérence du système pris dans sa globalité. Nous évaluerons la qualité de l’outil interprétatif obtenu à travers une lecture du Gorgias.
Abstract : In order to understand Plato’s knowledge acquisition process, we suggest a wide-range study of the dialectic, mainly focusing on the theatrical nature of his texts. From an analysis of the eleatic foundations of the antilogical method, we will try to understand the agonistic feature of the method given by Plato in his dialogs by using the dialogical logic (or game semantic). Then, we will bind our mid-conclusions and the general structure of Plato’s metaphysic; in order not to loose the coherence of the whole system. We will evaluate the quality of our interpretative tool through a reading of the Gorgias.

A obra platônica pode ser dividida em três fases distintas que agrupam diálogos com características comuns. No entanto, alguns diálogos são de difícil colocação, pois possuem características comuns a mais de uma fase. O Górgias é um desses diálogos, por um lado, possui argumentos característicos dos primeiros diálogos, e, por outro, demonstra uma maturidade temática e uma postura dogmática de Sócrates que mais se aproxima da República, portanto, da segunda fase. Entender quais são as possibilidades de agrupamento dos diálogos de Platão é fundamental para se propor o deslocamento do Górgias dos diálogos socráticos para a segunda fase, ou seja, aproxima-lo do mesmo ambiente conceitual da República, e, a partir disto, começar a enxergar no texto elementos filosóficos relevantes ao desenvolvimento da filosofia moral e política de Platão.
The platonic work can be divided into three distinct phases which form groups of dialogues with common characteristics. Nevertheless, some dialogues are hard to be placed because have characteristics which are commons to more tan one phase. The Górgias is one of these dialogues, from one side, has arguments characteristically from the first dialogues and, from the other, demonstrate thematic maturity and a dogmatic posture from Sócrates which approximates more to the Republic, therefore, the second phase. To understand which are the possibilities of grouping the Plato dialogues is fundamental to propose shifting Górgias from the socratic dialogues to the second phase, therefore approaching it to the same environmental concept of Republic, and, from this point, start seeing in the text philosophical elements relevant to the development of the moral and political philosophy of Plato.

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This paper intends to show the sophist Gorgias of Leontini s thought (ca. 480-380 B.C.); it emphasizes the Rhetoric and Plato s presentation of this sophist in his dialogue Gorgias. To achieve this purpose. We will see the historical contextualization of Greece in V and IV centuries B.C. and give special attention to the importance of lógos for póleis organization. After, the contrast between orality and literacy is studied, pointing the birth of Rhetoric and the effort of sophists in spreading it. The Gorgias thought will be presented based on the investigation of his main works: On the Nonbeing or On Nature, the Apology of Palamedes, the Encomium on Helen. In the first work, Gorgias shows the weakness of lógos to talk about the Being. In the second, he shows the ambiguity of lógos and in the third the power of speech concatenated and with sense upon listener souls. The Plato s thought about the Sophist of Leontini will be presented based on the dialogue Gorgias. In this play Plato shows Gorgias as a skilful master on Rhetoric and make evident the gape of this activity as practiced in Athens, for it doesn t have knowledge about the themes which talk in the court and assembly: the just and unjust. This works also analyzes the reason why Rhetoric is not a téchne for Plato and its character of mimicry
Objetiva-se estudar o pensamento do sofista Górgias de Leontinos (ca. 480-380 a.C.), dando destaque à Retórica e a apresentação feita por Platão deste sofista em seu diálogo intitulado Górgias. Para tanto, se fará a contextualização histórica da Grécia nos séculos V e IV, destacando a importância do lógos na organização das póleis. Em seguida, se tratará da passagem do surgimento e divulgação da escrita em contraste com a oralidade e, nesse contexto, o surgimento da Retórica, destacando os sofistas por sua preocupação em divulgar a arte oratória. O pensamento de Górgias é apresentado a partir da investigação de suas principais obras: O Tratado do Não Ser, A Defesa de Palamedes e O Elogio de Helena. Em cada uma dessas obras se destacará o modo como Górgias percebeu o lógos. Na primeira, destacou os limites do discurso para tratar do Ser, no segundo, a ambigüidade do lógos e no terceiro, a força do discurso encadeado e com sentido sobre a alma dos ouvintes. O pensamento de Platão a respeito do Sofista de Leontinos é apresentado a partir do diálogo Górgias. Nesse diálogo, Platão toma Górgias como mestre hábil de Retórica e mostra a lacuna da arte oratória praticada em Atenas, pois não tem conhecimento do justo e do injusto, temas a que se dedicam nos tribunais. Analisa-se também porque a Retórica não pode ser considerada téchne e seu caráter imitativo

"Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada, Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.) et Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France"
"Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada, Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.) et Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France"
Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2019-2020
Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2019-2020
Si Platon a choisi d’écrire des dialogues, c’est parce qu’ils illustrent le mouvement de la pensée et de la connaissance dans l’âme. Questionner et répondre permettent de réaliser sa propre ignorance. Toutefois, l’accès au savoir par le dialogue est plus difficile dès que l’on s’adresse à des âmes récalcitrantes ou à une foule, car un tel procédé prend du temps et nécessite la bonne volonté des participants. C’est le constat de cette difficulté à transmettre la vérité en politique que pose le Gorgias et auquel Platon cherche à remédier. Si le dialogue est impossible avec la foule, alors que la politique repose sur le soin des âmes de la cité, comment dès lors éduquer la masse ? Il faudrait développer un usage légitime de la rhétorique pour transmettre la vérité en politique. On considère souvent que ce projet de fondation ne s’effectue que dans les dialogues du Phèdre et des Lois. Pourtant, le Gorgias, qui se déroule pendant la guerre du Péloponnèse, ne se réduit pas à une critique de l’enseignement du célèbre rhéteur, Gorgias de Léontinoi. Au contraire, la remise en question épistémologique et morale de son « art oratoire » est la condition de possibilité de l’émergence d’une belle dêmêgoria (503a7). Le présent travail propose d’en faire l’étude en accordant une attention particulière au mouvement du dialogue et aux différents visages de la rhétorique qu’incarnent les personnages. On discernera trois étapes fondamentales dans le dialogue : la réception, la réfutation et la refondation dialectique de la rhétorique qui sont finalement reproduites à une échelle plus réduite et métaphorique dans le mythe eschatologique qui conclut l’oeuvre. Le premier moment permet de dégager les raisons de l’émergence de l’art oratoire à Athènes par une analyse du contexte polémique dans lequel le Gorgias a été écrit en tenant compte des multiples références qui ont été transposées par Platon (l’Éloge d’Hélène de Gorgias, les Cavaliers d’Aristophane, les Traités hippocratiques, le Contre les Sophistes d’Isocrate, La guerre du Péloponnèse de Thucydide et l’Antiope d’Euripide). La deuxième étape permet de saisir le double dévoilement de la rhétorique et du dialogue. D’un côté, Gorgias se révèle incapable de définir sa propre pratique et apparaît inconscient des conséquences dramatiques qu’elle engendre sur ses disciples. De l’autre, Socrate instaure un espace discursif dans lequel il peut réduire la rhétorique à une empirie en dégonflant ses prétentions épistémologiques (celle d’être un art) et politiques (celle d’être une puissance qui vise le plus grand des biens). Cette mise en parallèle de deux manières de parler permet d’opposer la maîtrise d’un savoir dialogique par Socrate à l’incompétence de Gorgias. Cette réfutation appelle un renversement complet de la conception de la justice, de la politique, et de l’existence. Affrontant ensuite Pôlos et Calliclès, Socrate analyse à la fois les conséquences néfastes de la rhétorique sur leurs âmes et sur la Cité, mettant en parallèle leur dégénérescence morale avec celle d’Athènes. Ce faisant, il s’attaque à deux confusions majeures qui sous-tendaient la pratique gorgianique du discours : penser que faire ce que l’on veut est un pouvoir qui rend libre et prendre le plaisir pour le bien. Le maître de Platon devient ainsi historien et juge de la politique corruptrice menée par les figures illustres d’Athènes que sont Thémistocle, Miltiade, Cimon et Périclès, livrant au passage une interprétation opposée à celle de Thucydide sur l’impérialisme athénien. Ce travail de sape de l’édifice rhétorique mène finalement à sa refondation. À partir de ces réfutations, Socrate théorise une nouvelle rhétorique dont il fait par ailleurs usage sur la personne de Calliclès. Ce nouvel emploi philosophique émerge à partir d’un ordre naturel. En effet, alors que Calliclès rejetait l’égalité imposée par la démocratie et appuyait sa thèse de l’homme fort sur une certaine vision de la nature, Socrate fondera précisément son renversement politique et judiciaire sur une conception naturelle et ordonnée, en considérant le cosmos. De l’ordre et de l’harmonie mathématique, il dégagera une égalité géométrique, proportionnelle, qui permettra de redonner sa juste place à la rhétorique. Ce renversement sera ultimement réalisé métaphoriquement dans le mythe eschatologique clôturant le dialogue.
Si Platon a choisi d’écrire des dialogues, c’est parce qu’ils illustrent le mouvement de la pensée et de la connaissance dans l’âme. Questionner et répondre permettent de réaliser sa propre ignorance. Toutefois, l’accès au savoir par le dialogue est plus difficile dès que l’on s’adresse à des âmes récalcitrantes ou à une foule, car un tel procédé prend du temps et nécessite la bonne volonté des participants. C’est le constat de cette difficulté à transmettre la vérité en politique que pose le Gorgias et auquel Platon cherche à remédier. Si le dialogue est impossible avec la foule, alors que la politique repose sur le soin des âmes de la cité, comment dès lors éduquer la masse ? Il faudrait développer un usage légitime de la rhétorique pour transmettre la vérité en politique. On considère souvent que ce projet de fondation ne s’effectue que dans les dialogues du Phèdre et des Lois. Pourtant, le Gorgias, qui se déroule pendant la guerre du Péloponnèse, ne se réduit pas à une critique de l’enseignement du célèbre rhéteur, Gorgias de Léontinoi. Au contraire, la remise en question épistémologique et morale de son « art oratoire » est la condition de possibilité de l’émergence d’une belle dêmêgoria (503a7). Le présent travail propose d’en faire l’étude en accordant une attention particulière au mouvement du dialogue et aux différents visages de la rhétorique qu’incarnent les personnages. On discernera trois étapes fondamentales dans le dialogue : la réception, la réfutation et la refondation dialectique de la rhétorique qui sont finalement reproduites à une échelle plus réduite et métaphorique dans le mythe eschatologique qui conclut l’oeuvre. Le premier moment permet de dégager les raisons de l’émergence de l’art oratoire à Athènes par une analyse du contexte polémique dans lequel le Gorgias a été écrit en tenant compte des multiples références qui ont été transposées par Platon (l’Éloge d’Hélène de Gorgias, les Cavaliers d’Aristophane, les Traités hippocratiques, le Contre les Sophistes d’Isocrate, La guerre du Péloponnèse de Thucydide et l’Antiope d’Euripide). La deuxième étape permet de saisir le double dévoilement de la rhétorique et du dialogue. D’un côté, Gorgias se révèle incapable de définir sa propre pratique et apparaît inconscient des conséquences dramatiques qu’elle engendre sur ses disciples. De l’autre, Socrate instaure un espace discursif dans lequel il peut réduire la rhétorique à une empirie en dégonflant ses prétentions épistémologiques (celle d’être un art) et politiques (celle d’être une puissance qui vise le plus grand des biens). Cette mise en parallèle de deux manières de parler permet d’opposer la maîtrise d’un savoir dialogique par Socrate à l’incompétence de Gorgias. Cette réfutation appelle un renversement complet de la conception de la justice, de la politique, et de l’existence. Affrontant ensuite Pôlos et Calliclès, Socrate analyse à la fois les conséquences néfastes de la rhétorique sur leurs âmes et sur la Cité, mettant en parallèle leur dégénérescence morale avec celle d’Athènes. Ce faisant, il s’attaque à deux confusions majeures qui sous-tendaient la pratique gorgianique du discours : penser que faire ce que l’on veut est un pouvoir qui rend libre et prendre le plaisir pour le bien. Le maître de Platon devient ainsi historien et juge de la politique corruptrice menée par les figures illustres d’Athènes que sont Thémistocle, Miltiade, Cimon et Périclès, livrant au passage une interprétation opposée à celle de Thucydide sur l’impérialisme athénien. Ce travail de sape de l’édifice rhétorique mène finalement à sa refondation. À partir de ces réfutations, Socrate théorise une nouvelle rhétorique dont il fait par ailleurs usage sur la personne de Calliclès. Ce nouvel emploi philosophique émerge à partir d’un ordre naturel. En effet, alors que Calliclès rejetait l’égalité imposée par la démocratie et appuyait sa thèse de l’homme fort sur une certaine vision de la nature, Socrate fondera précisément son renversement politique et judiciaire sur une conception naturelle et ordonnée, en considérant le cosmos. De l’ordre et de l’harmonie mathématique, il dégagera une égalité géométrique, proportionnelle, qui permettra de redonner sa juste place à la rhétorique. Ce renversement sera ultimement réalisé métaphoriquement dans le mythe eschatologique clôturant le dialogue.
If Plato chose to write dialogues, it is because they illustrate the movement of thought and knowledge in the soul. The form of question and answer allows the recollection, beginning with the recollection of one’s own ignorance. The access to knowledge through the practice of dialogue, however, is made more difficult once we take on recalcitrant souls or a crowd as interlocuters, for such a practice takes time and demands the goodwill of all concerned. It is this difficulty of transmitting truth in politics that the Gorgias lays bear and that Plato attempts to remedy. If dialogue is impossible with the crowd, even though politics rests on the care of citizens’ souls, how then to educate the masses? One must develop a legitimate way of using rhetoric to transmit truth in politics. We often consider that this foundational project is carried out only in the Phaedrus and the Laws. Nevertheless, the Gorgias, which unfolds during the Peloponnesian War, cannot be reduced to a critique of the teachings of the celebrated rhetor, Gorgias of Leontini. On the contrary, by calling his “oratorical art” into question, both morally and epistemologically, one establishes the conditions for the emergence of a good dêmêgoria (503a7). This study proposes to examine Plato’s questioning of Gorgias’ art by affording particular attention to the movement of the dialogue and to the different faces of rhetoric embodied by its characters. We will set out three fundamental steps in the dialogue: the reception, refutation, and dialectical refoundation of rhetoric, which are finally reproduced metaphorically, though on a smaller scale, in the eschatological myth that concludes the work. The first moment allows us to identify the reasons for the emergence of the art of rhetoric in Athens through an analysis of the polemical context in which the Gorgias was written, taking into account the many literary references woven into the dialogue by Plato (e.g. to Gorgias’ In Praise of Helen, Aristophanes’ Knights, the Hippocratic Treatises, Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, The Peloponnesian War of Thucydides, and Euripides’ Antiope). The second step allows us to grasp the double unveiling of rhetoric and dialogue. On the one hand, Gorgias is revealed to be incapable of defining his own practice and appears unconscious of its dramatic effects on his disciples. On the other hand, Socrates creates a discursive space in which he can reduce rhetoric to set of empirical data by deflating its claims, both epistemological (i.e. that of being an art) and political (i.e. that of being a power that aims at the highest of goods). This paralleling of two ways of speaking allows us to contrast Socrates’ mastery of dialogical knowledge with Gorgias’ incompetence. This refutation calls for a complete reversal of our conception of justice, politics, and of existence itself. In his subsequent confrontations with Pôlos and Callicles, Socrates analyses both the harmful consequences of rhetoric on their souls and on the City, comparing their moral degeneracy with that of Athens. In doing so, he tackles two major confusions that underpinned the Gorgianic practice of oratory, namely, that freedom is to be found in doing what we want and that the good is to be found in pleasure. Plato’s master thus becomes both historian and judge of the corrupting policies pursued by the great figures of Athenian politics, including Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon, and Pericles, offering an interpretation of Athenian imperialism opposite to that of Thucydides. This work of undermining the rhetorical edifice ultimately leads to its re-foundation. From these refutations, Socrates theorises a new rhetoric, one that he puts into practice in his exchange with Callicles. This new philosophical use of rhetoric emerges from the natural order of things. Indeed, while Callicles rejects the equality imposed by democracy and bases his thesis of the strong man on a certain vision of nature, Socrates founds his own reimagining of politics and justice on a natural and ordered conception of the cosmos. From order and mathematical harmony, he will produce a geometric and proportional equality that will finally allow rhetoric to be restored to its rightful place. This last twist will be realized metaphorically in the eschatological myth that closes the dialogue.
If Plato chose to write dialogues, it is because they illustrate the movement of thought and knowledge in the soul. The form of question and answer allows the recollection, beginning with the recollection of one’s own ignorance. The access to knowledge through the practice of dialogue, however, is made more difficult once we take on recalcitrant souls or a crowd as interlocuters, for such a practice takes time and demands the goodwill of all concerned. It is this difficulty of transmitting truth in politics that the Gorgias lays bear and that Plato attempts to remedy. If dialogue is impossible with the crowd, even though politics rests on the care of citizens’ souls, how then to educate the masses? One must develop a legitimate way of using rhetoric to transmit truth in politics. We often consider that this foundational project is carried out only in the Phaedrus and the Laws. Nevertheless, the Gorgias, which unfolds during the Peloponnesian War, cannot be reduced to a critique of the teachings of the celebrated rhetor, Gorgias of Leontini. On the contrary, by calling his “oratorical art” into question, both morally and epistemologically, one establishes the conditions for the emergence of a good dêmêgoria (503a7). This study proposes to examine Plato’s questioning of Gorgias’ art by affording particular attention to the movement of the dialogue and to the different faces of rhetoric embodied by its characters. We will set out three fundamental steps in the dialogue: the reception, refutation, and dialectical refoundation of rhetoric, which are finally reproduced metaphorically, though on a smaller scale, in the eschatological myth that concludes the work. The first moment allows us to identify the reasons for the emergence of the art of rhetoric in Athens through an analysis of the polemical context in which the Gorgias was written, taking into account the many literary references woven into the dialogue by Plato (e.g. to Gorgias’ In Praise of Helen, Aristophanes’ Knights, the Hippocratic Treatises, Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, The Peloponnesian War of Thucydides, and Euripides’ Antiope). The second step allows us to grasp the double unveiling of rhetoric and dialogue. On the one hand, Gorgias is revealed to be incapable of defining his own practice and appears unconscious of its dramatic effects on his disciples. On the other hand, Socrates creates a discursive space in which he can reduce rhetoric to set of empirical data by deflating its claims, both epistemological (i.e. that of being an art) and political (i.e. that of being a power that aims at the highest of goods). This paralleling of two ways of speaking allows us to contrast Socrates’ mastery of dialogical knowledge with Gorgias’ incompetence. This refutation calls for a complete reversal of our conception of justice, politics, and of existence itself. In his subsequent confrontations with Pôlos and Callicles, Socrates analyses both the harmful consequences of rhetoric on their souls and on the City, comparing their moral degeneracy with that of Athens. In doing so, he tackles two major confusions that underpinned the Gorgianic practice of oratory, namely, that freedom is to be found in doing what we want and that the good is to be found in pleasure. Plato’s master thus becomes both historian and judge of the corrupting policies pursued by the great figures of Athenian politics, including Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon, and Pericles, offering an interpretation of Athenian imperialism opposite to that of Thucydides. This work of undermining the rhetorical edifice ultimately leads to its re-foundation. From these refutations, Socrates theorises a new rhetoric, one that he puts into practice in his exchange with Callicles. This new philosophical use of rhetoric emerges from the natural order of things. Indeed, while Callicles rejects the equality imposed by democracy and bases his thesis of the strong man on a certain vision of nature, Socrates founds his own reimagining of politics and justice on a natural and ordered conception of the cosmos. From order and mathematical harmony, he will produce a geometric and proportional equality that will finally allow rhetoric to be restored to its rightful place. This last twist will be realized metaphorically in the eschatological myth that closes the dialogue.

The most common question that scholars ask regarding the concept of techne in the Plato dialogues is if it is possible to understand arete, morale or the good, as a techne, that is, if arete kan be viewed as a knowledge, an ability or a skill. Is arete something that can be taught? In this essay I will explore this question from a reversed viewpoint, and try the claim that techne always in itself is an excercise of arete, inasmuch as the goal of a techne has to be the good, or ”what is best”, in order for it to be a techne for Plato at all.

Ce mémoire veut rendre compte de la relation qu’entretient le Socrate historique avec la cité athénienne en tentant de dégager des témoignages de Platon, de Xénophon et d’Aristophane une pensée politique propre au personnage historique. Notre hypothèse consiste à affirmer que la philosophie socratique s’oppose aux valeurs du régime démocratique athénien dans la mesure où elle recherche l’excellence de l’âme. Constatant que les conditions nécessaires pour obtenir le meilleur jugement politique se font absentes de l’espace public démocratique, Socrate prône un désengagement des citoyens par rapport aux affaires publiques de leur cité. Nous défendons donc l’idée selon laquelle la pensée politique du Socrate de l’histoire peut se comprendre comme un « désengagement » politique puisque Socrate ne détient pas la science politique (vertu-science) et s’oppose à la conception de l’intérêt personnel que promeut sa cité.

Cette étude se propose de déterminer la nature et les enjeux véritables de la controverse opposant, sur la question de l'être, Platon et Aristote, aux principaux représentants de la sophistique : Protagoras d'Abdère et Gorgias de Léontium. Quelles sont les conditions de possibilité d'un logos sur l'être i. E. De l'ontologie ? Face à une critique sophistique se réclamant de la lettre du Poème (où se dévoile, pour la première fois, le projet d'une ontologie), prenant prétexte des insuffisances de ce dernier pour récuser toute possibilité d'une ontologie, Platon et Aristote n'ont d'autre choix que d'engager le combat contre le sophiste. En réponse à une phénoménologie protagoréenne pour laquelle il n'y a de science que du phénomène et à une logologie gorgienne qui veut que le seul objet du logos ce soit ce logos lui-même, l'Athénien et le Stagirite entendent bien réhabiliter le projet parménidien i. E. Garantir, contre la fidélité perverse du sophiste, la possibilité même de l'ontologie.

A new type of cavitation (damage) has been recently discovered from the Three Gorges turbines, that suggests a complicated inception mechanism involving the boundary-layer K-mode instability triggering cavitation nucleation. As one of the elements, the level of free-stream turbulence increased by wrongly designed guide-plate on the Three Gorges turbines could be a primary concern in the sense of receptivity and the transient growth of K-mode instability. The investigation focuses on the flow analysis of the on-coming flow influenced by the guide plate in terms of flow structure(s) and turbulence level variation. Firstly, CFD has been performed to obtain the main flow features in the whole turbine passage with more detailed analysis on the free-stream pressure-fluctuations near the lower surface of the guide vanes. The unsteady flow characteristics, especially the pressure fluctuations of low-frequency spectrum have been studied that significantly alternate the turbulence intensities and spectrum in the free-stream flow. The results verify that the addition of the guide-plate increases the free-stream turbulence, particularly contributing to the occurrence of a strongest component of extremely low-frequency pressure-fluctuation (i.e. the 0.336 Hz for the case 2 with opening of 16°). These low-frequency fluctuations readily transmit throughout the entire flow passage of the turbine. An extremely large-scale and united unsteady vortex structure that occupies the whole flow passage of a Francis turbine, has been identified for the first time. That is, a vortex-ring structure triggered by the guide-plate, through the connection of the vortices in the stay-vane and guide-vane channels plus those in the runner channels, further interacts with the helical vortex-rope in the draft tube at part-load conditions (e.g. 16° and 30°), forming such an united giant vortex structure. This extremely large-scale vortex structure is thus responsible for the components of extremely low-frequencies (i.e., 0.336 Hz for 16°, 0.15 Hz for 30°) which have been identified from two part-load conditions. These convincing results have proved how this wrongly designed guide-plate increases the free-stream turbulence by inducing extra unsteadiness with gust-like low-frequency and explained that the flow upstream the cone of draft-tube could affect the cone flow significantly, especially under part-load operation conditions.

L'analyse de la conception de la magie en Grèce ancienne dans une perspective d'histoire culturelle amène à considérer la notion de mageía comme un produit culturel grec construit dans le cadre d'une conjoncture historique particulière (entre la fin du Ve et le début du IVe siècle av. N. è. ). La première partie de cette thèse explore en trois chapitres la " niche culturelle ", le réseau de termes et de notions grecques qui ont permis la réception des mágoi dans les cités et l'utilisation de mots dérivés. Les verbes thélgein, kēleîn, pedân ou pharmakeúein, ont guidé l'enquête dont la source principale est constituée par l'épopée homérique. Dans la deuxième partie sont analysés les premiers usages du terme mágos et de ses dérivés, dans les Enquêtes d'Hérodote (ch. IV), dans le traité hippocratique Sur la maladie sacrée et des pièces de théâtre (ch. V), dans le corpus platonicien et l'Eloge d'Hélène de Gorgias (ch. VI), pour comprendre comment, pourquoi et de quoi ils deviennent signifiants
The analysis of the conception of magic in ancient Greece from the perspective of cultural history suggests that the notion of mageía should be considered as a Greek cultural product that was built within the scope of a particular historical conjuncture (between the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth century BC). The first part of this thesis explores in three chapters the “cultural niche”, the net of Greek terms and notions that have made it possible to welcome mágoi and to use the words derived from this term. The verbs thélgein, kēleîn, pedân and pharmakeúein, have guided this inquiry whose main source is Homeric epic. In the second part are analysed the first uses of mágos and the terms derived from it, in Herodotus' Inquires (ch. IV), in the Hippocratic treatise On the sacred disease and some plays of theatre (ch. V), in the corpus platonicum and in Gorgias' In the Praise of Helen (ch. VI), to understand how, why and for what purpose they become Greek signifiers

In both the Meno and the Protagoras, Plato investigates the unity, acquisition and nature of virtue (ἀρετή). Although these dialogues appear to reach opposing conclusions—the Protagoras that virtue is knowledge and the Meno that virtue is divinely dispensed true opinion—in fact they both articulate the same moral principle. Both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good. I investigate these two dialogues independently and on their own respective terms, dedicating Chapter 2 to the Protagoras and Chapter 3 to the Meno. Although both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good, neither offers an account of the good. This is because each dialogue is but a single part of a larger argument which culminates in the Republic, wherein we find a more complete explanation of knowledge of the good in the description of the philosopher-king.

Dialogues by Plato are utterly unique works, combining the sophistication of speculative thought with true art of rhetoric. Thus it should come as no surprise that Dialogues have been a subject of numerous dissertations by various researchers. Obviously, theses on Dialogues were mainly aimed at examining the philosophical thought of Plato and recognising its influence on later works by his spiritual successors as well as his opponents. Attractive to a potential audience, the liveliness and authenticity of the disputes led by colourful debaters are engendered not only by the curious questions touched upon in Plato's works, but also by a reason which proves quite unusual for philosophical texts. Namely, the eristic aspect of arguments presented by disputants – the aspect which has become the very basis of my doctoral thesis. The actual goal of conducting an analysis of Plato's Dialogues, i.e. Protagoras, Gorgias and Theaetetus, is to find in them something which could elude the standard analysis of a philosophical publication. The submitted dissertation consists of an introduction, four chapters, a conclusion, which also serves as a summary, and a list of references.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.